Tardiff v. Knox County
This text of 224 F.R.D. 522 (Tardiff v. Knox County) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Maine primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS’ OBJECTION TO AMENDED REPORT OF SCHEDULING CONFERENCE AND REVISED SCHEDULING ORDER
Defendants in the above captioned action object to a decision of the Magistrate Judge requiring the disclosure of reinsurance agreements under Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(a)(1)(D).1 See Defendants’ Objection to Amended Report of Scheduling Conference and Revised Scheduling Order (Docket Item No. 46). This Court concludes that reinsurance agreements fall under the umbrella of Rule 26(a)(1)(D) and accordingly will affirm the Magistrate Judge’s Order.
I. FACTS
This is a class action suit brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000) by Plaintiff Laurie Tar-diff and others similarly situated. The factual circumstances giving rise to this case are set forth in this Court’s Order Granting Plaintiffs Motion for Class Certification (Docket Item No. 21). See Tardiff v. Knox [523]*523County, 218 F.R.D. 332 (D.Me.2003), aff’d 365 F.3d 1 (1st Cir.2004).2
The current discovery dispute arises out of Defendant Knox County’s participation in the Maine County Commissioners Association Self-Funded Risk Management Pool pursuant to 30-A M.R.S.A. ch. 117.3 Under the Maine statute, “[a] public[,] self-funded pool shall obtain excess insurance or reinsurance ____The insurance shall limit the exposure of the pool to a defined level both as to ultimate claims values and loss ratio at which recovery from the insurer will be realized.” 30-A M.R.S.A. § 2253(3). The pool in which Knox County participates obtained reinsurance coverage pursuant to the statute.
II. DISCUSSION
Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 discusses the responsibilities of magistrate judges in terms of nondispositive and dispositive pretrial matters. A nondispositive matter is one which is not dispositive of a claim or a defense of a party. Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(a). In reviewing a magistrate judge’s determination on a nondispositive pretrial matter, the district court “shall modify or set aside any portion of the magistrate judge’s order found to be clearly erroneous or contrary to law.” Id.; Allen-dale Mut. Ins. Co. v. Rutherford, 178 F.R.D. 1. 2 (D.Me.1998); see generally Jacobsen v. Mintz, Levin, Cohn, Ferris, Glovsky & Popeo, P.C., 594 F.Supp. 583 (D.Me.1984).
Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(a)(1)(D) provides for discovery of “any insurance agreement under which any person carrying on an insurance business may be liable to satisfy part or all of a judgment which may be entered in the action or to indemnify or reimburse for payments made to satisfy the judgment.” Federal courts have held that reinsurance agreements are discoverable under Rule 26. See, e.g., Medmarc Cas. Ins. Co. v. Arroto Int’l, Inc., No. 01-CV-2394, 2002 WL 1870452, at *3 (E.D.Pa. July 29, 2002); Missouri Pac. R.R. Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Surety Co., No. 3:93-CV-1898-D, 1995 WL 861147, at *2 (N.D.Tex. Nov. 6, 1995); Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Cont’l Illinois Corp., 116 F.R.D. 78, 84 (N.D.Ill.1987). The National Union Fire Insurance court found that reinsurance agreements were discoverable under Rule 26 for the following reasons:
Reinsurers (“person[s] carrying on an insurance business”) are insurers’ own insurers. If Insurers are held liable under the Policies, they will turn to their reinsurers for partial indemnification, as provided in the reinsurance agreements, for any “payments made to satisfy the judgment.” Insurers contend their reinsurance agreements are not “insurance agree-[524]*524merits” under Rule 26(b)(2).4 True enough, reinsurance agreements are a special breed of insurance policy [actually, a contract of indemnity written by an insurer].... But the English language remains the same: Reinsurers “carry[] on an insurance business” and “may be liable ... to indemnify [Insurers] for payments made to satisfy the judgment” that Movants hope to obtain. Rule 26(b)(2) does not require that a party’s insurer be directly liable to the other party. It is totally irrelevant that the reinsurers would pay Insurers and not the defendants and that Movants cannot directly sue the reinsurers.
Nat’l Union Fire Ins., 116 F.R.D. at 84.
Turning to the case at bar, the Magistrate Judge ordered that “[i]n addition to all insurance agreements, reservation-of-rights letters and related documentation which the defendants have either already produced to the plaintiff or agreed to produce, they shall produce all reinsurance agreements and related documents.” Amended Report of Scheduling Conference and Revised Scheduling Order (Docket Item No. 40) at 3. Because Plaintiff seeks monetary damages in the instant action, Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(a)(1)(D) requires Defendants to disclose the reinsurance agreements. Defendants contend that “[b]eeause the insurance purchased by the Risk Pool (the reinsurance) provides no benefit whatsoever to the member counties, and because it does not provide for payments to be made to satisfy part of all of a judgment or to reimburse the Defendants for any payments that they make to satisfy a judgment, the information is not discoverable.” Defendants’ Objection to Amended Report of Scheduling Conference and Revised Scheduling Order at 2. This contention is misplaced. Rule 26(a)(1)(D) requires disclosure when “any person carrying on an insurance business may be liable to satisfy part of all of a judgment” or “reimburse for payments made.” Contrary to Defendants’ contention, the inquiry under Rule 26(a)(1)(D) focuses on whether payments are made at all, not on the identity of the recipient. Under the reinsurance agreements between the Pool and its reinsurers,5 the reinsurers are exposed to potential liability6 for reimbursing the Pool when judgment is entered against the Pool’s member. Accordingly, the reinsurance agreements fall within the scope of Rule 26(a)(1)(D) and must be disclosed to Plaintiff. The Magistrate Judge’s Order is not clearly erroneous or contrary to law.
III. CONCLUSION
The decisions of the Magistrate Judge contained in the Amended Report of Scheduling Conference and Revised Scheduling Order be, and they hereby are, AFFIRMED.
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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack
224 F.R.D. 522, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22862, 2004 WL 2567199, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/tardiff-v-knox-county-med-2004.