Tania T. Marker v. U.S. Department of Education

• Court: District Court, N.D. California
• Decided: January 20, 2026
• Docket: 3:23-cv-05873
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 TANIA T. MARKER, Case No. 23-cv-05873-JSC

8 Plaintiff, ORDER RE: MOTION FOR 9 v. SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND CROSS- MOTION FOR SUMMARY 10 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, JUDGMENT 11 Defendant. Re: Dkt. Nos. 44, 45

12 13 Tania T. Marker, proceeding without attorney representation, sues the U.S. Department of 14 Education (“DOE”) for failing to conduct an adequate search for records responsive to her 15 Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) request. (Dkt. No. 7.) Now pending before the Court are 16 the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment. (Dkt. Nos. 44, 45.) Having carefully 17 considered the parties’ submissions, and with the benefit of oral argument on January 14, 2026, 18 the Court GRANTS Defendant’s motion for summary judgment and DENIES Plaintiff’s motion 19 for summary judgment. Through its declarations, DOE has shown it performed an adequate 20 search for records responsive to Plaintiff’s FOIA request, and the additional records Plaintiff seeks 21 are beyond its control. Because Plaintiff does not present a genuine dispute as to any material 22 fact, DOE is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. 23 BACKGROUND 24 I. AMENDED COMPLAINT ALLEGATIONS 25 On February 4, 2022, Congressman Mark DeSaulnier’s office sent DOE a FOIA request on 26 Plaintiff’s behalf seeking:

27 [A]ll records related to [Plaintiff’s] federal or federal guaranteed and payment histories 1 [2] All FAFSA’s completed in [Plaintiff’s] name [3] Records of all consolidations 2 [4] Records of any Ombudsman disputes and their outcomes. 3 (Dkt. No. 44-2 at 2; Dkt. No. 7 ¶ 17.) Because she had not received a response, Plaintiff emailed 4 DOE on August 12, 2022 to appeal her request. (Dkt. No. 7 ¶ 18.) DOE informed Plaintiff 5 because Congressman DeSaulnier’s office had made the request, DOE had sent its final response 6 to the Congressman’s office and would not enter an appeal. (Id.) DOE agreed to mail Plaintiff its 7 final response, and Plaintiff received and accessed it. (Id.) Plaintiff then appealed DOE’s 8 response. (Id. ¶ 19.) On January 24, 2023, DOE granted Plaintiff’s appeal and produced an 9 additional 391 pages of records. (Id.; Dkt. No. 12 ¶ 19.) However, Plaintiff believed the 10 additional records “failed to meet all of [her] request” and DOE had not explained what it 11 withheld, considered exempt, or otherwise did not produce. (Dkt. No. 7 ¶ 19.) 12 II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY 13 On November 14, 2023, Plaintiff sued DOE and DOE Secretary Migel Cardona. (Dkt. No. 14 1.) Following the Court’s 28 U.S.C. § 1915 screening order, Plaintiff filed an amended complaint 15 against DOE under FOIA, 5 U.S.C. § 552, and the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201 16 and 2202. (Dkt. Nos. 5, 7.) The Court screened Plaintiff’s amended complaint and allowed 17 service, and DOE answered the amended complaint. (Dkt. Nos. 8, 12.) Following the parties’ 18 negotiations, DOE released an additional 1,833 pages of records to Plaintiff. (Dkt. No. 19 at 2.) 19 DOE also reached out to the two servicers holding Plaintiff’s federal loans and produced one 20 additional record to Plaintiff. (Dkt. No. 21 at 2.) However, Plaintiff stated she still sought 21 evidence of payments made in 2008 to a “previous servicer subject to a Consumer Financial 22 Protection Bureau order and Department of Justice settlement,” named either Conduent or ACS. 23 (Id.) DOE now moves for summary judgment in its favor. (Dkt. No. 44.) Plaintiff opposes 24 DOE’s motion and cross-moves for summary judgment in her favor. (Dkt. No. 45.) 