IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 24-1149 Filed April 9, 2025
TAYLOR JOSEPH JOHNSON, Petitioner-Appellee,
vs.
JENNIFER KAY STEELE, Respondent-Appellant. ________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Webster County, Kurt J. Stoebe,
Judge.
A mother appeals from modification of a custody decree placing physical
care of a child with the father. AFFIRMED.
Colin McCormack of Van Cleaf & McCormack Law Firm, LLP, Des Moines,
for appellant.
Dani L. Eisentrager of Eisentrager Law Office, Eagle Grove, for appellee.
Considered without oral argument by Greer, P.J., and Buller and
Langholz, JJ. 2
BULLER, Judge.
Jennifer Steele appeals from a decree modifying custody of a child to place
physical care with the father, Taylor Johnson. Jennifer contests whether there was
a material and substantial change in circumstances, whether Taylor proved he was
a superior caretaker, and the district court’s credibility findings. Taylor also
requests appellate attorney fees. We affirm and order Jennifer to pay Taylor $1000
for appellate attorney fees.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings
The parties were never married but share a child born in 2015. In 2019, the
parties were living in north central Iowa and stipulated to joint legal custody,
physical care with Jennifer, and visitation for Taylor.
Since the original stipulation, Jennifer moved to the Des Moines metro
and—in the district court’s words—“[h]er lifestyle became tumultuous.” She
worked at least six different jobs in four years, from daycare provider to sub-
sandwich maker. She, along with the child, lived in multiple residences during this
time, including an eviction that led to them living in a hotel for weeks. Jennifer’s
trial testimony and the child’s school records depict somewhat differing accounts
of the housing situation. During the same time period, her car was repossessed.
Her friend group and relationships were also in flux, characterized by the district
court as having “turmoil and instability.” As of trial, Jennifer had been living with
her new fiancé in an apartment for several months, and she said she was
occasionally delivering food for DoorDash but lacked full-time employment, which
she attributed in part to a difficult pregnancy. 3
Jennifer admitted at trial to a history of drug experimentation dating back to
“grade school,” but claimed she had not used drugs since 2013. The district court
found otherwise, concluding “other, more credible evidence demonstrates that
[Jennifer] has used methamphetamine throughout adulthood.” Jennifer attributed
a recent drug screen positive for amphetamines to her anxiety medicine. But she
also admitted to medical marijuana use essentially daily, up until a recent
pregnancy with another child. And Taylor described erratic behavior by Jennifer
he believed indicative of drug use. Although reports were made to the Iowa
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) regarding Jennifer’s drug use
around the child, none were founded. Despite denying personal drug use, Jennifer
agreed she had recently associated and lived with a person that had a “drug
history.”
The district court found the instability in Jennifer’s life had adversely affected
the child. School records showed numerous absences and tardies, leading the
school district to classify the child with “chronic absenteeism.” In the most recent
full academic year, the child missed twenty-two-and-a-half days of school and had
an additional eight tardies. In the most recent partial year, the child had
fifteen-and-a-half absences and thirty-eight tardies. The child was behind in
reading, writing, and math, and was placed on an individualized education program
(IEP). And the child had problems with hygiene and cleanliness, such as fleas and
dirty clothes. Jennifer’s estranged sister supplied damning testimony on the
conditions inside Jennifer’s home, describing human and animal feces on the floor
and how Jennifer’s parenting deteriorated after the original decree. And Taylor 4
described as many as five different caretakers assisting Jennifer with childcare in
recent years, from new boyfriends to neighbors she hardly knew.
Jennifer’s testimony, as summarized by the district court, “minimized” the
child’s problems and was inconsistent with other witnesses the court found more
credible—including Taylor, Taylor’s girlfriend and mother, Jennifer’s sister, and the
father of one of Jennifer’s other children. Jennifer also offered a variety of
explanations for the child’s hygiene issues, including blaming the child’s weight;
the district court found these explanations “unconvincing and unacceptable.”
