NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-3046-22
TARIQ ELSHABBA, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
JEFFERSON CAPITAL SYSTEMS, LLC,
Defendant-Respondent. __________________________
Argued March 12, 2025 – Decided May 2, 2025
Before Judges Mayer and Puglisi.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Passaic County, Docket No. L-1676-21.
Philip D. Stern argued the cause for appellant (Kim Law Firm LLC, attorneys; Philip D. Stern and Yongmoon Kim, on the briefs).
Aaron R. Easley argued the cause for respondent (Sessions Israel and Shartle, LLC, attorneys; Aaron R. Easley and Jay I. Brody, on the brief). PER CURIAM
Plaintiff Tariq Elshabba, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, appeals from the April 26, 2023 Law Division order granting defendant
Jefferson Capital Systems, LLC's motion to dismiss plaintiff's complaint for
failure to state a claim. We affirm.
Plaintiff incurred a debt and the lender transmitted that debt to defendant,
a debt collector. Defendant engaged a third-party letter vendor to draft, print,
address and mail a collection letter to plaintiff. The letter included plaintiff's
account number, the amount due to the lender and plaintiff's full name and
address.
In May 2021, plaintiff filed a single-count purported class action
complaint alleging violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act
(FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692 to 1692p. Defendant, in lieu of an answer, moved
to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Rule 4:6-2(e).
After hearing oral argument, Judge Bruno Mongiardo granted defendant's
motion and dismissed the complaint in an April 26, 2023 order accompanied by
a thorough and cogent oral decision. Quoting In re Camden County, 170 N.J.
439, 449 (2002), the judge first found plaintiff lacked standing because "there
[was] not a . . . 'substantial likelihood' that . . . plaintiff will . . . 'suffer harm in
A-3046-22 2 the event of an unfavorable decision.'" He further determined plaintiff "[did]
not have a . . . 'sufficient stake' in the litigation" nor "real adverseness with
respect to the subject matter," and therefore lacked standing to bring the action.
The judge nevertheless considered the merits of plaintiff's complaint in the event
we disagreed with his standing decision.
In evaluating whether plaintiff sufficiently pleaded a claim for a violation
of the FDCPA, the judge noted the plain language of the FDCPA prohibits a
debt collector from communicating, "in connection with the collection of a [ny]
debt." 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(b). After reviewing the legislative history of the
FDCPA, the judge dismissed the claim, reasoning "plaintiff [did] not allege that
the vendor misused the information, that the vendor disseminated the
information, or even that any individual at the vendor saw the information ," but
rather plaintiff's conduct was "a benign administrative task" and not the
"abusive, harassing, or misleading conduct" Congress intended to prevent by
enacting the FDCPA. The motion judge further found "[defendant's] letter is
not false, deceptive, or misleading as to the effect of a payment on the
enforceability of the debt," and therefore did not violate 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692c, e,
or f.
This appeal follows.
A-3046-22 3 We review de novo an order dismissing a complaint for lack of standing.
Courier-Post Newspaper v. Cnty. of Camden, 413 N.J. Super. 372, 381 (App.
Div. 2010). Rule 4:26-1 provides, "[e]very action may be prosecuted in the
name of the real party in interest." Standing requires that "a party must present
a sufficient stake in the outcome of the litigation, a real adverseness with respect
to the subject matter, and a substantial likelihood that the party will suffer harm
in the event of an unfavorable decision." In re Camden Cnty., 170 N.J. at 449.
Because New Jersey takes "a liberal approach to standing," id. at 448, we
are persuaded plaintiff established standing to bring this suit. Plaintiff had an
interest in litigating the alleged exposure of his personal data to a third party
and, if successful, would have been entitled to compensatory damages, as well
as attorneys' fees and costs. 15 U.S.C. § 1692k.
In agreeing plaintiff had standing to bring this action, we next consider
the motion judge's dismissal of the complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant
to Rule 4:6-2(e), which we review de novo. Baskin v. P.C. Richard & Son, LLC,
246 N.J. 157, 171 (2021) (citing Dimitrakopoulos v. Borrus, Goldin, Foley,
Vignuolo, Hyman & Stahl, P.C., 237 N.J. 91, 108 (2019)).
In considering a Rule 4:6-2(e) motion, "[a] reviewing court must examine
'the legal sufficiency of the facts alleged on the face of the complaint,' giving
A-3046-22 4 the plaintiff the benefit of 'every reasonable inference of fact.'" Ibid. (quoting
Dimitrakopoulos, 237 N.J. at 107). "The essential test [for determining the
adequacy of a pleading] is simply 'whether a cause of action is "suggested" by
the facts.'" Green v. Morgan Props., 215 N.J. 431, 451-52 (2013) (quoting
Printing Mart-Morristown v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 116 N.J. 739, 746 (1989)). "At
this preliminary stage of the litigation the [c]ourt is not concerned with the
ability of [the] plaintiff to prove the allegation contained in the complaint."