25 III. DOE’S EVIDENCE 26 DOE has submitted two declarations from its FOIA Team Lead LaToya Tribue explaining 27 its searches for records responsive to Plaintiff’s FOIA request. (Dkt. No. 33-1 ¶¶ 1-2; Dkt. No. 1 Student Aid (“FSA”) office was “reasonably likely to have responsive records.” (Dkt. No. 33-1 ¶¶ 2 5-6.) FSA then coordinated three searches through Student Experience and Aid Delivery 3 (“SEAD”), which “contracts with vendors who manage and oversee the borrower loan level 4 information,” and one search through FSA’s Ombudsman Office, which “handles complaints 5 and/or issues from borrowers related to Title IV federal student aid or one of the servicers FSA 6 provides.” (Id. ¶¶ 8, 10, 14.) 7 First, SEAD used Plaintiff’s Social Security number to search the National Student Loan 8 Data System (“NSLDS”), “a database that tracks and manages information about federal student 9 loans and grants and is a central database for student aid used by DOE.” (Id. ¶¶ 8(a)(i), 11.) 10 Using Plaintiff’s name or date of birth to search NSLDS would not return additional records 11 because each record in NSLDS contains the borrower’s name, date of birth, and Social Security 12 number. (Dkt. No. 46-1 ¶ 4.) For the same reason, searches for inaccurate spellings of Plaintiff’s 13 name would not return responsive records; Ms. Tribue nevertheless attests she did not find 14 additional records using Plaintiff’s last name and inaccurate first names “Tanya” and “Tonya.” 15 (Id. ¶ 6.) So, all records in the NSLDS database related to Plaintiff have been produced. (Id. ¶ 5.) 16 Second, SEAD used Plaintiff’s Social Security number to search the Common Origination 17 and Disbursement (“COD”) System, which is “designed to support origination, disbursement, and 18 reporting for Direct Loan, Federal Pell Grant, and the Teacher Education Assistance for College 19 and Higher Education (TEACH) Grant programs.” (Dkt. No. 33-1 ¶¶ 8(a)(ii), 12.) A subsequent 20 COD System search using Plaintiff’s name returned the same records, and the COD System does 21 not allow searches by date of birth. (Dkt. No. 46-1 ¶ 7.) So, all records in the COD System 22 related to Plaintiff have been produced. (Id.) 23 Third, SEAD used Plaintiff’s Social Security number and the first two letters of Plaintiff’s 24 last name to search the Business Intelligence (“BI”) Tool Database, “a web application that is used 25 to capture and maintain student records received from the Student Aid Report (SAR), which is the 26 results of the Free Application for Federal Student Aid (FASFA).” (Dkt. No. 33-1 ¶¶ 8(a)(iii), 13.) 27 The BI Tool Database does not allow searches by date of birth or Plaintiffs’ full name. (Dkt. No. 1 Fourth, FSA’s Ombudsman Office used Plaintiff’s name and Social Security number to 2 search its Salesforce-Based Records System, where it tracks complaints and issues from 3 borrowers. (Dkt. No. 33-1 ¶¶ 8(b), 14.) Because each record includes the borrower’s name, date 4 of birth, and Social Security number, a search for Plaintiff’s name or date of birth did not return 5 additional records. (Dkt. 46-1 ¶ 9.) So, all records in the Salesforce-Based Records System 6 related to Plaintiff have been produced. (Id.) 7 FSA also asked Aidvantage and Nelnet, Plaintiff’s federal loan servicers, who “handle 8 billing and other services” for Plaintiff’s loans on DOE’s behalf, for additional records related to 9 Plaintiff. (Dkt. No. 33-1 ¶¶ 8(c), 15.) FSA determined Plaintiff from August 1995 to September 10 2005 had two direct loans serviced by ACS Education Services, a loan servicing company once 11 contracted by DOE. (Id. ¶ 16.) FSA maintains ACS Education Services’ transactional data 12 records, which “confirm that no payments were made by Plaintiff on the two Direct Loans while it 13 was serviced by ACS Education Services.” (Id. ¶ 17.) However, in September 2005, these two 14 direct loans were consolidated to a Federal Family Education Loan (“FFEL”) loan serviced by 15 commercial servicer Conduent. (Id. ¶ 16.) At that point, all files for Plaintiff’s loans were 16 “transferred to Conduent and no longer reside[d] with DOE FSA,” and FSA “does not maintain, 17 nor have access to, records for Conduent” or “authority over Conduent on how to service its 18 loans.” (Id.) 19 DOE maintains additional databases, including the Student Aid Internet Gateway 20 Participation Management System (“SAIG”), the Enterprise Data Management and Analytics 21 Platform Service (“EDMAPS”), and the Financial Management System (“FMS”). (Dkt. No. 46-1 22 ¶ 11.) However, because these systems do not “contain unique borrower-specific information that 23 would be responsive to Plaintiff’s FOIA request,” DOE typically does not search these databases 24 when responding to FOIA requests about federal loan records. (Id. ¶¶ 11, 15.) Instead of 25 recording borrower-specific information, SAIG allows education institutions to exchange financial 26 aid data with FSA, EDMAPS aggregates records from many individuals to create reports, and 27 FMS summarizes FSA’s and other financial partners’ financial transaction data. (Id. ¶¶ 12-14.) 