Jennifer blamed the child’s “behavioral problems,” illness, and the numerous
“transitions” in housing for the school-attendance issues. And she testified that,
while she was “not always” sober from marijuana while caring for the child, she
tried to make sure another adult was there to help. Jennifer’s sister contradicted
this testimony, describing social-media posts by Jennifer showing drug use around
children in a living room.
In contrast to Jennifer, the court found Taylor had stable employment,
housing, and relationships. Taylor lived with his girlfriend and their shared son in
a house he owned in a small Wright County community. He worked predictable
hours and was paid well as a maintenance technician. And his extended family,
who the child was bonded to, would be a support.
The court described the parties as “polar opposite homes and parenting,”
with Taylor offering the safety and stability that Jennifer could not. And the court
emphasized that, even if Jennifer addressed some of her instability in the
immediate leadup to trial, “she [was] merely at the high point of her cyclical
behavior.” 5
The court decreed that it was time for the child “to be off her mother’s
merry-go-round,” found there had been a substantial change in circumstances,
placed physical care with Taylor based on his superior ability to parent, and
granted Jennifer visitation. Jennifer appeals.
II. Standard of Review
“Our review of a modification proceeding is de novo in light of the fact the
case was heard in equity.” Christy v. Lenz, 878 N.W.2d 461, 464 (Iowa Ct.
App. 2016). “At the same time, we recognize the virtues inherent in listening to
and observing the parties and witnesses.” In re Marriage of Pendergast, 565
N.W.2d 354, 356 (Iowa Ct. App. 1997). “In equity cases, especially when
considering the credibility of witnesses, the appellate court gives weight to the
fact-findings of the district court, but is not bound by them.” Iowa R. App.
P. 6.904(3)(g).
III. Discussion
Jennifer contests whether there was a substantial change in circumstances
and whether Taylor was a superior parent. But the throughline of her complaints
is a fundamental disagreement with the district court’s assessment of credibility:
she wishes the district court had believed her instead of the other witnesses. But
this is no basis for relief on appeal. We are a court for the correction of errors at
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 24-1149 Filed April 9, 2025
TAYLOR JOSEPH JOHNSON, Petitioner-Appellee,
vs.
JENNIFER KAY STEELE, Respondent-Appellant. ________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Webster County, Kurt J. Stoebe,
Judge.
A mother appeals from modification of a custody decree placing physical
care of a child with the father. AFFIRMED.
Colin McCormack of Van Cleaf & McCormack Law Firm, LLP, Des Moines,
for appellant.
Dani L. Eisentrager of Eisentrager Law Office, Eagle Grove, for appellee.
Considered without oral argument by Greer, P.J., and Buller and
Langholz, JJ. 2
BULLER, Judge.
Jennifer Steele appeals from a decree modifying custody of a child to place
physical care with the father, Taylor Johnson. Jennifer contests whether there was
a material and substantial change in circumstances, whether Taylor proved he was
a superior caretaker, and the district court’s credibility findings. Taylor also
requests appellate attorney fees. We affirm and order Jennifer to pay Taylor $1000
for appellate attorney fees.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings
The parties were never married but share a child born in 2015. In 2019, the
parties were living in north central Iowa and stipulated to joint legal custody,
physical care with Jennifer, and visitation for Taylor.
Since the original stipulation, Jennifer moved to the Des Moines metro
and—in the district court’s words—“[h]er lifestyle became tumultuous.” She
worked at least six different jobs in four years, from daycare provider to sub-
sandwich maker. She, along with the child, lived in multiple residences during this
time, including an eviction that led to them living in a hotel for weeks. Jennifer’s
trial testimony and the child’s school records depict somewhat differing accounts
of the housing situation. During the same time period, her car was repossessed.
