Taylor v. City of Saginaw

District Court, E.D. Michigan·Decided February 8, 2022·No. 1:17-cv-11067·Unknown

Opinion

1UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN NORTHERN DIVISION

ALISON PATRICIA TAYLOR,

Plaintiff, Case No. 1:17-cv-11067

v. Honorable Thomas L. Ludington United States District Judge CITY OF SAGINAW and TABITHA HOSKINS,

Defendants. _________________________________________/ OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO DIRECT NOTICE OF CLASS CERTIFICATION

This matter is before this Court upon Plaintiff’s Motion to Direct Class Notice, ECF No. 107. For the reasons stated hereafter, Plaintiff’s Motion will be granted. I. This is a putative class action challenging an age-old practice in parking enforcement: tire- chalking. On behalf of herself and a class of similarly situated motorists, Plaintiff Allison Patricia Taylor alleges that the City of Saginaw (the “City”) violated the Fourth Amendment by chalking the tires of vehicles to record how long they had been parked. See ECF No. 9 at PageID.74. In addition to naming the City as a Defendant, Plaintiff also names the City’s “most prolific [parking- ticket] issuer,” Tabitha Hoskins, who allegedly ticketed Plaintiff 14 times. Id. at PageID.72. In January 2022, this Court granted Plaintiff’s motion for class certification, certifying two classes under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b): (1) a primary, non-damages class and (2) a damages subclass. ECF No. 105. The primary class is defined as: All persons (excluding the presiding judicial officer, his staff, the case counsel and their staff) who had and/or will have a vehicle tire chalked by a City of Saginaw parking enforcement officer, without a warrant, from April 5, 2014 to present. Id. at PageID.2234. The subclass is defined as: All persons within the [primary] class who paid a parking ticket from April 5, 2014 to present as a result of the warrantless chalking of vehicle tire(s).

Id. at PageID.2235. The primary class was certified under (b)(2), while the subclass was certified under (b)(3). Id. at PageID.2248. Three days after her motion to certify was granted, Plaintiff filed a motion to direct class notice, proposing three forms of notice: (1) a postcard, (2) a newspaper publication, and (3) a broadcast on the City’s media platform, which is streamed on local television and YouTube. ECF No. 107at PageID.2256–58. Each form of notice would direct the reader to a website, www.SaginawChalk.com, which hosts a long-form notice and other papers related to this case. Id. As for timing, Plaintiff proposes that notices be sent on March 15, 2022, and that the opt-out period end on April 15, 2022. Id. at PageID.2259. Defendants do not oppose Plaintiff’s timeframe or the use of postcards and a newspaper publication; they only oppose Plaintiff’s request to use the City’s media platform. ECF No. 108 at PageID.2268–69. Specifically, they claim that a television and internet broadcast is unnecessary and might open Defendants to “claims from Plaintiff that the broadcast [was] in some manner insufficient or misleading.” Id. II. After class certification is granted, the next step in the class action process is to notify class members of the case. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2). The type of notice required depends on the type

of class that was certified. “For any class certified under Rule 23(b)(1) or (b)(2), the court may direct appropriate notice to the class.” FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(A) (emphasis added). Ordinarily, courts need not provide notice to a (b)(2) class given the “homogenous” interests of the class members. See Coleman v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 296 F.3d 443, 447 (6th Cir. 2002) (noting that a court need not provide “individual members of [a (b)(2)] class with notice and the opportunity to ‘opt out’ of the class action” because “[Rule 23(b)(2)] [is] designed to permit only classes with homogenous interests”); Pelt v. Utah, 539 F.3d 1271, 1289 (10th Cir. 2008) (“Due process does not require notice for absent class members in all actions under Rule 23(b)(2), as long as the class

members were adequately represented.”). In contrast, “[f]or any class certified under Rule 23(b)(3) . . . [,] the court must direct to class members the best notice that is practicable under the circumstances, including individual notice to all members who can be identified through reasonable effort.” FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(B) (emphasis added). Such notice is necessary for a (b)(3) class because (b)(3) classes typically involve claims for money damages, which implicate “individual interests that are necessarily heterogenous in nature.” Coleman, 296 F.3d at 448. Courts may provide notice to a (b)(3) class by either “United States mail, electronic means, or other appropriate means,” but any such notice “must state clearly and concisely state in plain, easily understood language”:

(i.) the nature of the action; (ii.) the definition of the class certified; (iii.) the class claims, issues, or defenses; (iv.) that a class member may enter an appearance through an attorney if the member so desires; (v.) that the court will exclude from the class any member who requests exclusion; (vi.) the time and manner for requesting exclusion; and (vii.) the binding effect of a class judgment on members under Rule 23(c)(3).

FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(B). Courts must provide a notice comporting with these requirements “before class members can be legally bound.” Faber v. Ciox Health, LLC, 944 F.3d 593, 603 (6th Cir. 2019) (emphasis added). III. This case involves two classes: (1) a primary, non-damages class, and (2) a damages subclass. Notice for each class is addressed separately below. A. Because the primary class was certified under Rule 23(b)(2), this Court “may direct

appropriate notice to the class.” See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(A) (emphasis added); Coleman, 296 F.3d at 447. Plaintiff contends that notice is unnecessary here, and this Court agrees. As explained in the class certification order, the principal interest of every primary class member is to prevent further tire-chalking. See ECF No. 105 at PageID.2242. Plaintiff and her counsel adequately represent that interest in this case. See id. at PageID.2242–43; Pelt, 539 F.3d at 1289 (“Due process does not require notice for absent class members in all actions under Rule 23(b)(2), as long as the class members were adequately represented.”). Further, the local press has consistently covered this case and the major developments in it. See, e.g., Cole Waterman, Appeals Court Again Reinstates Federal Tire-Chalking Lawsuit that Began in Saginaw, MLIVE (Aug. 26,

2021), https://www.mlive.com/news/saginaw-bay-city/2021/08/appeals-court-again-reinstates- federal-tire-chalking-lawsuit-that-began-in-saginaw.html [https://perma.cc/3WHC-8AJ5]; Ed White, Chalk It Up: Saginaw Parking Dispute Could Cover Thousands, DETROIT NEWS (Jan. 25, 2022), https://www.detroitnews.com/story/news/local/michigan/2022/01/25/chalk-up-michigan- parking-dispute-could-cover-thousands/9213791002/ [https://perma.cc/47NC-Z47P]. In these circumstances, further notice to the primary class is unnecessary. B. Because the subclass was certified under Rule 23(b)(3), this Court “must direct to class members the best notice that is practicable under the circumstances” and consistent with the requirements of subsection (c)(2)(B). FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(B) (emphasis added). As noted previously, the subclass consists of “[a]ll persons within the [primary] class who

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Taylor v. City of Saginaw, (E.D. Mich. 2022).

Taylor v. City of Saginaw (Taylor v. City of Saginaw) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

Related

Pelt v. Utah
539 F.3d 1271 (Tenth Circuit, 2008)
Gooch v. Life Investors Insurance Co. of America
672 F.3d 402 (Sixth Circuit, 2012)
Richard Faber v. Ciox Health, LLC
944 F.3d 593 (Sixth Circuit, 2019)