Tapia v. Tapia

Opinion

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5 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF GUAM 6

7 ANTHONY ANDY TAPIA, I DOMESTIC CASE NO. DM 0193-14 Plaintiff, 9

l0 DECISION AND ORDER

ll VELMA ALICE TAPIA,

t2 Defendant.

t3

l4

l5 INTRODUCTION t6 This matter came before the Honorable Arthur R. Barcinas on the 15th day of September, t7 2014. Plaintiff Anthony Andy Tapia is pro se, and Attomey Seaton M. Woodley, III represents t8 the Defendant. As the Court was in the midst of a jury trial, the Court took the Defendant's l9

20 Motion to Dismiss under advisement without benefit of oral argument. For the reasons set forth

2t below, the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED. 22 BACKGROUND 23 The Plaintiff filed a Verified Complaint for Divorce on April 7, 2014, in the Superior 24

Court of Guam, seeking divorce on the basis of extreme mental cruelty, and requesting all of the 25

26 community property and none of the community debt. The Plaintiff also sought primary custody

27 over the children of the parties, who reside with the Defendant in Connecticut, and child 28 support. On June 2, the Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss, arguing that the Court lacked Decision and Order DM 0193-14; Tapia v. Tapia

personal jurisdiction over her, that Guam was an inconvenient forum for the Defendant, that the I

2 Plaintiff had requested relief which the Court had no jurisdiction to grant, and for the Plaintiffls

3 failure to comply with pleading requirements. That motion was accompanied by a declaration 4 stating that the Defendant has never lived, resided, or worked in Guam, has no property located 5 in Guam, and rather is a resident of the State of Connecticut. The Defendant also declared that 6

to the best of her knowledge, the Plaintiff was on Guam only due to his naval assignment. 7

8 At a scheduling conference on July 2, the Court granted the Plaintiff, then represented 9 by counsel, a continuance of the motion hearing. On August 6, the Plaintiff represented himself t0 pro se, stating that his previous counsel had not relayed his wishes regarding ownership of the ll family home and custody of the children. The Court instructed the Plaintiff to examine the t2

l3 Rules of Civil Procedure and Local Rules, gave the Plaintiff until September 8 to respond to the

l4 Defendant's motion, and set the motion hearing for September 15, 2014. On August 29, the

l5 Defendant's counsel filed a declaration stating that the Defendant had initiated a divorce action t6 against the Plaintiff in the Superior Court of Connecticut, and that the Plaintiff had been served l7 the complaint and summons for the Connecticut action. The Plaintiff did not file a response to l8

l9 the motion to dismiss. On September 15, the Court, being in the midst of a jury trial, took the

20 motion under advisement on the pleadings. 2l DISCUSSION 22 I. Personal Jurisdiction 23

l9 GCA $ 33l8(a) provides the residency requirement for divorces on Guam, and reads: 24

25 A divorce or dissolution of marriage may be granted if one (1) of the parties has been a resident of Guam for at least ninety (90) days immediately preceding the 26 filing of a complaint for divorce, or dissolution of maniage. For purposes of this Section, a person shall be deemed a resident if one (1) of the parties has been 27 assigned with the U.S. Military to a unit on Guam or a ship home-ported in Guam 28 for at least ninety (90) days immediately preceding the filing of a complaint for

Page 2 of9 Decision and Order DM 0193-14; Tapia v. Tapia

divorce or dissolution of maffiage or if one (1) of the parties is physically present I in Guam for at least ninety (90) days immediately preceding the filing of a 2 complaint for divorce or dissolution of marriage. Physical presence by one of the parties in Guam for a period of ninety (90) days prior to filing of the action for J divorce or dissolution of maniage shall give rise to a conclusive presumption of compliance with this Section. 4

