NOTICE 2024 IL App (4th) 240122-U FILED This Order was filed under November 7, 2024 Supreme Court Rule 23 and is NO. 4-24-0122 Carla Bender not precedent except in the 4th District Appellate limited circumstances allowed IN THE APPELLATE COURT Court, IL under Rule 23(e)(1). OF ILLINOIS
FOURTH DISTRICT
ROBERT TAYLOR, ) Appeal from the Petitioner-Appellee, ) Circuit Court of v. ) Rock Island County RAVEN BRADFORD, ) No. 22FA159 Respondent-Appellant. ) ) Honorable ) Richard A. Zimmer, ) Judge Presiding.
JUSTICE LANNERD delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Harris and Knecht concurred in the judgment.
ORDER ¶1 Held: The appellate court affirmed in part and reversed in part, concluding the trial court did not err when it denied respondent’s motion to transfer venue but abused its discretion when it denied her motion to reconsider its decision ordering her to move back to Illinois.
¶2 Respondent, Raven Bradford, appeals from the Rock Island circuit court’s
judgment denying her motions to (1) transfer the proceedings to Texas and (2) reconsider the
court’s decision ordering her to move back to Illinois from Texas. Petitioner, Robert Taylor,
responds the court properly denied the motions. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for
further proceedings.
¶3 I. BACKGROUND
¶4 A. Petition to Establish Parenting Time ¶5 Taylor and Bradford are the unmarried parents of two children, R.T. (born March
2011) and N.T. (born August 2017). In January 2017, Taylor was charged and later convicted of
domestic battery causing bodily harm in Rock Island case No. 17-CM-383, wherein Bradford,
while pregnant, was the alleged victim. In October 2018, the State charged Taylor with aggravated
domestic battery (strangulation), two counts of domestic battery, and criminal damage to property
in Rock Island case No. 18-CF-928, wherein Bradford was again the alleged victim. The same date
those charges were filed, Bradford obtained a plenary order of protection against Taylor. In March
2019, Taylor was convicted of aggravated domestic battery (strangulation), a Class 2 felony, and
was sentenced to four years in prison.
¶6 On March 11, 2022, Taylor was released from prison and began serving a four-year
term of mandatory supervised release (MSR). In June 2022, he filed a petition to establish
parenting responsibilities and parenting time with respect to R.T. and N.T. A few weeks later,
Bradford filed a response, asserting that according to the conditions of Taylor’s MSR, he was not
to have contact with her or the children. Out of concern for her own safety, as well as the children’s,
her whereabouts were to remain unknown to Taylor. Bradford asked the trial court to dismiss the
petition based on Taylor’s legal disability barring him from contact with the children.
¶7 B. Motion to Return to Illinois
¶8 In September 2022, Taylor filed a motion requesting Bradford return the children
to Illinois. In the motion, Taylor alleged that shortly after receiving notice of his petition, Bradford
moved to Texas with R.T. and N.T. without permission of the trial court or notice to him. Taylor
claimed Bradford violated section 609.2(c) of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage
Act (Act) (750 ILCS 5/609.2(c) (West 2022)).
-2- ¶9 In response, Bradford asserted she had not violated section 609.2(c) of the Act
because that section only applies when an order establishing parenting time is already in place and
no such order existed in this case. Bradford maintained Taylor’s petition should be dismissed based
on the terms of his MSR barring him from contact with her or the children.
¶ 10 C. Motion Hearing
¶ 11 On September 23, 2023, the trial court conducted a hearing on Taylor’s motion. At
the outset, the parties and the court acknowledged their agreement section 609.2(c) of the Act did
not apply to the proceedings in this case, but the court nonetheless had the authority to order
Bradford back to Illinois if it was in the children’s best interest.
¶ 12 1. Taylor
¶ 13 Taylor testified he lived in a two-bedroom apartment in Silvis, Illinois, and earned
money working full-time in a highway construction training program. Taylor had many supportive
family members around the Quad Cities region and throughout the Midwest. Taylor’s parents, who
were retired, had relationships with the children and saw them occasionally before Bradford moved
them to Texas. Taylor had an aunt in Davenport who often assisted him and the children
financially. This aunt previously gave Bradford $100,000 towards purchasing a home in Moline
and had also purchased a vehicle for her. Taylor regretted his past actions and hoped to be
reintroduced to the children so he could reestablish his relationship with them and be present in
their lives in the future. While incarcerated, Taylor participated in a substance abuse program for
three years, which included three hours of group meetings five days per week, and completed anger
management classes. Following his release, Taylor completed additional anger management
classes and a parenting class offered through the Rock Island County Council on Addictions
(RICCA).
