IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
TANIA DAVIS,
, Case No. 2:25-cv-00025-JDW v.
HENRY COMPANY, et al.,
.
MEMORANDUM
Antidiscrimination laws do what their name suggests: they bar discrimination. In the workplace setting, they do not prevent an employer from terminating an employee who the employer decides is not good at her job. Of course, sometimes an employer will try to cover up the real reason that it fires an employee because it knows that discrimination is illegal. Tania Davis claims that Henry Company and Carlisle Companies (collectively, “Henry”) did just that. But it’s not enough for her to say it; she has to offer enough evidence for a jury reasonably to conclude that Henry is trying to cover up its discrimination. In that effort, she comes up short. The evidence in this case shows that Ms. Davis was a subpar employee in the 59 days that she worked at Henry and that Henry fired her during her probationary period rather than continue to try to train her. Maybe that was harsh, maybe it was smart business. But I conclude that no reasonable jury could conclude that it was discriminatory, so I will grant Henry’s summary judgment motion. I. BACKGROUND A. Ms. Davis’s Employment At Henry
On June 14, 2022, Ms. Davis accepted an offer to work as a Customer Service Representative at Defendants Henry Company and Carlisle Companies, Inc. (collectively, “Henry”). The terms and conditions of the offer provided, among other things, that Ms.
Davis would report to Customer Service Manager Tracy Dero and that Ms. Davis’s position would be at will. Ms. Davis began work on June 20, 2022. As a customer service representative, Ms. Davis was responsible for facilitating a positive customer experience and processing customer purchase orders. To bring her up to speed, Ms. Davis received
a series of training materials and basic orders to process. Henry permitted her to shadow other customer service employees to learn the ins-and-outs of the job. Like all new customer service employees, Henry put Ms. Davis on a 90-day probationary period to ensure she could handle the responsibilities of her role. Henry terminated Ms. Davis on
August 18, 2022. 1. Performance issues During Ms. Davis’s time at Henry, Ms. Dero saw or heard about several performance
problems on Ms. Davis’s part. On July 13, 2022, Senior Customer Service Coordinator Brad Copeland reported to Ms. Dero that Ms. Davis had not entered two orders that he left for her two days earlier. He also noted that Ms. Davis was “late everyday” and “never gets up to ask for something to do.” (ECF No. 21-2 at 25.) Mr. Copeland opined that Ms. Davis “doesn’t have basic computer knowledge,” “is learning [Henry’s] system even slower [than] normal,” and “doesn’t have the can-do attitude that someone should have when they are
new.” (ECF No. 21-2 at 25.) On July 22, 2022, a customer emailed Henry’s customer service team and requested that someone review an incorrect purchase order. Ms. Davis, who had entered the
incorrect information on the purchase order, wrote to the customer that she was “working remotely,” “d[id] not have access to the PO,” and asked the customer to provide “the correct PO# … so that I can fix it quickly instead of waiting until Monday[.]” (ECF No. 28- 17 at 2; ECF No. 21-2 at 26.) After the customer provided the purchase order
information, Ms. Davis did not correct the error but instead told the customer that the purchase order “look[ed] to be entered one time” and to “[l]et me know if you have any further ?’s.” (ECF No. 28-17 at 2.) Ms. Dero contacted Ms. Davis to say that she “d[id] not believe [Ms. Davis] [was]
addressing the customer’s issue.” (ECF No. 28-17 at 1.) Ms. Dero also told Ms. Davis to pull the purchase order so that they could review it on Monday. The next day, Ms. Dero followed up with Ms. Davis via email to explain what Ms. Davis had done wrong, how to
fix it, and how to inform the customer that the error was corrected. Ms. Dero also directed Ms. Davis to “spell out all words” in communications with customers so that the customer service team does not appear to be “texting” with them. (ECF No. 21-2 at 26.) Others complained about Ms. Davis’s speed in performing her duties. In the last week of July 2022, a coworker tasked with monitoring new employees emailed Ms. Davis
