Taylor v. Carolina Home Care Agency

CourtNorth Carolina Industrial Commission
DecidedAugust 5, 2004
DocketI.C. NO. 178214
StatusPublished

This text of Taylor v. Carolina Home Care Agency (Taylor v. Carolina Home Care Agency) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering North Carolina Industrial Commission primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Taylor v. Carolina Home Care Agency, (N.C. Super. Ct. 2004).

Opinion

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The undersigned reviewed the prior Opinion and Award, based upon the record of the proceedings before Deputy Commissioner Chapman. The appealing party has not shown good ground to reconsider the evidence; receive further evidence; rehear the parties or their representatives; and having reviewed the competent evidence of record, the Full Commission affirms the Opinion and Award of Deputy Commissioner Chapman with minor modifications.

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The undersigned finds as fact and concludes as matters of law the following, which were entered into by the parties at the hearing as

STIPULATIONS
1. The parties are subject to and bound by the provisions of the North Carolina Workers' Compensation Act.

2. An employer-employee relationship existed between the defendant-employer and the plaintiff at all relevant times herein.

3. Defendant-employer was insured with National Compensation America Inc. at all relevant times herein.

4. An Industrial Commission Form 22 wage statement will be used to calculate plaintiff's average weekly wage. (No Form 22 was submitted to the Commission so no findings were made regarding plaintiff's average weekly wage.)

5. Plaintiff continued to receive compensation for temporary total disability as of the date of hearing before the Deputy Commissioner.

The parties stipulated into evidence 122 of medical records and reports.

The pre-trial agreement dated March 5, 2003 which was submitted by the parties, is incorporated by reference.

A Form 63 has been submitted in the case and is incorporated by reference.

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EVIDENTIARY RULINGS
Defendant-Appellants' Motion to have the Full Commission receive new evidence is held in abeyance until plaintiff has had the opportunity to be evaluated and receive treatment by a doctor chosen with the assistance of a nurse from the North Carolina Industrial Commission Nurses' Section.

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Based upon all of the competent evidence of record and reasonable inferences flowing therefrom, the Full Commission makes the following:

FINDINGS OF FACT
1. At the time of the hearing before the Deputy Commissioner, plaintiff was forty-nine years old, has a GED and has completed training to be a Certified Nursing Assistant I. In September 2001 she was employed by defendant-employer in Whiteville. Her job involved going to the homes of elderly clients and providing home care, which included washing their clothes, cleaning the house, cooking meals, bathing them, if necessary, and otherwise helping them with grooming. She would see one or two clients each day.

2. On September 10, 2001, plaintiff's regular client had a doctor's appointment so she was asked to go to the home of a supposedly bed-bound client who had had a stroke. She had never worked with this client before. Once at the client's home, his wife informed her that he was not bed-bound but would go to the table to eat breakfast and then would go lie on the couch. In order for the client to move from the table to the couch, plaintiff had to help him get out of his wheelchair. While she was helping him get up out of the wheelchair, he initially helped to raise himself up, but then abruptly slumped back, pulling her forward. She immediately felt pain in her low back so she sat down. When she sat down, she felt a popping sensation in her right hip.

3. Plaintiff went to her family doctor the next day with complaints of low back and right hip pain. Dr. Gerald's impression was that the pain in her hip was radicular in nature. He prescribed medication for a lumbar strain. Her symptoms worsened, however, so he referred her to Dr. Candella, an orthopedic surgeon. Dr. Candella examined her on September 19, 2001 and sent her to physical therapy. He subsequently ordered an MRI of her hip to rule out a possible injury there, but defendants refused to authorize it and insisted that plaintiff stop seeing Dr. Candella. They sent her to Dr. Foster, an orthopedic surgeon, in Wilmington.

4. Dr. Foster first examined plaintiff on November 14, 2001. Despite ongoing symptoms which limited her ability to function, he refused to prescribe anti-inflammatory or pain medication for her. He advised her to take over-the-counter medication and sent her to physical therapy. By November 28, 2001, plaintiff had low back pain, right groin pain, pain radiating down her right leg to her foot and she reported a catching sensation in her hip. Dr. Foster then ordered an MRI of her lumbar spine which he interpreted as showing some mild stenosis at L4-5 with no evidence of nerve root impingement. Consequently, he sent her back to physical therapy but continued to refuse to prescribe medication for her. Plaintiff experienced persistent pain in her back, hip and leg despite the physical therapy. The pain interfered with her sleep and her activities. In January of 2002, plaintiff reported numbness in her foot and giving way of her knee, so Dr. Foster ordered a myelogram/CT scan. The tests revealed a protrusion at L4-5 with possible slight nerve root impingement.

5. In keeping with the irregular treatment practices he had previously followed, Dr. Foster then gave plaintiff the option of a nerve root block or returning to work without restrictions. He then determined that the block should be administered at the L5 level even though the tests had only showed problems at L4-5 and not at L5-S1. On March 4, 2002, he performed the injection. Following the procedure, plaintiff experienced numbness and weakness in her legs such that she could not stand or walk and almost had to be admitted to the hospital overnight. Dr. Foster blamed her for the response and thought that he had done a fabulous job. He then determined that she had reached maximum medical improvement and ordered a functional capacity evaluation. The physical therapist would not perform the functional capacity evaluation, however, because plaintiff had not been followed recently for her mitral valve prolapse, so Dr. Foster released her to return to work at full duty.

6. On April 16, 2002, plaintiff sought treatment with Dr. Eskander and he ordered a functional capacity evaluation. The test was performed on April 22 and 23, 2002. Plaintiff was noted to have given maximum effort for the test and was found to be capable of only performing light work. After receiving notice of the functional capacity results, Dr. Foster gave her permanent restrictions but recommended no further treatment. Plaintiff's job with defendant-employer involved medium level work, so she still could not perform those duties. Her employer did not offer work suitable to plaintiff's capacity.

7. Plaintiff then requested a second opinion and was seen on July 9, 2002 by Dr. Rodger, an orthopedic surgeon. Dr. Rodger examined her and reviewed films from her MRIs. It was his impression that her symptoms came from an annular tear with disc bulging at L4-5 and from trochanteric bursitis. Dr. Rodger opined she did not have a surgical lesion so he recommended that she be treated by a doctor specializing in pain management.

8. No further treatment was provided to plaintiff by defendants. In view of Dr. Foster's statement that she might have a non-organic component to her problem, plaintiff's attorney sent her to Dr. Howard, a psychiatrist. Dr. Howard evaluated her on January 30, 2003. By that time plaintiff had become withdrawn, irritable, depressed and anxious. Although she had been quite active before her injury, she was spending most of her days in bed at that time. Dr.

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Bluebook (online)
Taylor v. Carolina Home Care Agency, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/taylor-v-carolina-home-care-agency-ncworkcompcom-2004.