Tasha Subili v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)

• Court: Indiana Court of Appeals
• Decided: August 18, 2016
• Docket: 71A03-1601-CR-212
• Status: Published

Opinion

MEMORANDUM DECISION FILED Aug 18 2016, 8:26 am Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as CLERK Indiana Supreme Court precedent or cited before any court except for the Court of Appeals and Tax Court purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata, collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Sean P Hilgendorf Gregory F. Zoeller South Bend, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana Caryn N. Szyper Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Tasha Subili, August 18, 2016

Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No. 71A03-1601-CR-212

v. Appeal from the St. Joseph Superior Court State of Indiana, The Hon. Jenny Pitts Manier, Judge Trial Court Cause No. 71D02-1503- Appellee-Plaintiff. CM-1075

Bradford, Judge.

Case Summary [1] On March 27, 2015, Appellant-Defendant Tasha Subili was on the property of

the South Bend International Airport (“the Airport”) after having been told she

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 71A03-1601-CR-212 | August 18, 2016 Page 1 of 6 was no longer welcome there without legitimate business. Subili approached

Mark Eads and told him that she needed money to get to LaPorte, Indiana, and

said she had found a driver willing to take her there for $60. As Eads attempted

to verify Subili’s story with the taxi driver that Subili indicated, Subili took a

$50 bill from Eads’s hand without authorization. Appellee-Plaintiff the State of

Indiana charged Subili with criminal trespass and criminal conversion, both

Class A misdemeanors. The trial court found Subili guilty as charged and

sentenced her to 270 days of incarceration for each conviction, to be served

concurrently, and ordered restitution of $50. Subili contends that the State

failed to produce sufficient evidence to sustain either of her convictions.

Because we disagree, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History [2] On January 29, 2015, Matthew Willis, who works as a police officer,

emergency medical technician, and firefighter at the Airport, responded to a

report of a woman yelling at the taxi stand. Officer Willis arrived and found

Subili walking nearby. Officer Willis recognized Subili from an incident nine

days previously, when he had told her that if she came back to the Airport

“scamming people for money” and did not have an appropriate ticket, she

would be issued a trespass order. Consequently, when Officer Willis

encountered Subili on January 29, 2015, and verified that she did not have a

ticket, he issued her a trespass order. The “Notice of Trespass” notified Subili

that her patronage was no longer welcome at the Airport and that if she entered

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 71A03-1601-CR-212 | August 18, 2016 Page 2 of 6 the premises again without a valid ticket for a mode of transportation available

at the Airport, she would be prosecuted for trespass and subject to a fine and/or

incarceration. Officer Willis testified that it was “common practice” to give

copies of trespass orders to those they were issued to and that he told Subili she

was no longer welcome at the Airport if she “was not conducting business as far

as those planes, trains [or] buying a ticket[.]” Tr. p. 18-19. The Notice of

Trespass, admitted as State’s Exhibit 1, indicates that it was served on Subili.

[3] On March 27, 2015, Eads was at the Airport to pick up his mother when he was

approached by Subili. Subili told Eads that she needed money to get to LaPorte

and that she had found a taxi driver willing to take her for $60. Eads told Subili

that he wanted to meet the taxi driver, and the duo walked to a taxi, into which

Subili “crawled[.]” Tr. p. 22. As Eads questioned the driver, who was

“nodding his head no[,]” Subili reached out and “snatched” a $50 bill that Eads

had in his hand. Tr. p. 22. At that point, the driver exited the taxi and, along

with Eads, held the back doors of the taxi, preventing Subili’s escape. Subili

“turned into a wild cat in the back of that taxi [and] was attempting to kick the

windows out and everything out.” Tr. p. 22. Eventually, police arrived and

arrested Subili. At no point did Eads tell Subili that she could have the $50 bill

and, in fact, specifically told her that he would only give it to the taxi driver.

[4] On March 30, 2015, the State charged Subili with criminal trespass and

criminal conversion, both Class A misdemeanors. On October 8, 2015, the trial

court found Subili guilty as charged and sentenced her to 270 days of

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 71A03-1601-CR-212 | August 18, 2016 Page 3 of 6 incarceration for each conviction, to be served concurrently, and ordered

restitution of $50.

Discussion and Decision [5] Subili contends that the State failed to produce sufficient evidence to sustain

either of her convictions. When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we

neither weigh the evidence nor resolve questions of credibility. Jordan v. State,

656 N.E.2d 816, 817 (Ind. 1995). We look only to the evidence of probative

value and the reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom which support the

verdict. Id. If from that viewpoint there is evidence of probative value from

which a reasonable trier of fact could conclude that the defendant was guilty

beyond a reasonable doubt, we will affirm the conviction. Spangler v. State, 607

N.E.2d 720, 724 (Ind. 1993).

I. Criminal Trespass [6] Indiana Code subsection 35-43-2-2(b)(1) provides, in part, that “[a] person who

… not having a contractual interest in the property, knowingly or intentionally

enters the real property of another person after having been denied entry by the

other person or that person’s agent …. commits criminal trespass, a Class A

misdemeanor.” “A person has been denied entry under subsection (b)(1) when

the person has been denied entry by means of … personal communication, oral

or written[.]” Ind. Code § 35-43-2-2(c)(1).

[7] Subili contends that the State failed to establish that Officer Willis actually

served the Notice of Trespass on her on January 29, 2015, even though the Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 71A03-1601-CR-212 | August 18, 2016 Page 4 of 6 Notice indicates that it was served on her. Officer Willis, however, testified

that it was “common practice” to serve Notices of Trespass, which gives rise to

a reasonable inference that this was done on January 29, 2015. In any event,

Indiana Code subsection 35-43-2-2(c) provides that a person may be denied

entry through oral personal communication, and Officer Willis testified that he

told Subili that she was no longer welcome on Airport property without a valid

reason to be there. Subili points to her testimony that she was at the Airport to

meet a friend for a drink before travelling to LaPorte. The trial court was under

no obligation to credit this testimony and did not. Subili’s argument is nothing

more than an invitation to reweigh the evidence, which we will not do.

II. Criminal Conversion [8] Subili also contends that the State failed to produce sufficient evidence to

support her conviction for criminal conversion. “A person who knowingly or

intentionally exerts unauthorized control over property of another person

commits criminal conversion, a Class A misdemeanor.” Ind. Code § 35-43-4-

39(a). Subili’s argument seems to be that the State’s proof fails because there is

no evidence that the $50 bill was found on her person after her arrest. Subili

cites to no authority for the proposition that the converted property must be

found on a defendant in order to support a conviction for criminal conversion.

Eads testified that he specifically told Subili that he would only give the $50 bill

to the taxi driver and that Subili subsequently took it from his hand. The trial

court was entitled to credit this testimony and did so. Again, Subili’s argument

amounts to an invitation to reweigh the evidence, which we will not do.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 71A03-1601-CR-212 | August 18, 2016 Page 5 of 6 [9] We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Pyle, J., and Altice, J., concur.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 71A03-1601-CR-212 | August 18, 2016 Page 6 of 6