Taylor, K. v. Braverman, K.

• Court: Superior Court of Pennsylvania
• Decided: April 13, 2026
• Docket: 1666 EDA 2025
• Status: Unpublished
• Author: Kunselman

Opinion

J-A01027-26

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

KATHRYN A. TAYLOR, INDIVIDUALLY : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF AND AS ADMINISTRATRIX OF THE : PENNSYLVANIA ESTATE OF MARK TAYLOR, : DECEASED : : Appellant : : : v. : No. 1666 EDA 2025 : : KEITH BRAVERMAN AND DIANE : BRAVERMAN, H/W :

Appeal from the Order Entered June 18, 2025 In the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County Civil Division at No(s): 2025-00982

BEFORE: DUBOW, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and SULLIVAN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY KUNSELMAN, J.: FILED APRIL 13, 2026

In this breach of contract action, Kathryn Taylor, individually, and as

administratrix of the estate of her deceased husband, Mark Taylor, (“Taylor”)

appeals from the order sustaining the preliminary objections of Keith and

Diane Braverman (“the Bravermans”). Taylor claims that the trial court erred

in concluding that the doctrine of res judicata bars this action. Upon review,

we affirm.

This appeal arises from the sale of Taylor’s home to the Bravermans.

The trial court summarized the factual and procedural history as follows:

On July 18, 2024, [Taylor] first filed suit against [the Bravermans] for breach of contract in case number 2024-04554 (“First Suit”). [Taylor had] agreed to sell her residence to [the Bravermans] for $525,000. Because the residence was worth more than $525,000, J-A01027-26

[the Bravermans] allegedly agreed to give [Taylor] an additional sum of $125,000. [Taylor] alleged that [the Bravermans] failed to pay the additional sum. [Taylor] is Keith Braverman’s aunt.

On November 13, 2024, [the Bravermans] filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings. [They] alleged that the defenses of statutes of fraud[], the merger doctrine, and the parol evidence rule barred recovery. On February 1, 2025, [the trial court] granted [the Bravermans] motion for judgment on the pleadings. [Taylor did not appeal that decision.]

On February 27, 2025, [Taylor] filed a second suit against [the Bravermans] in case number 2025-00982 (“Second Suit”) [or “instant action”]. The suit involved the same issue as the First Suit . . . but the Second Suit [attached a written agreement to the complaint which the Bravermans signed on May 1, 2022, and allegedly agreed to repay a $120,000 personal loan to Taylor].

On March 21, 2025, [the Bravermans] filed preliminary objections. [They] alleged that [Taylor’s] claim was barred by the doctrine of res judicata. [Taylor filed a response claiming that the decision in the First Suit was not a decision on the merits and that she attached a written document to the complaint in the Second Suit.] On June 18, 2025, [the trial court] sustained [the Bravermans’] preliminary objections and dismissed [Taylor’s Second Suit] with prejudice.

Trial Court Opinion, 8/4/2025, at 1-2 (citations omitted) (excessive

capitalization omitted).

Taylor filed this timely appeal. She and the trial court complied with

Appellate Rule 1925.

Taylor raises the following single issue for our review:

I. Whether the [trial court] committed an error of law when it determined that [Taylor’s] cause of action was barred by res judicata “because the same action had already been litigated in a prior case” when in fact the action was never and has not been litigated in this or any other court.

Taylor’s Brief at 3.

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Preliminarily, we note that “[o]ur standard of review of an order of the

trial court overruling or granting preliminary objections is to determine

whether the trial court committed an error of law. When considering the

appropriateness of a ruling on preliminary objections, the appellate court must

apply the same standard as the trial court.” De Lage Landen Fin. Servs.,

Inc. v. Urban P'ship, LLC, 903 A.2d 586, 589 (Pa. Super. 2006).

“Preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer test the legal sufficiency of the complaint.” When considering preliminary objections, all material facts set forth in the challenged pleadings are admitted as true, as well as all inferences reasonably deducible therefrom. Preliminary objections which seek the dismissal of a cause of action should be sustained only in cases in which it is clear and free from doubt that the pleader will be unable to prove facts legally sufficient to establish the right to relief. If any doubt exists as to whether a demurrer should be sustained, it should be resolved in favor of overruling the preliminary objections.

Hykes v. Hughes, 835 A.2d 382, 383 (Pa. Super. 2003) (citations omitted).

