Target Corp. v. United States

626 F. Supp. 2d 1285, 33 Ct. Int'l Trade 760, 33 C.I.T. 760, 31 I.T.R.D. (BNA) 1582, 2009 Ct. Intl. Trade LEXIS 66
CourtUnited States Court of International Trade
DecidedJune 17, 2009
DocketConsol. 06-00383
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 626 F. Supp. 2d 1285 (Target Corp. v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Court of International Trade primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Target Corp. v. United States, 626 F. Supp. 2d 1285, 33 Ct. Int'l Trade 760, 33 C.I.T. 760, 31 I.T.R.D. (BNA) 1582, 2009 Ct. Intl. Trade LEXIS 66 (cit 2009).

Opinion

OPINION

GORDON, Judge.

Before the court are the Final Results Pursuant to Court Remand (Nov. 10, 2008) (“Remand Determination”) filed by the U.S. Department of Commerce (“Commerce”) pursuant to Target Corp. v. United States, 32 CIT -, 578 F.Supp.2d 1369 (2008) (“Target”), a consolidated action in which Plaintiffs, Target Corporation (“Target”), Qingdao Kingking Applied Chemistry Co., Ltd., et al. (“Qingdao”), and Specialty Merchandise Corporation (“SMC”), have challenged Commerce’s final affirmative circumvention determination that petroleum wax candles with 50 percent or more palm or other vegetable-oil based waxes (“mixed-wax”) are later-developed merchandise covered by the antidumping duty order on petroleum wax candles from China. See Petroleum Wax Candles from the People’s Republic of China, 71 Fed.Reg. 59,075 (Dep’t Commerce Oct. 6, 2006) (final determination anticircumvention inquiry) (“Final Determination ”); Issues and Decision Memorandum for the Later-Developed Merchandise Anticircumvention Inquiry of the Antidumping Duty Order on Petroleum Wax Candles from the People’s Republic of China (A-570-504), at 23 (Sept. 29, 2006) (J.App. 11, PR 187), available at http://ia.ita.doc. gov/frn/summary/prc/E6-16613-l.pdf (last visited June 17, 2009) (“Decision Memorandum ”); Memorandum from Julia Hancock, Case Analyst, Evidence Memorandum for the Later-Developed Merchandise Anticircumvention Inquiry of the Anti-dumping Duty Order on Petroleum Wax Candles from the People’s Republic of China (Sept. 29, 2006) (JApp. 36, PR 189) (“Evidence Memorandum”). The court has jurisdiction pursuant to Section 516a(a)(2)(B)(vi) of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended, 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(a)(2)(B)(vi) (2006) 1 and 28 U.S.C. § 1581(c) (2000). For the reasons set forth below, the court sustains the Remand Determination.

II. Standard of Review

When reviewing an anticircumvention determination under 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(a)(2)(B)(vi) and 28 U.S.C. § 1581(c), the Court of International Trade sustains Commerce’s determinations, findings, or conclusions unless they are “unsupported by substantial evidence on the record, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(b)(1)(B)(i). When reviewing whether Commerce’s actions are unsupported by substantial evidence, the court assesses whether the agency action is reasonable given the record as a whole. See Nippon Steel Corp. v. United States, 458 F.3d 1345, 1350-51 (Fed.Cir.2006).

III. Discussion

Although the court presumes familiarity with its Target decision, some background will aid the reader. In the Final Determination Commerce determined that mixed-wax candles are later-developed merchandise covered by the antidumping duty order on petroleum wax candles from China. The central statutory question for Commerce during the proceeding was whether *1288 mixed-wax candles, which were arguably in existence at the time of the antidumping investigation, could nonetheless still constitute “later-developed merchandise” within the meaning of the statute. Section 1677j(d)(1) defines “later-developed merchandise” as “merchandise developed after an [antidumping] investigation is initiated.” 19 U.S.C. § 1677j(d)(1) (emphasis added). The question for Commerce was whether mixed-wax candles were “developed” by the time of the initiation of the investigation or “developed” sometime thereafter.

In interpreting section 1677j(d)(l), Commerce identified “two key elements” to define “later-developed” merchandise: (1) there had to be a significant technological advancement or a significant alteration of the subject merchandise involving commercially significant changes — an advancement/alteration factor, and (2) the merchandise had to be commercially unavailable at the time of the less than fair value investigation — a commercial availability factor. Final Determination, 71 Fed.Reg. at 59,077.

In Target, among other things, the court reviewed the advancement/alteration factor and determined that Commerce’s proposed requirement that later-developed merchandise must in every instance entail a “significant alteration” or “significant technological advance” of the subject merchandise was contrary to the statute. Target, 32 CIT at -, 578 F.Supp.2d at 1377-78. Upon remand Commerce reconsidered its interpretation of the meaning of the term “later-developed” and agreed with the court that later-developed merchandise does not necessarily entail a significant alteration or technological advance in every instance. Remand Determination at 2. Consequently, Commerce abandoned this as a requirement for merchandise to be “later-developed.”

In Target the court sustained Commerce’s commercial availability factor as a reasonable interpretation of the statute entitled to deference. Target, 32 CIT at -, 578 F.Supp.2d at 1375-76. On the substantial evidence question of whether mixed-wax candles were commercially unavailable at the time of the initiation of the investigation, the court held that Commerce’s purported finding (in which it could not “definitively conclude” that mixed-wax candles were commercially available at the time of the antidumping investigation), created confusion for purposes of judicial review. The court explained:

Rather than make a straightforward finding that mixed-wax candles were commercially unavailable at the time of the LTFV, Commerce introduced an unexplained, subjective, evidentiary standard — definitive conclusiveness— and found this standard had not been met. It is a puzzling turn of phrase; it almost bespeaks an administrative presumption of commercial unavailabilityrebuttable by definitively conclusive evidence (whatever that may be) of commercial availability. Commerce, though, directly contradicted such notions:
[B]oth Respondents and Petitioners had the burden to establish whether mixed-wax candles were commercially available at the time of the LTFV investigation. All parties were given the opportunity to submit evidence that mixed-wax candles were available or evidence that mixed-wax candles were not available in the market. Accordingly, the burden did not rest on any single party.
[Decision Memorandum at 25].

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Bluebook (online)
626 F. Supp. 2d 1285, 33 Ct. Int'l Trade 760, 33 C.I.T. 760, 31 I.T.R.D. (BNA) 1582, 2009 Ct. Intl. Trade LEXIS 66, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/target-corp-v-united-states-cit-2009.