Tayjuan Trevion-Wayne Fletcher v. M. Adsuei et al.

CourtDistrict Court, W.D. Washington
DecidedDecember 1, 2025
Docket2:24-cv-00925
StatusUnknown

This text of Tayjuan Trevion-Wayne Fletcher v. M. Adsuei et al. (Tayjuan Trevion-Wayne Fletcher v. M. Adsuei et al.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, W.D. Washington primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Tayjuan Trevion-Wayne Fletcher v. M. Adsuei et al., (W.D. Wash. 2025).

Opinion

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5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 6 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT SEATTLE 7 8 TAYJUAN TREVION-WAYNE FLETCHER, 9 CASE NO. 2:24-cv-00925-TL-BAT Plaintiff, REPORT AND 10 v. RECOMMENDATION 11 M. ADSUEI et al., 12 D f d t

13 On June 14, 2024, while Plaintiff was a King County Jail detainee, he filed a § 1983 14 complaint alleging King County Jail Defendants violated his Eighth Amendment rights on May 15 17, 2024, by using excessive force against him. Plaintiff is now serving a criminal sentence at the 16 Washington Corrections Center. 17 On October 17, 2025, Defendants moved for summary judgment on the grounds Plaintiff 18 failed to exhaust his administrative remedies, and because the complaint fails to state a claim 19 upon which relief may be granted. Dkt. 25.1 Defendant’s summary judgment motion was noted 20 for November 14, 2025. Plaintiff has not responded to the motion. 21 22 23 1 Defendants also filed a Rand warning advising Plaintiff his case will be dismissed if summary judgment is granted; the Rand warning also advised Plaintiff what he must do to oppose the motion. Dkt. 29. 1 The Court having considered the summary judgment motion, supporting declarations and 2 the record recommends the motion be GRANTED and the case be DISMISSED with prejudice. 3 DISCUSSION 4 A. Summary Judgment Standard

5 The Court should grant summary judgment when the “movant shows that there is no 6 genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of 7 law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247 (1986). 8 The moving party has the initial burden of showing “that there is an absence of evidence 9 to support the nonmoving party’s case.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986). 10 Where the moving party does not have the burden at trial, it can meet its initial burden by 11 presenting evidence negating an essential element of the nonmoving party’s case, or by 12 establishing the nonmovant lacks sufficient evidence to satisfy its burden at trial. Nissan Fire & 13 Marine Ins. Co. v. Fritz Companies, Inc., 210 F.3d 1099, 1102 (9th Cir. 2000). Where the 14 moving party has the burden at trial, it can meet its initial burden by presenting evidence

15 sufficient to demonstrate that no reasonable trier of fact could find for the nonmoving party; the 16 evidence presented must establish beyond controversy every essential element of the claim. 17 Southern California Gas. Co. v. City of Santa Ana, 336 F.3d 885, 888–89 (9th Cir. 2003). 18 If the moving party meets its initial responsibility, the burden then shifts to the 19 nonmoving party to show a genuine issue of material fact for trial. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. 20 Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 585–87 (1986). A genuine dispute exists if the evidence 21 shows a “reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 22 258. Material facts are those which might affect the outcome of the suit under governing law. Id. 23 A mere scintilla of evidence cannot create a factual dispute. Id. at 252. Likewise, the nonmoving 1 party cannot “defeat summary judgment with allegations in the complaint, or with unsupported 2 conjecture or conclusory statements.” Hernandez v. Spacelabs Med. Inc., 343 F.3d 1107, 1112 3 (9th Cir. 2003). 4 Allegations based merely on the Plaintiff’s belief are not enough to oppose summary

5 judgment, as are unsupported conjecture and conclusory statements. Id.; McElyea v. Babbitt, 833 6 F.2d 196, 197–98 n.1 (9th Cir. 1987). In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the Court 7 must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, Matsushita Elec. Indus. 8 Co., 475 U.S. at 587, and may not weigh the evidence or make credibility determinations, 9 Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. 10 Where, as here, the nonmoving party fails to respond to the summary judgment motion, 11 the Court cannot grant the motion automatically. Heinemann v. Satterberg, 731 F.3d 914, 916 12 (9th Cir. 2013) (“[A] motion for summary judgment may not be granted based on a failure to file 13 an opposition to the motion.”); Local Rules W.D. Wash. LCR 7(b)(2). Rather, the Court can 14 grant summary judgment only if “the motion and supporting materials—including the facts

15 considered undisputed—show that the movant is entitled to it.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(3); see 16 Heinemann, 731 F.3d at 916. A fact may be considered undisputed at summary judgment if it is 17 raised in an unopposed motion. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(3); Heinemann, at 916. 18 B. Mandatory Exhaustion Requirement 19 Summary judgment in favor of Defendants should be granted because there is no dispute 20 Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies at the King County Jail before bringing 21 this action. Before a prisoner may bring a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, he or she 22 must first exhaust all available administrative remedies. Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act 23 of 1995 (“PLRA”): 1 No action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner 2 confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted. 3 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). Exhaustion in cases covered by § 1997e(a) is mandatory. Booth v. 4 Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 739 (2001). Exhaustion must be proper and complete. Thus, the mere 5 fact a plaintiff has filed an initial grievance under a detention center’s grievance policy does not 6 satisfy the PLRA exhaustion requirement; a plaintiff must exhaust all levels of an available 7 grievance procedure before he can initiate litigation. See id. at 736–41. Even when the prisoner 8 seeks relief not available in grievance proceedings, such as money damages, exhaustion is still a 9 prerequisite to suit. Booth, 532 U.S. at 741. If a claim is not exhausted, it must be dismissed. 10 McKinney v. Carey, 311 F.3d 1198, 1199 (9th Cir. 2002). 11 Failure to exhaust administrative remedies may be brought in a summary judgment 12 motion. Albino v. Baca, 747 F.3d 1162, 1168 (9th Cir. 2014). Once the defendant proves (1) 13 there was an available administrative remedy and (2) the plaintiff failed to exhaust the available 14 remedy, the burden shifts to the plaintiff. To avoid dismissal, the plaintiff must then show there 15 was something peculiar about his claim that made the “existing and generally available 16 administrative remedies effectively unavailable to him.” Williams v.

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Related

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.
477 U.S. 242 (Supreme Court, 1986)
Booth v. Churner
532 U.S. 731 (Supreme Court, 2001)
Theodore Heinemann, I v. Daniel Satterberg
731 F.3d 914 (Ninth Circuit, 2013)
Juan Albino v. Lee Baca
747 F.3d 1162 (Ninth Circuit, 2014)
Lonnie Williams, Jr. v. Daniel Paramo
775 F.3d 1182 (Ninth Circuit, 2015)
Parker v. Eddy
6 F.2d 196 (First Circuit, 1925)
McKinney v. Carey
311 F.3d 1198 (Ninth Circuit, 2002)

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Tayjuan Trevion-Wayne Fletcher v. M. Adsuei et al., Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/tayjuan-trevion-wayne-fletcher-v-m-adsuei-et-al-wawd-2025.