IN THE
Court of Appeals of Indiana T.J., FILED Appellant-Respondent Oct 03 2025, 10:45 am
CLERK Indiana Supreme Court Court of Appeals v. and Tax Court
J.J., Appellee-Petitioner
October 3, 2025 Court of Appeals Case No. 25A-DC-457 Appeal from the Hamilton Superior Court The Honorable David K. Najjar, Judge Trial Court Cause No. 29D05-2005-DC-3392
Opinion by Judge Weissmann Judges Bailey and Brown concur.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-DC-457 | October 3, 2025 Page 1 of 23 Weissmann, Judge.
[1] When T.J. (Father) and J.J. (Mother) divorced in 2020, they agreed, and the
dissolution court ordered, that they would share joint legal custody of their two
young sons (Children) and that Mother would have primary physical custody of
them subject to Father’s regular parenting time. Father injured one child by
throwing a toy in anger and on other occasions the parents disagreed about
Children’s medical treatment. Mother then sought to modify the dissolution
decree. She requested sole legal custody of Children and restrictions on Father’s
parenting time. The dissolution court granted such relief, first through a
preliminary order and then through a final judgment a year later. Father
appeals, and we affirm, finding the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
modifying legal and physical custody.
Facts [2] Mother and Father, who married in 2010, are the parents of M.J., born in 2016,
and F.J., born in 2018. The 10-year marriage was dissolved through a Mediated
Waiver of Final Hearing, Decree of Dissolution of Marriage, Settlement Agreement and
Judgment Entry (Decree) in September 2020.
[3] The Decree specified that Mother and Father would have joint legal custody of
Children and that Mother would have primary physical custody subject to
Father’s parenting time. Under the Decree, Father would pay child support of
$165 weekly, as well as $150 weekly for work-related childcare expenses for the
younger child. The Decree also noted that Mother and Father had opted against
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-DC-457 | October 3, 2025 Page 2 of 23 vaccinating Children but that they would discuss future vaccinations upon
request of either parent.
[4] Fourteen months after the Decree was entered, Mother petitioned for
modification of custody and parenting time based, among other things, on her
allegations that Father had improperly disciplined Children and left them alone
while driving his girlfriend to work. Mother and Father resolved part of these
issues through a mediated settlement, and Mother ultimately withdrew her
remaining claims.
[5] In 2023, Mother became increasingly concerned about Father’s behaviors and
mental health. She alleged that Father sent her “bizarre and rambling
messages,” including one in which he stated that a religious sect had developed
the COVID vaccine to “depopulate” the world. App. Vol. II, p. 11; Tr. Vol. II,
p. 98. Mother believed Children were harmed by Father’s sharing of his views
with Children. Twice when one child needed emergency medical care, Father
declined the treatment that the physicians recommended and that Mother
endorsed based on Father’s own research of medical issues on the internet.
[6] In one instance, Father declined oral antibiotics to prevent infection when one
child was scratched by Father’s rooster. Father told the physician that he would
agree to the medication only if the child’s bloodwork was already abnormal.
The physician warned that if the child were not treated until after the infection
progressed, the child’s condition could deteriorate quickly. In the other
instance, Father disallowed a chest x-ray and oral antibiotics for the child after
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-DC-457 | October 3, 2025 Page 3 of 23 the child was taken to the emergency room with a respiratory infection.
Because the parties shared legal custody at the time and could not agree, the
child did not receive the treatment recommended by the attending physicians.
Father also refused to allow Children to drink from their paternal
grandmother’s water bottle because she had been vaccinated and he feared
Children would be adversely affected by her vaccinations through her saliva.
Father also had criticized the paternal grandmother for giving one of the
children Tylenol.
[7] On a different occasion, Father placed a bottle of potassium iodide in one
child’s jacket “to prevent radiation poisoning which enters into your thyroid
and eats away all your internal organs and skin . . . like the Chernobyl movie
where the guys are in the hospital dying horrendous deaths.” App. Vol. II, p. 8.
Father then advised Mother that “there will be a blackout of all
communications, likely electrical/gas, and internet in the not too distant
future.” Id. at 9. Father asked Mother to bring Children to his home “[w]hen
this happens . . . since we’ve been preparing for all of this for the last two
years.” Id.