5 le GCA $ 8318(a) (200s). 6 The Plaintiff has submitted a verified complaint for divorce that states that he has 7 resided on Guam for more than ninety days. Pl.'s Verified Compl. 1, Apr. 7,2014. The I Defendant's Declaration also states that to the best of the Defendant's knowledge, the Plaintiff 9

is assigned to Naval Station, Guam. Def.'s Decl. 3, May 29,2014. The Court finds that the t0

ll Plaintiff has been a resident of Guam for at least ninety days immediately preceding filing of the

t2 complaint for divorce, and thus the requirement of $ 8318(a) is met. l3 Guam's long-arm statute authorizes the Superior Court of Guam to exercise personal t4 jurisdiction "on any basis not inconsistent with the Organic Act or the Constitution of the l5

t6 United States." 7 GCA $ 14109 (2005). Under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth

t7 Amendment to the United States Constitution, courts may only exercise personal jurisdiction

l8 o'certain over the defendant if the defendant has minimum contacts with [the forum] such that t9 the maintenance of the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial 20 justice. ttt ÞfrT f-nmmntnc Tnn \/ l}ST Donrr¡acf -l-olo^^rm Haw Inc 1999 Guam 17 \ 17 2l

22 (alteration in original) (quoting Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washinglon, 326 U s. 3r0, 316 (194s)).

23 Because Guam's long-arm statute reaches as far as the federal Constitution allows, "[A] court

24 analyzing personal jurisdiction under Guam's long-arm statute, simultaneously analyzes the 25 issue of constitutional due process." Banes v. Superior Court,2012 Guam 11 T 17. Inanother 26

divorce case, the Supreme Court ruled that the defendant had no contacts with Guam, because 27

28 "she has never resided, worked in, or visited Guam." Speicher v. Speicher,2013 Guam l1 T 9.

Page 3 of 9 Decision and Order DM 0193-14; Tapia v. Tapia

Similarly, in the case at bar, the defendant declares that she resides in Connecticut, owns I

2 a home in Connecticut, and works in Connecticut. Def.'s Decl. 1-2, May 29,2014. She has

3 never lived in Guam and never worked in Guam. Id. at 1. The Plaintiff has not filed an 4 opposition or made an argument that the Plaintiff does have the minimum contacts with Guam 5 requisite for the Court to assert jurisdiction, and nothing else in the record provides any reason 6

to doubt the veracity of the Defendant's declaration. The Court lacks personal jurisdiction over 7

I the Defendant.

9 II. Divisible Divorce t0 Yet despite the lack of personal jurisdiction, the Court is not foreclosed from il adjudicating the dissolution of marriage aspect of the Plaintiffls complaint. "Divisible divorce l2

t3 is based on the principle under which 'financial responsibility and marital status may be t4 separately litigated at different times and in different forums,"' Speicher v. Speicher,2013

l5 Guam 11 I 17 (quoting In re Marriage of Gray,25l CaL Rptr. 846, 850 (Ct. App. 1988). The t6 Full Faith and Credit Clause of the federal Constitution requires recognition of the divorce 17

decree notwithstanding the lack of jurisdiction over the property matters of at least one of the t8

l9 married spouses. See id. The Superior Court of Guam has jurisdiction to adjudicate the

20 Plaintifls Complaint for Divorce despite its lack of personal jurisdiction over the Defendant, 2t and thus its inability to adjudicate the property interests of the partìes. Divisible divorce "is 22 more than a jurisdictional concept." Speicher v. Speicher ,2013 Guam 1 I I l8 (quoting HgL¡¡. 23

Superior Court,352P.2d 161,165 (Cal. 1960)). It has an important public policy purpose to 24

25 make sure that the dissolution of an unworkable and injurious marriage is not prevented by

26 property disputes. See Speicher v. Speicher,2013 Guam 1 I 1[ 18. 27

Page 4 of9 Decision and Order DM 0193-14; Tapiav. Tapia

Similarly, the Court may not exercise jurisdiction over child custody matters, as the I

2 children's home state is Connecticut rather than Guam, and also the Court lacks personal

3 jurisdiction over the Defendant. See 7 GCA $ 39201(a)(l) (restricting the Superior Court of 4 Guam's jurisdiction to make child custody determinations to cases in which Guam is the home 5 State of the child). But the lack ofjurisdiction over child custody does not foreclose the Court's 6

limited jurisdiction over the marriage relationship. See Speicher v. Speicher,2013 Guam I I fllJ 7

8 16-19.Instead, "[t]he power to prevent a final dissolution should be used only when necessary

9 to preserve the authority of the court." Speicher v. Speicher ,2073 Guam I I I 19 (quoting Hull t0 v. Superior Court ,352 P.2d 16I, 163 (Cal. 1960)). The Court has jurisdiction to adjudicate the ll marital status of the parties. l2

r3 III. Comity l4 On August 29,2014, the Court was informed that the Defendant has flrled a divorce t5 action against the Plaintiff in the Superior Court of the State of Connecticut. Decl. of Counsel l6 I , Aug. 29, 2014. The summons and complaint were served on the Plaintiff on August 26, and t7 the initial hearing was set for September 9. Id. The Connecticut action potentially raises the l8

l9 issue of whether this Court should dismiss or stay the present action on grounds of comity with

