Taylor v. Carryl

24 Pa. 259, 1855 Pa. LEXIS 24
CourtSupreme Court of Pennsylvania
DecidedMarch 26, 1855
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 24 Pa. 259 (Taylor v. Carryl) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Taylor v. Carryl, 24 Pa. 259, 1855 Pa. LEXIS 24 (Pa. 1855).

Opinion

The opinion of the Court was delivered, March 26, 1855, by

Lowhie, J.

These facts raise the question, what is the relative value of these two attachments ?

It is admitted that there is no superiority of courts of admiralty over common law courts that entitles their process to any pre-emi-nence ; yet there are thoughts underlying this admission and appearing in the argument, that tend to shape and control its effect, and they need some notice.

It is no kind of evidence of their superiority that their seal is admitted everywhere in evidence; for so is that of a notary public. Neither in England nor here are the seals of other foreign courts so treated; yet both there and here the admiralty is an inferior court.

And there is no peculiarity in the principle that all the world are chargeable with notice of what is going on in the Court of Admiralty; for that is only an emphatic mode of stating the ordinary doctrine of lis pendens.

Nor is there any peculiarity in the fact that the admiralty process against ships is in rerh; for almost all common law courts have the same sort of process; in Ohio, a justice of the peace may issue it; and, in substance, the proceeding by a justice of the peace against a stray cow is exactly equivalent: 6 Watts 492. It is no essential part of the form that the thing should be styled the defendant.

The District Court is not superior by reason of its being a federal court, except so far as it has the advantage of being part [262]*262of a jurisdiction wbicb, in its highest impersonations, has the power to declare the limits of its own authority.

It has a peculiar dignity when sitting as a Prize Court, and applying the great principles of international law; but as an Instance Court it is simply a Court of Common Pleas and Quarter Sessions, with different forms, and with jurisdiction of a special class of cases, and in the very nature of things, bound by the usages and statutes of the state where it sits, or by the statutes of the Union; for it can have no other law. Its creation is not the institution of new relations, duties, or obligations among citizens ; but merely a provision for enforcing those already existing. Where admiralty laws exist, it may administer them. Where they do not, it cannot. Like all other federal institutions, it must Submit to have its jurisdiction strictly construed.

It is not superior, as a Court of Equity is, because of a power to draw to’itself all the litigation about a particular subject-matter, as being the only Court where the claims of all can be adequately adjudicated; for it cannot even incidentally bring any other than admiralty claims within its jurisdiction.

It is merely a co-ordinate court, and its suitors must be content to have it governed by the principle that, among equal jurisdictions, that is exclusive which is first attached.

This is an essential principle of government, and presents one aspect of the idea that all the institutions and ordinances of the same government have a unity and consistency ‘of purpose which demand that its functions and functionaries shall act freely and harmoniously as elements of the same system. This ideal unity does not, however, exist in practice in every and scarcely in any government, because of the fundamental difference in the principles that enter into the organization of its different departments. If they represent different interests, there will be conflicts between them, because their principles are various.

Hence the jealousy that once existed in England and in this country between the courts of chancery and admiralty on the one hand, and the common law courts on the other: the former representing and favoring the monarchical, and the latter the democratic element of government. This jealousy has subsided or died away under the general prevalence of the popular element in the organization and control of both; and these conflicts have resulted in advantage to the general welfare, as all such conflicts do, when they do not spread beyond the different departments of the government.

There is practically a similar element of discord in this country in its federal and state judiciary departments, arising out of the facts that their respective jurisdictions are not susceptible of perfectly defined limits, and that the sources of their authority are not identical. And, since it is not easily seen how there can be [263]*263any constituted harmony between the two forms of administration, except so far as we can rely on the wisdom and unity of the federal judiciary, it becomes very obvious that we are not without danger of having the power of the state judiciary very seriously impaired, by a process similar to that by which the local courts of the Anglo-Saxons were absorbed by the courts of the Norman kings.

This evil was, in a measure, corrected in England by the gradual infusion of the popular and customary principles into the king’s courts; but that would be no corrective here, if our American notions of the danger of any increase in the centralization of power are well founded. It is certainly a very prevalent sentiment that our state courts are competent to settle all juridical questions that depend upon state laws, and that, even if they are not, it is best that they should try to do it, and that it is conducive to general intelligence and order that they should be allowed to do it as best they can.

It is supposed that very much of the energy of the people of this country arises from the fact that they all participate so largely and directly in the regulation of their own government; and it would be considered most disastrous if a majority of Americans, democratic though it might be, should govern the affairs of each state or township. Our feelings and Our attention are most attracted by matters that are nearest home, and we can, of course, manage them better than even wiser people at a distance can do, except in those instances where our interest is too earnest for our judgment; and if those instances be not numerous and important enough to form a class by themselves, they must take their- chance of the errors and failings that belong to humanity.

Certainly there ought to be no encroachment of one department upon the province of another, founded upon the suspicion that one will do its duty less honestly or intelligently than the other. And the danger of encroachment is not avoided merely by the honesty and intelligence of those who are invested with official functions; for these qualities are necessary to see the right and understand the defects of others in administering it, and then a strong and earnest mind may mislead them into supplying those defects by encroachments which, by reason alone of their beneficial results, become dangerous precedents of unwarranted jurisdiction.

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Related

Myers v. Lohr
72 Pa. Super. 472 (Superior Court of Pennsylvania, 1919)
Notley's Petition
106 A. 716 (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 1919)
In re Le Vay
125 F. 990 (M.D. Pennsylvania, 1903)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
24 Pa. 259, 1855 Pa. LEXIS 24, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/taylor-v-carryl-pa-1855.