[8] In early December 2023, Mother filed an emergency petition to modify Father’s
parenting time. She also petitioned for a protective order against Father,
alleging he injured their child after becoming angry and throwing a toy that hit
the child near his eye. When the child next reported to school with a black eye
from the incident, the school reported the injury to the Indiana Department of
Child Services, which thereafter investigated.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-DC-457 | October 3, 2025 Page 4 of 23 [9] A week after Mother’s emergency filings, the trial court conducted a hearing
and entered a preliminary order denying the protective order. But the court
restricted Father’s parenting time to “up to four (4) hours per week supervised
at an agency such as Kids Voice or Neutral Grounds at [Father’s] expense.” Id.
at 13. The court also preliminarily granted Mother temporary sole legal custody
of Children and recommended Father undergo a mental health evaluation. The
preliminary order further provided “[t]hat unless modified herein[,] all other
orders shall remain in full force and effect.” Id.
[10] Father, who represented himself throughout the modification proceedings,
opted not to schedule the supervised parenting time because he viewed
supervision at the facility as traumatic for Children and stigmatizing for him.
As a result, Father did not exercise any parenting time after December 2023
through the date of briefing in this appeal. He also opted to forgo the mental
health evaluation recommended by the court.
[11] Although Mother had temporary sole legal custody, Father continued to
instruct Mother as to which medical treatments Children should receive. For
instance, he told her to not allow Children to receive fluoride treatments at their
regular dental checkup in January 2024 and gave her materials from the internet
that he claimed supported his position. Mother proceeded with the fluoride
treatments.
[12] Shortly after the preliminary order was entered, Father persuaded Mother to
allow him to speak at length with Children by telephone, although the
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-DC-457 | October 3, 2025 Page 5 of 23 preliminary order allowed only supervised parenting time. Mother eventually
halted the calls, however, when Father discussed what she viewed as age-
inappropriate topics with Children (then 4 and 6) including transgenderism and
the assassination of President John F. Kennedy. Father thereafter sought
clarification from the court as to his ability to communicate with Children. In
February 2024, the trial court clarified that in light of its recommendation that
Father undergo a mental health evaluation and its finding that Children’s
mental and emotional wellbeing would be significantly impaired unless Father’s
parenting time was restricted, Father was not permitted to communicate with
Children outside of his supervised parenting time.
[13] The trial court denied Father’s repeated requests that the court stay or otherwise
not implement the preliminary order. At a review hearing in April 2024, Father
defended his decisions to reject recommended medical treatments for Children.
He testified that “[t]he medical decisions I made were based on me having
medical knowledge” and that Mother’s decision-making was wrong because she
was “uninformed.” Tr. Vol. II, pp. 161-162. Father also testified:
I know that I wasn’t in the wrong. I know that I protected my children from having antimicrobial resistance, any kind of negative drug risks that were being pushed on him as a result of medical child abuse which is established. It’s—and the reality of the people who are attacking me is based off of being uninformed about these risks.
Id. at 162.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-DC-457 | October 3, 2025 Page 6 of 23 [14] Shortly after the review hearing concluded, the court entered an order finding
that the emergency had not been remedied and that the restrictions on Father’s
parenting time and custodial decision-making should continue. The court
ordered that “[o]nce Father has engaged in supervised parenting time for a
period of at least 90 days, or upon a showing of a substantial change in
circumstances, any party may request a further review hearing to determine if
the restrictions should be modified or terminated.” App. Vol. II, p. 21.
[15] The trial court later permitted the State to intervene on the child support issue.
Mother, through her counsel, then petitioned for modification of child support,
for contempt for Father’s failure to meet his child support and other financial
obligations specified in the Decree, and for modification of the Decree to allow
Mother to claim the tax exemptions for the children annually. Two days later,
Father petitioned to enforce the Decree’s provision regarding vaccinations that
specified Mother and Father initially opted against vaccinating Children but
would discuss future vaccinations upon request of either parent.