20 the Connecticut court. See Speicher v. Speicher, 2013 Guam 11 TI 2I'22 (describing the 2t comity doctrine and the factors to consider when applying it). However, the Connecticut action 22 postdated the Defendant's motion to dismiss and the Plaintiff has not had an opportunity to 23

argue against dismissal on comity grounds. The Court should not rule sua sponte on the issue 24

25 of comity without giving the parties notice and an opportunity to be heard. See Yokeno v. Lai,

26 2014 Guam 18I26. Therefore, the Court does not address the comity issue. 27 IV. Forum Non Conveniens 28

Page 5 of9 Decision and Order DM 0193-14; Tapiav, Tapia

The Defendant argues that the Court should dismiss the action on grounds that Guam is I

2 not a convenient forum, and that Connecticut is a more convenient forum for the litigation.

3 Def.'s Mot. 1-2, Jun.2,2014. The Court must undertake a balancing analysis of the factors in 4 favor or and against a grant ofjurisdiction on grounds offorum non conveniens. See Speicher 5

v. Speicheu 2013 Guam l1 fln2l-23. "Where the court has considered all relevant public and 6

private interest factors, and where its balancing of these factors is reasonable, the decision may 7

8 only be reversed when there has been a clear abuse of discretion." PCI Commc'ns, Inc. v. GST

9 Pacwest Telecom Haw.. Inc. , 1999 Guam 17 n 40 (citing Creative Tech.. Ltd. v. Azteh Sys. Pte. t0 Ltd, 61 F.3d 696, 699 (gth Cir. 1995)). The decision involves "weighing of a mix of private and ll public interests, keeping in mind that the plaintiff s choice of forum is usually to be respected." l2

l3 Speicher v. $peicher,2013 Guam 11 ï 10 (quoting Walter Fuller Aircraft Sales. Inc.. v. t4 Reppblic of the Philippines ,965 F.2d 1375, 1389 (5th Cir. 1992)).

r5 In PCI Commc'ns, the Supreme Court looked to the case 9ulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, t6 where the U.S. Supreme Court listed the following private factors to consider when weighing a t7 motion to dismiss for forum non conveniens: t8

l9 An interest to be considered, and the one likely to be most pressed, is the private interest of the litigant. Important considerations are the relative ease of access to 20 sources of proof; availability of compulsory process for attendance of unwilling, and the cost of obtaining attendance of willing, witnesses; possibility of view of 2t premises, if view would be appropriate to the action; and all other practical 22 problems that make trial of a case easy, expeditious and inexpensive. There may also be questions as to the enforceability of a judgment if one is obtained. The 23 court will weigh relative advantages and obstacles to fair trial. It is often said that the plaintiff may not, by choice of an inconvenient forum, 'vex,' 'harass,' or 24 'oppress' the defendant by inflicting upon him expense or trouble not necessary to 25 his own right to pursue his remedy. But unless the balance is strongly in favor of the defendant, the plaintiffs choice of forum should rarely be disturbed. 26

27 Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 303 U.S. 501, 508 (1947). And when it discussed the public factors,

28 the U.S. Supreme Court wrote:

Page 6 of9 Decision and Order DM 0193-14; Tapia v. Tapia

Factors of public interest also have place in applying the doctrine. Administrative difficulties follow for courts when litigation is piled up in congested centers I

) instead of being handled at its origin. Jury duty is a burden that ought not to be imposed upon the people of a community which has no relation to the 3 litigation...There is a local interest in having localized controversies decided at home. 4