Her friend group and relationships were also in flux, characterized by the district
court as having “turmoil and instability.” As of trial, Jennifer had been living with
her new fiancé in an apartment for several months, and she said she was
occasionally delivering food for DoorDash but lacked full-time employment, which
she attributed in part to a difficult pregnancy. 3
Jennifer admitted at trial to a history of drug experimentation dating back to
“grade school,” but claimed she had not used drugs since 2013. The district court
found otherwise, concluding “other, more credible evidence demonstrates that
[Jennifer] has used methamphetamine throughout adulthood.” Jennifer attributed
a recent drug screen positive for amphetamines to her anxiety medicine. But she
also admitted to medical marijuana use essentially daily, up until a recent
pregnancy with another child. And Taylor described erratic behavior by Jennifer
he believed indicative of drug use. Although reports were made to the Iowa
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) regarding Jennifer’s drug use
around the child, none were founded. Despite denying personal drug use, Jennifer
agreed she had recently associated and lived with a person that had a “drug
history.”
The district court found the instability in Jennifer’s life had adversely affected
the child. School records showed numerous absences and tardies, leading the
school district to classify the child with “chronic absenteeism.” In the most recent
full academic year, the child missed twenty-two-and-a-half days of school and had
an additional eight tardies. In the most recent partial year, the child had
fifteen-and-a-half absences and thirty-eight tardies. The child was behind in
reading, writing, and math, and was placed on an individualized education program
(IEP). And the child had problems with hygiene and cleanliness, such as fleas and
dirty clothes. Jennifer’s estranged sister supplied damning testimony on the
conditions inside Jennifer’s home, describing human and animal feces on the floor
and how Jennifer’s parenting deteriorated after the original decree. And Taylor 4
described as many as five different caretakers assisting Jennifer with childcare in
recent years, from new boyfriends to neighbors she hardly knew.
Jennifer’s testimony, as summarized by the district court, “minimized” the
child’s problems and was inconsistent with other witnesses the court found more
credible—including Taylor, Taylor’s girlfriend and mother, Jennifer’s sister, and the
father of one of Jennifer’s other children. Jennifer also offered a variety of
explanations for the child’s hygiene issues, including blaming the child’s weight;
the district court found these explanations “unconvincing and unacceptable.”
Jennifer blamed the child’s “behavioral problems,” illness, and the numerous
“transitions” in housing for the school-attendance issues. And she testified that,
while she was “not always” sober from marijuana while caring for the child, she
tried to make sure another adult was there to help. Jennifer’s sister contradicted
this testimony, describing social-media posts by Jennifer showing drug use around
children in a living room.
In contrast to Jennifer, the court found Taylor had stable employment,
housing, and relationships. Taylor lived with his girlfriend and their shared son in
a house he owned in a small Wright County community. He worked predictable
hours and was paid well as a maintenance technician. And his extended family,
who the child was bonded to, would be a support.
The court described the parties as “polar opposite homes and parenting,”
with Taylor offering the safety and stability that Jennifer could not. And the court
emphasized that, even if Jennifer addressed some of her instability in the
immediate leadup to trial, “she [was] merely at the high point of her cyclical
behavior.” 5
The court decreed that it was time for the child “to be off her mother’s
merry-go-round,” found there had been a substantial change in circumstances,
placed physical care with Taylor based on his superior ability to parent, and
granted Jennifer visitation. Jennifer appeals.
II. Standard of Review
“Our review of a modification proceeding is de novo in light of the fact the
case was heard in equity.” Christy v. Lenz, 878 N.W.2d 461, 464 (Iowa Ct.
App. 2016). “At the same time, we recognize the virtues inherent in listening to
and observing the parties and witnesses.” In re Marriage of Pendergast, 565
N.W.2d 354, 356 (Iowa Ct. App. 1997). “In equity cases, especially when
considering the credibility of witnesses, the appellate court gives weight to the
fact-findings of the district court, but is not bound by them.” Iowa R. App.
