NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT ___________
No. 25-1517 __________
TARIQ WYATT, Appellant
v.
CHRISTINA HAUSER, Registered Nurse SCI-Mahanoy; CAPT. DREHER, Correctional Officer SCI-Mahanoy; LIEUTENANT DAVIS, Correctional Officer SCI-Mahanoy; CAPTAIN BANKS, Correctional Officer SCI-Mahanoy; C.O. GUNTHER; SUPERINTENDENT MAHANOY SCI; DEPUTY WHITE, Deputy Superintendent SCI- Mahanoy; J. MACKNIGHT, Program Manager SCI-Mahanoy; C. COUNSELOR, Counselor SCI-Mahanoy; EVANS; J. MAHALLY, Grievance Coordinator SCI- Mahanoy; F. WALTER, Grievance Coordinator SCI-Mahanoy; A. RODRIGUEZ, Correctional Officer SCI-Mahanoy; MAJOR SOKALOSKI; N. GUZENSKI, Correctional Officer; RN AMY BING; C.O. ADAM FRITZINGER; C.O. JOSEPH FLYNN; JOSEPH DUPONT; RN ANGELA LANDMESSER; JOHN CHUNA ____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania (D.C. Civil Action No. 1:22-cv-00092) District Judge: Honorable Malachy E. Mannion ____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) May 20, 2026
Before: KRAUSE, RESTREPO, and PORTER, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: June 3, 2026) ___________ OPINION* ___________
PER CURIAM
Tariq Wyatt appeals pro se the District Court’s grant of summary judgment in
favor of the defendants. We will affirm.
Wyatt filed suit against numerous officials (“Defendants”) employed at the State
Correctional Institution at Mahanoy (“SCI-Mahanoy”) in Frackville, Pennsylvania,
alleging violations of his First, Fifth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment Rights. These
allegations arose from a series of events that took place over a span of ten days in
October 2021. The incidents included a nurse’s handling Wyatt’s medication without
gloves, his one-day placement in a Psychiatric Observation Cell (“POC”), the issuance of
several misconducts, cold conditions in the Restricted Housing Unit (“RHU”), officers’
utilization of Oleoresin Capsicum (“OC”) spray on one occasion, and officers’
misplacement of Wyatt’s property, which was later returned to him or replaced.
After a period of discovery, Wyatt and Defendants filed cross motions for
summary judgment. The District Court granted Defendants’ motion, concluding that
Wyatt’s claims were barred by his failure to exhaust administrative remedies and that, in
the alternative, his claims failed on the merits. The District Court denied Wyatt’s
summary judgment motion. Wyatt timely appealed the District Court’s order.1
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent. 1 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We exercise plenary review over the District Court’s summary judgment decision. See Blunt v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 767 F.3d 247, 265 (3d Cir. 2014). Summary judgment is appropriate where “the movant 2 On appeal, Wyatt argues that the District Court erroneously determined that he
had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies because exhaustion was unavailable to
him. We disagree.
“Under the [Prison Litigation Reform Act], prisoners who seek to challenge their
conditions of confinement must exhaust all available administrative remedies.” Prater v.
Dep’t of Corr., 76 F.4th 184, 203 (3d Cir. 2023) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a)).
Exhaustion must be complete before the prisoner files suit. See Ahmed v. Dragovich, 297
F.3d 201, 209 (3d Cir. 2002). To exhaust administrative remedies, an inmate must use
each step of the three-part procedure provided by the Pennsylvania Department of
Corrections: initial review, appeal to the Facility Manager, and final appeal to the
Secretary’s Office of Inmate Grievance and Appeals (“SOIGA”).
Exhaustion is not required, however, if administrative remedies are not available.
See Ross v. Blake, 578 U.S. 632, 635 (2016). Relevant here, administrative remedies are
not “available” “when prison administrators thwart inmates from taking advantage of a
grievance process through machination, misrepresentation, or intimidation.” Id. at 644.
Nor are administrative remedies available “where a prison official inhibits an inmate
from resorting to them through serious threats of retaliation or bodily harm.” Rinaldi v.
United States, 904 F.3d 257, 267 (3d Cir. 2018). Once the defendant establishes that the
shows that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). We may affirm “on any basis supported by the record.” See Murray v. Bledsoe, 650 F.3d 246, 247 (3d Cir. 2011) (per curiam). 3 inmate failed to exhaust administrative remedies, it is the inmate’s burden to show that
the remedies were unavailable to him. See id. at 268.
