Rel: March 13, 2026
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA OCTOBER TERM, 2025-2026 _________________________
SC-2025-0346 and SC-2025-0357 _________________________
Tara Grall
v.
William Grall and G-Team, P.C.
Appeals from Lauderdale Circuit Court (CV-24-900070)
STEWART, Chief Justice.
These consolidated appeals arise from a dispute between Tara Grall
and her former husband, William Grall, regarding a business in which
they are the sole, coequal shareholders, G-Team, P.C. ("G-Team"). In
appeal no. SC-2025-0346 ("the first appeal"), Tara filed a notice of appeal SC-2025-0346 and SC-2025-0357
seeking review of several interlocutory orders of the Lauderdale Circuit
Court ("the trial court"). While the first appeal was pending, the trial
court purported to enter a final judgment directing the winding up of G-
Team, from which Tara also filed a notice of appeal -- appeal no. SC-2025-
0357 ("the second appeal"). For the following reasons, we dismiss both
appeals.
Facts and Procedural History
G-Team is an Alabama professional corporation that had previously
done business in Lauderdale County. In March 2024, during the
pendency of the Grall's divorce proceedings and after G-Team had
permanently ceased doing business, William commenced a derivative
action against Tara under § 10A-2A-7.40 et seq., Ala. Code 1975, seeking
to enforce the purported right of G-Team to sell its real property ("the
property") to cover its mortgage debt. Following a hearing in which Tara
asserted that the property could not be sold because it was subject to a
lien from the Small Business Administration, the trial court ordered the
sale of the property. It then set a hearing to determine the proper
distribution of the sale proceeds and to complete G-Team's winding-up
process.
2 SC-2025-0346 and SC-2025-0357
Tara, proceeding pro se, subsequently filed -- among many other
motions -- a motion titled "Emergency Motion to Stay May 1, 2025
Hearing Due to Vehicle Safety, Financial Hardship, and Pending Federal
Litigation," and a motion titled "Motion to Recuse Judge Ben Graves for
Judicial Bias, Ethical Conflict, and Material Witness Involvement." The
trial court entered orders denying both motions.
On April 22, 2025, Tara, citing Rule 4(a)(1), Ala. R. App. P., filed a
notice of appeal to the Court of Civil Appeals. She described her appeal
as "interlocutory" and requested from the Court of Civil Appeals a stay of
proceedings in the trial court pending appellate review. That court denied
Tara's request.
Despite the pendency of Tara's appeal, the trial court conducted a
final hearing to complete G-Team's winding-up process. On May 1, 2025,
the trial court purported to enter a final judgment. Tara appealed that
judgment to the Court of Civil Appeals. The Court of Civil Appeals
transferred Tara's appeals to this Court based on a lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction.
Discussion
3 SC-2025-0346 and SC-2025-0357
Although neither party has raised the issue, we must determine
whether this Court has jurisdiction over Tara's appeals before we can
consider the merits of her arguments. See Nunn v. Baker, 518 So. 2d 711,
712 (Ala. 1987) ("[J]urisdictional matters are of such magnitude that we
take notice of them at any time and do so even ex mero motu."). For this
Court to have jurisdiction to consider an appeal, the appeal must be
authorized by statute or the Alabama Rules of Appellate Procedure. See
John Crane-Houdaille, Inc. v. Lucas, 534 So. 2d 1070, 1073 (Ala. 1988)
(discussing this Court's jurisdiction over appeals from certain orders).
Section 12-22-2, Ala. Code 1975, authorizes appeals from final judgments
to the "appropriate appellate court."1 Rule 4(a)(1), among other things,
authorizes appeals arising from certain types of interlocutory orders.
Tara relies on Rule 4(a)(1) as authorization for each of her appeals.
The First Appeal, Appeal No. SC-2025-0346
Tara filed her first notice of appeal on April 22, 2025, before a final
judgment was entered by the trial court. In her notice of appeal, Tara
stated that she was appealing "(1) the trial court's failure to recuse
1A final judgment is one that resolves all claims against all parties.
Jakeman v. Lawrence Grp. Mgmt. Co., 82 So. 3d 655, 659 (Ala. 2011). 4 SC-2025-0346 and SC-2025-0357
despite being a material witness in the underlying matter, (2) the court's
refusal to allow remote appearance notwithstanding substantial evidence
of financial and physical hardship including irreparable harm to the
Defendant … and (3) judicial inaction in upholding clearly established
federal lien priority under 31 U.S.C. § 3713 and UCC § 9-315." None of
these orders addressing those issues qualifies as a final judgment that
would support an appeal. Nor is any of them a type of interlocutory order
from which Rule 4(a)(1) authorizes a direct appeal -- i.e., an interlocutory
order "(A) … granting, continuing, modifying, refusing, or dissolving an
injunction, or refusing to dissolve or to modify an injunction; (B) …
appointing or refusing to appoint a receiver; [or] (C) … determining the
right to public office." Because Tara's first appeal is not from a final
judgment, and because it is not from a qualifying interlocutory order
under Rule 4(a)(1), we lack jurisdiction to consider that appeal, and it is
due to be dismissed. See Richey v. Morris, 389 So. 3d 347, 348 (Ala. 2023);
see also Ex parte Alabama Dep't of Hum. Res., 999 So. 2d 891, 895 (Ala.
