Taylor v. Brun

CourtDistrict Court, M.D. Tennessee
DecidedSeptember 13, 2024
Docket1:24-cv-00082
StatusUnknown

This text of Taylor v. Brun (Taylor v. Brun) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, M.D. Tennessee primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Taylor v. Brun, (M.D. Tenn. 2024).

Opinion

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE NASHVILLE DIVISION

COREY TAYLOR #534419, et al., ) ) Plaintiffs, ) ) NO. 1:24-CV-00082 v. ) ) JUDGE CAMPBELL CHRIS BRUN, et al., ) MAGISTRATE JUDGE HOLMES ) Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Corey Taylor, an inmate of the Turney Center Industrial Complex in Only, Tennessee, filed a pro se complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on behalf of himself and other inmates regarding their conditions of confinement. (Doc. No. 1). Also pending before the Court are the following motions: “Petition for Leave to Proceed as a Class Without Prepayment of Filing Fees” (Doc. No. 2); “Petition for Leave to Assign and Appoint Class Counsel or Class Administrator” (Doc. No. 3); “Petition for Urgent Protective Order/Injunction Order/Relief of Emergency Basis” (Doc. No. 4); “Petition Seeking Class Action Certification to be Recognized as a Class Action Suit” (Doc. No. 5); “Petition for Leave to Hold and Hear all Petitions and Hold an Emergency Hearing on Injunction Pursuant to the Unconstitutional Conditions” (Doc. No. 6); and “Petition for Leave for this Court to Allow Other Plantiff’s [sic] to Opt Into/be Added Unto this Matter as Soon as all Signatures Are Collected” (Doc. No. 7). I. MOTIONS TO CERTIFY CLASS, ALLOW OTHER PLAINTIFFS TO OPT IN, AND PROCEED WITHOUT PREPAYING FILING FEES

In Taylor’s “Petition for Leave to Proceed as a Class Without Prepayment of Filing Fees” he asks the Court to grant a class of “122 and not more than 130”1 inmates pauper status “owing to [their]

1 Other Mason, Lee, McCaleb, Franklin, Sinclair, and Smith, these 122 to 130 inmates are not identified in the complaint. the filing fee, the Court first must address Taylor’s request for class certification. For a case to proceed as a class action, several requirements must be met, including that “representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests” of any class that may be certified. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4). However, it is settled law that “[a] prisoner proceeding without an attorney may not represent the interests of fellow inmates in a class action.” Boussum v. Washington, 649 F. Supp.3d 525, 528 (E.D. Mich. 2023) (citing Heard v. Caruso, 351 F. App’x 1, 15 (6th Cir. 2009); Palasty v. Hawk, 15 F. App’x 197, 200 (6th Cir. 2001) (“[P]ro se prisoners are not able to represent fairly the class.”)). Courts have noted that “pervasive impracticalities associated with multiple-plaintiff prisoner

litigation ... militate[ ] against” allowing a prisoner to represent the interests of fellow inmates in a class action. Proctor v. Applegate, 661 F. Supp. 2d 743, 780 (E.D. Mich. 2009) (citing Boretsky v. Corzine, No. 08-2265, 2008 WL 2512916, at *5 (D. N.J. June 23, 2008)). For example, “jail populations are notably transitory, making joint litigation difficult.” Id. (quoting Boretsky, 2008 WL 2512916, at *5). Additionally, the individual plaintiffs within the class must meet the exhaustion requirement of 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). Id. (quoting Boretsky, 2008 WL 2512916, at *6). Consequently, Taylor’s motions for class certification (Doc. Nos. 2, 5) must be denied as well as his motion to permit other plaintiffs to opt in “as soon as all signatures are collected” (Doc. No. 7). He can advance claims on his only behalf only. See Boussum, 649 F. Supp.3d 525, 528 (noting that, although “Plaintiffs diligently addressed some of the impediments of prisoner litigation” and “every

