Taylor v. Bisignano

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
DecidedFebruary 4, 2026
Docket24-7219
StatusUnpublished

This text of Taylor v. Bisignano (Taylor v. Bisignano) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Taylor v. Bisignano, (9th Cir. 2026).

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FEB 4 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

REBECCA L. TAYLOR, No. 24-7219 D.C. No. Plaintiff - Appellant, 3:24-cv-05163-DWC v. MEMORANDUM* FRANK BISIGNANO, Commissioner of Social Security,

Defendant - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington David W. Christel, Magistrate Judge, Presiding

Submitted February 2, 2026** Portland, Oregon

Before: CHRISTEN, HURWITZ, and DESAI, Circuit Judges.

This is an appeal from a district court judgment affirming a decision by an

Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) denying an application by Rebecca Taylor for

social security disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income.

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). We review “the district court’s order affirming the ALJ’s denial of social

security benefits de novo and will disturb the denial of benefits only if the decision

contains legal error or is not supported by substantial evidence.” Lambert v. Saul,

980 F.3d 1266, 1270 (9th Cir. 2020) (cleaned up). “Where evidence is susceptible

to more than one rational interpretation, it is the ALJ’s conclusion that must be

upheld.” Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 679 (9th Cir. 2005). We have jurisdiction

under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) and affirm.

1. Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s determination that the medical

opinions of Drs. Wingate, Renn, and Fitterer were inconsistent with the overall

record. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(b)(2), (c)(2) (explaining that consistency with the

record is one of the most important factors in assessing a medical opinion). There

was substantial evidence that since becoming sober and regularly taking her

medication, Taylor exhibited typical mood, affect, and behavior, generally reported

being stable and that medication improved her symptoms, was able to take care of

herself and her five children, and was able to regularly socialize outside the home at

Narcotics Anonymous (“NA”) meetings and on family trips. See Wellington v.

Berryhill, 878 F.3d 867, 876 (9th Cir. 2017) (“[E]vidence of medical treatment

successfully relieving symptoms can undermine a claim of disability.”).

2. The ALJ provided “specific, clear, and convincing reasons” for finding

Taylor’s subjective symptom testimony inconsistent with the overall record. Smartt

2 24-7219 v. Kijakazi, 53 F.4th 489, 494 (9th Cir. 2022) (cleaned up); see also 20 C.F.R. §

404.1529(c)(4) (instructing ALJs to determine whether there are inconsistencies

between an applicant’s testimony “and the rest of the evidence”). The record

demonstrated that Taylor’s mental health has generally stabilized and that she

routinely exhibited normal affect, mood, and behavior. The ALJ also considered

Taylor’s reported daily activities, which included running NA meetings, socializing

in public, and taking care of her five children. See Crane v. Shalala, 76 F.3d 251,

254 (9th Cir. 1996) (finding ALJ properly discredited claimant testimony where the

ALJ considered the claimant’s “daily activities, the notes of the treating therapist,

and the evidence suggesting that he responded well to treatment for depression”);

Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1113 (9th Cir. 2012) (finding observations of

typical mental health functioning and claimant’s reported social activities

undermined her testimony of anxiety), superseded by regulation on other grounds

by 20 C.F.R. § 404.1502(a).

3. An ALJ “must consider limitations and restrictions imposed by all of

an individual’s impairments, even those that are not severe” in the Residual

Functional Capacity (“RFC”) analysis. Buck v. Berryhill, 869 F.3d 1040, 1049 (9th

Cir. 2017) (cleaned up). Even assuming that the ALJ should have evaluated Taylor’s

migraines in the RFC analysis, any error was harmless because it was

“inconsequential to the ultimate nondisability determination.” Molina, 674 F.3d at

3 24-7219 1115 (cleaned up). After Taylor testified that various stimuli would incite migraines,

the ALJ questioned the vocational expert about available jobs that would avoid those

reported triggers, ultimately rejecting one of the expert’s proposed professions and

substituting a different position.

AFFIRMED.

4 24-7219

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Related

Molina v. Astrue
674 F.3d 1104 (Ninth Circuit, 2012)
Gavin Buck v. Nancy Berryhill
869 F.3d 1040 (Ninth Circuit, 2017)
Laurie Wellington v. Nancy Berryhill
878 F.3d 867 (Ninth Circuit, 2017)
Karen Lambert v. Andrew Saul
980 F.3d 1266 (Ninth Circuit, 2020)

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Bluebook (online)
Taylor v. Bisignano, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/taylor-v-bisignano-ca9-2026.