Printing Mart-Morristown, 116 N.J. at 746.
"[I]f the complaint states no claim that supports relief, and discovery will
not give rise to such a claim, the action should be dismissed." Dimitrakopoulos,
237 N.J. at 107. "A trial court's interpretation of the law and the legal
consequences that flow from established facts are not entitled to any special
deference." Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan, 140 N.J.
366, 378 (1995).
On appeal, plaintiff largely reprises the same arguments raised before the
motion judge: his claims should not be dismissed. We disagree, addressing
plaintiff's claims in turn.
In order to establish an FDCPA claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate: (1)
the plaintiff is a consumer; (2) the defendant is a debt collector; (3) the
A-3046-22 5 challenged practice involves an attempt to collect a "debt" as defined by the
FDCPA; and (4) the defendant violated the FDCPA in attempting to collect the
debt. Midland Funding LLC v. Thiel, 446 N.J. Super. 537, 549 (App. Div. 2016)
(quoting Douglass v. Convergent Outsourcing, 765 F.3d 299, 303 (3d Cir.
2014)).
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NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-3046-22
TARIQ ELSHABBA, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
JEFFERSON CAPITAL SYSTEMS, LLC,
Defendant-Respondent. __________________________
Argued March 12, 2025 – Decided May 2, 2025
Before Judges Mayer and Puglisi.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Passaic County, Docket No. L-1676-21.
Philip D. Stern argued the cause for appellant (Kim Law Firm LLC, attorneys; Philip D. Stern and Yongmoon Kim, on the briefs).
Aaron R. Easley argued the cause for respondent (Sessions Israel and Shartle, LLC, attorneys; Aaron R. Easley and Jay I. Brody, on the brief). PER CURIAM
Plaintiff Tariq Elshabba, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, appeals from the April 26, 2023 Law Division order granting defendant
Jefferson Capital Systems, LLC's motion to dismiss plaintiff's complaint for
failure to state a claim. We affirm.
Plaintiff incurred a debt and the lender transmitted that debt to defendant,
a debt collector. Defendant engaged a third-party letter vendor to draft, print,
address and mail a collection letter to plaintiff. The letter included plaintiff's
account number, the amount due to the lender and plaintiff's full name and
address.
In May 2021, plaintiff filed a single-count purported class action
complaint alleging violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act
(FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692 to 1692p. Defendant, in lieu of an answer, moved
to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Rule 4:6-2(e).
After hearing oral argument, Judge Bruno Mongiardo granted defendant's
motion and dismissed the complaint in an April 26, 2023 order accompanied by
a thorough and cogent oral decision. Quoting In re Camden County, 170 N.J.
439, 449 (2002), the judge first found plaintiff lacked standing because "there
[was] not a . . . 'substantial likelihood' that . . . plaintiff will . . . 'suffer harm in
A-3046-22 2 the event of an unfavorable decision.'" He further determined plaintiff "[did]
not have a . . . 'sufficient stake' in the litigation" nor "real adverseness with
respect to the subject matter," and therefore lacked standing to bring the action.
The judge nevertheless considered the merits of plaintiff's complaint in the event
we disagreed with his standing decision.
In evaluating whether plaintiff sufficiently pleaded a claim for a violation
of the FDCPA, the judge noted the plain language of the FDCPA prohibits a
debt collector from communicating, "in connection with the collection of a [ny]
debt." 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(b). After reviewing the legislative history of the
FDCPA, the judge dismissed the claim, reasoning "plaintiff [did] not allege that
the vendor misused the information, that the vendor disseminated the
information, or even that any individual at the vendor saw the information ," but
rather plaintiff's conduct was "a benign administrative task" and not the
"abusive, harassing, or misleading conduct" Congress intended to prevent by
enacting the FDCPA. The motion judge further found "[defendant's] letter is
not false, deceptive, or misleading as to the effect of a payment on the
enforceability of the debt," and therefore did not violate 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692c, e,
or f.
This appeal follows.
A-3046-22 3 We review de novo an order dismissing a complaint for lack of standing.
Courier-Post Newspaper v. Cnty. of Camden, 413 N.J. Super. 372, 381 (App.
Div. 2010). Rule 4:26-1 provides, "[e]very action may be prosecuted in the
name of the real party in interest." Standing requires that "a party must present
a sufficient stake in the outcome of the litigation, a real adverseness with respect
to the subject matter, and a substantial likelihood that the party will suffer harm
in the event of an unfavorable decision." In re Camden Cnty., 170 N.J. at 449.
