Tanner v. Ingalls Shipbuilding, Inc.

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
DecidedSeptember 15, 1993
Docket92-5034
StatusPublished

This text of Tanner v. Ingalls Shipbuilding, Inc. (Tanner v. Ingalls Shipbuilding, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Tanner v. Ingalls Shipbuilding, Inc., (5th Cir. 1993).

Opinion

United States Court of Appeals,

Fifth Circuit.

Nos. 92-4974, 92-5003 and 92-5034.

Caylor TANNER, and Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, U.S. Department of Labor, Petitioners,

v.

INGALLS SHIPBUILDING, INC., Respondent.

Adolphus LEE, and Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, U.S. Department of Labor, Petitioners,

Norman WITTNER, and Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, U.S. Department of Labor, Petitioners,

Sept. 21, 1993.

Petitions for Review of an Order of the Benefits Review Board.

Before WIENER, EMILIO M. GARZA, Circuit Judges, and LITTLE*, District Judge.

LITTLE, District Judge:

The issue common to each appellant is whether occupational hearing loss claimants under the

Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act (the Act) are required to have their hearing

disabilities compensated under subsection (A) or subsection (B) of 33 U.S.C. § 908(c)(13). Finding

that subsection (A) is the applicable portion of the Act, we reverse the administrative decisions of the

Benefits Review Board.

FACTS

This appeal represents the consolidation of three similar claims that arose under the Act. In

each case, the claimant was an employee of the appellee, Ingalls Shipbuilding, Inc. (Ingalls), and

* District Judge of the Western District of Louisiana, sitting by designation. suffered an employment related hearing loss. As a result of hearing tests performed on the claimants,

each was diagnosed as having zero percent impairment in one ear and measurable impairment in the

other ear. Each claimant filed for compensation benefits under the Act and was accorded a hearing

before an administrative law judge (ALJ).

In two of the cases (Tanner and Wittner), the ALJ recognized that the claimants had

impairment in only one ear (monaural impairment) but concluded t hat compensation should be

calculated as impairment in both ears (binaural impairment), in accordance with 33 U.S.C. §

908(c)(13)(B). The Benefits Review Board (the Board) affirmed this approach. In the remaining

case (Lee), the same ALJ awarded compensation on the basis of a monaural impairment in

accordance with 33 U.S.C. § 908(c)(13)(A), and the Board reversed this decision.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

This court reviews decisions of the Benefits Review Board for errors of law and adherence

to the substantial evidence standard that governs the Board's review of the ALJ's factual

determinations. Marathon Oil Co. v. Lunsford, 733 F.2d 1139, 1141 (5th Cir.1984). Generally, the

Director's interpretation of the Act is entitled to deference. Boudreaux v. American Workover, Inc.,

680 F.2d 1034, 1046 (5th Cir.1982). But, no deference will be given to an administrative

interpretation of a statute that is contrary to the plain meaning of its language. Nicklos Drilling Co.

v. Cowart, 927 F.2d 828, 831 (5th Cir.1991).

THE LANGUAGE OF THE ACT

The pertinent part of section 908 states:

§ 908. Compensation for disability

Compensation for disability shall be paid to the employee as follows:

******

(c) Permanent partial disability: In case of disability partial in character but permanent in quality the compensation shall be 662/3 per centum of the average weekly wages, ... and shall be paid to the employee, as follows:

(13) Loss of hearing: (A) Compensation for loss of hearing in one ear, fifty-two weeks.

(B) Compensation for loss of hearing in both ears, two-hundred weeks.

(E) Determinations of loss of hearing shall be made in accordance with the guides for the evaluation of permanent impairment as promulgated and modified from time to time by the American Medical Association.

33 U.S.C.S. § 908 (1980 & Supp.1993).

During the administrative proceedings Ingalls argued, and the Board agreed, that subsection

908(c)(13)(E) requires monaural hearing impairments be converted to binaural hearing percentages

pursuant to the American Medical Association's Guides for the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment

(AMA Guides). The pertinent part of the AMA Guides reads:

Binaural hearing impairment is determined using the following formula:

5 × 7 hearing 7 hearing

Binaural Hearing impairment + impairment

Impairment (%) = of better ear of poorer ear

_____________________________________

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A purely monaural hearing impairment should be converted to binaural hearing impairment for the better ear.

It was this conversion to binaural hearing impairment that caused each claimant to be

compensated under § 908(c)(13)(B) rather than § 908(c)(13)(A), and in each instance, this

conversion resulted in a smaller award than the claimant would have received if § 908(c)(13)(A) had

been applied.

INTERPRETATION OF THE STATUTE

In its three-two opinion in Tanner, the Board stated that in the 1984 amendments to the Act,

Congress specified that hearing loss determinations are to be made in accordance with the current

AMA Guides, and the Guides require that monaural impairment should be converted to binaural impairment. It was the Board's conclusion that Congress intended to treat the question of impairment

as a medical issue rather than a legal issue. The Board further stated that this does not read §

908(c)(13)(A) out of the statute as subsection (A) still applies when a claimant suffers a traumatic

injury to one ear that results in a loss of hearing in that ear.

Although this is a case of first impression for this circuit, the Second and Fourth Circuits have

dealt with cases directly on point. The Fourth Circuit found that the interpretation of the Board runs

afoul of the basic principal that a statute must not be interpreted to render a portion of the statute

meaningless. It was the Fourth Circuit's opinion that the Board had effectively read subsection (A)

out of the statute because neither the legislative history nor the statute provided any basis for the view

that subsection (A) was limited to cases in which hearing loss was caused by traumatic injury. Garner

v. Newport News Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Company, 1992 WL 29281, *2, 1992 U.S.App. LEXIS

2327, *5 (4th Cir.1992). In addition, the Fourth Circuit noted it could find no logical reason for

compensating monaural hearing losses differently depending on their cause. Id.

The Fourth Circuit went on to state that it could find "no irreconcilable conflict between the

statute's directive that monaural losses be compensated according to the criteria of subsection (A) and

the directive of subsection (E) that determinations of hearing loss be made in accordance with the

Guides." Id. The Fourth Circuit viewed the Guides as providing the method employed under the Act

for measuring hearing loss, while the statute provides a formula for determining how the loss will be

compensated. Id., 1992 WL 29281 at *2, 1992 U.S.App. LEXIS 2327 at *5-6.

The Second Circuit found the Board's reading of the statute "untenable" stating:

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Related

Marathon Oil Co. v. Lunsford
733 F.2d 1139 (Fifth Circuit, 1984)
Nicklos Drilling Co. v. Cowart
927 F.2d 828 (Fifth Circuit, 1991)
Rasmussen v. General Dynamics Corp.
993 F.2d 1014 (Second Circuit, 1993)

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