Here, the District Court concluded that Wyatt had failed to appeal any of his
grievances to final review. Wyatt does not refute this conclusion in his brief but instead
argues that the grievance process was unavailable to him. This argument fails. Wyatt
first asserts that his fear of retaliation prevented him from completing the grievance
appeals process. But this assertion is undermined by the fact that, during the same
timeframe, he was able to appeal eight unrelated grievances to final review. Moreover,
Wyatt failed to allege any direct threat from prison officials indicating that his pursuit of
grievances would result in his transfer to a different cell block—the consequence he
feared. Cf. Turner v. Burnside, 541 F.3d 1077, 1085 (11th Cir. 2008) (concluding that “a
prison official’s serious threats of substantial retaliation against an inmate for lodging or
pursuing in good faith a grievance make the administrative remedy ‘unavailable[.]’”).
His claim that the arduous nature of the grievance process rendered it unavailable
to him is also belied by the record. In his complaint, Wyatt asserted, for example, that
Defendant Mason would respond to grievance appeals late or not respond at all.
However, the record shows that Wyatt received a response to every grievance relevant to
his complaint—Wyatt simply did not continue the appeals process. Wyatt also
complained that his grievances would often be rejected for not including proper dates or
combining too many events in one grievance. But his filing of 154 grievances during his
time at SCI-Mahanoy should have given him ample opportunity to familiarize himself
with proper procedures. We therefore conclude that the District Court properly granted
4 summary judgment in Defendants’ favor based on Wyatt’s failure to exhaust his
administrative remedies as to his claims affiliated with those grievances.2
Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment.3 Wyatt’s motion
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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT ___________
No. 25-1517 __________
TARIQ WYATT, Appellant
v.
CHRISTINA HAUSER, Registered Nurse SCI-Mahanoy; CAPT. DREHER, Correctional Officer SCI-Mahanoy; LIEUTENANT DAVIS, Correctional Officer SCI-Mahanoy; CAPTAIN BANKS, Correctional Officer SCI-Mahanoy; C.O. GUNTHER; SUPERINTENDENT MAHANOY SCI; DEPUTY WHITE, Deputy Superintendent SCI- Mahanoy; J. MACKNIGHT, Program Manager SCI-Mahanoy; C. COUNSELOR, Counselor SCI-Mahanoy; EVANS; J. MAHALLY, Grievance Coordinator SCI- Mahanoy; F. WALTER, Grievance Coordinator SCI-Mahanoy; A. RODRIGUEZ, Correctional Officer SCI-Mahanoy; MAJOR SOKALOSKI; N. GUZENSKI, Correctional Officer; RN AMY BING; C.O. ADAM FRITZINGER; C.O. JOSEPH FLYNN; JOSEPH DUPONT; RN ANGELA LANDMESSER; JOHN CHUNA ____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania (D.C. Civil Action No. 1:22-cv-00092) District Judge: Honorable Malachy E. Mannion ____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) May 20, 2026
Before: KRAUSE, RESTREPO, and PORTER, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: June 3, 2026) ___________ OPINION* ___________
PER CURIAM
Tariq Wyatt appeals pro se the District Court’s grant of summary judgment in
favor of the defendants. We will affirm.
Wyatt filed suit against numerous officials (“Defendants”) employed at the State
Correctional Institution at Mahanoy (“SCI-Mahanoy”) in Frackville, Pennsylvania,
alleging violations of his First, Fifth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment Rights. These
allegations arose from a series of events that took place over a span of ten days in
October 2021. The incidents included a nurse’s handling Wyatt’s medication without
gloves, his one-day placement in a Psychiatric Observation Cell (“POC”), the issuance of
several misconducts, cold conditions in the Restricted Housing Unit (“RHU”), officers’
utilization of Oleoresin Capsicum (“OC”) spray on one occasion, and officers’
misplacement of Wyatt’s property, which was later returned to him or replaced.
After a period of discovery, Wyatt and Defendants filed cross motions for
summary judgment. The District Court granted Defendants’ motion, concluding that
Wyatt’s claims were barred by his failure to exhaust administrative remedies and that, in
the alternative, his claims failed on the merits. The District Court denied Wyatt’s
summary judgment motion. Wyatt timely appealed the District Court’s order.1
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent. 1 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We exercise plenary review over the District Court’s summary judgment decision. See Blunt v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 767 F.3d 247, 265 (3d Cir. 2014). Summary judgment is appropriate where “the movant 2 On appeal, Wyatt argues that the District Court erroneously determined that he
had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies because exhaustion was unavailable to
him. We disagree.