1 reasonably likely to contain responsive records,” “did not omit searching any databases within 2 FSA’s control that would reasonably be calculated as having responsive records,” and used search 3 terms “reasonably calculated to return all responsive records.” (Dkt. 33-1 ¶ 18; Dkt. 46-1 ¶ 16.) 4 FSA processed 2,286 pages of records responsive to Plaintiff’s request, and produced all located 5 responsive records to Plaintiff on August 15, 2022; January 24, 2023; May 17, 2024; and July 17, 6 2024. (Dkt. No. 33-1 ¶¶ 19-20.) 7 DISCUSSION 8 I. LEGAL STANDARD 9 A. Summary Judgment 10 The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allow for summary judgment when the pleadings, 11 discovery, and affidavits show there is “no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant 12 is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56; see also Celotex Corp. v. 13 Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). Material facts are those which may affect the outcome of the 14 case. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A dispute as to a material 15 fact is genuine if there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the 16 nonmoving party. See id. 17 “On cross motions for summary judgment, the burdens faced by opposing parties vary with 18 the burden of proof they will face at trial.” First Pac. Networks, Inc. v. Atl. Mut. Ins. Co., 891 F. 19 Supp. 510, 513 (N.D. Cal. 1995). “When the party moving for summary judgment would bear the 20 burden of proof at trial, it must come forward with evidence which would entitle it to a directed 21 verdict if the evidence went uncontroverted at trial.” C.A.R. Transp. Brokerage Co., Inc. v. 22 Darden Rests., Inc., 213 F.3d 474, 480 (9th Cir. 2000) (quotation marks and citation omitted). “In 23 such a case, the moving party has the initial burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue 24 of fact on each issue material to its case.” Id. If the moving party produces sufficient evidence on 25 each issue material to its case, “the burden then moves to the opposing party, who must present 26 significant probative evidence tending to support its claim or defense.” Id. (quotation marks and 27 citation omitted). If the opposing party “fails to produce enough evidence to create a genuine 1 Marine Ins. Co. v. Fritz Cos., Inc., 210 F.3d 1099, 1103 (9th Cir. 2000). On the other hand, when 2 the moving party would not bear the burden at trial, it can meet its summary judgment burden by 3 (1) “produc[ing] evidence negating an essential element of the nonmoving party’s case,” or (2) 4 “after suitable discovery, . . . show[ing] that the nonmoving party does not have enough evidence 5 of an essential element of its claim or defense to carry its ultimate burden of persuasion at trial.” 6 Id. at 1106. “[W]hen simultaneous cross-motions for summary judgment on the same claim are 7 before the court, the court must consider the appropriate evidentiary material identified and 8 submitted in support of both motions, and in opposition to both motions, before ruling on each of 9 them.” Fair Hous. Council of Riverside Cnty., Inc. v. Riverside Two, 249 F.3d 1132, 1134 (9th 10 Cir. 2001). 11 B. FOIA 12 “FOIA was enacted to facilitate public access to Government documents.” Lahr v. Nat’l 13 Transp. Safety Bd., 569 F.3d 964, 973 (9th Cir. 2009) (quotation marks and citation omitted). To 14 facilitate public access, FOIA “gives individuals a judicially-enforceable right of access to 15 government agency documents.” Lion Raisins v. Dep’t of Agric., 354 F.3d 1072, 1079 (9th Cir. 16 2004). FOIA provides “each agency, upon any request for records which (i) reasonably describes 17 such records and (ii) is made in accordance with published rules stating the time, place, fees (if 18 any), and procedures to be followed, shall make the records promptly available to any person.” 