P. 6.904(3)(g).
III. Discussion
Jennifer contests whether there was a substantial change in circumstances
and whether Taylor was a superior parent. But the throughline of her complaints
is a fundamental disagreement with the district court’s assessment of credibility:
she wishes the district court had believed her instead of the other witnesses. But
this is no basis for relief on appeal. We are a court for the correction of errors at
law, limited to reviewing the cold record of live proceedings below. See Iowa Code
§ 602.5103(1) (2023). We do not see witnesses first-hand, we cannot evaluate
demeanor, and we are ill-suited to resolving irreconcilable testimony—like the
disagreements between Jennifer and the balance of the witnesses at trial. For
these reasons, even when we engage in de novo review, we give the district court’s 6
fact findings “weight and defer especially where the credibility of witnesses is a
factor in the outcome.” Hora v. Hora, 5 N.W.3d 635, 645 (Iowa 2024) (cleaned
up). So, while we understand why Jennifer wishes the district court credited her
rather than the other witnesses, we are not persuaded to second-guess the
credibility findings of a trial court.
In seeking to disturb the physical-care status quo, Taylor had to prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that conditions related to parenting the child have
materially and substantially changed since the 2019 custody decree. See In re
Marriage of Frederici, 338 N.W.2d 156, 158 (Iowa 1983); Thorpe v. Hostetler, 949
N.W.2d 1, 5 (Iowa Ct. App. 2020). To be material and substantial, changed
circumstances must meet three criteria: (1) the court did not contemplate those
circumstances when entering the decree; (2) the changes are essentially
permanent; and (3) the changed circumstances relate to the welfare of the child.
See Frederici, 338 N.W.2d at 158; Thorpe, 949 N.W.2d at 5. To warrant
modification, the parent seeking to change custody bears the burden to prove a
superior ability to care for the child. In re Marriage of Hoffman, 867 N.W.2d 26, 32
(Iowa 2015).
Contrary to Jennifer’s claim on appeal, we do not find the district court’s
finding on the material and substantial change in circumstances to be “vague.” It’s
clear to us the overall issue was Jennifer’s instability and deficiencies in parenting,
as manifested through the combination of housing, transportation, and
employment issues; hygiene problems; poor school attendance; and drug use
(whether marijuana, methamphetamine, or both). Although Jennifer has
experienced some of these problems throughout her life, the trial testimony paints 7
a picture of accelerating instability that was not contemplated by the parties at the
time of the original stipulated decree. While each individual area of instability might
not have warranted modification on its own, the aggregate circumstances satisfied
Taylor’s heavy burden to prove modification is warranted, as they amount to an
essentially permanent material and substantial change in circumstance that affects
the welfare of the child.
Having found modification warranted, we consider whether Taylor proved
he would be the superior caretaker. We have already listed the deficits in
Jennifer’s parenting established by the record, and we review these in light of the
district court’s credibility findings. Many of those same credibility determinations
weigh in favor of Taylor, given the contrast the court below drew between his home
and parenting and that of Jennifer. We generally agree with these findings. Taylor
offers more stable housing, employment, and transportation. There is no evidence
he uses drugs or associates with persons who do. And he has no history of
hindering the child’s educational progress. Our reading of the record also indicates
that Taylor has insight into how Jennifer’s instability has negatively affected the
child—insight Jennifer sorely lacks regarding her own conduct. For these reasons,
we agree with the district court that the record established Taylor was a superior
caretaker compared to Jennifer.
Last, Taylor seeks appellate attorney fees. Jennifer did not file a reply brief,
leaving his request uncontested. We could likely grant Taylor’s request on that
basis alone. See In re Marriage of Schuler, 6 N.W.3d 338, 341 (Iowa Ct. App.
2024). But even if Jennifer had resisted, we would exercise our discretion to order
her to pay some amount of Taylor’s appellate attorney fees: Taylor prevailed over 8
all issues appealed, and he was obligated to defend the district court ruling. See
Iowa Code § 600B.26. But we are mindful of Jennifer’s somewhat lesser financial
means in comparison to Taylor’s. Based on the record regarding her income, we
order Jennifer to pay $1000 toward Taylor’s appellate attorney fees.
AFFIRMED.