[16] Then, in September 2024—10 months after the emergency hearing—Father
sought to reopen the evidence presented at that hearing, though a final hearing
was scheduled later that month. He claimed he had insufficient time to prepare
for the emergency hearing in December 2023. The trial court denied Father’s
motion without a hearing.
[17] The court proceeded on September 26, 2024, to conduct the first of two final
hearings. Mother testified that although she initially had agreed not to vaccinate
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-DC-457 | October 3, 2025 Page 7 of 23 Children, she now believed some vaccinations were necessary. She agreed to
inform Father if Children were vaccinated. Father continued to express
opposition to any vaccines, confidence in his own medical decision-making,
and a belief that Mother was uninformed on such issues.
[18] The court continued the final hearing to December 9, 2024, in an order denying
Father’s petition to enforce the vaccination provisions in the Decree. Viewing
Father’s petition as “a gross misunderstanding of the Court’s orders,” the court
rejected Father’s view that the vaccination provisions in the Decree remained
enforceable after the trial court granted Mother legal custody of Children in
December 2023. Id. at 30. The court clarified that Mother, as Children’s
temporary sole legal custodian, had the authority to make all medical decisions
for Children including those involving vaccinations.
[19] The order further provided:
The Court would remind the parties, and Respondent in particular, that this Court’s recommendation of a mental health examination for Respondent remains. This Court’s authority to review and reconsider whether an emergency exists also remains. Respondent, however, has done nothing to alleviate the Court’s concerns. Respondent, further, has done nothing to demonstrate that he is capable of engaging in productive parenting time with the children, having refused to engage in supervised parenting time. Respondent has, instead, invested his time and efforts into schooling himself as an amateur lawyer and an amateur physician. He is welcome to do so. But such efforts do not persuade this Court of his ability to effectively parent the children or to effectively communicate with Petitioner and co-parent in a way that furthers the best interests of the children.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-DC-457 | October 3, 2025 Page 8 of 23 Id. at 30-31.
[20] At the second final hearing in December, Mother testified that joint legal
custody was untenable because Father reacted hostilely to any opposition to his
views. She was concerned about his mental state, given the nature of some of
his writings to her. Mother also testified that they disagreed as to the topics that
should be discussed with Children.
[21] Father testified that he had not engaged in the supervised visitation ordered a
year earlier because “I’m not going to give this court additional information to
use against me from some person who doesn’t know me or the kids, to be used
as fodder to justify a decision that should never have been made against me in
the first place.” Tr. Vol. III, p. 12. He also stated: “Same thing goes for the
psychological evaluation[,] and I do not want my kids to have to go through
that experience and seeing me being babysat by somebody they don’t know
because they think that Dad did something wrong.” Id. Later, Father testified:
“I’m not going to follow these requirements to see my kids.” Id. at 15.
[22] In January 2025, the trial court issued its final order, accompanied by findings
of fact and conclusions of law. It granted Mother’s requests for sole legal
custody and for restrictions on Father’s parenting time, permitting Father up to
4 hours weekly of parenting time, to be supervised by a “professional agency.”
App. Vol. II, p. 72. The court specified that Father would be responsible “for
setting up the supervision and for all costs of the supervision.” Id. at 67. The
court also increased Father’s child support obligation, granted Mother the tax
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-DC-457 | October 3, 2025 Page 9 of 23 exemptions for Children, and denied Mother’s requests to hold Father in
contempt and for attorney fees. Father appeals.
Discussion and Decision [23] Father challenges the trial court’s modifications of legal custody and parenting
time. When, as here, a trial court enters findings of fact and conclusions of law
under Indiana Trial Rule 52(A), we apply a two-tiered standard of review: we
first determine whether the evidence supports the findings and then consider
whether the findings support the judgment. Hurst v. Smith, 192 N.E.3d 233, 242
(Ind. Ct. App. 2022). The trial court’s findings and conclusions will be set aside
only if they are “clearly erroneous”—that is, “if the record contains no facts or
inferences supporting the judgment.” Id. “A judgment is clearly erroneous when
a review of the record leaves us with a firm conviction that a mistake has been
made.” Id. In conducting this review, “we neither reweigh the evidence nor
assess the credibility of the witnesses but consider only the evidence most
favorable to the judgment.” Id.