2008) ("[W]e are obligated to dismiss an appeal if, for any reason,
jurisdiction does not exist.").
The Second Appeal, SC-2025-0357
5 SC-2025-0346 and SC-2025-0357
Tara filed her second notice of appeal on May 1, 2025, seeking
review of the trial court's purported May 1, 2025, final judgment. That
judgment, however, was entered during the pendency of the first appeal.
The filing of an appeal has jurisdictional implications. Williams v.
Mari Props., LLC, 329 So. 3d 1237, 1240 (Ala. 2020). Specifically, it
divests the trial court of jurisdiction. Id. That is because "[j]urisdiction of
a case can be in only one court at a time," Reynolds v. Colonial Bank, 874
So. 2d 497, 503 (Ala. 2003), and, while an appeal is pending, the binding
presumption is that the court with jurisdiction is the appellate court.
Williams, 329 So. 3d at 1240 n.3. The appellate court retains jurisdiction
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Rel: March 13, 2026
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA OCTOBER TERM, 2025-2026 _________________________
SC-2025-0346 and SC-2025-0357 _________________________
Tara Grall
v.
William Grall and G-Team, P.C.
Appeals from Lauderdale Circuit Court (CV-24-900070)
STEWART, Chief Justice.
These consolidated appeals arise from a dispute between Tara Grall
and her former husband, William Grall, regarding a business in which
they are the sole, coequal shareholders, G-Team, P.C. ("G-Team"). In
appeal no. SC-2025-0346 ("the first appeal"), Tara filed a notice of appeal SC-2025-0346 and SC-2025-0357
seeking review of several interlocutory orders of the Lauderdale Circuit
Court ("the trial court"). While the first appeal was pending, the trial
court purported to enter a final judgment directing the winding up of G-
Team, from which Tara also filed a notice of appeal -- appeal no. SC-2025-
0357 ("the second appeal"). For the following reasons, we dismiss both
appeals.
Facts and Procedural History
G-Team is an Alabama professional corporation that had previously
done business in Lauderdale County. In March 2024, during the
pendency of the Grall's divorce proceedings and after G-Team had
permanently ceased doing business, William commenced a derivative
action against Tara under § 10A-2A-7.40 et seq., Ala. Code 1975, seeking
to enforce the purported right of G-Team to sell its real property ("the
property") to cover its mortgage debt. Following a hearing in which Tara
asserted that the property could not be sold because it was subject to a
lien from the Small Business Administration, the trial court ordered the
sale of the property. It then set a hearing to determine the proper
distribution of the sale proceeds and to complete G-Team's winding-up
process.
2 SC-2025-0346 and SC-2025-0357
Tara, proceeding pro se, subsequently filed -- among many other
motions -- a motion titled "Emergency Motion to Stay May 1, 2025
Hearing Due to Vehicle Safety, Financial Hardship, and Pending Federal
Litigation," and a motion titled "Motion to Recuse Judge Ben Graves for
Judicial Bias, Ethical Conflict, and Material Witness Involvement." The
trial court entered orders denying both motions.
On April 22, 2025, Tara, citing Rule 4(a)(1), Ala. R. App. P., filed a
notice of appeal to the Court of Civil Appeals. She described her appeal
as "interlocutory" and requested from the Court of Civil Appeals a stay of
proceedings in the trial court pending appellate review. That court denied
Tara's request.
Despite the pendency of Tara's appeal, the trial court conducted a
final hearing to complete G-Team's winding-up process. On May 1, 2025,
the trial court purported to enter a final judgment. Tara appealed that
judgment to the Court of Civil Appeals. The Court of Civil Appeals
transferred Tara's appeals to this Court based on a lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction.
Discussion
3 SC-2025-0346 and SC-2025-0357
Although neither party has raised the issue, we must determine
whether this Court has jurisdiction over Tara's appeals before we can
consider the merits of her arguments. See Nunn v. Baker, 518 So. 2d 711,
712 (Ala. 1987) ("[J]urisdictional matters are of such magnitude that we
take notice of them at any time and do so even ex mero motu."). For this
Court to have jurisdiction to consider an appeal, the appeal must be
authorized by statute or the Alabama Rules of Appellate Procedure. See
John Crane-Houdaille, Inc. v. Lucas, 534 So. 2d 1070, 1073 (Ala. 1988)
(discussing this Court's jurisdiction over appeals from certain orders).
Section 12-22-2, Ala. Code 1975, authorizes appeals from final judgments
to the "appropriate appellate court."1 Rule 4(a)(1), among other things,
authorizes appeals arising from certain types of interlocutory orders.