The doctrine of res judicata is intended “to foreclose repetitious litigation

by barring parties from re-litigating a matter that was previously litigated or

could have been litigated.” Wilmington Trust Nat'l Assoc. v. Unknown

Heirs, 219 A.3d 1173, 1179 (Pa. Super. 2019) (emphasis added). “Thus, a

party must raise all matters related to an issue at first opportunity or be

forever barred from raising them again.” Khalil v. Travelers Indem. Co. of

America, 273 A.3d 1211, 1224 (Pa. Super. 2022) (internal citation and

brackets omitted)

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The party claiming res judicata must establish four common elements

(or four identities) before the doctrine applies: (1) identity of issues; (2)

identity of causes of action; (3) identity of persons and parties to the action;

and (4) identity of the quality or capacity of the parties suing or sued. See

Wilkes ex rel. Mason v. Phoenix Home Life Mut. Ins. Co., 902 A.2d 366,

378 n.9 (Pa. 2006). The trial court “may consider whether the factual

allegations of both actions are the same, whether the same evidence is

necessary to prove each action and whether both actions seek compensation

for the same damages.” Dempsey v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 653 A.2d 679,

681 (Pa. Super. 1995) (en banc) (citation omitted).

Additionally, the prior action must have resulted in a final judgment on

the merits. See id. at 680-81. A final judgment exists where the trial court

“passed directly on the substance of the claim” in the prior litigation. U.S.

Bank Nat'l Ass'n v. Davis, 232 A.3d 952, 955 (Pa. Super. 2020).

Furthermore, the application of the doctrine of res judicata presents a

question of law. Our standard of review is de novo and our scope of review is

plenary. Moyer v. Shaffer, 305 A.3d 1064, 1067 (Pa. Super. 2023).

In her sole issue on appeal in the instant action, Taylor claims that the

trial court erred in applying the doctrine of res judicata and dismissing this

case. Taylor first argues that it was inappropriate for the Bravermans to raise

res judicata by preliminary objection rather than as an affirmative defense in

new matter. Taylor further argues that res judicata only bars the relitigation

of claims previously decided on the merits. Here, because there was no

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hearing on the merits or even oral argument, Taylor maintains that the trial

court did not dispose of the matter on its merits, and therefore there was no

final judgment. Lastly, Taylor argues that she was not required to attach May

1, 2022, agreement, which she attached to the complaint in the instant action,

to the complaint in the First Suit. Moreover, she argues that her failure to do

so does not preclude her from doing so now to show the Bravermans owed

her additional money. Therefore, according to Taylor, the trial court erred in

sustaining the Bravermans’ preliminary objection, and this Court should

reverse the trial court’s order. Taylor’s Brief at 9-10. We disagree.

Generally, res judicata is an affirmative defense which should be pled

as new matter. See Pa.R.C.P. 1030(a). However, the proper method for

challenging the procedural propriety of another party's preliminary objection

raising res judicata is to file a preliminary objection. Duquesne Slag

Products Co. v. Lench, 415 A.2d 53, 54 (Pa. 1980). Further, “‘[w]here a

party erroneously asserts substantive defenses in preliminary objections

rather than . . . in new matter, the failure of the opposing party to file

preliminary objections to defective preliminary objections . . . waives the

procedural defect and allows the trial court to rule on the preliminary

objections.’” Hvizdak v. Linn, 190 A.3d 1213, 1228 (Pa. Super. 2018)

(quoting Preiser v. Rosenzweig, 614 A.2d 303 (Pa. Super. 1992)).

Furthermore, it is well-settled that “[i]ssues not raised in the trial court are

waived and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.” Pa.R.A.P. 302(a).

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Here, as the Bravermans claim, Taylor did not file preliminary objections

to challeng the procedural method by which the Bravermans asserted their

claim of res judicata. Instead, Taylor filef an answer to the Bravermans’

preliminary objection.1 As such, Taylor waived her argument that the

Bravermans improperly raised the doctrine of res judicata by preliminary

objection, and the trial court properly considered the Bravermans’ res judicata

claim.2 We now consider the merits of Taylor’s challenge to the Bravermans’

assertion of res judicata.

The trial court concluded that res judicata applied and barred the instant

action. The court noted that the issue in the First Suit was the same in the

instant action, i.e., whether the Bravermans owed Taylor additional money

for her home. We further observe that Taylor similarly sued the Bravermans,

being the same parties, in the First Suit for breach of contract as she did in

____________________________________________

1 By doing so, Taylor effectively treated the Bravermans’ objection as new matter and answered it. Taylor could not accomplish anything more by requiring them to strictly follow the proper procedure, which she herself did not do. Therefore, Taylor was not prejudiced when the trial court considered the Bravermans’ preliminary objection. See Rufo v. Bastian-Blessing Co., 207 A.2d 823, 826 (Pa. 1965).