5 19 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3)(A). 20 Because “the facts are rarely in dispute,” FOIA cases are often decided upon motions for 21 summary judgment. See Minier v. Cent. Intel. Agency, 88 F.3d 796, 800 (9th Cir. 1996). “Courts 22 are permitted to rule on summary judgment in FOIA cases solely on the basis of government 23 affidavits describing the documents sought.” Lion Raisins, 354 F.3d at 1082. However, if there is 24 evidence of the government agency’s bad faith, courts do not give government affidavits the 25 “substantial weight” they ordinarily receive. See Hunt v. Cent. Intel. Agency, 981 F.2d 1116, 1119 26 (9th Cir. 1992) (quotation marks and citation omitted). 27 II. ADEQUACY OF DOE’S SEARCHES 1 search reasonably calculated to uncover all relevant documents.” Lahr, 569 F.3d at 986 (quotation 2 marks and citation omitted). “In evaluating the adequacy of the search, the issue is not whether 3 there might exist any other documents possibly responsive to the request, but rather whether 4 the search for those documents was adequate.” Hamdan v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 797 F.3d 759, 770- 5 71 (9th Cir. 2015) (quotation marks and citation omitted) (emphasis in original); see also id. at 6 772 (explaining requesters are “entitled to a reasonable search for records, not a perfect one”). 7 “[U]nder FOIA, agencies bear the burden of demonstrating the adequacy of their search beyond a 8 material doubt.” Transgender L. Ctr. v. Immigr. & Customs Enf’t, 46 F.4th 771, 780 (9th Cir. 9 2022). “An agency can demonstrate the adequacy of its search through reasonably detailed, 10 nonconclusory affidavits submitted in good faith.” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted); see 11 also Hamdan, 797 F.3d at 770 (“Affidavits submitted by an agency to demonstrate the adequacy 12 of its response are presumed to be in good faith.”). 13 Ms. Tribue’s declarations demonstrate DOE conducted a search reasonably calculated to 14 uncover all relevant documents responsive to Plaintiff’s FOIA request. First, FSA’s searches of 15 NSLDS, the “central database for student aid,” and the COD System, which manages reporting for 16 Direct Loan and other programs, were reasonably calculated to uncover records “related to federal 17 or federal guaranteed student loans including . . . information related to all FFEL and Direct 18 Loans, applications and payment histories [and] . . . records of all consolidations.” (Dkt. No. 33-1 19 ¶¶ 8(a)(i)-(ii), 11, 12; Dkt. No. 7 ¶ 17.) Second, FSA’s search of the BI Tool Database, which 20 maintains student records received from FAFSA results, was reasonably calculated to uncover 21 requested records of “FAFSA’s completed in Plaintiff’s name.” (Dkt. No. 33-1 ¶ 8(a)(iii), 13; 22 Dkt. No. 7 ¶ 17.) Third, FSA’s search of the Ombudsman Office’s Salesforce-Based Records 23 System, which tracks complaints from borrowers related to federal student aid or FSA’s servicers, 24 was reasonably calculated to uncover requested records “of any Ombudsman disputes and their 25 outcomes.” (Dkt. No. 33-1 ¶¶ 8(b), 14; Dkt. No. 7 ¶ 17.) In addition, FSA asked Aidvantage and 26 Nelnet, who “handle billing and other services” for Plaintiff’s federal loans, for Plaintiff’s records 27 and produced any uncovered records to Plaintiff. (Dkt. No. 33-1 ¶¶ 8(c), 15, 20.) Because Ms. 1 processes,” DOE has shown its search was reasonably calculated to uncover all relevant 2 documents. See Laws.’ Comm. for C.R. of S.F. Bay Area v. U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, 534 F. Supp. 3 2d 1126, 1131 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (quotation marks and citation omitted). So, DOE has met its 4 burden of showing its search was adequate. 