[24] Guiding our review is the “well-established preference in Indiana ‘for granting
latitude and deference to our trial judges in family law matters.’” Steele-Giri v.
Steele, 51 N.E.3d 119, 124 (Ind. 2016) (quoting In re Marriage of Richardson, 622
N.E.2d 178 (Ind. 1993)). “Appellate courts ‘are in a poor position to look at a
cold transcript of the record, and conclude that the trial judge, who saw the
witnesses, observed their demeanor, and scrutinized their testimony as it came
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-DC-457 | October 3, 2025 Page 10 of 23 from the witness stand, did not properly understand the significance of the
evidence.’” Id. (quoting Kirk v. Kirk, 770 N.E.2d 304, 307 (Ind. 2002)).
[25] We also note that Father represents himself on appeal, and Mother has not filed
an appellee’s brief. The former circumstance does not impact the standard of
review, but the second does. Father is “held to the same legal standards as
licensed attorneys” so his pro se status garners no special consideration. Basic v.
Amouri, 58 N.E.3d 980, 983-84 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016). “[P]ro se litigants are
bound to follow the established rules of procedure and must be prepared to
accept the consequences of their failure to do so.” Id.
[26] But where, as here, no appellee’s brief is filed, the appellant need only prove
prima facie error to prevail on appeal. Salyer v. Washington Regular Baptist Church
Cemetery, 141 N.E.3d 384, 386 (Ind. 2020). “Prima facie error in this context
means ‘at first sight, on first appearance, or on the face of it.’” Id. (quoting Front
Row Motors, LLC v. Jones, 5 N.E.3d 753, 758 (Ind. 2014)). Although we will not
undertake to make arguments on behalf of the absent appellee, we remain
obligated to reach the correct result dictated by the law and facts. Jenkins v.
Jenkins, 17 N.E.3d 350, 352 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014). Under this standard, we
conclude that Father has not established prima facie error. Accordingly, we
affirm.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-DC-457 | October 3, 2025 Page 11 of 23 I. The Trial Court Did Not Violate Father’s Right to Due Process by Admitting Exhibits 1-10 or in Denying Father’s Motion to Correct Error [27] Father claims that the trial court’s admission “of [Mother’s] eight late-filed
exhibits and denial of Father’s Motion to Correct Error violated [Father’s]
Fourteenth Amendment due process rights by depriving him of a fair
opportunity to challenge evidence and present rebuttal evidence critical to the
January 28, 2025, Final Judgment.” Appellant’s Br., p. 24.
[28] Father has waived this due process claim in several ways.1 First, Father failed to
object on due process grounds to the admission of the exhibits that he now
challenges on appeal. See Dennerline v. Atterholt, 886 N.E.2d 582, 594 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2008) (finding waiver under similar circumstances based partly on the
long-standing rule that a party cannot argue on appeal an issue not properly
presented to the trial court).
[29] Second, Father’s motion to correct error was not timely filed. A motion to
correct error, “if any, must be filed not later than thirty (30) days after the entry
of a final judgment is noted in the Chronological Case Summary.” Indiana
Trial Rule 59(C). Father’s motion to correct error was filed January 17, 2024—
after the emergency hearing and preliminary order but a year before the trial
court entered final judgment. Father’s motion to correct error filed in response
1 Father repeatedly refers to the trial court judge solely by the judge’s last name. Father is advised in any future appellate filings to refer to the judge as judge, court, trial court, or “Judge [last name].”
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-DC-457 | October 3, 2025 Page 12 of 23 to an interlocutory order “is ineffective for any purpose.” Murray v. Murray, 309
N.E.2d 831, 832 (1974) (decided under prior version of appellate rules that
required the filing of a motion to correct error after a final judgment as a
prerequisite to appeal).
[30] Third, Father has not recited the legal standard by which due process violations
are determined. Nor has he provided any argument as to why that standard was
met here. Father therefore has waived this claim by failing to provide cogent
argument. See Lowrance v. State, 64 N.E.3d 935, 938 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (“We
will not become an ‘advocate for a party, or address arguments that are
inappropriate or are too poorly developed or expressed to be understood.’”)
