Taurin A. Johnson v. Dexter Payne, Director, Arkansas Division of Correction

2024 Ark. 131

• Court: Supreme Court of Arkansas
• Decided: September 19, 2024
• Status: Published

Opinion

Cite as 2024 Ark. 131 SUPREME COURT OF ARKANSAS No. CV-23-824

Opinion Delivered: September 19, 2024 TAURIN A. JOHNSON APPELLANT PRO SE APPEAL FROM THE LINCOLN COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT V. [NO. 40CV-23-119]

DEXTER PAYNE, DIRECTOR, HONORABLE JODI RAINES ARKANSAS DIVISION OF DENNIS, JUDGE CORRECTION APPELLEE AFFIRMED.

BARBARA W. WEBB, Justice

Taurin A. Johnson appeals the denial and dismissal of his pro se petition for writ of

habeas corpus pursuant to Arkansas Code Annotated section 16-112-101 (Repl. 2016) filed

in Lincoln County where he is incarcerated. Johnson alleged in his petition and in his

argument on appeal that his life-without-parole sentence for the crime of first-degree

murder was illegally amended to life with parole under the Fair Sentencing of Minors Act

(FSMA). According to Johnson, he was not provided with a resentencing hearing before an

amended judgment was allegedly entered, and he claims that the FSMA was applied ex post

facto to his sentence in that the crime of murder was committed in 1993, and the FSMA

was enacted in 2017. See Ark. Code Ann. § 16-93-621 (Supp. 2017). Johnson claims that

his judgment should be vacated. The circuit court denied and dismissed the petition on the

ground that Johnson failed to provide sufficient evidence that the original judgment and commitment order was amended or that he was otherwise being illegally detained. We

affirm.

I. Background

In 1994, Johnson pleaded guilty to first-degree murder and attempted first-degree

murder in the Phillips County Circuit Court. The crimes were committed on January 21,

1993. Johnson’s date of birth is August 11, 1975; therefore, Johnson was seventeen when

he committed the crimes to which he pleaded guilty. Johnson was sentenced to a term of

life imprisonment without parole for the murder conviction and a concurrent sentence of

360 months’ imprisonment for the attempted-murder conviction.

Johnson previously filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in 2018, alleging that his

sentence was illegal pursuant to Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), because he was

seventeen when the crimes were committed. His petition was denied by the circuit court,

and the denial was affirmed by this court because the holding in Miller did not apply to

Johnson’s conviction for first-degree murder in that his life sentence was not mandatorily

imposed. See Johnson v. State, 2018 Ark. 168, 546 S.W.3d 470.

II. Standard of Review

We will affirm a circuit court’s decision on a petition for writ of habeas corpus unless

it is clearly erroneous. Hobbs v. Gordon, 2014 Ark. 225, 434 S.W.3d 364. A decision is

clearly erroneous when, although there is evidence to support it, the appellate court, after

reviewing the entire evidence, is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake

has been made. Id.

2 III. Arguments on Appeal

Johnson first contends that his judgment reflecting a sentence of life without parole

was illegally modified to life with parole without the Phillips County Circuit Court

conducting a resentencing hearing. However, as previously noted, we held that although

Johnson was a juvenile when he committed murder, he was not entitled to have his

judgment vacated and a resentencing hearing held pursuant to the holding in Miller. Johnson,

2018 Ark. 168, 546 S.W.3d 470. Furthermore, in Proctor v. Payne, 2020 Ark. 142, 598

S.W.3d 17, we held that the FSMA’s parole-eligibility provisions are not cognizable in

habeas proceedings. Habeas proceedings do not extend to issues of parole eligibility and are

limited to questions of whether the petitioner is in custody pursuant to a valid judgment of

conviction or whether the convicting court had proper jurisdiction. Id.

Johnson next asserts that the FSMA was applied to his sentence in violation of the

prohibition against ex post facto laws. This claim is likewise unavailing. Section 16-93-

621(a)(2)(A) and (B) provides in pertinent part that juveniles who committed first-degree

murder before March 2017 are eligible for parole after serving twenty-five years of their life

sentence. Because of the clear intention of the General Assembly, it is undisputed that the

FSMA contains parole-eligibility provisions that apply retroactively to juveniles convicted

of murder before it was enacted in 2017. See Ark. Parole Bd. v. Johnson, 2022 Ark. 209, 654

S.W.3d 820. A parole statute less favorable to one who had been sentenced prior to its

passage than the parole law existing at the time of his sentencing would be unconstitutional

as an ex post facto law. Bosnick v. Lockhart, 283 Ark. 206, 672 S.W.2d 52 (1984). The FSMA

parole provisions are more favorable—not less favorable—to Johnson. Johnson is now

3 eligible for release on parole, and the FSMA provisions are not unconstitutional ex post

facto law. See id.

Affirmed.

Taurin Johnson, pro se appellant.

Tim Griffin, Att’y Gen., by: Joseph Karl Luebke, Ass’t Att’y Gen., for appellee.