Tarik Smith v. County of Riverside

District Court, C.D. California·Decided July 1, 2025·No. 5:25-cv-00545·Unknown

Opinion

Case No. 5:25-cv-00545-FLA (SK) TARIK SMITH, Plaintiff, STIPULATED PROTECTIVE v. ORDER CAMACHO, individually and in her Action Filed: February 28, 2025 Pretrial Conference: *** official capacity, REBECCA Trial Date: *** ZAMORA, individually and in her Assigned to: official capacity and DOES 1-13, Hon. Judge Fernando L. Aenlle- Rocha, District Judge inclusive, Courtroom 6B Defendants. Magistrate Judge Hon. Judge Steve Kim Courtroom 540 1. A. PURPOSES AND LIMITATIONS Discovery in this action is likely to involve production of confidential, proprietary, or private information for which special protection from public disclosure and from use for any purpose other than prosecuting this litigation may be warranted. Accordingly, the parties hereby stipulate to and petition the Court to enter the following Stipulated Protective Order. The parties acknowledge that this Order does not confer blanket protections on all disclosures or responses to discovery and that the protection it affords from public disclosure and use extends only to the limited information or items that are entitled to confidential treatment under the applicable legal principles. The parties further acknowledge, as set forth in Section 12.3 (Filing Protected Material), below, that this Stipulated Protective Order does not entitle them to file confidential information under seal; Civil Local Rule 79-5 sets forth the procedures that must be followed and the standards that will be applied when a party seeks permission from the court to file material under seal. In connection with this action, Plaintiff and Defendant may produce certain documents, things, materials, or other information derived therefrom that contain personal medical, employment or financial information not available to the public; and/or personnel files, information, Department of Public Social Services records and County Department of Human Resources records; and any confidential information contained therein or in any summary, copy, abstract, or other documents derived in whole or part therefrom. Such information may implicate the privacy interests of the party and are properly protected through a Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c) protective order. Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 35 n.21 (1984) (“Rule 26(c) includes among its express purposes the protection of a ‘party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression or undue burden or expense.’ Although the Rule contains no specific reference to privacy or to other rights or interests that may be implicated, such matters are implicit in the broad purpose and language of the Rule.”); Soto v. City of Concord, 162 F.R.D. 603, 617 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (a party’s privacy rights are to be protected through a “carefully crafted protective order.”). California law fiercely protects the confidentiality of juvenile records. See, e.g., Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code section 827 (providing that “the Legislature reaffirms its belief that juvenile court records, in general, should be confidential”). Federal courts have likewise adhered to this confidentiality. See Meyer v. County of San Diego, 2022 WL 395967, *7 (S.D. Cal., Feb. 8, 2022) and T.T. v. Cty. of San Diego, 2020 WL 6118781, at *1 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 16, 2020) (granting a motion to seal juvenile records because “given the confidential status of plaintiff’s juvenile records pursuant to section 827 of the Welfare and Institutional Code, the Court finds that defendants have articulated compelling reasons in support of their motion to seal”). In light of the nature of the claims and allegations in this case and the parties’ representations that discovery in this case will involve the production of confidential records, including but not limited to sensitive operational documents (including investigative records) and/or confidential employment/personnel records and information of employees of the County, as well as Plaintiff’s and/or Plaintiff’s children’s medical and/or mental health information, and confidential juvenile dependency court records containing private and sensitive information pertaining to Plaintiff and/or Plaintiff’s minor child as it relates to their underlying juvenile dependency case which is the subject of this action. The disclosure of the foregoing information to non-parties or others would be harmful to the parties' interests, including Plaintiff. Therefore, this information must be protected. The parties shall not designate any information/documents as confidential without a good faith belief that such information/documents have been maintained in a confidential, non-public manner, and that there is good cause or a compelling reason why it should not be part of the public record of this case. Accordingly, to expedite the flow of information, to facilitate the prompt resolution of disputes over confidentiality of discovery materials, to adequately protect information the parties are entitled to keep confidential, to ensure that the parties are permitted reasonable necessary uses of such material in preparation for and in the conduct of trial, to address their handling at the end of the litigation, and serve the ends of justice, a protective order for such information is justified in this matter. It is the intent of the parties that information will not be designated as confidential for tactical reasons and that nothing be so designated without a good faith belief that it has been maintained in a confidential, non-public manner, and there is good cause why it should not be part of the public record of this case. 2. DEFINITIONS 2.1 Action: This pending federal lawsuit, Tarik Smith v. County of Riverside, et al., Case No. 5:25-cv-00545-FLA (SKx) 2.2 Challenging Party: a Party or Non-Party that challenges the designation of information or items under this Order. 2.3 “CONFIDENTIAL” Information or Items: information (regardless of how it is generated, stored, or maintained) or tangible things that qualify for protection under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c), and as specified above in the Good Cause Statement. 2.4 Counsel: Outside Counsel of Record and House Counsel (as well as their support staff). 2.5 Designating Party: a Party or Non-Party that designates information or items that it produces in disclosures or in responses to discovery as “CONFIDENTIAL.” 2.6 Disclosure or Discovery Material: all items or information, regardless of the medium or manner in which it is generated, stored, or maintained (including, among other things, testimony, transcripts, and tangible things), that are produced or generated in disclosures or responses to discovery in this matter. 2.7 Expert: a person with specialized knowledge or experience in a matter pertinent to the litigation who has been retained by a Party or its counsel to serve as an expert witness or as a consultant in this Action. 2.8 House Counsel: attorneys who are employees of a party to this Action. House Counsel does not include Outside Counsel of Record or any other outside counsel. 2.9 Non-Party: any natural person, partnership, corporation, association, or other legal entity not named as a Party to this action. 2.10 Outside Counsel of Record: attorneys who are not employees of a party to this Action but are retained to represent or advise a party to this Action and have appeared in this Action on behalf of that party or are affiliated with a law firm which has appeared on behalf of that party, including support staff. 2.11 Party: any party to this Action, including all of its officers, directors, employees, consultants, retained experts, and Outside Counsel of Record (and their support staffs). 2.12 Producing Party: a Party or Non-Party that produces Disclosure or Discovery Material in thi

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Related

Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart
467 U.S. 20 (Supreme Court, 1984)
Soto v. City of Concord
162 F.R.D. 603 (N.D. California, 1995)