-3- ¶ 14 On cross-examination, Taylor agreed he had not provided Bradford direct financial
support for the children since being released from prison and beginning employment, noting the
no-contact order was in place. When asked about the night leading to his aggravated domestic
battery conviction, Taylor denied hitting R.T. because she witnessed him hitting Bradford. Instead,
Taylor claimed he “spanked” R.T. because she came downstairs because of the “noise” Bradford
was making during the battery.
¶ 15 Taylor denied that his family had discussed purchasing a home for Bradford in
Georgia in March 2022. Taylor also denied that when Bradford agreed to accept money from
Taylor’s family for the home in Moline, it was with the understanding Taylor would remain in
Chicago upon his release from prison and not be permitted to travel to the Quad Cities area. He
did not know whether any of his family members made Bradford such promises. Taylor further
claimed he was sober since being sent to prison but admitted to abusing drugs heavily in the five
years before his incarceration. Additionally, he completed four months of inpatient treatment at
RICCA, beginning the day he was released from prison.
¶ 16 2. Bradford
¶ 17 Bradford testified regarding the altercation leading to Taylor’s conviction for
aggravated domestic battery. That evening, Taylor choked her outside of their home, which R.T.
witnessed through the window. Taylor also beat her for several hours in front of N.T. Although
Taylor testified he “spanked” R.T. that night because she came downstairs during his altercation
with Bradford, Bradford alleged Taylor actually hit R.T. on the lower back because she witnessed
Taylor choking Bradford. Bradford feared for the children’s safety because Taylor admitted to
being high on liquid Xanax and had threatened to kill her. Taylor would often leave her at home
alone with the children while he went out to use drugs with his friends. Bradford ultimately decided
-4- to leave Taylor on July 4, 2018. That night, Taylor smoked a bag of methamphetamine and
attacked his son from a previous relationship, T.T., by pushing his fingers into T.T.’s eyes while
bathing him. After this, Bradford moved to a duplex in Moline with R.T. and N.T., where she lived
for one year. She lived in another house in Moline for several years until purchasing the home in
Moline with assistance from Taylor’s aunt.
¶ 18 Bradford also described moving to Cedar Rapids in 2015 to distance herself and
the children from Taylor’s involvement in “gang-related things.” Additionally, in 2016, Taylor
beat her while she was pregnant with N.T. Taylor later pleaded guilty to domestic battery related
to that incident. After this, Bradford maintained the relationship with Taylor because he promised
to change and began working with a psychologist, as ordered by the court. Bradford believed
Taylor had not changed since going to prison and would begin his old behaviors “the moment
nobody is watching him.” Taylor had never been consistently employed, but instead earned money
by selling drugs. Bradford testified that in July 2023, she called Taylor on the phone after hearing
from his family members how much he had changed. Within “ten seconds” of the call, Taylor
aggressively demanded to know how many times he needed to say sorry. This indicated to
Bradford he had not changed.
¶ 19 Bradford testified the children were doing “amazing” in Texas. After the incident
in 2018, she and R.T. both engaged in therapy. Although Bradford allowed Taylor’s family to visit
with the children with the condition they not talk about Taylor during the visits, they often did
anyway. R.T. informed Bradford when Taylor’s family members talked about him, which
Bradford believed led to an “unstable” environment and made the children upset for several days
afterwards.
-5- ¶ 20 Bradford only accepted the money for the home in Moline on the understanding
that (1) Taylor’s family would not tell him where she lived and (2) he would live in Chicago for
four years following his release from prison. Bradford had always maintained she would not feel
safe regarding Taylor moving back to the Quad Cities unless he had demonstrated his prior issues
had been resolved. Two days before Taylor’s release from prison on March 21, 2022, Bradford
was informed he would be returning to the Quad Cities area. Bradford immediately began
arranging to leave and traveled to Texas in May 2022, where she applied for and was approved for
an apartment. She listed the Moline house for sale prior to going to Texas to look for housing.
