Tariq Ahmad v. Jim Fulkerson

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: January 24, 2023
• Docket: 21-17030
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JAN 24 2023 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

TARIQ AHMAD, No. 21-17030

Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 3:20-cv-00717-MMD-CLB

v. MEMORANDUM* JIM FULKERSON; DOES, 1-10, inclusive,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Nevada Miranda M. Du, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted January 18, 2023**

Before: GRABER, PAEZ, and NGUYEN, Circuit Judges

Tariq Ahmad appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing

his diversity action arising out of a suit alleging commercial bribery and fraud. We

have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a dismissal for lack

of personal jurisdiction. CollegeSource, Inc. v. AcademyOne, Inc., 653 F.3d 1066,

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). 1073 (9th Cir. 2011). We affirm.

The district court properly dismissed Ahmad’s action for lack of personal

jurisdiction because Ahmad failed to allege sufficient claim-related contacts with

Nevada to provide the court with specific personal jurisdiction over defendant.

See id. at 1076-80 (discussing requirements for specific jurisdiction).

We do not consider Ahmad’s contentions regarding general jurisdiction

because they were raised for the first time on appeal. See Cold Mountain v.

Garber, 375 F.3d 884, 891 (9th Cir. 2004) (“In general, we do not consider an

issue raised for the first time on appeal.”); Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455

(9th Cir. 1998) (explaining that a failure to object to a magistrate judge’s legal

conclusion is a factor to be weighed in considering the propriety of finding waiver

of an issue on appeal).

The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Ahmad further

leave to amend because amendment would have been futile. See Cervantes v.

Countrywide Home Loans, 656 F.3d 1034, 1041 (9th Cir. 2011) (setting forth

standard of review and explaining that a district court may deny leave to amend if

amendment would be futile).

We reject as unpersuasive Ahmad’s contention that his motion for leave to

file a second amended complaint rendered moot defendant’s motion to dismiss the

2 21-17030 first amended complaint.

AFFIRMED.

3 21-17030