Tanya Anderson and Delmonte Anderson, Individually and as Personal Representatives of the Supervised Estate of Michael Delshawn Anderson v. Civil City of South Bend (mem. dec.)
Opinion
MEMORANDUM DECISION Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as precedent or cited before any court except for the purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata, collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANTS ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEES Jeffrey A. Golding CIVIL CITY OF SOUTH BEND, Valparaiso, Indiana SOUTH BEND POLICE DEPARTMENT, CITY
ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, ET AL.
Aladean M. DeRose
City Attorney
South Bend, Indiana
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES
ST. JOSEPH COUNTY
PROSECUTING ATTORNEY,
MICHAEL DVORAK, KEN COTTER, ST. JOSEPH COUNTY CORONER’S OFFICE, RANDY MAGDALINSKI, ST. JOSEPH COUNTY METRO
HOMICIDE UNIT, AND TIM
CORBETT
James F. Groves
David E. Ballard
Lee, Groves & Zalas
South Bend, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 71A03-1502-CT-53 | October 16, 2015 Page 1 of 10
Tanya Anderson and Delmonte October 16, 2015 Anderson, Individually and as Court of Appeals Case No. Personal Representatives of the 71A03-1502-CT-53 Supervised Estate of Michael Appeal from the St. Joseph Delshawn Anderson, Deceased, Superior Court et al., The Honorable Jenny Pitts Manier, Appellants-Plaintiffs, Judge Trial Court Cause No.
v. 71D05-1407-CT-258
Civil City of South Bend a/k/a “City of South Bend,” South Bend Police Department, St. Joseph County Prosecuting Oct 16 2015, 5:48 am Attorney, St. Joseph County Coroner’s Office, St. Joseph County Metro Homicide Unit, et al., Appellees-Defendants
Crone, Judge.
Case Summary
[1] Michael Delshawn Anderson (“Michael”) 1 was allegedly tased and assaulted by
South Bend police officers and died in police custody. On the last day of the statutory limitations period, Michael’s parents, Tanya and Delmonte Anderson, filed a wrongful death complaint against various defendants affiliated with the
1 Because appellants have a common surname, we refer to Michael by his first name.
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Civil City of South Bend (collectively “the City Defendants”) and St. Joseph County (collectively “the County Defendants”) on behalf of themselves individually and as personal representatives of Michael’s estate, as well as on behalf of Michael’s minor children (collectively “the Plaintiffs”). The complaint was file-stamped with that date, and the summonses furnished by the Plaintiffs were file-stamped eight days later. The City Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the Plaintiffs’ complaint, presumably on the basis that the lawsuit was untimely because the summonses were not “filed” with the clerk before the limitations period expired. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss and later denied the Plaintiffs’ motion to correct error.
[2] The Plaintiffs now appeal. We conclude that the trial court erred in granting the City Defendants’ motion to dismiss because the Indiana Trial Rules require only that a plaintiff “furnish” a summons contemporaneously with the “filing” of a complaint, and there is no indication in the record that the Plaintiffs failed to do so here. Ind. Trial Rule 4(B). Consequently, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.
Facts and Procedural History [3] By way of background, Indiana Trial Rule 3 states,
A civil action is commenced by filing with the court a complaint or such equivalent pleading or document as may be specified by statute, by payment of the prescribed filing fee or filing an order waiving the filing fee, and, where service of process is required, by furnishing to the clerk as many copies of the complaint and summons as are necessary.
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And Indiana Trial Rule 4(B) states,
Contemporaneously with the filing of the complaint or equivalent pleading, the person seeking service or his attorney shall furnish to the clerk as many copies of the complaint and summons as are necessary. The clerk shall examine, date, sign, and affix his seal to the summons and thereupon issue and deliver the papers to the appropriate person for service.
Our supreme court has held that a civil action is untimely “if the plaintiff files a complaint within the applicable statute of limitations but does not tender the summons to the clerk within that statutory period.” Ray-Hayes v. Heinamann, 760 N.E.2d 172, 173 (Ind. 2002), reh’g granted on other grounds, 768 N.E.2d 899.
[4] Michael was allegedly tased and assaulted by South Bend police and died in their custody on July 22, 2012. The Plaintiffs filed a wrongful death complaint against the City Defendants and the County Defendants on July 22, 2014, the last day of the statutory limitations period. The trial court’s chronological case summary (“CCS”) entry for that date states, “Complaint/Equivalent Pleading Filed,” and the complaint is file-stamped July 22, 2014. Appellants’ App. at 5, 16.
[5] On August 19, 2014, the City Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the Plaintiffs’ complaint, presumably under Indiana Trial Rule 12(B)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. To our dismay, the motion
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 71A03-1502-CT-53 | October 16, 2015 Page 4 of 10 does not appear in the record before us. 2 We presume that it asserts that the Plaintiffs’ lawsuit was untimely because the summonses were not “filed” on July 22, 2014. The summonses are file-stamped July 30, 2014. City Defendants’ App. at 4-6. But the CCS does not state that the summonses were furnished to the clerk on that date; it simply states that service was issued. Appellants’ App. at 5.
[6] On October 23, 2014, the trial court held a hearing on the motion to dismiss. The Plaintiffs’ counsel appeared by telephone due to illness. When the court asked him to respond to the City Defendants’ argument that the summonses were untimely “filed,” he said, “I don’t know how to respond because I don’t have that in front of me,” and, “I believe that everything was filed at the same time.” Tr. at 6, 7. That same day, the trial court issued an order granting the City Defendants’ motion to dismiss on the basis that the summonses were untimely “filed.” 3 Appellants’ App. at 11.
[7] Trial Rule 59(C) states that a
motion to correct error, if any, shall be filed not later than thirty (30) days after the entry of a final judgment is noted in the
2 Cf. Ind. Appellate Rule 50(A)(2) (stating that appellant’s appendix “shall contain … pleadings and other documents from the Clerk’s Record in chronological order that are necessary for resolution of the issues raised on appeal”); Ind. Trial Rule 50(A)(3) (stating that appellee’s appendix “may contain additional items that are relevant to either issues raised on appeal or on cross-appeal”). 3 In the same order, the trial court also granted a motion for judgment on the pleadings filed by the County Defendants. The Plaintiffs’ notice of appeal and appellate brief do not mention this ruling, but the County Defendants filed an appellees’ brief, apparently out of an abundance of caution.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 71A03-1502-CT-53 | October 16, 2015 Page 5 of 10
Chronological Case Summary. A copy of the motion to correct error shall be served, when filed, upon the judge before whom the case is pending pursuant to Trial Rule 5.
Trial Rule 5(E) states, “Except as otherwise provided in subparagraph (2) hereof, all pleadings and papers subsequent to the complaint which are required to be served upon a party shall be filed with the Court either before service or within a reasonable period of time thereafter.”
[8] The CCS indicates that the Plaintiffs filed a motion to correct error on November 24, 2014, which was the latest possible date under Trial Rule 59(C). The CCS also indicates that a motion to correct error was filed on November 26, 2014. The appellants’ appendix contains a copy of the motion to correct error that is file-stamped November 24, 2014, and states in pertinent part,
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Tanya Anderson and Delmonte Anderson, Individually and as Personal Representatives of the Supervised Estate of Michael Delshawn Anderson v. Civil City of South Bend (mem. dec.) (Tanya Anderson and Delmonte Anderson, Individually and as Personal Representatives of the Supervised Estate of Michael Delshawn Anderson v. Civil City of South Bend (mem. dec.)) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.