Tawny Sharp v. Deutsche Bank National Trust

623 F. App'x 425

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: November 25, 2015
• Docket: 12-56017
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

MEMORANDUM **

Tawny Sharp and David Walters appeal pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing their action arising out of foreclosure proceedings. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a dismissal on the basis of res judica-ta. Mpoyo v. Litton Electro-Optical Sys., 430 F.3d 985, 987 (9th Cir.2005). We affirm.

The district court properly dismissed plaintiffs’ action as barred by the doctrine of res judicata because plaintiffs could have raised their claims in Sharp’s prior California state court action, which involved the same primary rights, the same parties or their privies, and resulted in a final judgment on the merits. See Fed’n of Hillside & Canyon Ass’ns v. City of Los Angeles, 126 Cal.App.4th 1180, 24 Cal. Rptr.3d 543, 557 (2004) (setting forth elements of res judicata under California law and noting that “[r]es judicata bars the litigation not only of issues that were actually litigated but also issues that could have been litigated”); see also Mueller v. J.C Penney Co., 173 Cal.App.3d 713, 219 Cal.Rptr. 272 (1985) (“Under California law, spouses are in privity with each other where the cause of action in the prior litigation was ‘community in nature’ and the ‘proceeds of any judgment that might have been recovered ... would have belonged to both husband and wife, as community property.’” (quoting Zaragosa v. Craven, 33 Cal.2d 315, 321, 202 P.2d 73 (1949))).

We reject plaintiffs’ arguments that defendants lacked “constitutional standing” to bring a motion to dismiss or that the district court lacked authority to hear the motion.

AFFIRMED.

** This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.