Tanner & DeLaney Engine Co. v. Hall

Supreme Court of Alabama

Tanner & DeLaney Engine Co. v. Hall

5 So. 584, 86 Ala. 305

CourtSupreme Court of Alabama

DecidedMarch 1, 1889

StatusPublished

Cited by4 cases

This text of 5 So. 584 (Tanner & DeLaney Engine Co. v. Hall) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Alabama primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Tanner & DeLaney Engine Co. v. Hall, 5 So. 584, 86 Ala. 305 (Ala. 1889).

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Opinion

SOMEBRVILLE, J.

1. It was not competent to prove the existence of a partnership between the defendant Hall and Mobley, by general reputation, or common rumor. Hogan v. Douglass, 2 Ala. 499; Humes v. O'Bryan, 74 Ala. 64.

The court, under this principle, properly excluded the testimony of the witness Butler, to which exception was taken by the defendant. If the fact had been proved that the saw-mill business was openly carried on in Chipley, Florida, in the name of Hall & Mobley as partners, perhaps the common notoriety of this fact might also be proved to charge the defendant with probable knowledge of it, in order to show that, by culpable silence or express agreement, the defendant had permitted himself to be held out to the public as a partner ; provided it were further proved that the debt sued for was contracted on the faith of this fact, and related to the alleged partnership business. But that is not this case. Humes v. O'Bryan, 74 Ala. 64, supra; Woods v. Montevallo C. & T. Co., 84 Ala. 560; Ala. Fertilizer Co. v. Reynolds & Lee, 85 Ala. 19.

2. The record contains no evidence tending to prove that Butler was the agent of. tbe plaintiff, having authority to take possession of the engine. His declaration, therefore, representing himself to be such agent, when he took possession of the engine, was not admissible against the plaintiff, without independent evidence of such alleged agency. — Mar tin v. Brown, 75 Ala. 442 ; 3 Brick., Dig. p. 21, § 40. The court erred in not excluding the testimony of the defendant, as to Butler’s representation that he was acting as an agent for the plaintiff, in assuming authority to take possession of the engine.

3. There was no error in excluding the proposed oral evidence of the attachment proceedings in Florida, under which it was claimed that the engine had been sold, and purchased by the plaintiff. Those proceedings were matters of record, *308 and constituted material evidence affecting the validity of the seizure of the property, and the amount of the plaintiff’s recovery in the action. This record should have been proved by certified transcript, and not orally by secondary evidence.

Beversed and remanded.

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SOMEBRVILLE, J.

1. It was not competent to prove the existence of a partnership between the defendant Hall and Mobley, by general reputation, or common rumor. Hogan v. Douglass, 2 Ala. 499; Humes v. O'Bryan, 74 Ala. 64.

The court, under this principle, properly excluded the testimony of the witness Butler, to which exception was taken by the defendant. If the fact had been proved that the saw-mill business was openly carried on in Chipley, Florida, in the name of Hall & Mobley as partners, perhaps the common notoriety of this fact might also be proved to charge the defendant with probable knowledge of it, in order to show that, by culpable silence or express agreement, the defendant had permitted himself to be held out to the public as a partner ; provided it were further proved that the debt sued for was contracted on the faith of this fact, and related to the alleged partnership business. But that is not this case. Humes v. O'Bryan, 74 Ala. 64, supra; Woods v. Montevallo C. & T. Co., 84 Ala. 560; Ala. Fertilizer Co. v. Reynolds & Lee, 85 Ala. 19.

2. The record contains no evidence tending to prove that Butler was the agent of. tbe plaintiff, having authority to take possession of the engine. His declaration, therefore, representing himself to be such agent, when he took possession of the engine, was not admissible against the plaintiff, without independent evidence of such alleged agency. — Mar tin v. Brown, 75 Ala. 442 ; 3 Brick., Dig. p. 21, § 40. The court erred in not excluding the testimony of the defendant, as to Butler’s representation that he was acting as an agent for the plaintiff, in assuming authority to take possession of the engine.

3. There was no error in excluding the proposed oral evidence of the attachment proceedings in Florida, under which it was claimed that the engine had been sold, and purchased by the plaintiff. Those proceedings were matters of record, *308 and constituted material evidence affecting the validity of the seizure of the property, and the amount of the plaintiff’s recovery in the action. This record should have been proved by certified transcript, and not orally by secondary evidence.

Beversed and remanded.

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