These events occurred prior to being served with Taylor’s petition in this case, but she did not
actually move to Texas until afterwards.
¶ 21 Ultimately, Bradford believed that Taylor should not be reintroduced to the children
until after completing his term of MSR. She wanted reassurance he had changed before having
any contact with the children.
¶ 22 On cross-examination, Bradford admitted that because of the no-contact order, she
did not know what Taylor was like since being released from prison. When Bradford was asked
why she called Taylor in July 2023 if she feared him, she responded she was trying to alleviate her
fears about visiting the area and thought if he was remorseful, she could “let [her] guard down.”
Additionally, Taylor’s family members claimed he had changed and it was “unnatural” for the
children to be separated from their father.
¶ 23 Following Bradford’s testimony, the parties stipulated to Taylor’s criminal history,
which included the following convictions: manufacturing and delivery of cannabis (2014),
unlawful possession of a blackjack (2015), criminal damage to property (2016), obstruction of
justice (2016), domestic battery (2017), and aggravated domestic battery (2018).
-6- ¶ 24 The trial court continued the matter to September 28, 2023. At the outset, the court
read into the record a portion of a document from the Illinois Department of Corrections Parole
Board approving Taylor’s request to be allowed contact with R.T. and N.T., as dictated by court
order:
“ ‘The request was parolee Taylor was released with [Prisoner Review Board
(PRB)] orders of substance abuse, outpatient mental health, domestic battery and
[Treatment Alternatives for Safe Communities] and has completed all orders
successfully. He was also released with PRB order of no contact with [Bradford,
R.T. and N.T.] due to an [order of protection] that was recently vacated. Parolee
has remained compliant with all parole rules including weekly phone check-ins and
making himself available for face-to-face visits. He is currently on level 3
supervision. Parolee is working a full-time job and supporting himself while renting
an apartment. 2/29 [sic] there were no active [orders of protection].’ ”
The court clarified that based on the language of this document, it allowed only for contact with
the children—not Bradford. Accordingly, the no-contact order with Bradford remained in effect.
¶ 25 The trial court found Taylor’s testimony was credible and emphasized his
participation in various treatment programs, commenting that he went above and beyond what was
required of him. The court questioned whether Bradford’s fear of Taylor was genuine based on
her July 2023 contact with him via phone, stating, “If somebody is truly afraid of somebody, I
don’t know why you’d reach out and contact him. That does not make any sense to me.” Although
Bradford testified Taylor’s family tried to control her, the court found the opposite to be true:
“Her packing up and moving is controlling the kids. Her taking the attitude that,
well, he can’t contact me but I can contact him is a classic example of a person with
-7- a no contact order thinking they get to control and can order the other person away
whenever they want, but then when they want to contact them, they can’t. She is
clearly the controlling one here as the one who’s trying to do it.”
The court did not believe it would be better to delay reunification with the children until after
Taylor completed MSR. Instead, the court found it would be safer for reunification to occur while
the no-contact order with Bradford remained in place and while Taylor was under supervision.
Ultimately, the court found the best interest of the children would be preserved by contact with
both parents. Furthermore, the court determined a meaningful reunification between Taylor and
the children could not occur if the children remained in Texas. The court granted Taylor’s motion
and ordered Bradford to move back to Illinois with the children within 30 days.
¶ 26 D. Motions to Reconsider and Transfer
¶ 27 On October 12, 2023, Bradford filed motions to (1) reconsider the trial court’s
ruling ordering her to move back to Illinois and (2) transfer the proceedings to Collin County,
Texas. In her motion to reconsider, Bradford argued it was in the best interest of the children that
they remain in Texas with her, emphasizing Taylor’s history of violence, abuse, and addiction. In
the motion to transfer, Bradford asserted the children’s principal residence was in Collin County,
where they had lived for over a year. Furthermore, evidence related to the children’s current living
conditions and education was in Collin County. Accordingly, Bradford claimed transfer of the case
would serve the interests of justice and the convenience of the parties.
¶ 28 On December 18, 2023, the trial court conducted a hearing on Bradford’s motions.
Following arguments, the court denied both motions. On January 8, 2024, the court entered a
written order stating the same and compelling Bradford to return to Illinois within 45 days. The
-8- order further provided reunification between the children and Taylor must occur upon Bradford’s
return to Illinois.