“Under the [Prison Litigation Reform Act], prisoners who seek to challenge their
conditions of confinement must exhaust all available administrative remedies.” Prater v.
Dep’t of Corr., 76 F.4th 184, 203 (3d Cir. 2023) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a)).
Exhaustion must be complete before the prisoner files suit. See Ahmed v. Dragovich, 297
F.3d 201, 209 (3d Cir. 2002). To exhaust administrative remedies, an inmate must use
each step of the three-part procedure provided by the Pennsylvania Department of
Corrections: initial review, appeal to the Facility Manager, and final appeal to the
Secretary’s Office of Inmate Grievance and Appeals (“SOIGA”).
Exhaustion is not required, however, if administrative remedies are not available.
See Ross v. Blake, 578 U.S. 632, 635 (2016). Relevant here, administrative remedies are
not “available” “when prison administrators thwart inmates from taking advantage of a
grievance process through machination, misrepresentation, or intimidation.” Id. at 644.
Nor are administrative remedies available “where a prison official inhibits an inmate
from resorting to them through serious threats of retaliation or bodily harm.” Rinaldi v.
United States, 904 F.3d 257, 267 (3d Cir. 2018). Once the defendant establishes that the
shows that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). We may affirm “on any basis supported by the record.” See Murray v. Bledsoe, 650 F.3d 246, 247 (3d Cir. 2011) (per curiam). 3 inmate failed to exhaust administrative remedies, it is the inmate’s burden to show that
the remedies were unavailable to him. See id. at 268.
Here, the District Court concluded that Wyatt had failed to appeal any of his
grievances to final review. Wyatt does not refute this conclusion in his brief but instead
argues that the grievance process was unavailable to him. This argument fails. Wyatt
first asserts that his fear of retaliation prevented him from completing the grievance
appeals process. But this assertion is undermined by the fact that, during the same
timeframe, he was able to appeal eight unrelated grievances to final review. Moreover,
Wyatt failed to allege any direct threat from prison officials indicating that his pursuit of
grievances would result in his transfer to a different cell block—the consequence he
feared. Cf. Turner v. Burnside, 541 F.3d 1077, 1085 (11th Cir. 2008) (concluding that “a
prison official’s serious threats of substantial retaliation against an inmate for lodging or
pursuing in good faith a grievance make the administrative remedy ‘unavailable[.]’”).
His claim that the arduous nature of the grievance process rendered it unavailable
to him is also belied by the record. In his complaint, Wyatt asserted, for example, that
Defendant Mason would respond to grievance appeals late or not respond at all.
However, the record shows that Wyatt received a response to every grievance relevant to
his complaint—Wyatt simply did not continue the appeals process. Wyatt also
complained that his grievances would often be rejected for not including proper dates or
combining too many events in one grievance. But his filing of 154 grievances during his
time at SCI-Mahanoy should have given him ample opportunity to familiarize himself
with proper procedures. We therefore conclude that the District Court properly granted
4 summary judgment in Defendants’ favor based on Wyatt’s failure to exhaust his
administrative remedies as to his claims affiliated with those grievances.2
Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment.3 Wyatt’s motion
requesting that judgment be made solely on his brief is denied.4
2 The District Court was incorrect about one grievance, number 951864, which was pursued to final review. However, this grievance concerned Defendant Mahally’s alleged mishandling of Wyatt’s grievances and therefore should have been raised from the denial of the grievances in question. Thus, it was not properly exhausted. See Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 88 (2006) (indicating that, in order to properly exhaust, “a prisoner must complete the administrative review process in accordance with applicable procedural rules[, ] as a precondition to bringing suit in federal court.”); see also Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 200 (2007) (indicating that the procedural rules a prisoner must follow for proper exhaustion are defined by the prison’s grievance process itself). And, in any event, as the District Court explained, this claim is meritless. 3 We have considered Wyatt’s remaining arguments on appeal and conclude that they are without merit. 4 In this motion, Wyatt claims that Defendants failed to timely file their brief in support of the appeal. However, Defendants/Appellees did timely file their brief, but Wyatt had not yet received notice of its filing when he submitted this motion. 5