(quoting Perry v. Anonymous Physician 1, 25 N.E.3d 103, 105 n.1 (Ind. Ct. App.
2014)); see also Ind. Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a)-(b) (specifying the required
contents of an appellant’s brief include relevant analysis and citation to
supporting authority).
[31] In any case, the exhibits that Father references were admitted during the
emergency hearing on December 15, 2023, that resulted in the preliminary
order. In his motion to correct error filed in response to the preliminary order,
Father essentially sought to supplement or refute Mother’s evidence presented
at the emergency hearing. Although the trial court denied Father’s motion to
correct error, he had the opportunity at three subsequent hearings—the review
hearing in April 2024 and the two final hearings in September and December
2024—to supplement or refute the exhibits that Mother admitted at the
emergency hearing on December 15, 2023. Father, in fact, seized that
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-DC-457 | October 3, 2025 Page 13 of 23 opportunity, although the trial court determined some of the evidence he
introduced was inadmissible. All these hearings occurred before the court’s final
judgment.
[32] Given these opportunities for Father to present the additional evidence that he
claims he was unable to introduce at the emergency hearing, the trial court did
not deny Father “a fair opportunity to challenge evidence and present rebuttal
evidence critical to the January 28, 2025, Final Judgment.” Appellant’s Br., p.
24.
II. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Modifying Legal Custody and Parenting Time [33] Father next contends the trial court erred in modifying legal custody and
restricting his parenting time. He argues that the trial court’s findings in support
of Mother’s sole legal custody are deficient and that the trial court erroneously
restricted his parenting time based on Father’s religion-based discussions with
Children without any showing of harm.
[34] We review custody modifications for an abuse of discretion “with a preference
for granting latitude and deference to our trial judges in family law matters.”
Hecht v. Hecht, 142 N.E.3d 1022, 1028 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020) (quoting Werner v.
Werner, 946 N.E.2d 1233, 1244 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011)). Parenting time
modifications likewise are reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. Maw
v. Pringle, 263 N.E.3d 790, 792 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025). We affirm the trial court’s
modification of both legal custody and parenting time.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-DC-457 | October 3, 2025 Page 14 of 23 A. Legal Custody [35] A court may not modify a legal custody order unless “the modification is in the
best interests of the child” and “there is a substantial change in one (1) or more
of the [statutory] factors that the court may consider.” Ind. Code § 31-17-2-
21(a). In determining whether an award of joint legal custody is in the best
interests of the child, the court considers the following factors:
(1) The age and sex of the child.
(2) The wishes of the child’s parent or parents.
(3) The wishes of the child, with more consideration given to the child’s wishes if the child is at least fourteen (14) years of age.
(4) The interaction and interrelationship of the child with:
(A) the child’s parent or parents;
(B) the child’s sibling; and
(C) any other person who may significantly affect the child’s best interests.
(5) The child’s adjustment to the child’s:
(A) home;
(B) school; and
(C) community.
(6) The mental and physical health of all individuals involved.
(7) Evidence of a pattern of domestic or family violence by either parent.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-DC-457 | October 3, 2025 Page 15 of 23 (8) Evidence that the child has been cared for by a de facto custodian, and if the evidence is sufficient, the court shall consider the factors described in section 8.5(b) of this chapter.
(9) A designation in a power of attorney of:
(A) the child’s parent; or
(B) a person found to be a de facto custodian of the child.
Ind. Code §§ 31-17-2-8, -21(b).
[36] Father contends that the trial court’s legal custody determination is not
supported by valid findings establishing a substantial change in circumstances
or that the modification was in Children’s best interests. He claims the court’s
relevant findings “rely on speculative allegations[] and late-filed exhibits [that]
prejudiced Father’s pro se defense, rendering the modification an abuse of
discretion.” Appellant’s Br., p. 15.
[37] Father particularly challenges the trial court’s findings that suggest Father’s
views, especially on medical issues, are “fringe.” App. Vol. II, pp. 63, 71. He
argues the trial court violated his rights under the First Amendment and
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution by basing its legal
custody decision partly on findings relating to his religious beliefs.