named plaintiff signed the complaint and submitted an application to proceed in forma pauperis”, “wrongly or not, the law prohibits pro se prisoners from representing other prisoners in class actions.”). It necessarily follows that Taylor’s motion to assign and appoint class counsel or a class administrator (Doc. No. 3) must be denied. Under Rule 11(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, all pleadings filed with the Court must be signed “by a party personally if the party is unrepresented.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(a). Taylor submitted a complaint purportedly seeking relief for himself and a putative class of over 100 inmates. (Doc. No. 1 at 1). He listed six of those inmates by name as co-plaintiffs: Steve Mason, Antonio Lee, Clarence McNab, Antonio Franklin, Tonnie Smith, and Stephen Sinclair. (Id.) However, only Taylor signed the complaint. (Id. at 7). Under his signature, Taylor handwrote, “See attached sheet for all others.” (Id.) However, no attachment was filed. Thus, the complaint bears only Taylor’s signature. Every pleading must be signed by a party personally if the party is unrepresented. See Fed. R.

Civ. P. 11(a). If Mason, Lee, McCaleb, Franklin, Smith, and/or Sinclair wish to be recognized as a co- plaintiff2 to this action, each of them MUST sign the complaint and return it to the Court within 30 days. If the Court does not receive a signed complaint from these putative co-plaintiffs, the Court will not consider them to be, or to have ever been, co-plaintiffs to this action, and no filing fee will be assessed against them. III. FILING FEE To file a federal civil lawsuit, a plaintiff must submit the civil filing fee or an Application for Leave to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP Application”). In addition, if seeking pauper status, a plaintiff must provide a certified copy of his inmate trust fund account statement for the 6-month period immediately preceding the filing of his complaint as required by 28 U.S.C.§ 1915(a)(2).

When there are multiple plaintiffs in a case, as here, each plaintiff is proportionately liable for any fees or costs. See Talley-Bey v. Knebl, 168 F.3d 884, 887 (6th Cir. 1999); In re Prison Litigation

2 To clarify, co-plaintiff status is different than being a member of class action. As discussed herein, the Court cannot certify a class action in this case. if voluntarily, does not negate that plaintiff's responsibility to pay his or her portion of the filing fee. Fox v. Koskinen, No. 2:09-cv-160, 2009 WL 2507405, at *1 (W.D. Mich. Aug. 24, 2009) (citing McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 607 (6th Cir. 1997), overruled on other grounds by Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199 (2007)). Here, neither Taylor nor any of the named co-plaintiffs have submitted his portion of the civil filing fee or an IFP Application along with a certified inmate trust fund account statement. Therefore, the Clerk is DIRECTED to mail Taylor, Smith, Lee, Sinclair, Mason, McCaleb, and Franklin each an Application for Leave to Proceed in District Court Without Prepaying Fees or Costs for prisoners (Short Form, AO 240) (often called an IFP application). To proceed as co-plaintiffs in this case, each

of them MUST do one of the following within 30 days of entry of this Order: either (1) file with the Court a written statement documenting his intention to pay his portion of the civil filing fee in this case4; or (2) complete and return the IFP application, along all with required documentation, to the district court.

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Hubbard v. Haley
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Jones v. Bock
549 U.S. 199 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Randolph Muhammad Talley-Bey, Jr. v. Paul Knebl
168 F.3d 884 (Sixth Circuit, 1999)
Souvannaseng Boriboune v. Gerald Berge
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Hagan v. Rogers
570 F.3d 146 (Third Circuit, 2009)
Proctor v. Applegate
661 F. Supp. 2d 743 (E.D. Michigan, 2009)
Lamont Heard v. Patricia Caruso
351 F. App'x 1 (Sixth Circuit, 2009)
Palasty v. Hawk
15 F. App'x 197 (Sixth Circuit, 2001)

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Bluebook (online)
Taylor v. Brun, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/taylor-v-brun-tnmd-2024.