Taylor v. City of Columbia

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
• Decided: October 19, 2009
• Docket: 09-1486
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 09-1486

CAROLYN YVONNE MURPHY TAYLOR,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

v.

CITY OF COLUMBIA; CHARLES AUSTIN, in his official capacity as City Manager and his individual capacity; DONNIE BALZEIGLER, in his official capacity as Code Enforcement Officer and his individual capacity; LARRY MCCALL, in his official capacity as Chief Code Enforcement Officer and his individual capacity,

Defendants – Appellees,

and

WALTER TODD, Esq., in his official capacity as Assistant City Attorney and his individual capacity; DANA MARIE THYE, Esq., in her official capacity as Assistant City Attorney and her individual capacity; HUNTER P. SWANSON, Esq., in her official capacity as Assistant City Attorney and her individual capacity,

Defendants.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at Columbia. Joseph R. McCrorey, Magistrate Judge. (3:07-cv-00983-JFA-JRM)

Submitted: October 15, 2009 Decided: October 19, 2009

Before SHEDD, DUNCAN, and AGEE, Circuit Judges. Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Carolyn Yvonne Murphy Taylor, Appellant Pro Se. Robert Gordon Cooper, OFFICE OF THE CITY ATTORNEY, Columbia, South Carolina; William Henry Davidson II, Matthew Blaine Rosbrugh, DAVIDSON & LINDEMANN, PA, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellees.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

2 PER CURIAM:

Carolyn Yvonne Murphy Taylor seeks to appeal

magistrate judge’s orders granting in part and denying in part

her motions to compel discovery. This court may exercise

jurisdiction only over final orders, 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2006),

and certain interlocutory and collateral orders, 28 U.S.C.

§ 1292 (2006); Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b); Cohen v. Beneficial Indus.

Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949). The orders Taylor seeks to

appeal are neither final orders nor appealable interlocutory or

collateral orders. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal for lack

of jurisdiction. We dispense with oral argument because the

facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the

materials before the court and argument would not aid the

decisional process.

DISMISSED