Tara relies on Rule 4(a)(1) as authorization for each of her appeals.
The First Appeal, Appeal No. SC-2025-0346
Tara filed her first notice of appeal on April 22, 2025, before a final
judgment was entered by the trial court. In her notice of appeal, Tara
stated that she was appealing "(1) the trial court's failure to recuse
1A final judgment is one that resolves all claims against all parties.
Jakeman v. Lawrence Grp. Mgmt. Co., 82 So. 3d 655, 659 (Ala. 2011). 4 SC-2025-0346 and SC-2025-0357
despite being a material witness in the underlying matter, (2) the court's
refusal to allow remote appearance notwithstanding substantial evidence
of financial and physical hardship including irreparable harm to the
Defendant … and (3) judicial inaction in upholding clearly established
federal lien priority under 31 U.S.C. § 3713 and UCC § 9-315." None of
these orders addressing those issues qualifies as a final judgment that
would support an appeal. Nor is any of them a type of interlocutory order
from which Rule 4(a)(1) authorizes a direct appeal -- i.e., an interlocutory
order "(A) … granting, continuing, modifying, refusing, or dissolving an
injunction, or refusing to dissolve or to modify an injunction; (B) …
appointing or refusing to appoint a receiver; [or] (C) … determining the
right to public office." Because Tara's first appeal is not from a final
judgment, and because it is not from a qualifying interlocutory order
under Rule 4(a)(1), we lack jurisdiction to consider that appeal, and it is
due to be dismissed. See Richey v. Morris, 389 So. 3d 347, 348 (Ala. 2023);
see also Ex parte Alabama Dep't of Hum. Res., 999 So. 2d 891, 895 (Ala.
2008) ("[W]e are obligated to dismiss an appeal if, for any reason,
jurisdiction does not exist.").
The Second Appeal, SC-2025-0357
5 SC-2025-0346 and SC-2025-0357
Tara filed her second notice of appeal on May 1, 2025, seeking
review of the trial court's purported May 1, 2025, final judgment. That
judgment, however, was entered during the pendency of the first appeal.
The filing of an appeal has jurisdictional implications. Williams v.
Mari Props., LLC, 329 So. 3d 1237, 1240 (Ala. 2020). Specifically, it
divests the trial court of jurisdiction. Id. That is because "[j]urisdiction of
a case can be in only one court at a time," Reynolds v. Colonial Bank, 874
So. 2d 497, 503 (Ala. 2003), and, while an appeal is pending, the binding
presumption is that the court with jurisdiction is the appellate court.
Williams, 329 So. 3d at 1240 n.3. The appellate court retains jurisdiction
until it disposes of the appeal, even if it ultimately determines that it
never had jurisdiction to consider the appeal in the first place. See Foster
v. Greer & Sons, Inc., 446 So. 2d 605, 608 (Ala. 1984), overruled on other
grounds by Ex parte Andrews, 520 So. 2d 507 (Ala. 1987). Because only
the appellate court has jurisdiction while the appeal is pending, any
purported final judgment the trial court enters during that time is void.
See, e.g., Etheredge v. Genie Indus., Inc., 632 So. 2d 1324, 1325 (Ala.
1994) (holding that trial court's order entered while appeal was pending
"was a nullity and would not support a notice of appeal"). This Court
6 SC-2025-0346 and SC-2025-0357
lacks jurisdiction to consider an appeal from a void judgment. See Honea
v. Raymond James Fin. Servs., Inc., 240 So. 3d 550, 558 (Ala. 2017).
In this case, when Tara filed her first notice of appeal on April 22,
2025, the trial court was divested of jurisdiction to proceed to a final
adjudication of the matter. Nevertheless, the trial court continued
issuing orders, culminating in its purported final judgment entered May
1, 2025. Because the trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter that
judgment, the judgment is void. Accordingly, the second appeal, which
arises from that judgment, is also due to be dismissed. See MPQ, Inc. v.
Birmingham Realty Co., 78 So. 3d 391, 394 (Ala. 2011) (" 'A judgment
entered by a court lacking subject-matter jurisdiction is absolutely void
and will not support an appeal; an appellate court must dismiss an
attempted appeal from such a void judgment.' " (quoting Vann v. Cook,
989 So. 2d 556, 559 (Ala. Civ. App. 2008))).
Conclusion
The first appeal is taken from certain interlocutory orders from
which a direct appeal does not lie. The first appeal is, therefore,
dismissed. Because the judgment at issue in the second appeal was
7 SC-2025-0346 and SC-2025-0357
entered while the trial court was divested of jurisdiction, that judgment
is void, and the appeal from that void judgment must also be dismissed.
SC-2025-0346 -- APPEAL DISMISSED.
SC-2025-0357 -- APPEAL DISMISSED.
Shaw, Bryan, Mendheim, and McCool, JJ., concur.