¶ 29 On January 22, 2024, Bradford filed a timely petition for leave to file an
interlocutory appeal under Illinois Supreme Court Rules 306(a)(4) and (5) (eff. Oct. 1, 2020), or
alternatively, Illinois Supreme Court Rule 307(a)(1) (eff. Nov. 1, 2017). Bradford also filed a
motion to stay enforcement of the court’s January 8, 2024, order under Illinois Supreme Court
Rule 305(b) (eff. Jul. 1, 2017). We note the record does not show whether the trial court has ruled
on Bradford’s motion to stay. On February 13, 2024, this court allowed Bradford’s petition for
leave to appeal.
II. ANALYSIS
¶ 30 On appeal, Bradford presents two arguments. First, Bradford argues the trial court
erred when it denied her motion to transfer venue to Collin County, Texas, because it was
uncontested (1) she lawfully moved there with the children and (2) Texas had home state
jurisdiction. Second, Bradford challenges the court’s denial of her motion to reconsider, asserting
the best interest factors weighed in favor of allowing her and the children to remain in Texas.
¶ 31 Taylor responds the trial court properly denied Bradford’s motion to transfer the
case to Texas because it was not a more appropriate forum under the factors enumerated in section
207(b) of the Uniform Child-Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA) (750 ILCS
36/207(b) (West 2022)). Furthermore, Taylor maintains the court properly denied Bradford’s
motion to reconsider because there was no evidence the court misapplied the law and no abuse of
discretion occurred.
¶ 32 We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings.
¶ 33 A. Motion to Transfer Venue
-9- ¶ 34 Bradford first argues the trial court erred when it denied her motion to transfer
venue to Collin County, Texas. Specifically, Bradford claims, under section 102(7) of UCCJEA
(id. § 102(7)), Texas was the “home state” in this case. According to Bradford, Illinois lost home
state jurisdiction after “the expiration of six months from which the children began living in the
state of Texas on a full time basis for nearly two years.” Alternatively, Bradford claims, if this
court finds Illinois does have home state jurisdiction, the trial court nonetheless erred when it
declined to transfer the case to Texas because it was the more convenient forum. Taylor responds
Illinois had home state jurisdiction and the court properly denied Bradford’s motion based on the
factors set forth in section 207(a) of UCCJEA (id. § 207(a)).
¶ 35 1. Home State Jurisdiction
¶ 36 We first consider Bradford’s claim Texas had home state jurisdiction under section
201(a) of UCCJEA. Section 201(a) of UCCJEA states, in relevant part, as follows:
“[A] court of this State has jurisdiction to make an initial child-custody
determination only if:
(1) this State is the home State of the child on the date of the commencement
of the proceeding, or was the home State of the child within six months before the
commencement of the proceeding and the child is absent from this State but a parent
or person acting as a parent continues to live in this State.” Id. § 201(a).
Section 102(7) of UCCJEA defines “home state” as “the state in which a child lived with a parent
or a person acting as a parent for at least six consecutive months immediately before the
commencement of a child-custody proceeding.” Id. § 102(7). Additionally, “commencement” is
defined as “the filing of the first pleading in a proceeding.” Id. § 102(5).
- 10 - ¶ 37 Although section 201(a) of UCCJEA uses the term “jurisdiction,” it is
well-established that it is not used in the traditional sense—i.e., “the power of a court to hear and
determine cases of the general class to which the proceeding in question belongs.” Belleville
Toyota, Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 199 Ill. 2d 325, 334 (2002). In McCormick v.
Robertson, 2014 IL App (4th) 140208, ¶ 28, this court explained Illinois trial courts’ subject matter
jurisdiction in child custody proceedings is derived from their general jurisdiction set forth in
article VI, section 9, of the Illinois Constitution of 1970. See Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, § 9.
Accordingly, the jurisdictional requirements for child custody determinations set forth in section
201(a) of UCCJEA do not confer jurisdiction, but instead “[establish] the procedural framework
within which a circuit court may properly exercise its subject-matter jurisdiction.” McCormick,
2014 IL App (4th) 140208, ¶ 30. Whether the trial court properly exercised its jurisdiction under
section 201(a) of UCCJEA is a matter of statutory interpretation, which this court reviews de novo.