[38] We already have found that Father waived any error in, or suffered no
prejudice from, the admission of the allegedly late-filed exhibits. We need not
address Father’s remaining constitutional claims because even if we set aside
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-DC-457 | October 3, 2025 Page 16 of 23 the trial court’s findings about Father’s religious views, the remaining findings
support the trial court’s modification of legal custody.
[39] The trial court’s findings focused on the parties’ inability, as joint legal
custodians, to reach consensus on matters relating to Children. Joint legal
custody requires “that the persons awarded joint custody . . . share authority
and responsibility for the major decisions concerning the child’s upbringing,
including the child’s education, health care, and religious training.” Ind. Code §
31-9-2-67. “[T]he trial court decides ‘whether the parents have the ability to
work together for the best interests of their children.’” Pilkington v. Pilkington,
227 N.E.3d 885, 897 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024) (quoting Arms v. Arms, 803 N.E.2d
1201-10 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004)). Joint custody is inappropriate when “the parties
have made child-rearing a battleground.” Id. (quoting Periquet-Febres v. Febres,
659 N.E.2d 602, 605 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995)).
[40] Here, the court found that Mother and Father disagreed on medical treatment
in two situations when doctors recommended a course of treatment including
oral antibiotics, which Father opposed. The findings reflect that Mother and
Father also disagreed generally as to vaccinations, with Mother favoring some
vaccinations and Father opposing all.
[41] The court also noted Mother’s testimony that her disagreement with Father’s
views was “met with hostility” and that “co-parenting with Father is extremely
difficult.” App. Vol. II, pp. 62-63. And the court found that Mother objected to
Father discussing certain topics with Children that she deemed inappropriate
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-DC-457 | October 3, 2025 Page 17 of 23 for their young age. Id. at 63. The trial court also found that “Father discounts
and disregards the opinions of others if those opinions are not those that he
himself shares” and “[w]hen Mother expresses different opinions, and her views
are not given validity, co-parenting is impossible.” Id. at 66.
[42] Father acknowledges these disagreements, although he views his position as
correct and attributes the conflict to Mother being uninformed. Father’s
arguments on appeal reflect his continued disagreement with the trial court’s
assessment of the parties’ ability to cooperate. To the extent Father challenges
the trial court’s findings as unsupported by the evidence, such challenges
constitute a request for this Court to reweigh the evidence, which we cannot do
on appeal. See Steele-Giri, 51 N.E.3d at 124 ("Appellate judges are not to
reweigh the evidence nor reassess witness credibility.") (quoting Best v. Best, 941
N.E.2d 499, 502 (Ind. 2011)). The record contains sufficient evidence to support
the trial court’s findings regarding legal custody. These findings, in turn,
support the trial court’s judgment awarding Mother sole legal custody. The
court concluded:
54. It is in the best interests of the children that Mother have sole legal custody over the children, [and that she be] empowered to make decisions for the best interest of the children in all important matters, including health and medical decisions, education, and religious upbringing. This shall be without exception and shall necessarily include decisions about whether to vaccinate the children for various diseases and/or viruses.
***
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-DC-457 | October 3, 2025 Page 18 of 23 77. Despite their prior agreement to exercise joint legal custody, the parties now are not willing or able to communicate [or] exercise joint legal custody, [and] the parties now are not willing or able to communicate or cooperate in advancing the child’s [sic] welfare.
78. The Court cannot find that the children have established a close and beneficial relationship with Father as he has been voluntarily absent from their lives for at least a year.
79. The Court also has significant concerns regarding the fitness and suitability of Father to exercise joint legal custody.
80. These factors weigh heavily against an award of joint legal custody.
81. An application of these factors as well as the reality that Mother is the primary physical custodian weigh heavily in favor of Mother being awarded sole legal custody. Indeed, the children are with Mother exclusively due to Father’s refusal to participate in parenting time.
Id. at 67, 70-71.
[43] Given that the parties could no longer agree on matters central to Children’s
welfare—including whether they should exercise joint legal custody—and had
great difficulty cooperating with each other, the trial court did not err in
concluding a substantial change of circumstances existed. And the trial court’s
conclusion that Mother would be the better choice as legal custodian also was
justified by its findings, particularly considering that Mother had been
Children’s sole caretaker for the past year due to Father’s refusal to exercise
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-DC-457 | October 3, 2025 Page 19 of 23 supervised parenting time. For these reasons, Father’s challenge to the
modification of legal custody fails.