5 Id. at 508-9.

6 The Plaintiff has a private interest in litigating the divorce in Guam, where he now 7 resides. But the Defendant has an opposite interest in having the case litigated in Connecticut. 8 Moreovero the Defendant has declared that she is unable to travel to Guam to litigate here, as 9

one ofher sons has central auditory processing disorder and another has epilepsy and requires l0

ll twice daily medication to prevent seizures. Def.'s Decl. 3, May 29,2014. The Plaintiff, on the

t2 other hand, has not similarly declared that litigation in Connecticut would be a hardship for t3 him. If either party has to travel to conduct litigation, the prospect appears to burden the t4 Defendant more than it does the Plaintiff. In the terms of Gulf Oil Corp., while the Court does t5

t6 not definitively rule that it was the Plaintiff s intent to "vex, harass, or oppress" the Defendant

l7 by filing a parallel suit in Guam, the Plaintiffs "own right to a remedy" would not be l8 eliminated by litigation in Connecticut. This is especially the case because the only remedy this l9 Court has jurisdiction to provide is dissolution of marriage, which may be accomplished by 20

litigating in Connecticut as well as by litigating in Guam, and a Connecticut court may also 21

22 grant remedies to the Plaintiff that this Court lacks jurisdiction to provide. Moreover, any other

23 persons who may have to be deposed or testify are in Connecticut, where the Defendant lives 24 with the parties' children, and not in Guam, where the Plaintiff moved due to his naval 25 assignment. Any physical evidence that might need to be considered is likewise located on 26

Connecticut. The litigation would be more 'oeasy, expeditious and inexpensive," if it took place 27

28 in Connecticut, and not in Guam.

PageT of9 Decision and Order DM 0l 93- l4; Tapia v. Tapia

With regard to public interest factors, the Supreme Court notes that "fs]tates have a I

2 strong public policy interest in the marital status of persons domiciled in their jurisdiction."

3 Speicher v. Speicher,2013 Guam I I T 19 (citations omitted). Further, "The power to prevent a 4 final dissolution should be used only when necessary to preserve the authority of the court." Id. 5 at !J 19 (citations omitted). If this Court hears the case, and finds the statutory requirements for 6

granting dissolution on the basis of irreconcilable differences are met, it does not have the 7

8 discretion to deny the dissolution.

9 But the Supreme Court also wrote that this Court has discretion, not about whether or l0 not to grant a decree of dissolution if the statute's requirements are met, but about whether to ll hear the case in the first place. See id. atl23.ln that light, Guam's public policy interest in the t2

r3 status of the parties' marriage is one point in favor of hearing the case. But Connecticut has an

l4 equal public policy interest in the marital status of its resident, the Defendant. A decree of

l5 divorce by either a Guam court or a Connecticut court would, under the Full Faith and Credit t6 Clause, bind the other court to the result of the determination, possibly in contravention of the t7 other jurisdiction's public policy interest. This is not an unequivocal reason to take up t8

t9 jurisdiction.

20 Moreover, looking again at the Gulf Oil Corp. factors, taking jurisdiction of this case 21 would surely create "administrative difficulties" by "piling up litigation" in Guam. Whether or 22 not to grant adissolution decree is not a decision subject to ajury verdict, but the basic concern 23

for efficiency is also relevant to bench trials. While "there is a local interest in having localized 24

25 controversies decided at home," this divorce is not, at its essence, a Guam controversy. It is a

26 Connecticut controversy in which one of the parties has moved to Guam. The "local interest," in 27 this case, points to it being decided in Connecticut. 28

Page 8 of9 Decision and Order DM 0193-14; Tapia v. Tapia

The U.S. Supreme Court has stated "unless the balance is strongly in favor of the I

2 defendant, the plaintiff s choice of forum should rarely be disturbed." Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert,

J 303 U.S. 501, 508 (1947). But looking at and balancing the relevant private and public interest 4 factors here, the Court finds that the balance in this case is strongly in favor of the Defendant. 5 Thus, the Court finds that Guam is not a convenient forum for this divorce litigation, even when 6

the litigation is limited to the issue of marital status and excludes issues of property, support and 7

8 child custody.

9 V. Sufficiency of Plaintiffls Pleading l0 Because the Court grants the Defendant's motion on forum non conveniens grounds, the il issue raised by the Defendant of the sufficiency of the Plaintiff s complaint under the Guam t2

l3 Rules of Civil Procedure and Guam statutes is moot.

t4 CONCLUSION t5 For the reasons set forth above, the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED. t6

t7

l8

l9

20 IT IS SO ORDERED this day of $Ëps#äffi r& 2t

22 a 23 HONORABLE ARTHUR R. BARCINAS 24 Judge, Superior Court of Guam

26 SERVICE VIA COUBT,BOX I ¿lqkhowledoe lhai a copy ol lhe 27 ln thê

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