Taylor Reynolds v. Homecomings Financial Network

Ninth Circuit

Taylor Reynolds v. Homecomings Financial Network

599 F. App'x 802

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

DecidedApril 17, 2015

Docket13-15339

StatusUnpublished

This text of 599 F. App'x 802 (Taylor Reynolds v. Homecomings Financial Network) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Taylor Reynolds v. Homecomings Financial Network, 599 F. App'x 802 (9th Cir. 2015).

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Opinion

MEMORANDUM ***

Plaintiffs Taylor Lee Reynolds and Connie B. Evans appeal the district court’s partial dismissal of their complaint and partial grant of summary judgment to Defendants. Reviewing de novo, Lopez-Valenzuela v. Arpaio, 770 F.3d 772, 777 (9th Cir.2014) (en banc), petition for cert, filed, 83 U.S.L.W. 3631 (U.S. Jan. 13, 2015) (No. 14-825), we affirm.

1.Because Plaintiffs failed to raise to the district court their argument concerning the endorsement of the note, the argument is waived. O’Guinn v. Lovelock Corr. Ctr., 502 F.3d 1056, 1063 n. 3 (9th Cir.2007). In any event, it is unpersuasive. In Nevada, “a promissory note and a deed of trust are automatically transferred together unless the parties agree otherwise.” Edelstein v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon, 286 P.3d 249, 257 (Nev.2012) (en banc). As the district court explained, the deed of trust was transferred validly to the foreclosing entity, GMAC Mortgage, LLC. Because GMAC Mortgage was the beneficiary of the deed and the holder of the note, it had authority to foreclose on the property. Id. at 255. The district court properly granted summary judgment.

2. Contrary to Plaintiffs’ argument, “a mortgage note is a negotiable instrument.” Leyva v. Nat’l Default Servicing Corp., 255 P.3d 1275, 1279 (Nev.2011).

3. We have considered Plaintiffs’ other arguments and find none persuasive.

AFFIRMED.

***

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

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MEMORANDUM ***

Plaintiffs Taylor Lee Reynolds and Connie B. Evans appeal the district court’s partial dismissal of their complaint and partial grant of summary judgment to Defendants. Reviewing de novo, Lopez-Valenzuela v. Arpaio, 770 F.3d 772, 777 (9th Cir.2014) (en banc), petition for cert, filed, 83 U.S.L.W. 3631 (U.S. Jan. 13, 2015) (No. 14-825), we affirm.

1.Because Plaintiffs failed to raise to the district court their argument concerning the endorsement of the note, the argument is waived. O’Guinn v. Lovelock Corr. Ctr., 502 F.3d 1056, 1063 n. 3 (9th Cir.2007). In any event, it is unpersuasive. In Nevada, “a promissory note and a deed of trust are automatically transferred together unless the parties agree otherwise.” Edelstein v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon, 286 P.3d 249, 257 (Nev.2012) (en banc). As the district court explained, the deed of trust was transferred validly to the foreclosing entity, GMAC Mortgage, LLC. Because GMAC Mortgage was the beneficiary of the deed and the holder of the note, it had authority to foreclose on the property. Id. at 255. The district court properly granted summary judgment.

2. Contrary to Plaintiffs’ argument, “a mortgage note is a negotiable instrument.” Leyva v. Nat’l Default Servicing Corp., 255 P.3d 1275, 1279 (Nev.2011).

3. We have considered Plaintiffs’ other arguments and find none persuasive.

AFFIRMED.

***

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

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599 F. App'x 802, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/taylor-reynolds-v-homecomings-financial-network-ca9-2015.

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