In re J.S., 2019 IL App (1st) 190059, ¶ 19.
¶ 38 Here, the trial court properly exercised its jurisdiction in conformity with section
201(a) of UCCJEA because Illinois was the children’s home state at the commencement of
proceedings. Under section 102(5) of UCCJEA, the proceedings in this case commenced on June
3, 2022, when Taylor filed his petition. Per Bradford’s testimony, the children had been living in
Moline, Illinois, with her from July 2018 to July 2022. Although Bradford testified she signed a
lease for an apartment in Texas in May 2022, she did not move to Texas with the children until
July 2022. Contrary to Bradford’s assertions on appeal, the fact that more than six months have
passed since the children moved to Texas after the proceedings began does not negate Illinois’s
home state jurisdiction, which attached at the commencement of proceedings. See id.; see also id.
§ 201(a). Because the children had resided in Illinois with Bradford for longer than six months
- 11 - prior to June 3, 2022, the court properly determined Illinois had home state jurisdiction in this
case.
¶ 39 2. Section 207(a) Factors
¶ 40 Bradford alternatively argues that even if Illinois has home state jurisdiction under
section 201(a) of UCCJEA, the trial court nonetheless erred when it declined to transfer the case
because Collin County, Texas, is the more convenient forum to adjudicate the issues presented in
this case. Taylor counters that the court properly denied Bradford’s motion because Illinois was
the more convenient forum under the factors set forth in section 207(b) of UCCJEA. We agree
with Taylor.
¶ 41 “The doctrine of forum non conveniens is an equitable doctrine that assumes the
existence of more than one forum with jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter of a
case.” Griffith v. Mitsubishi Aircraft International, Inc., 136 Ill. 2d 101, 105 (1990). Applying this
doctrine “invokes principles of convenience and fairness in choosing between two or more forums
that have jurisdiction.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. Section 207(a) of UCCJEA codifies
the doctrine in child custody cases, providing, “A court of this State which has jurisdiction under
this Act to make a child-custody determination may decline to exercise its jurisdiction at any time
if it determines that it is an inconvenient forum under the circumstances and that a court of another
state is a more appropriate forum.” Id. § 207(a). In turn, section 207(b) of UCCJEA provides the
analytical framework for determining whether another state is the more appropriate forum,
directing the trial court to consider the following factors:
“(1) whether domestic violence has occurred and is likely to continue in the future
and which state could best protect the parties and the child;
(2) the length of time the child has resided outside this State;
- 12 - (3) the distance between the court in this State and the court in the state that would
assume jurisdiction;
(4) the relative financial circumstances of the parties;
(5) any agreement of the parties as to which state should assume jurisdiction;
(6) the nature and location of the evidence required to resolve the pending litigation,
including testimony of the child;
(7) the ability of the court of each state to decide the issue expeditiously and the
procedures necessary to present the evidence; and
(8) the familiarity of the court of each state with the facts and issues in the pending
litigation.” Id. § 207(b).
The court’s principal task is to determine which court can most capably act in the best interest of
the children. In re Marriage of Rickett, 2020 IL App (3d) 180657, ¶ 17. This court reviews a trial
court’s inconvenient forum decision for an abuse of discretion. In re Marriage of Horgan, 366 Ill.
App. 3d 180, 185 (2006). An abuse of discretion occurs when the court’s decision is arbitrary,
unreasonable, or no reasonable person would agree with it. In re Marriage of Hall, 278 Ill. App.
3d 782, 785 (1996).
¶ 42 The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Bradford’s request to
transfer the case to Texas on inconvenient forum grounds. Although the court did not specifically
consider the section 207(b) factors, this court may affirm on any basis supported by the record,
regardless of the trial court’s reasoning. In re Guardianship Estate of Tatyanna T., 2012 IL App
(1st) 112957, ¶ 19. Here, the record supports a conclusion the section 207(b) factors could
reasonably favor continuing the proceedings in Illinois. First, while there was an extensive and
documented history of Taylor’s abuse toward Bradford, the no-contact order remained in place,
- 13 - which would mitigate the risk of future abuse. Additionally, even though the children have resided
in Texas for two years, they lived in Illinois for most of their lives, including at least four years
immediately prior to the proceedings in this case. Furthermore, Collin County, Texas, is hundreds
of miles from Rock Island, Illinois, where many important witnesses, such as Taylor and his family
members, resided. Most significantly, the Rock Island circuit court had already established a
familiarity with the parties and the facts in this case for months before Bradford requested to
transfer the proceedings and demonstrated its ability to adjudicate the issues in this case.