2 Notwithstanding this, we note that this Court has held that res judicata may

be raised by preliminary objection. A court may overlook the invocation of res judicata in a preliminary objection where, as here, the complaint at issue refers to the prior action and the facts surrounding the prior and current litigation are not in dispute. See Khalil v. Cole, 240 A.3d 996, 1001 (Pa. Super. 2020); Ellis v. Moran Foods, 344 A.3d 1126 (Pa. Super. 2025), appeal denied, 2026 WL 276125 (Pa. Feb. 3, 2026).???

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the instant action. Therefore, both actions had the required

elements/identities in common.

But Taylor claims that the order granting judgment on the pleadings in

the First Suit was not a determination on the merits in that case. Taylor is

correct that, for res judicata to apply, Pennsylvania law requires that the trial

court dispose of the matter in the prior litigation on its merits and “pass[]

directly on the substance of the claim.” See supra.

This court has explained the distinction between a judgment on the

merits and a judgment which is not:

“A judgment for the defendant is not on the merits where it is based merely on rules of procedure rather than on rules of substantive law. If the judgment determines that the plaintiff has no cause of action, it is on the merits; but if it determines only that the plaintiff is not entitled to recover in the particular action, it is not on the merits. If the defendant, whether on demurrer, motion, verdict or otherwise, obtains judgment in his favor on a ground not involving the substance of the plaintiff's cause of action, the cause of action is not extinguished thereby. This is the case, for example, where the judgment is based on the lack of jurisdiction of the court over the defendant or over the subject of the action, on the plaintiff's lack of capacity to sue, on the pendency of a prior action, on the misjoinder or nonjoinder of parties or on the misjoinder of causes of action.”

Brown v. Cooney, 442 A.2d 324, 326 (Pa. 1982) (quoting Restatement,

Judgments section 49, Comment a (1942)) (emphasis added). A motion for

judgment on the pleadings is similar to a demurrer. It may be entered when

there are no disputed issues of fact and the moving party is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law. Erie Ins. Exch. v. Mione, 253 A.3d 754, 759

(Pa. Super. 2021) (citation omitted). Eynon v. United States Steel Corp.,

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336 A.3d 983 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2025), reargument denied (May 29, 2025),

appeal denied, 2025 WL 3277686 (Pa. Nov. 25, 2025); 50 C.J.S. Judgments

section 633, p. 67 (1947).

Here, the trial court determined, as a matter of law and based on

________, that the Bravermans were entitled to judgment. According to the

trila court, it based its decision on ________________. This operated as a

demurred to Taylor’s action. Thus, the trial court’s order granting the

Bravermans’ motion for judgment of the pleadings was a demurrer and

therefore a final judgment on the merits; it was not merely procedural. If

Taylor was displeased with this result, she could have appealed but did not.

Lastly, Taylor’s argument that her attachment of the written, purported

agreement between Taylor and the Bravermans for additional money to the

complaint in the instant action renders res judicata inapplicable, is meritless.

As the trial court observed, res judicata bars the “relitigation of issues that

could have been raised.” Trial Court Opinion, 8/5/25, at 3. Here, Taylor could

have attached this document to the complaint in the First Suit, but she did not

and does not explain why now. Instead, she simply, and incorrectly, maintains

that she was not required to attach it to her complaint in the First Suit.

Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1019 provides that, “[w]hen any claim or

defense is based upon an agreement, the pleading shall stte specifically if the

agreement is oral or written. . . . [and] when any claim or defense is based

upon a writing, the pleader shall attach a copy of the writing.” Pa.R.C.P.

1019((h) and (i). Seemingly, Taylor could have attached this writing but did

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not. Regardless, it remains that the First Suit is the same as the instant action

and res judicata applies to bar the instant action.

Accordingly, from our review of the record, we conclude that the trial

court did not commit an error of law or abuse its discretion by granting the

Bravemans’ preliminary objection and dismissing Taylor’s complaint in the

instant action. As the trial court observed, Taylor sought to relitigate the First

Suit when she filed the instant action, which is prohibited under the law.

Order affirmed.

Date: 4/13/2026

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