Taurus Clyde Hill, II v. Sgt. Amin Baham, Jr., et al.

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Wisconsin
DecidedOctober 22, 2025
Docket2:25-cv-01212
StatusUnknown

This text of Taurus Clyde Hill, II v. Sgt. Amin Baham, Jr., et al. (Taurus Clyde Hill, II v. Sgt. Amin Baham, Jr., et al.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Wisconsin primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Taurus Clyde Hill, II v. Sgt. Amin Baham, Jr., et al., (E.D. Wis. 2025).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN

TAURUS CLYDE HILL, II,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 25-cv-1212-bhl

SGT. AMIN BAHAM, JR., et al.,

Defendants.

SCREENING ORDER

Plaintiff Taurus Clyde Hill, II, who is currently serving a state prison sentence at the Racine Correctional Institution and representing himself, filed a complaint under 42 U.S.C. §1983, alleging that his civil rights were violated. This matter comes before the Court on Hill’s motion for leave to proceed without prepayment of the filing fee and to screen the complaint. MOTION FOR LEAVE TO PROCEED WITHOUT PREPAYMENT OF THE FILING FEE Hill has requested leave to proceed without prepaying the full filing fee (in forma pauperis). A prisoner plaintiff proceeding in forma pauperis is required to pay the full amount of the $350.00 filing fee over time. See 28 U.S.C. §1915(b)(1). Hill has filed a certified copy of his prison trust account statement for the six-month period immediately preceding the filing of his complaint, as required under 28 U.S.C. §1915(a)(2), and has been assessed and paid an initial partial filing fee of $1.81. Therefore, the Court will grant Hill’s motion for leave to proceed without prepaying the filing fee. SCREENING OF THE COMPLAINT The Court has a duty to review any complaint in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity, and dismiss any complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised any claims that are legally “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §1915A(b). In screening a complaint, the Court must determine whether the complaint complies with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and states at least plausible claims for which relief may be granted. To state a cognizable claim under the federal notice pleading system, a plaintiff is required to provide a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that [he] is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). It must be at least sufficient to provide notice to each defendant of what he or she is accused of doing, as well

as when and where the alleged actions or inactions occurred, and the nature and extent of any damage or injury the actions or inactions caused. “The pleading standard Rule 8 announces does not require ‘detailed factual allegations,’ but it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). “The tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions. Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. A complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. at 556. “[T]he complaint’s allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Id. at 555 (internal quotations omitted). ALLEGATIONS OF THE COMPLAINT Hill is an inmate at the Racine Correctional Institution. Dkt. No. 1. Defendants are Sgt. Amin Baham, Sgt. Wilson, Cpt. Ciara Vincent, Deputy Warden Kenya Mason, Security Director Brandon Morris, Lt. Sangsay, and Unit Manager Porter. Id. According to the complaint, Sgt. Baham issued “false” Conduct Report #00467774 charging Hill with Disobeying Orders (§DOC 303.28), Disruptive Conduct (§DOC 303.33), Disrespect (§DOC 303.29), and Threats (§DOC 303.18). Id. at 2-3. Sgt. Baham wrote in the conduct report that Hill was an “aggressor.” Id. at 3. Hill states, “I took my ticket the long way, so I can prepare to call witnesses and…subpoena camera footage.” Id. On July 18, Cpt. Vincent held a due process hearing on the conduct report. Id. Cpt. Vincent called two of Hill’s inmate witnesses, both of whom testified that Hill did not curse at Sgt. Baham or threaten Sgt. Baham. Id. at 3-4. Cpt. Vincent found Hill not guilty of Disrespect (§DOC 303.29) and Threats (§DOC

303.18). Id. at 4. But Hill was found guilty of Disobeying Orders (§DOC 303.28) and Disruptive Conduct (§DOC 303.33). Id. Hill served 30 days in Temporary Lock-up (TLU). Id. at 5. For relief, Hill seeks monetary damages. Id. THE COURT’S ANALYSIS “To state a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. §1983, a plaintiff must allege that he or she was deprived of a right secured by the Constitution or the laws of the United States, and that this deprivation occurred at the hands of a person or persons acting under the color of state law.” D.S. v. E. Porter Cty. Sch. Corp., 799 F.3d 793, 798 (7th Cir. 2015) (citing Buchanan–Moore v. Cty. of Milwaukee, 570 F.3d 824, 827 (7th Cir. 2009)). To state a Fourteenth Amendment due process claim, Hill must allege that: (1) he was deprived of a constitutionally protected liberty interest; and (2) the procedures he was afforded were constitutionally deficient. Ealy v. Watson, 109 F.4th 958, 964 (7th Cir. 2024). Disciplinary segregation deprives an inmate of his liberty interest when it imposes an “atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Id. at 964-65 (quoting Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995)). The Court looks at the “combined import” of the duration of the confinement and the conditions endured. Id. (citing Hardaway v. Meyerhoff, 734 F.3d 740, 743 (7th Cir. 2013)). Absent harsh conditions of confinement, disciplinary segregation for a period of time less than six months does not typically trigger a liberty interest. Marion v. Columbia Corr. Inst., 559 F.3d 693, 698 (7th Cir. 2009) (noting “six months of segregation is not such an extreme term and, standing alone, would not trigger due process rights.”). Once a liberty interest has been invoked, the Court looks to what process was due. Ealy, 109 F.4th 958 at 965-66. An inmate who is facing transfer to disciplinary segregation is only entitled to “informal, nonadversarial due process,” which leaves substantial discretion and flexibility in the hands of the prison administrators. Id. (citing Adams v.

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Taurus Clyde Hill, II v. Sgt. Amin Baham, Jr., et al., Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/taurus-clyde-hill-ii-v-sgt-amin-baham-jr-et-al-wied-2025.