Taylor v. Apfel

100 F. Supp. 2d 451, 1999 WL 1867071
CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Michigan
DecidedNovember 18, 1999
Docket99-10086
StatusPublished

This text of 100 F. Supp. 2d 451 (Taylor v. Apfel) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Michigan primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Taylor v. Apfel, 100 F. Supp. 2d 451, 1999 WL 1867071 (E.D. Mich. 1999).

Opinion

OPINION AND ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF MAGISTRATE JUDGE CHARLES E. BINDER

ROBERTS, District Judge.

I. Introduction

Pending before the Court are the Commissioner’s Objections to Magistrate Judge Charles E. Binder’s September 16, 1999 Report and Recommendation that the Court reverse the Commissioner and remand this action for an award of benefits. The Commissioner agrees that this case should be reversed but argues that it should be remanded for further fact-finding. After a de novo review of the record, the Court will adopt Magistrate Judge Binder’s Report and Recommendation.

*452 II. Background

Plaintiff alleges that she has a seizure disorder, the severity of which meets the requirements of Listing 11.03. In a November 25, 1997 decision, Administrative Law Judge Robert Stalker concluded that Plaintiff did not meet any listings, although he provided no specific analysis of Listing 11.03. ALJ Stalker went on to conclude that Plaintiff could perform a significant number of sedentary jobs and was, thus, not disabled.

Plaintiff thereafter filed the instant lawsuit. In her Motion for Summary Judgment, she urged the Court to reverse the Commissioner and award benefits to Plaintiff. The Commissioner, on the other hand, filed a Motion to Enter Judgment Reversing the Commissioner’s Decision with Remand to the Agency. In that Motion, the Commissioner argued that additional factual development was necessary for a determination of whether Plaintiff is entitled to disability benefits. As a result, there is no dispute that this case should be remanded. Rather, the issue in contention is whether the remand should be for further factual development or for an award of benefits.

III. Analysis

If a court determines that substantial evidence does not support the Secretary’s decision, the court can reverse the decision and immediately award benefits only if all essential factual issues have been resolved and the record adequately establishes a plaintiff’s entitlement to benefits.... A judicial award of benefits is proper only where the proof of disability is overwhelming or where the proof of disability is strong and evidence to the contrary is lacking.

Faucher v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 17 F.3d 171, 176 (6th Cir.1994). In this case, the Court finds that the record is adequate, that the proof of disability is strong and that the evidence to the contrary is lacking.

In particular, the proof is strong that Plaintiff has a seizure disorder the severity of which meets Listing 11.03. That Listing requires:

Epilepsy — Minor motor seizures (petit mal, psychomotor, or focal), documented by EEG and by detailed description of a typical seizure pattern, including all associated phenomena; occurring more frequently than once weekly in spite of at least 3 months of prescribed treatment. With alteration of awareness or loss of consciousness and transient pos-tictal manifestations of unconventional behavior or significant interference with activity during the day.

20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 § 11.03

In a November 3, 1997 Seizure Questionnaire, one of Plaintiffs treating physicians, David N. Herrman, M.D., opined that Plaintiff had the type and frequency of seizures described in Listing 11.03 and added, “The patient continues to have frequent daily myoclonic jerks as of 11/3/97.” (Tr. at 143-144). Further, as required by § 11.00A, Dr. Herrman opined that the frequency of Plaintiff’s seizures occurred despite medication. (Tr. at 144).

The Court recognizes that, under § 11.00A Plaintiffs serum blood levels must be considered for determining whether Plaintiff meets the requirements of § 11.03. 1 Additionally, the Court recognizes that many of the medical records before the Court reflect Plaintiffs serum drug levels as having been either below therapeutic levels or unavailable because Plaintiff had ceased taking her medication. (Tr. at 145-146, 150, 169-170 & 182). However, although § 11.00A requires the Plaintiffs serum drug level be considered, low drug levels do not automatically preclude a claimant from meeting the requirements of Listing 11.03. “When the report *453 ed blood drug levels are low, therefore, the information obtained from the treating source should include the physician’s statement as to why the levels are low....”

In this case, the record demonstrates that Plaintiffs low drug levels were caused, at least in part, by drug allergies. Plaintiff had allergic reactions to Dilantin, Depakote and Tegretol and she states that that is why she ceased taking those medications. , ALJ Stalker asserted that there was little medical verification of these allergies and dismissively concluded that Plaintiff had been noncompliant. (Tr. at 26). However, ALJ Stalker’s decision to reject Plaintiffs claim of drug allergies was not supported by substantial evidence. Three of Plaintiffs physicians have noted her allergic reactions to the seizure medications (Tr. at 169,173 & 182). For example, on December 5, 1996, Karim Fram M.D. stated the following:

Ms. Taylor was seen on follow-up visit and she reported one seizure early today associated with brief loss of consciousness and jerking of the whole body followed by post ictal forgetfulness for a few minutes. The patient was unable to use Tegretol because of developing rash and swelling of her tongue. She was allergic to Dilantin and Depakote before. She is allergic to Tegretol at this time.

(Tr. at 169).

Significantly, just three days prior to that December 6, 1996 report by Dr. Fram, the level of Tegretol in Plaintiffs blood was within therapeutic range. (Tr. at 171) 2 This evidence supports Plaintiffs claim that she has experienced allergic reactions to her seizure medications when she has attempted to take them as prescribed. On this record, ALJ Stalker was not justified in presuming that Plaintiff has simply been noncompliant.

Moreover, to the extent that Plaintiff has not complied with her treatment, “the Secretary may not deny SSI disability benefits on the basis of noncompliance with treatment unless it is shown that compliance would restore the claimant’s ability to work_” Lucas v. Sullivan, 918 F.2d 1567, 1572 (11th Cir.1990). Despite ALJ Stalker’s finding to the contrary, there is no evidence in the record to refute Dr. Herrman’s opinion that Plaintiffs minor seizures continue when she has complied with her treating regimen.

To find that “the claimant’s current medications essentially control her seizures,” ALJ Stalker mischaracterized the record (Tr. at 28). For example, ALJ Stalker commented that Dr.

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Bluebook (online)
100 F. Supp. 2d 451, 1999 WL 1867071, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/taylor-v-apfel-mied-1999.