TANNER v. O'MALLEY

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Pennsylvania
DecidedJuly 24, 2024
Docket2:23-cv-00302
StatusUnknown

This text of TANNER v. O'MALLEY (TANNER v. O'MALLEY) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
TANNER v. O'MALLEY, (E.D. Pa. 2024).

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

CHRISTOPHER LEE T., : CIVIL ACTION : v. : : MARTIN O’MALLEY, : No. 23-cv-302 Commissioner of Social Security. :

MEMORANDUM OPINION

CRAIG M. STRAW July 24, 2024 United States Magistrate Judge

Christopher Lee T. (hereafter “Plaintiff”) seeks review of the Commissioner’s decision denying his application for Disability Insurance Benefits (DIB). The parties consented to proceed before a Magistrate Judge1 and the matter was assigned to me.2 For the following reasons, I deny Plaintiff’s request for review and affirm the Commissioner’s decision. I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY On May 11, 2020, Plaintiff filed an application for DIB under the Social Security Act, alleging a disability onset date (AOD) of March 17, 2019. R. 230. The claim was denied initially on September 18, 2020, and again on reconsideration. R. 85-86, 88-115. Plaintiff requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). R. 139. On January 5, 2020, a hearing took place over the phone before ALJ Kathleen McDade because of the Covid-19 pandemic. R. 50-53. Plaintiff appeared with his counsel, Karen Quinn. R. 52. Vocational Expert (VE) Robert Jackson testified at the hearing. R. 22, 66-67.

1 See Doc. 4; 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) & Fed. R. Civ. P. 73. 2 See Doc. 3. 1 The ALJ issued a decision denying benefits. R. 19-44. Plaintiff filed a request for review of the ALJ’s decision, which was denied. R. 1-4. Thus, the ALJ’s decision became the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security. R. 1-3; 20 C.F.R. § 404.981. Plaintiff’s counsel then filed this action in federal court. Doc. 1. Plaintiff filed a Brief and Statement of

Issues in Support of Request for Review. Doc. 17. Defendant filed a Response to Plaintiff’s Request for Review. Doc. 25. Plaintiff subsequently filed a reply. Doc. 28. II. LEGAL STANDARDS To prove disability, a claimant must demonstrate an “inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment . . . which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). The Commissioner employs a five-step sequential process to determine if a claimant is disabled, evaluating: 1. Whether the claimant is currently engaged in substantial gainful activity;

2. If not, whether the claimant has a “severe impairment” that significantly limits their physical or mental ability to perform basic work activities;

3. If so, whether based on the medical evidence, the impairment meets or equals the criteria of an impairment listed in the listing of impairments (“Listings,” see 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1), which results in a presumption of disability;

4. If the impairment does not meet or equal the criteria for a listed impairment, whether, despite the severe impairment, the claimant has the residual functional capacity (RFC) to perform their past work; and

5. If the claimant cannot perform their past work, whether there is other work in the national economy that the claimant can perform based on the claimant’s age, education, and work experience.

2 See Zirnsak v. Colvin, 777 F.3d 607, 611 (3d Cir. 2014); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4). Plaintiff bears the burden of proof at steps one through four, while the burden shifts to the Commissioner at step five to establish that the claimant can perform other jobs in the local and national economies based on their age, education, work experience, and RFC. See Poulos v. Comm’r of

Soc. Sec., 474 F.3d 88, 92 (3d Cir. 2007). The court’s role on judicial review is to determine whether the Commissioner’s decision is supported by substantial evidence. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Schaudeck v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 181 F.3d 429, 431 (3d Cir. 1999). “Substantial evidence is ‘such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion,’” and must be “‘more than a mere scintilla but may be somewhat less than a preponderance of the evidence.” Zirnsak, 777 F.3d at 610 (quoting Rutherford v. Barnhart, 399 F.3d 546, 552 (3d Cir. 2005)); see also Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1148, 1154 (2019) (explaining substantial evidence “means only—‘such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion’”) (quoting Consol. Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938) (additional citations omitted)).

It is a deferential standard of review. Jones v. Barnhart, 364 F.3d 501, 503 (3d Cir. 2004) (citing Schaudeck, 181 F.3d at 431). III. ALJ’S DECISION AND PLAINTIFF’S REQUEST FOR REVIEW The ALJ determined that Plaintiff acquired sufficient quarters of coverage to remain insured through December 31, 2024. R. 25. The ALJ found that Plaintiff had not engaged in any substantial gainful employment since the AOD. Id. The ALJ noted Plaintiff had one severe impairment, rheumatoid arthritis (RA), and several nonsevere impairments including borderline obesity, coronary artery disease, substance

3 use in disorder in remission, and mental impairment disorders. R. 25-26; 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c). The ALJ decided that Plaintiff’s impairments, either singly or in combination, did not meet or medically equal any of the Listings.3 R. 29; 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1; see also 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(d), 404.1525, 404.1526.

Considering the entire record, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had the RFC to perform light work as defined in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(b), except he could occasionally climb ramps and stairs, but never climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds. R. 30, 67-68. Plaintiff could frequently handle, finger, and feel bilaterally as well as frequently operate foot controls bilaterally. Id. Plaintiff can occasionally be exposed to extreme cold; but cannot be exposed to hazards, such as unprotected heights and unprotected moving mechanical parts. Id. The ALJ found Plaintiff could perform his past relevant work as a service advisor4 because the work comported with the light work limitations incorporated into Plaintiff’s RFC. R. 42. Plaintiff, however, could not perform his past relevant work as an auto mechanic5 because the work exceeded the RFC’s light work restriction. Id.; see 20 C.F.R. §

Related

Brown v. Astrue
649 F.3d 193 (Third Circuit, 2011)
Fruehauf Corporation v. General Highway Express, Inc
893 F.2d 1334 (Sixth Circuit, 1990)
Arthur Poulos v. Commissioner of Social Security
474 F.3d 88 (Third Circuit, 2007)
Foley v. Barnhart
432 F. Supp. 2d 465 (M.D. Pennsylvania, 2005)
Roseann Zirnsak v. Commissioner Social Security
777 F.3d 607 (Third Circuit, 2014)
Cadillac v. Comm Social Security
84 F. App'x 163 (Third Circuit, 2003)
Salles v. Commissioner of Social Security
229 F. App'x 140 (Third Circuit, 2007)
Biestek v. Berryhill
587 U.S. 97 (Supreme Court, 2019)
Reed v. Berryhill
337 F. Supp. 3d 525 (E.D. Pennsylvania, 2018)
Brown v. Bowen
845 F.2d 1211 (Third Circuit, 1988)

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TANNER v. O'MALLEY, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/tanner-v-omalley-paed-2024.