Conversely, there had been no attempt to conduct any proceedings in Texas. Specifically, the court
reasoned as follows:
“Bottom line is there was a petition filed here in June—on June 6th of ‘22. Your
client participated in that case. There was no objection to jurisdiction here. There
was nothing raised as far as transferring some place else. Everybody agreed and it
was going to proceed here. We had multiple statuses here. I remember talking
multiple times with the attorneys, waiting to get clarification from the Department
of Corrections to see whether or not this was even something that was going to be
possible, and so we couldn’t move forward until we had that.”
In sum, the court’s decision was not arbitrary or unreasonable given the record in this case.
Accordingly, no abuse of discretion occurred when it denied Bradford’s motion to transfer venue.
¶ 43 B. Motion to Reconsider Order to Return to Illinois
¶ 44 Bradford next argues the trial court erred when it denied her motion to reconsider
its decision ordering her to return to Illinois with the children. Emphasizing Taylor’s history of
addiction and domestic abuse, Bradford asserts it was in the best interest of the children to remain
in Texas and not to return to Illinois. Taylor responds the court properly denied Bradford’s motion
- 14 - to reconsider because it was in the children’s best interest to reestablish a relationship with Taylor,
which could not be effectively achieved if they remained in Texas. We agree with Bradford and
reverse the portion of the court’s temporary order requiring Bradford to return to Illinois.
¶ 45 Before entering a final order allocating parenting time, a trial court may enter a
temporary order allocating parenting time and for the relocation of the children consistent with the
best interest of the children. 750 ILCS 5/603.5 (West 2022). Any relocation of the children must
be ordered consistent with subsections (c) to (g) of section 609.2 of the Act (id. § 609.2(c)-(g)).
Id. § 603.5(a-5). The language of those subsections presupposes that the parent requesting the
relocation of the children is also the parent planning to relocate. See id. § 609.2(c)-(g). For
instance, subsection (c) requires the parent intending to relocate to provide written notice of the
relocation to the other parent, and subsection (d) indicates the information to be provided in the
notice. Id. § 609.2(c)-(d). However, the circumstances in this case are backward: the parent
requesting relocation of the children, i.e., Taylor, is not the same parent who will be relocating,
i.e., Bradford. Furthermore, to determine the best interest of the children when allocating parenting
time via temporary order, the court is to consider the factors set forth in section 602.7 of the Act.
Id. § 603.5(a). Those factors include, inter alia, the following:
“(1) the wishes of each parent seeking parenting time;
(2) the wishes of the child, taking into account the child’s maturity and ability to
express reasoned and independent preferences as to parenting time;
(3) the amount of time each parent spent performing caretaking functions with
respect to the child in the 24 months preceding the filing of any petition for
allocation of parental responsibilities or, if the child is under 2 years of age, since
the child’s birth;
- 15 - (4) any prior agreement or course of conduct between the parents relating to
caretaking functions with respect to the child;
(5) the interaction and interrelationship of the child with his or her parents and
siblings and with any other person who may significantly affect the child’s best
interests;
(6) the child’s adjustment to his or her home, school, and community;
(7) the mental and physical health of all individuals involved;
(8) the child’s needs;
(9) the distance between the parents’ residences, the cost and difficulty of
transporting the child, each parent’s and the child’s daily schedules, and the ability
of the parents to cooperate in the arrangement;
(10) whether a restriction on parenting time is appropriate;
(11) the physical violence or threat of physical violence by the child’s parent
directed against the child or other member of the child’s household;
(12) the willingness and ability of each parent to place the needs of the child ahead
of his or her own needs;
(13) the willingness and ability of each parent to facilitate and encourage a close
and continuing relationship between the other parent and the child;
(14) the occurrence of abuse against the child or other member of the child’s
household;
***
(17) any other factor that the court expressly finds to be relevant.” Id. § 602.7.
