Tasby v. Wright

542 F. Supp. 134
CourtDistrict Court, N.D. Texas
DecidedFebruary 26, 1982
DocketCiv. A. 3-4211-H
StatusPublished
Cited by12 cases

This text of 542 F. Supp. 134 (Tasby v. Wright) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Tasby v. Wright, 542 F. Supp. 134 (N.D. Tex. 1982).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION

SANDERS, District Judge.

The Court has carefully reviewed the Minority Neighborhood Option Plan (MNOP) submitted by the Dallas Independent School District (DISD) and is of the opinion that it should be disapproved.

Under the desegregation plan set in place in 1976 for the Dallas school system and still in operation today, students in grades 4 through 8, who do not live in naturally integrated areas, are assigned and transported to centrally located centers in the Northwest, Northeast and Southeast sub-districts. Tasby v. Estes, 412 F.Supp. 1192, 1214 (N.D.Tex.1976), remanded with instructions, 572 F.2d 1010 (5th Cir. 1978). The East Oak Cliff and Seagoville schools, and naturally integrated areas (including the Southwest subdistrict), are not included in these student assignment patterns.

Pursuant to the Fifth Circuit remand, this Court held four weeks of hearings in April and May 1981 to assess the constitutional adequacy of the 1976 plan. No testimony focused specifically on either the 4-6 or 7-8 grade schools or the student assignment plan in effect for these grades. Strong opposition was expressed, however, by a significant number of minority parents to the use of traditional racial balance remedies such as transportation to cure the effects of school segregation. Noting the depth and breadth of the objections raised to the further use of such remedies, the Court in its August 3, 1981, Opinion directed counsel “to analyze the feasibility, and the legality, of giving minority students the option to remain in their neighborhood 4-8 centers and waive their constitutional right to be assigned and transported to a desegregated school — in other words, to ‘opt out’ of busing.” Tasby v. Wright, 520 F.Supp. 683, 750 (N.D.Tex.1981).

*136 On October 13, 1981, the DISD submitted a proposed desegregation plan which included the MNOP. Under the terms of the MNOP, schools serving grades 4-6 would be reopened in South Dallas, near North Dallas and West Dallas. Schools serving grades 7-8 would also be reopened in South Dallas and West Dallas. These schools would be made available, to the extent their capacity permits, to receive students residing in these areas who are currently being transported to receiving 4-6 and 7-8 centers in northwest, northeast, and southeast Dallas. Under the criteria proposed by the District, a student’s request for MNOP transfer would not be granted if it would cause the enrollment at any 4-6 or 7-8 receiving center to become predominantly anglo. The program likewise would not permit MNOP transfers to result in overcrowding at the newly opened MNOP schools.

The MNOP proposal is opposed by the Plaintiffs, and the NAACP and Cunningham Intervenors on the grounds that its implementation will result in the unjustified creation of additional one-race schools and that the legal theory underlying the program will not withstand constitutional scrutiny. The Black Coalition and Brinegar Intervenors support the MNOP.

The Court has carefully reviewed the MNOP proposal, the detailed provisions for its execution and the brief submitted by DISD in support of its constitutional adequacy. Allowing minority students disenchanted with the results of court-ordered transportation to waive their constitutional right to a desegregated education is a concept which has considerable merit in both law and equity. The constraints imposed by the directions of the Fifth Circuit remand, however, and the other factors set forth in this Memorandum Opinion, have led the Court to conclude that the MNOP proposal is not acceptable.

A legal theory which would afford minority students the right to forego participation in racial balance remedies such as transportation appears to conflict with the traditional precepts which have underpinned controlling school desegregation jurisprudence. Ever since Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 74 S.Ct. 686, 98 L.Ed. 873 (1954), judicial consideration of school desegregation cases has begun with the standard:

[I]n the field of public education the doctrine of ‘separate but equal’ has no place. Separate educational facilities are inherently unequal.

Id. at 495, 74 S.Ct. at 692. Thus, the overriding responsibility of this Court is “to eliminate from the public schools all vestiges of state-imposed segregation.” Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1, 14, 91 S.Ct. 1267, 1275, 28 L.Ed.2d 554 (1971). To the extent that the practicalities of the situation permit, the Court must “make every effort to achieve the greatest possible degree of actual desegregation . . . . ” Id. at 26, 91 S.Ct. at 1281. See also Davis v. Board of School Commissioners of Mobile County, 402 U.S. 33, 37, 91 S.Ct. 1289, 1291, 28 L.Ed.2d 577 (1971). This principle has been repeatedly affirmed by the higher courts and governs this Court as it seeks to fashion an equitable desegregation decree.

The criterion for determining the validity of provisions in a desegregation plan is whether they are reasonably related to these ultimate objectives. Valley v. Rapides Parish School Board, 646 F.2d 925 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v. Jefferson County Board of Education, 372 F.2d 836 (5th Cir. 1966). A desegregation plan must promise meaningful and immediate progress toward disestablishing state-imposed segregation. “The burden on a school board today is to come forward with a plan that promises realistically to work and promises realistically to work now." Green v. County School Board, 391 U.S. 430, 439, 88 S.Ct. 1689, 1694, 20 L.Ed.2d 716 (1968) (emphasis in original).

Although these precedents control, the significant portion of the Dallas minority community which opposes mandatory transportation should not be ignored. The apparently escalating sentiment against such racial balance remedies has different roots. Testimony during the April and May 1981 *137 hearings revealed that some in the minority community considered mandatory transportation unacceptable because its burdens had been disproportionately imposed on minority children. Many minority witnesses preferred remedies designed to improve educational quality and to eliminate the disparity in academic achievement that can be attributed to past segregation. It is important to note, however, that the disapproval of racial balance remedies by these minority parents was not presented as a rejection of the constitutional principles vindicated in Brown, and the hundreds of school desegregation decisions since Brown. Rather, the dispute is about the most effective remedies to eliminate the vestiges of school segregation.

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Related

Tasby v. Moses
265 F. Supp. 2d 757 (N.D. Texas, 2003)
Tasby v. Gonzalez
972 F. Supp. 1065 (N.D. Texas, 1997)
Tasby v. Woolery
869 F. Supp. 454 (N.D. Texas, 1994)
Tasby v. Edwards
807 F. Supp. 421 (N.D. Texas, 1992)
Tasby v. Wright
585 F. Supp. 453 (N.D. Texas, 1984)

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542 F. Supp. 134, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/tasby-v-wright-txnd-1982.