[44] This disposition also resolves Father’s alternate contention that granting
Mother sole legal custody—including control over medical decisions for
Children—violates the terms of the Decree. Mother successfully petitioned to
modify the Decree’s provision of joint legal custody. As we have determined,
such modification is countenanced by Indiana Code § 31-17-2-21(a) and
justified by the trial court’s findings and conclusions. This ruling left Mother in
sole control of medical decision-making for Children. Ind. Code § 31-17-2-17(a)
(“the [legal] custodian may determine the child’s upbringing, including the
child’s education, health care, and religious training”). Accordingly, Father’s
claim of a conflict between the legal custody modification and the Decree is
unavailing.
B. Parenting Time Restrictions [45] “Indiana has long recognized that the rights of parents to visit their children is a
precious privilege that should be enjoyed by noncustodial parents.” Duncan v.
Duncan, 843 N.E.2d 966, 969 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006). A trial court “may modify
an order granting or denying parenting time rights whenever modification
would serve the bests interests of the child.” Ind. Code § 31-17-4-2. But the
court “shall not restrict a parent’s parenting time rights unless [it] finds that the
parenting time might endanger the child’s physical health or significantly
impair the child’s emotional development.” Id. This statutory provision has
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-DC-457 | October 3, 2025 Page 20 of 23 been interpreted as barring parenting time restrictions “unless that visitation
would endanger the child’s physical health or emotional development.” Duncan,
843 N.E.2d at 969.
[46] Father claims the trial court erroneously restricted his parenting time to four
hours per week of supervised visits. He asserts the trial court violated his First
Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment rights by basing this decision partly
on findings relating to his religious beliefs. But again, even if we disregard the
trial court’s findings as to Father’s religious beliefs, the remaining findings
sufficiently support the trial court’s judgment restricting Father’s parenting
time.
[47] The trial court found that one of the children reported being injured during a
two-day visit with Father when Father became angry and threw a toy that
struck the child, who suffered a black eye. The court further found that a
teacher reported the child’s injury to authorities. The court was justifiably
concerned about Father exercising unsupervised parenting time after Father’s
expression of anger resulted in injury to the child. As the court found, Father
took no action afterward that increased the court’s confidence that unsupervised
visitation was safe for Children.
[48] The court also found that Father had refused to exercise his supervised
parenting time, meaning that he had not seen Children for a year. Father also
failed to undergo the recommended mental health evaluation—an assessment
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-DC-457 | October 3, 2025 Page 21 of 23 that presumably could have helped the court to determine whether Children
would be safe in Father’s unsupervised care or whether continued outbursts,
like the one that injured child, were possible. Finally, the court found that
Father’s expression of his “fringe” views on medicine to Children “can be and
is harmful to them and to their psychological and emotional well-being.” App.
Vol. II, p. 64. The court also determined that Father “engaged in a pattern of
denying standard medical care to the children, exposed the children to fringe . .
. medical views . . . that endanger the physical health of the children and
significantly impair the emotional development of the children.” Id. at 71.
[49] As with the court’s findings on legal custody, Father’s challenges to the non-
religious-based findings regarding parenting time are merely a request to
reweigh the evidence. These findings, which are based on evidence in the
record such as Father’s own statements, support the trial court’s conclusions
that Father’s behavior constituted a substantial change in circumstances
justifying modification of Father’s parenting time to four hours per week at a
supervision facility.
[50] The trial court’s order does not preclude Father from seeking modification of
his parenting time in the future. Should Father choose to participate in
supervised parenting time and demonstrate that circumstances have changed,
he may petition the court for expanded parenting time. Based on our standard
of review and the record before us, however, we cannot conclude that the trial
court erred in implementing the current restrictions on Father's parenting time.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-DC-457 | October 3, 2025 Page 22 of 23 [51] We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
Bailey, J., and Brown, J., concur.
APPELLANT PRO SE T.J. Noblesville, Indiana
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-DC-457 | October 3, 2025 Page 23 of 23