5 Plaintiff disputes the adequacy of DOE’s search because DOE did not “account for how 6 Plaintiff’s name was spelled, if it used her first and last name, [] the rationale behind an ‘and/or’ 7 approach with respect to SSN,” “why such alternate search terms as Plaintiff’s address, date of 8 birth, or state drivers license were not included in the search methodology, or the number of 9 searches it conducted and the time horizon searched.” (Dkt. No. 45 at 9.) Ms. Tribue’s 10 supplemental declaration answers these questions. First, Ms. Tribue explains searching NSLDS 11 using Plaintiff’s name, incorrectly spelled name, or date of birth, instead of Plaintiff’s Social 12 Security number, would not return additional records because each record contains the borrower’s 13 name, date of birth, and Social Security number. (Dkt. No. 46-1 ¶¶ 4, 6.) She also attests searches 14 using Plaintiff’s last name and inaccurate first names “Tanya” and “Tonya” did not return 15 additional records. (Id. ¶ 6.) Second, Ms. Tribue attests searching the COD System using 16 Plaintiff’s name returned the same records as using Plaintiff’s Social Security number, and the 17 COD System does not allow searches by date of birth. (Id. ¶ 7.) Third, Ms. Tribue explains the BI 18 Tool Database does not allow searches by date of birth, and searches based on Plaintiff’s full name 19 would not produce additional records because each record includes the borrower’s name and 20 Social Security number. (Id. ¶ 8.) Fourth, Ms. Tribue attests the Ombudsman Office’s search for 21 Plaintiff’s name or date of birth did not return additional records because each record includes the 22 borrower’s name, date of birth, and Social Security number. (Id. ¶ 9.) Ms. Tribue also clarifies 23 DOE did not include a date limit on any searches, and the borrower’s address and driver’s license 24 numbers were not search field options in the searched databases. (Id. ¶ 10; Dkt. No. 33-1 ¶ 9.) In 25 addition, that DOE’s searches resulted in 2,286 pages of responsive records produced to Plaintiff 26 supports the conclusion DOE “used a search method sufficient to produce the information 27 [Plaintiff] requested.” (Id. ¶¶ 19-20.) See Abhyanker v. U.S. Pat, & Trademark Off., No. 23-CV- 1 terms because agency produced responsive records). So, DOE has shown its search terms were 2 reasonably calculated to uncover all relevant documents. 3 Plaintiff also argues DOE did not search several Federal Student Aid systems listed in the 4 Federal Register, including SAIG, EDMAPS, and FMS. (Dkt. No. 45 at 9.) However, Ms. Tribue 5 explains those databases “do not typically contain unique records associated with specific, 6 indefinable borrowers that are not already available within the other databases the agency 7 routinely searches” and so would not include “unique borrower-specific information that would be 8 responsive to Plaintiff’s FOIA Request.” (Dkt. No. 46-1 ¶¶ 11, 15.) Specifically, SAIG allows 9 education institutions to exchange financial aid data with FSA, EDMAPS aggregates records from 10 many individuals to create reports, and FMS summarizes FSA’s and financial partners’ financial 11 transaction data. (Id. ¶¶ 12-14.) Because DOE has demonstrated these databases are not “places 12 in which [Plaintiff’s requested records] might be expected to be found,” DOE performed an 13 adequate search without searching within them. See Transgender L. Ctr., 46 F.4th at 781 14 (quotation marks and citation omitted). In addition, Ms. Tribue’s attestation FSA “searched all 15 sources within FSA’s control that would be reasonably likely to contain responsive records” and 16 “did not omit searching any databases within FSA’s control that would reasonably be calculated as 17 having responsive records” is “presumed to be in good faith.” (Dkt. 33-1 ¶ 18.) See Hamdan, 797 18 F.3d at 770. 19 Given DOE’s declarations, Plaintiff’s arguments about DOE’s searches, search terms, and 20 searched databases fail to raise a genuine dispute of material fact about the adequacy of DOE’s 21 search. So, DOE has met its burden of demonstrating its search for records responsive to 22 Plaintiff’s FOIA request was adequate. 