to ask if she had “been able to get any orders entered yet today” because she had “not see[n] any in the system for [Ms. Davis] yet.” (ECF No. 21-2 at 27.) On another occasion, this coworker checked in with Ms. Davis after noticing Ms. Davis had only completed one
order, to which Ms. Davis responded that she was not about speed but about accuracy. (ECF No. 21-2 at 27–28.) Ms. Davis’s speed eventually caused Ms. Dero to have to do her job for her. On August 8, 2022, seven members of the customer service team were provided with
instructions and asked to complete a total of 26 tasks, four of which were assigned to Ms. Davis. By the following evening, five of the team members had completed their assigned tasks. Ms. Davis was not one of them. Upon noticing that Ms. Davis had not completed any of her assigned tasks, Ms. Dero took over and did them for her. Ms. Dero then emailed
Ms. Davis, saying “[y]ou didn’t[] have any done so I took care of them. Do not duplicate.” (ECF No. 21-2 at 29.) Even with Ms. Dero stepping in, Ms. Davis still did not speed up. On August 10,
2022, Pricing Specialist Nancy Willard sent a “high” priority email to the customer service team requesting that a customer’s orders be released. (ECF No. 21-2 at 29.) The task was not completed that day. Then, the following day, Ms. Dero reached out to Ms. Davis and reminded her to ask for help if she was “not sure what to do on these” and to leave customer service requests unread in the email box if she had not completed it. (ECF No. 21-2 at 30.) Ms. Davis still had not completed Ms. Willard’s request by the morning of
August 11, 2022, causing Ms. Willard to send a follow-up email to again ask for the release of the customer’s orders. 2. Health-related concerns and absences
Ms. Davis suffers from acute Diverticulitis Menstrual Dysmenorrhea, which is a medical condition that causes severe pelvic and abdominal pain and extreme cramping during menstruation. Sometime in July 2022, Ms. Davis informed Lisa Maestas, an employee in HR, about her medical condition. Ms. Maestas told Ms. Davis that she would
let Ms. Davis’s supervisors know about her condition. However, Ms. Maestas did not send Ms. Davis confirmation that she had done so. On July 25, 2022, Ms. Davis left work without first notifying Ms. Dero. Later that day, Ms. Davis texted Ms. Dero, explaining that she “will ... inform HR of a preexisting issue
that [she] ha[s] that sets [her] menstrual off from time to time.” (ECF No. 21-2 at 26–27.) Mr. Dero responded by acknowledging that she was aware of Ms. Davis’s condition but “didn’t know it was to the point of leaving” and saying that she understands “things come
up” but that she needs Ms. Davis to “[p]lease make sure I’m aware you are going home etc in [the] future” as “I need reliability” given the nature of customer service’s role. (ECF No. 21-2 at 27.) On August 10, 2022, Ms. Davis followed up with Ms. Maestas about her disclosure of her medical issues. Ms. Maestas confirmed that she had notified Ms. Dero and that Ms.
Dero was informed that Ms. Davis had abruptly left work on July 25, 2022, because of her “cramps.” (ECF No. 21-2 at 59–60.) On August 18, 2022, Ms. Davis told Ms. Dero that she had been experiencing an “episode” and would be working from home after eating
something and taking medication. (ECF No. 21-2 at 40.) Ms. Dero wrote back, telling Ms. Davis that she needed Ms. Davis in the office even if Ms. Davis had to come in after her normal start time. Ms. Davis made her way to the office that morning. 3. Complaints of discrimination
In Ms. Davis’s time at Henry, she was the only black employee on the customer service team. During that time, two Henry employees made remarks that she deems to have been about her about her race. Ms. Davis contacted HR about these interactions.1 On July 28, 2022, Ms. Davis emailed Ms. Maestas to request a meeting to talk “about
something important … not about our last convo about being sick.” (ECF No. 21-2 at 55.) Ms. Davis followed up the next day thanking Ms. Maestas and letting her know that she “read some articles on how to approach these kinds of situations in a professional way.”