- 16 - ¶ 46 “A trial court’s determination of what is in the best interests of the child should not
be reversed unless it is clearly against the manifest weight of the evidence and it appears that a
manifest injustice has occurred.” In re Marriage of Eckert, 119 Ill. 2d 316, 328 (1988). It is
well-established that “[t]he trial court is in the best position to judge the credibility of the witnesses
and determine the best interests of the child.” In re Custody of G.L., 2017 IL App (1st) 163171,
¶ 24. Additionally, “[w]here the evidence permits multiple inferences, we will accept those
inferences that support the trial court’s order.” Id. “Under the manifest weight standard, an
appellate court will affirm the trial court’s ruling if there is any basis in the record to support the
trial court’s findings.” Id.
¶ 47 We conclude the trial court’s finding, via temporary order, it was in the best interest
of the children for Bradford to move back to Illinois with the children was against the manifest
weight of the evidence and represented a manifest injustice to Bradford. First, the language of
sections 603.5(a-5) and 609.2(c)-(g) of the Act, which provide for the temporary relocation of
children, suggests those sections were not intended to be used in circumstances (such as here)
where the parent seeking the relocation of the children is not the same parent to be relocated. See
750 ILCS 5/603.5(a-5), 609.2(c)-(g) (2022). Furthermore, there is no indication the court
considered either the section 609.2(g) or 602.7 factors in rendering its decision, other than a general
statement that it was considering the best interest of the children. While this court typically
presumes the court knows and follows the law (see Vance v. Joyner, 2019 IL App (4th) 190136,
¶ 91), the court in this case never indicated a single factor it considered relevant to the issue of the
children’s best interest. The court offered no explanation as to why reunification could not be
effectively accomplished while the children remained in Texas, stating, “I don’t see reunification
happening via Zoom.” The court did not consider any other option for reunification short of forcing
- 17 - Bradford, on a temporary basis, to move back to Illinois. Furthermore, the parties agreed there was
no court order or statute prohibiting Bradford from moving to Texas with the children in May
2022. Even accepting the court’s credibility determinations, which favored Taylor and disfavored
Bradford, the record showed Taylor was a recovering addict with multiple convictions for
domestic abuse—one of which included strangulation—and had no relationship with the children
for four years due to his prison sentence and the no-contact order. Although Taylor’s family had
assisted Bradford financially in the past, Bradford was the children’s primary caretaker since their
birth and during Taylor’s prison sentence. The court’s decision prioritized the children’s interest
in cultivating a currently nonexistent relationship with Taylor while failing to consider any other
factors it was required to consider by statute. Despite the fact the court ordered Taylor’s family to
financially assist Bradford with moving back to Illinois, this did not account for the significant
disruption to Bradford’s employment and the children’s education and other activities that would
occur upon relocation. Moreover, the court did not hear any testimony as to what constitutes
reunification therapy or regarding methods that might be available without requiring Bradford to
relocate. Requiring such a disruption to Bradford and the children’s lives on a temporary basis
solely to facilitate reunification with a parent who has not been allocated decisionmaking authority
and has not even sought traditional parenting time constitutes a manifest injustice and an extreme
remedy that is unsupported by the record and not necessary to achieve the goal of reunification.
Furthermore, it is inconsistent with the applicable statutes providing for temporary relocation of
children under the Act. Accordingly, we conclude the court abused its discretion when it denied
Bradford’s motion to reconsider its decision ordering her to move back to Illinois with the children
on a temporary basis. We therefore vacate the portion of the court’s order requiring Bradford to
move back to Illinois with the children on a temporary basis and remand with directions for the
- 18 - court and parties to arrange for reunification therapy that does not require Bradford to move back
to Illinois. We express no opinion on whether relocation of Bradford and the children would be in
the children’s best interest in a final judgment allocating parenting time and responsibilities.
¶ 48 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 49 For the reasons stated, we affirm the Rock Island circuit court’s judgment denying
Bradford’s motion to transfer venue to Texas. We reverse the court’s denial of Bradford’s motion
to reconsider and vacate the portion of the court’s order requiring Bradford to move back to Illinois
with the children. We remand the case with directions to consider options for reunification therapy
that do not require Bradford to move back to Illinois.
¶ 50 Affirmed in part and reversed in part; vacated in part and remanded with directions.
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