Tarantini v. Russo Realty Corp.

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Tarantini v. Russo Realty Corp.

259 A.D.2d 484, 684 N.Y.S.2d 890, 1999 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 2045

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedMarch 1, 1999

StatusPublished

Cited by4 cases

This text of 259 A.D.2d 484 (Tarantini v. Russo Realty Corp.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Tarantini v. Russo Realty Corp., 259 A.D.2d 484, 684 N.Y.S.2d 890, 1999 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 2045 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1999).

Pincite

Opinion

—In an action, inter alia, to establish title to certain real property by adverse possession, the defendant Russo Realty Corp. appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Kitson, J.), dated June 15, 1998, which denied its motion for leave to amend its answer to interpose as a fifth affirmative defense that the action seeks to deprive it of its rights in the property in violation of its substantive due process rights.

Ordered that the order is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.

Motions for leave to amend pleadings are to be liberally granted absent prejudice or surprise resulting directly from the delay (see, CPLR 3025 [b]; McCaskey, Davies & Assocs. v New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., 59 NY2d 755, 757; Fa-hey v County of Ontario, 44 NY2d 934, 935). However, where the proposed amendment is palpably insufficient as a matter of law or is totally devoid of merit, leave should be denied (see, Alejandro v Riportella, 250 AD2d 556; Sentry Ins. Co. v KeroSun, Inc., 122 AD2d 204; Norman v Ferrara, 107 AD2d 739). Here, the appellant’s proposed defense, that the plaintiffs action violates its substantive due process rights under the Federal and State Constitutions, is insufficient as a matter of law, as it failed to identify any government action against it which would involve those rights. Therefore, the motion for leave to amend the answer was properly denied. O’Brien, J. P., Ritter, Joy and Altman, JJ., concur.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

—In an action, inter alia, to establish title to certain real property by adverse possession, the defendant Russo Realty Corp. appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Kitson, J.), dated June 15, 1998, which denied its motion for leave to amend its answer to interpose as a fifth affirmative defense that the action seeks to deprive it of its rights in the property in violation of its substantive due process rights.

Ordered that the order is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.

Motions for leave to amend pleadings are to be liberally granted absent prejudice or surprise resulting directly from the delay (see, CPLR 3025 [b]; McCaskey, Davies & Assocs. v New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., 59 NY2d 755, 757; Fa-hey v County of Ontario, 44 NY2d 934, 935). However, where the proposed amendment is palpably insufficient as a matter of law or is totally devoid of merit, leave should be denied (see, Alejandro v Riportella, 250 AD2d 556; Sentry Ins. Co. v KeroSun, Inc., 122 AD2d 204; Norman v Ferrara, 107 AD2d 739). Here, the appellant’s proposed defense, that the plaintiffs action violates its substantive due process rights under the Federal and State Constitutions, is insufficient as a matter of law, as it failed to identify any government action against it which would involve those rights. Therefore, the motion for leave to amend the answer was properly denied. O’Brien, J. P., Ritter, Joy and Altman, JJ., concur.

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)

259 A.D.2d 484, 684 N.Y.S.2d 890, 1999 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 2045, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/tarantini-v-russo-realty-corp-nyappdiv-1999.

Opinion

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack