Tavares-Dos Santos v. Blanche

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: May 26, 2026
• Docket: 22-1575
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAY 26 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

EUGENIO TAVARES-DOS SANTOS, No. 22-1575 Agency No. Petitioner, A099-038-635 v. MEMORANDUM*

TODD BLANCHE, Acting Attorney General,

Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted May 19, 2026** San Francisco, California

Before: COLLINS, JOHNSTONE, and DE ALBA, Circuit Judges.

Eugenio Tavares-Dos Santos, a native and citizen of Brazil, petitions for

review of an order by the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) denying his

motion to reopen his proceedings for cancellation of removal. We review for abuse

of discretion denials of motions to reopen. Lemus-Escobar v. Bondi, 158 F.4th 944,

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). 952 (9th Cir. 2025). We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252, and we deny the

petition.

1. The BIA denied Tavares-Dos Santos’s motion to reopen because the

evidence did not make a sufficient showing that removal would result in the

requisite hardship to his mother to establish prima facie eligibility for cancellation

of removal. See Fonseca-Fonseca v. Garland, 76 F.4th 1176, 1180 (9th Cir. 2023)

(identifying three independent grounds for denying reopening); see also 8 U.S.C.

§ 1229b(b)(1)(D) (hardship requirement for cancellation of removal); id.

§ 1229a(c)(7)(B) (motion to reopen must be supported by affidavits or other

evidence); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1) (motion to reopen must include “all supporting

documentation”). This conclusion was reasonable based on the evidence of

hardship submitted in support of the motion. Thus, Tavares-Dos Santos has not

shown that the BIA abused its discretion in denying his motion to reopen.

Because the BIA denied the motion solely on the dispositive hardship

element of cancellation and not as a matter of discretion, it was not required to

reach the impact of Tavares-Dos Santos’s vacated conviction on his claim. See

Najmabadi v. Holder, 597 F.3d 983, 991–92 (9th Cir. 2010); see also Virk v. INS,

295 F.3d 1055, 1060 (9th Cir. 2002) (“[T]he BIA must consider and weigh the

favorable and unfavorable factors in determining whether to deny a motion to

reopen proceedings on discretionary grounds.”).

2 22-1575 2. Tavares-Dos Santos failed to exhaust his claim for voluntary

departure because he did not raise it before the BIA. “To exhaust a claim, the

noncitizen must put the BIA on notice of the challenge, and the BIA must have an

opportunity to pass on the issue.” Suate-Orellana v. Garland, 101 F.4th 624, 629

(9th Cir. 2024) (citation modified). The motion to reopen and supplemental filings

focused exclusively on cancellation of removal and did not request voluntary

departure relief. Because we agree with the government that Tavares-Dos Santos

failed to exhaust this claim, we decline to consider it.

PETITION DENIED.

3 22-1575