1 Henry disputes that Ms. Davis ever reported experiencing racial discrimination in the workplace because there is not an explicit reference to race or discrimination more generally in any of Ms. Davis’s messages with Ms. Maestas. However, given that I am to draw all reasonable inferences in Ms. Davis’s favor at this stage in the litigation and that the record shows Ms. Davis contacted the human resources department on multiple occasions about something other than her medical issue, I conclude for purposes of summary judgment that she reported these incidents to Henry. (ECF No. 21-2 at 55.) Ms. Maestas then told her to reach out “if the situations get[] wors[e].” (ECF No. 21-2 at 55.) Ms. Davis also emailed Ms. Maestas on August 12, 2022,
asking if she had “some time this evening to go over some confidential information/updates I would like to send you.” (ECF No. 21-2 at 55.) 4. Termination
On August 11, 2022, Ms. Dero had a phone call with Ms. Davis during which Ms. Dero expressed her frustrations with Ms. Davis’s performance. Following the call, Ms. Davis emailed Ms. Dero and acknowledged that she knew Ms. Dero was “extremely frustrated” with her performance but tried to explain that she was “still new and learning.” (ECF No.
21-2 at 31.) Ms. Dero responded that she was “struggling to understand” why Ms. Davis was “not further advanced,” given that Ms. Dero “had spelled it out in emails and know the other [customer service representatives] have been going over things with [Ms. Davis].” (ECF No. 21-2 at 32.) Ms. Dero also advised Ms. Davis that “[r]ather [than] pushing
back[,] it would be more beneficial to look at the reference guides you have, videos available[,] and [customer service representative’s] assistance.” (ECF No. 21-2 at 32.) On August 12, 2022, Ms. Dero decided to fire Ms. Davis. Ms. Dero worked with
Michael Seal, Henry’s Vice President of Human Resources, and others to finalize a termination plan. One reason that Ms. Dero cited in justifying Ms. Davis’s firing was that she had only entered 29 orders. (ECF No. 21-2 at 64.) That number, however, was wrong; Ms. Davis had entered 76 orders. Mr. Seal also sought advice from Henry’s attorney, Miguel Hernandez, which was not Henry Company’s typical practice for terminating employees. After the conclusion of this process, Ms. Dero terminated Ms. Davis on August,
18, 2022, once Ms. Davis came to the office. B. Procedural History Ms. Davis filed her employment discrimination Complaint against Henry on January
3, 2025, and amended it on August 12, 2025. In the Amended Complaint, Ms. Davis asserts claims for racial discrimination, hostile work environment, disability discrimination, failure to accommodate, and retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, the Americans with Disabilities Act, and the Pennsylvania Human Relations
Act. Following discovery, Henry moved for summary judgment on all of Ms. Davis’s claims. Ms. Davis opposed but stated that she is “no longer pursu[ing] her underlying hostile work environment or race discrimination claims” and requested that I deem Henry’s summary judgment motion moot as to those claims. ( ECF No. 22 at 1 n.1.)2
II. LEGAL STANDARD Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a) permits a party to seek summary judgment “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant
2 Henry’s original deadline to file a reply was December 26, 2025. Henry requested, Ms. Davis consented to, and I granted an extension of that deadline to January 8, 2026. But Henry did not file a reply by the deadline. Instead, over a week later, on January 16, 2026, Henry submitted a letter asking permission file a reply . Ms. Davis filed a motion to strike the letter for failure to comply with my Policies and Procedures. Because I am granting summary judgment in Henry’s favor on all of Ms. Davis’s claims, I will deny Ms. Davis’s motion to strike as moot. is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). In ruling on a summary judgment motion, a court must “view the facts and draw reasonable inferences in the light
most favorable to the party opposing the summary judgment motion.” , 550 U.S. 372, 378 (2007) (alternation and quotation omitted). However, “[t]he non-moving party may not merely deny the allegations in the moving party’s pleadings; instead, [s]he
must show where in the record there exists a genuine dispute over a material fact.” , 480 F.3d 252, 256 (3d Cir. 2007). If she fails to make this showing, then the court may “consider the fact undisputed” and “grant summary judgment if the motion and supporting materials—including the facts considered undisputed—show that
the movant is entitled to it[.]” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2)-(3). III. ANALYSIS A. Discrimination And Retaliation Courts reviewing employment discrimination and retaliation claims apply the
burden-shifting framework set forth in , 411 U.S. 792 (1973). , 168 F.3d 661, 667–68 (3d Cir. 1999) (ADA discrimination claims); , 49 F.4th 340,
346 (3d Cir. 2022) (retaliation claims); , 687 F. Supp. 3d 644, 649 (E.D. Pa. 2023) (PHRA claims). Under that framework a plaintiff bears the burden of showing a case of discrimination or retaliation. , 411 U.S. at 802. The burden of doing so at this step “is not intended to be onerous.” , 45 F.3d 724, 728 (3d Cir. 1995). Once a showing has been made, the burden shifts to the defendant to articulate some “legitimate nondiscriminatory
reason” for the employee’s firing. If the defendant does so, then the burden shifts back onto the plaintiff to show by a preponderance of the evidence that the reasons offered by the defendant are merely pretext for discrimination or retaliation.
, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981). 1. case a. Disability discrimination To establish a claim for disability discrimination, a plaintiff must
establish that she (i) is disabled within the meaning of the ADA; (ii) is otherwise qualified to perform the essential functions of the job, with or without reasonable accommodation; and (iii) has suffered an adverse employment action because of the employer’s discrimination. , 134 F.3d 576, 580 (3d Cir. 1998). For the
second element, the plaintiff bears the burden of proving she is “an otherwise qualified” individual. , 184 F.3d 296, 306 (3d Cir. 1999). An otherwise qualified individual will have the prerequisites for the position ( , the
educational background, employment experience, licenses, etc.) and the ability to perform the essential functions of the position with or without reasonable accommodation. , 134 F.3d at 580. Henry does not dispute that Ms. Davis had the prerequisites for her role, but it argues that she lacked the ability to perform the essential functions of her position with
or without reasonable accommodation because she failed “to communicate clearly in writing and verbally” with customers. (ECF No. 21-1 at 23.) But Henry’s argument misconstrues the inquiry. The relevant question is a matter of kind, not degree.
, 867 F.3d 411, 415 (3d Cir. 2017). That is, when determining whether Ms. Davis is a qualified individual for purposes of establishing her disability discrimination case, I must determine whether she had the to perform the required tasks of her role, not whether she could perform them to the
her boss found to be satisfactory. Henry takes issue with the way that Ms. Davis communicated, but it does not dispute that she had the ability to interact with customers. Given that this inquiry is limited to whether Ms. Davis could perform the requisite tasks of her role and does not encompass the degree at which she performed them, Ms. Davis has
met her burden of establishing a case of disability discrimination. b. Retaliation To establish a case of retaliation under the ADA, Section 1981, Title VII,
and the PHRA, a plaintiff must show (i) she engaged in protected employee activity, (ii) the employer took adverse action after or contemporaneous to the time at which she engaged in protected activity, and (iii) there is a causal link between the protected activity and adverse action. , 126 F.3d 494, 500 (3d Cir. 1997) (retaliation under ADA); , 696 F. Supp. 3d 66, 101 (E.D. Pa. 2023) (retaliation under Section 1981, Title VII, and the PHRA). Courts consider the
totality of circumstances when determining whether a plaintiff has established the requisite causal connection. , 206 F.3d 271, 280–81 (3d Cir. 2000). However, “an unusually suggestive proximity in time between the protected
activity and the adverse action may be sufficient, on its own, to establish” that there is a causal link. , 497 F.3d 286, 302 (3d Cir. 2007) (quotations omitted). In this case, there is temporal proximity between the protected activity and adverse
employment action. Ms. Davis first informed Henry about her acute diverticulitis menstrual dysmenorrhea sometime in July. Henry decided to terminate her on August 12, 2022, approximately two weeks later. Perhaps more importantly, Henry does not appear to dispute that Ms. Davis has established a case of retaliation. Thus,
considering the close temporal proximity between protected activity and her termination, Ms. Davis has established a case of retaliation. 2. Legitimate nondiscriminatory/nonretaliatory reason
Henry has provided a legitimate nondiscriminatory and nonretaliatory reason for firing Ms. Davis: she failed to satisfactorily perform the requisite tasks of her job. As the burden is one of articulation, not proof, Henry has satisfied its burden. , 411 U.S. at 802. 3. Pretext Because Henry articulated a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for terminating Ms.