23 III. DOE’S CONTROL OVER ADDITIONAL RECORDS 24 An agency only has an obligation to produce records if the agency is “in control of the 25 requested materials at the time the FOIA request is made.” U.S. Dep’t of Just. v. Tax Analysts, 26 492 U.S. 136, 145 (1989). Because control focuses on an agency’s possession of the requested 27 materials, an agency is not obligated to produce documents not in its possession. See Rojas v. 1 “required to retrieve documents which have escaped its possession, but which it has not 2 endeavored to recover.” Tax Analysts, 492 U.S. at 148 n.10 (quotation marks and citation 3 omitted). “However, the burden is on the agency to demonstrate, not the requester to disprove, 4 that the materials sought are not currently” in the agency’s possession. See Ctr. for Investigative 5 Reporting v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 14 F.4th 916, 937 (9th Cir. 2021) (cleaned up). 6 Plaintiff argues DOE’s search was inadequate because it did not locate records related to 7 payments made to a servicer named ACS or Conduent in 2008. However, DOE has demonstrated 8 it does not possess these records. According to Ms. Tribue’s declaration, Plaintiff held two direct 9 loans which ACS Education Services serviced from August 1995 through September 2005. (Dkt. 10 No. 33-1 ¶ 16.) In September 2005, however, these two loans were consolidated to a FFEL loan 11 serviced by Conduent, a commercial servicer, and “[a]ll files regarding Plaintiff’s FFEL loan were 12 transferred to Conduent” and “no longer reside[d] with DOE FSA.” (Id.) Furthermore, “DOE 13 FSA does not maintain, nor have access to, records for Conduent,” or “have authority over 14 Conduent on how to service its loans.” (Id.) So, DOE does not possess or control any records of 15 payments Plaintiff made to Conduent in 2008. 16 Because the unlocated records requested by Plaintiff are not within DOE’s control, DOE 17 does not have an obligation to produce them in order to adequately respond to Plaintiff’s FOIA 18 request. 19 IV. PLAINTIFF’S REMAINING REQUESTS 20 Plaintiff also asks DOE to “provide[] lawful justification to what it has withheld.” (Dkt. 21 No. 45 at 9.) In response, Ms. Tribue attests “all responsive records located through the searches 22 described above have been produced to Plaintiff.” (Dkt. No. 33-1 ¶ 20.) Because Plaintiff does 23 present evidence of bad faith or any “contrary evidence in the record,” the Court takes Ms. 24 Tribue’s attestation DOE is not withholding any located, responsive documents at “face value.” 25 See Ecological Rts. Found. v. U.S. Env’t Prot. Agency, No. 22-15936, 2023 WL 4342100, at *1 26 (9th Cir. July 5, 2023) (quoting Hamdan, 797 F.3d at 769, 779 (quoting Hunt v. CIA, 981 F.2d 27 1116, 1119 (9th Cir. 1992))). 1 “payment records correlated to valid applications which also authenticate consolidations,” and 2 || “what agency employee approved an unlawfully issued Direct loan.” (Dkt. No. 47 at 5.) Plaintiff 3 also seeks “a way to inform of any prospective rights as it relates to evidence of a legal obligation 4 || torepay funds.” (/d. at 6.) However, because FOIA only requires federal agencies to “make 5 || records available upon a request which ‘reasonably describes’ the records sought,” DOE is not 6 || required to respond to requests for records not included in Plaintiff's February 4, 2022 FOIA 7 request. See Am. Small Bus. League v. U.S. Off. of Mgmt. & Budget, 631 F. Supp. 3d 804, 820 8 (N.D. Cal. 2022) (citation omitted) (explaining requesting party could not change interpretation 9 and scope of FOIA request while in litigation). Furthermore, to the extent Plaintiff asks DOE to 10 answer questions, as opposed to produce records, FOIA does not require DOE to do so. See 11 Yagman v. Pompeo, 868 F.3d 1075, 1080-81 (9th Cir. 2017). 2 CONCLUSION 5 13 Because on the record before the Court DOE has shown as a matter of undisputed fact it 14 || conducted an adequate search for records responsive to Plaintiff's FOIA request and the 3 15 unproduced records are not in DOE’s possession, the Court GRANTS the United States’ motion a 16 || for summary judgment and DENIES Plaintiffs motion for summary judgment. 3 17 This Order disposes of Docket Nos. 44 and 45. 18 IT IS SO ORDERED. 19 Dated: January 20, 2026 20 21 ne 7 JAQQUELINE SCOTT CORL United States District Judge 23 24 25 26 27 28