Opinion of the Court
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure. As
addressed in more detail herein, we conclude that the Court of Appeals erred because
an order granting a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss is reviewed de novo and neither
party requested findings of fact and conclusions of law.
I. Background
¶2 On 1 May 2018, plaintiffs commenced this action against Bank of America,
N.A. (Bank of America), alleging fraud and other related claims arising out of Bank
of America’s Home Affordable Modification Program. Bank of America moved to
dismiss the amended complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to North
Carolina Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). The trial court granted Bank of America’s
motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), concluding that plaintiffs’ claims were
“barred by the applicable statute[ ] of limitation[s]” and that “the claims of all
[p]laintiffs who were parties to foreclosure proceedings [were] barred by the doctrines
of res judicata and collateral estoppel.” Plaintiffs appealed.
¶3 In its decision, a divided panel of the Court of Appeals acknowledged that
appellate courts review orders granting a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6)
de novo. Taylor v. Bank of Am., N.A., No. COA20-160-2, 2021 WL 4535323, *2 (N.C.
Ct. App. Oct. 5, 2021). Then, after observing that the trial court did not make findings
of fact, the Court of Appeals concluded that it could not “determine the reason behind
the grant” and could not “conduct a meaningful review of the trial court’s conclusions
of law.” Taylor, 2021 WL 4535323, at *3. Based on these conclusions, the Court of
Appeals reversed the trial court’s order and remanded the case. Id. On remand, the
Court of Appeals directed the trial court to make factual findings and conclusions of
law. Id.
¶4 The dissent concluded that the trial court correctly dismissed plaintiffs’ claims
as time barred under the applicable statute of limitations. Taylor, 2021 WL 4535323,
at *3–4 (Dillon, J., dissenting). Bank of America filed a notice of appeal based on the
dissent pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-30(2).
II. Analysis
¶5 On appeal to this Court, Bank of America argues that the Court of Appeals
“erred by professing that it could not resolve this issue of law on the record” and
concluding that it “needed ‘findings of fact’ ” from the trial court to conduct a de novo
review of a Rule 12(b)(6) ruling. Bank of America claims that there is no need for a
trial court to articulate its reasoning in an order on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss
because appellate courts analyze de novo whether a complaint’s allegations state a
claim upon which relief can be granted. Additionally, Bank of America contends that
factual findings and conclusions of law are improper in the context before this Court.
Bank of America raises that North Carolina Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a)(2) provides
that “[f]indings of fact and conclusions of law are necessary on decisions of any motion
or order . . . only when requested by a party and as provided by Rule 41(b).” N.C.G.S.
§ 1A-1, Rule 52(a)(2) (2021) (emphasis added). Bank of America asserts, and plaintiffs
concede, that plaintiffs did not request findings of fact and conclusions of law.
¶6 Given that plaintiffs appealed to the Court of Appeals an order granting a Rule
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss and the record does not reflect that any party requested
findings of fact and conclusions of law, we agree that the Court of Appeals erred. The
standard of review for an order granting a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss is well
established. Appellate courts review de novo an order granting a Rule 12(b)(6) motion
to dismiss. E.g., Bridges v. Parrish, 366 N.C. 539, 541 (2013).
¶7 “The word de novo means fresh or anew; for a second time . . . .” In re Hayes,
261 N.C. 616, 622 (1964) (cleaned up); see also De Novo, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th
ed. 2019) (defining “de novo” as “[a]new”). The appellate court, just like the trial court
below, considers “whether the allegations of the complaint, if treated as true, are
sufficient to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under some legal theory.”
Bridges, 366 N.C. at 541 (quoting Coley v. State, 360 N.C. 493, 494 (2006)). In other
words, under de novo review, the appellate court as the reviewing court considers the
Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss anew: It freely substitutes its own assessment of
whether the allegations of the complaint are sufficient to state a claim for the trial
court’s assessment. See id.; Lanvale Props., LLC v. Cnty. of Cabarrus, 366 N.C. 142,
149 (2012); Morris Commc’ns Corp. v. City of Bessemer City Zoning Bd. of Adjustment,
365 N.C. 152, 156 (2011). Thus, the review of an order granting a Rule 12(b)(6) motion
to dismiss does not involve an assessment or review of the trial court’s reasoning.
Rather, the appellate court affirms or reverses the disposition of the trial court—the
granting of the Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss—based on the appellate court’s review
of whether the allegations of the complaint are sufficient to state a claim.
¶8 Assuming, without in any way deciding, that there could ever be a need for the
making of findings and conclusions in an order granting or denying a motion to
dismiss lodged pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the North Carolina Rules of Civil
Procedure, neither plaintiffs nor Bank of America requested factual findings or
conclusions of law in the trial court’s order. Pursuant to Rule 52(a)(2) of the North
Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure, a trial court is not required to make factual
findings and conclusions of law to support its order unless requested by a party.
N.C.G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 52(a)(2); see also Toshiba Glob. Com. Sols., Inc. v. Smart &
Final Stores LLC, 381 N.C. 692, 2022-NCSC-81, ¶ 5. Therefore, the trial court was
not required to include any factual findings or conclusions of law in its order granting
Bank of America’s Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. As a result, there is no legal basis
or practical reason for the Court of Appeals to remand the case to the trial court to
make factual findings and conclusions of law.
¶9 We conclude that the Court of Appeals erred by not conducting a de novo review
of the sufficiency of the allegations in plaintiffs’ complaint as required by the well-
established standard of review. Therefore, we vacate the Court of Appeals’ decision
and remand this case to the Court of Appeals to fulfill its obligation to follow this
Court’s precedent and to address “whether the allegations of the complaint, if treated
as true, are sufficient to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under some
legal theory.” Bridges, 366 N.C. at 541 (quoting Coley, 360 N.C. at 494). Given the
foregoing, we do not reach Bank of America’s remaining arguments concerning the
insufficiency of the allegations to state a claim.
III. Conclusion
¶ 10 The Court of Appeals erred by remanding the case to the trial court with
instructions to make factual findings and conclusions of law. Thus, we vacate the
Court of Appeals’ decision and remand this case to the Court of Appeals to review this
matter in a manner not inconsistent with this opinion.
VACATED AND REMANDED.
Justice BERGER did not participate in the consideration or decision of this
case.