Davis, the burden shifts back onto Ms. Davis to show that Henry’s explanation was pretextual. To establish pretext, Ms. Davis “must point to some evidence, direct or circumstantial, from which a factfinder could reasonably either (1) disbelieve [Henry’s] articulated legitimate
reasons; or (2) believe that an invidious discriminatory reason was more likely than not a motivating or determinative cause of [Henry’s] action.” , 100 F.4th 458, 474– 75 (3d Cir. 2024) (quotation omitted). She can meet this burden by “painting the employer's articulated reasons as weak, implausible, contradictory, or incoherent” or “by showing that
the employer in the past had subjected [her] to unlawful discriminatory treatment, or that the employer treated other, similarly situated persons not of [her] protected class more favorably.” , 49 F.4th at 347 (alternations accepted and quotations omitted). Ms. Davis does none of this. In her opposition brief, she points to seven different
parts of the record to argue that a jury could reasonably determine that Henry is lying when it said Ms. Davis’s job performance led to her termination. But this evidence, whether considered individually or collectively, is insufficient for a jury to reasonably draw
such a conclusion. At times, the record contradicts it. , Ms. Davis contends that Henry did nothing to investigate her claims of racial discrimination, leaving Ms. Davis to look up how to handle such situations on her own. Even if true, that argument seems directed at Ms. Davis’s now-abandoned racial discrimination claim. A failure to investigate racial discrimination does not suggest pretext as it relates to disability discrimination or retaliation. In addition, the argument flies in the
face of the numerous decisions from courts in this circuit that have held a failure to investigate claims of discrimination is not enough to show pretext. , , 40 F. App’x 650, 653 (3d Cir. 2002); , 832 F.
Supp. 2d 539, 553 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 22, 2011); , Civ. Action No. 11-1462, 2013 WL 1216858, at *29 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 25, 2013). I agree with these decisions. Ample evidence shows that Ms. Davis’s job performance was subpar. The fact that Henry did not investigate her complaints about direct remarks she received from two
employees and indirect remarks she heard around the office is not enough to cause a jury to reasonably disbelieve that Henry fired her for lackluster performance or believe that disability discrimination or retaliation caused her termination.3 Ms. Davis argues that Henry’s failure to investigate suggests that the company
intended to retaliate against her for making those same complaints. However, Ms. Davis does nothing to connect the lack of investigation to a retaliatory motive other than this
3 Ms. Davis only cites two cases from this Circuit to support her argument, neither of which is persuasive. (( ECF No. 22 at 12) (citing , Civ. Action No. 3:20-cv-2021, 2022 WL 36238 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 4, 2022) and , 247 F. Supp. 3d 546 (E.D. Pa. 2017)).) The cases have a different procedural posture and do not relate to pretext. Ms. Davis never reconciles the fact that these cases were decided at the motion to dismiss stage as opposed to the summary judgment stage. Nor does she acknowledge that they concerned whether a plaintiff could establish a case instead of pretext. Given these differences in combination with the record, I am not persuaded by Ms. Davis’s arguments that a failure to investigate establishes pretext. attorney argument. There’s a difference, however, between turning a deaf ear to complaints of discrimination and deciding to retaliate against someone for making those
complaints. One doesn’t necessarily suggest the other, and Ms. Davis offers no evidence to support her assertion that one suggested the other in this case. Ms. Davis also argues Henry harbored animosity towards her disability and need
for accommodations because Ms. Maestas failed to inform Ms. Dero of Ms. Davis’s medical condition and because Ms. Dero expressed no “concern for Ms. Davis or her health whatsoever” on the day that Ms. Davis abruptly left work due to her cramps. (ECF No. 22 at 13, 15 (emphasis omitted).) However, even drawing all inferences in Ms. Davis’s
favor, the record does not support Ms. Davis’s contentions. For one thing, on August 10, 2022, Ms. Maestas confirmed with Ms. Davis that Ms. Maestas informed Ms. Dero of Ms. Davis’s medical condition. And, even if Ms. Maestas took some time to inform Ms. Dero of Ms. Davis’s medical condition, no reasonable factfinder would conclude that Henry
harbored animus towards Ms. Davis’s disability because of a delay that, at most, totaled a couple weeks. I also disagree with Ms. Davis’s characterization that Ms. Dero did not express any
concern for her disability. Ms. Dero acknowledged that she was aware of Ms. Davis’s symptoms but “didn’t know it was to the point of leaving,” said that she “understand[s] things come up,” and explained she just needs to be “aware you are going home etc in [the] future.” (ECF No. 22 at 13.) Just because Ms. Dero emphasized the need for reliability does not mean she was not concerned for Ms. Davis. In any event, the fact that a coworker or supervisor did not express much sympathy is not enough for a jury to reasonably
conclude there was discriminatory animus. The law doesn’t demand sympathy. , Ms. Davis contends that she “had not been notified of anyone, including management or customers, complaining about any aspect of her performance.” (ECF No.