Because New Jersey takes "a liberal approach to standing," id. at 448, we
are persuaded plaintiff established standing to bring this suit. Plaintiff had an
interest in litigating the alleged exposure of his personal data to a third party
and, if successful, would have been entitled to compensatory damages, as well
as attorneys' fees and costs. 15 U.S.C. § 1692k.
In agreeing plaintiff had standing to bring this action, we next consider
the motion judge's dismissal of the complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant
to Rule 4:6-2(e), which we review de novo. Baskin v. P.C. Richard & Son, LLC,
246 N.J. 157, 171 (2021) (citing Dimitrakopoulos v. Borrus, Goldin, Foley,
Vignuolo, Hyman & Stahl, P.C., 237 N.J. 91, 108 (2019)).
In considering a Rule 4:6-2(e) motion, "[a] reviewing court must examine
'the legal sufficiency of the facts alleged on the face of the complaint,' giving
A-3046-22 4 the plaintiff the benefit of 'every reasonable inference of fact.'" Ibid. (quoting
Dimitrakopoulos, 237 N.J. at 107). "The essential test [for determining the
adequacy of a pleading] is simply 'whether a cause of action is "suggested" by
the facts.'" Green v. Morgan Props., 215 N.J. 431, 451-52 (2013) (quoting
Printing Mart-Morristown v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 116 N.J. 739, 746 (1989)). "At
this preliminary stage of the litigation the [c]ourt is not concerned with the
ability of [the] plaintiff to prove the allegation contained in the complaint."
Printing Mart-Morristown, 116 N.J. at 746.
"[I]f the complaint states no claim that supports relief, and discovery will
not give rise to such a claim, the action should be dismissed." Dimitrakopoulos,
237 N.J. at 107. "A trial court's interpretation of the law and the legal
consequences that flow from established facts are not entitled to any special
deference." Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan, 140 N.J.
366, 378 (1995).
On appeal, plaintiff largely reprises the same arguments raised before the
motion judge: his claims should not be dismissed. We disagree, addressing
plaintiff's claims in turn.
In order to establish an FDCPA claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate: (1)
the plaintiff is a consumer; (2) the defendant is a debt collector; (3) the
A-3046-22 5 challenged practice involves an attempt to collect a "debt" as defined by the
FDCPA; and (4) the defendant violated the FDCPA in attempting to collect the
debt. Midland Funding LLC v. Thiel, 446 N.J. Super. 537, 549 (App. Div. 2016)
(quoting Douglass v. Convergent Outsourcing, 765 F.3d 299, 303 (3d Cir.
2014)). Here, the motion judge correctly considered legislative intent to
determine whether the alleged conduct violated the FDCPA.
In examining the plain meaning of a statute, "the Legislature's intent is
paramount and, generally, the statutory language is the best indicator of that
intent." Hodges v. Sasil Corp., 189 N.J. 210, 223 (2007). "Statutory words are
ascribed their ordinary meaning and are read in context with related provisions,
giving sense to the legislation as a whole." Ibid. "Our duty is to construe and
apply the statute as enacted." DiProspero v. Penn, 183 N.J. 477, 492 (2005)
(quoting In re Closing of Jamesburg High Sch., 83 N.J. 540, 548 (1980)).
Plaintiff alleged defendant's use of a letter vendor to create a debt
collection letter was, in and of itself, abusive, deceptive or unfair. In support of
his arguments, plaintiff cites out-of-state decisions interpreting the FDCPA. We
note "decisions of the federal courts of appeals are not binding on this court,"
Daniels v. Hollister Co., 440 N.J. Super. 359, 367 n.7 (App. Div. 2015), and
therefore decline to address the out-of-jurisdiction cases cited by plaintiff. See
A-3046-22 6 Pressler & Verniero, Current N.J. Court Rules, cmt. 3.5 on R. 1:36-3 (2025)
("On questions of federal constitutional law and statutory law, only decisions of
the United States Supreme Court are binding on the courts of this state.").
We concur with the motion judge's determination that defendant's use of
a letter vendor was not abusive, deceptive, nor unfair and reject plaintiff's
proposed interpretation of the FDCPA as uncritically literal. Defendant's
disclosure of debt-related information to a letter vendor was not the type of
conduct Congress intended to regulate when it enacted the FDCPA. When
viewing plaintiff's complaint and affording him all reasonable inferences of fact,
plaintiff did not "genuinely allege" any facts establishing defendant's conduct
violated the FDCPA.
To the extent we have not expressly addressed any of plaintiff's remaining
issues, it is because they lack sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written
opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).
Affirmed.
A-3046-22 7