22 at 15–16 (emphasis omitted).) The record makes clear that that’s not true, though. Ms. Dero sent many emails to Ms. Davis about her poor performance. In any event, Ms. Davis’s subjective understanding of how she was performing at work does not shed light on how Henry perceived her performance, and the record establishes that at the time that Ms.
Davis worked at Henry, many people who worked with her were unhappy with her performance. Ms. Dero received messages from other employees about Ms. Davis showing up late, not completing assignments, and not volunteering to help the customer service team. It’s possible that Henry could have done a better job communicating with
her, but that’s not the relevant inquiry. The record confirms that Henry’s employees – including her supervisor with the power to terminate her – thought Ms. Davis was doing a bad job, and Ms. Henry has not pointed to anything to suggest that the company used
those concerns as a pretext to terminate her. , Ms. Davis argues that the fact that Ms. Dero understated the amount of work Ms. Davis had completed when justifying Ms. Davis’s termination, coupled with the fact that Henry sought advice from a lawyer prior to firing Ms. Davis, could lead a jury to believe that Henry was trying to conceal its “nefarious intent and/or prepare for litigation, knowing [it] w[as] acting in discriminatory and retaliatory fashion.” (ECF No. 22 at 22.) But
Ms. Davis provides no evidence that suggests Ms. Dero intentionally lied when she said Ms. Davis had completed less work than she did. While I must draw inferences in Ms. Davis’s favor in ruling on a summary judgment motion, finding nefarious intent from an
ostensible mistake is more than an inference; it’s a logical leap. Mistakes happen, and Ms. Davis needs some evidence to suggest that the mistake wasn’t innocent before the inference she suggests would become reasonable. In addition, a company’s decision to use a different method for terminating an
employee and to consult a lawyer before doing so does not show that the employer’s articulated reason for terminating the employee was pretextual. Ms. Davis provides no explanation for how Henry’s departure from past practice discredits its articulated reason that she failed to sufficiently perform the requisite duties of her role. She merely points
out the incorrect statement and protocol departure and leaves it for me to assume the rest. Again, that’s more than an inference, and it’s not enough on this record for a jury to find pretext.
, Ms. Davis argues that the temporal proximity between the time she engaged in protected conduct and the time she was fired establishes pretext. Temporal proximity can call into question an employer’s motive in terminating an employee. , 873 F.2d 701, 709 (3d Cir. 1989). But that does not mean it does so in this case. Ms. Davis only worked at Henry for 59 days. Thus, everything happened in a short period of time. And, while Ms. Davis engaged in protected activity during that time,
she also performed poorly. Under those circumstances, even drawing inferences in her favor, the timing of the termination decision does not suggest that retaliation was really at play or otherwise call into question Henry’s explanation for its decision.
, Ms. Davis attempts to show contradictions in Henry’s reason for firing her by highlighting alleged inconsistencies between parts of Ms. Dero’s statements with other parts of the record, but the argument misconstrues the record and goes beyond reasonable inferences. In addition to Ms. Dero’s error about the number of tasks that Ms.
Davis completed, Ms. Davis takes issue with Ms. Dero’s testimony that no one knew where Ms. Davis went on the day she left work and that she did not know about Ms. Davis’s health conditions until August 11, 2022. She bases her argument on Ms. Maestas’s message on August 10, 2022. But that message came weeks after Ms. Davis left work on
July 25, 2022, and it doesn’t shed any light on what Ms. Dero knew on the day that Ms. Davis left, as opposed to information that Ms. Dero learned some time later. , Ms. Davis points to Jennifer Pinzon as a comparator whose work “often had
to be corrected” but who Henry did not terminate. (ECF No. 22 at 24 (emphasis omitted).) But aside from the fact that they both made mistakes, Ms. Davis does not explain how closely related she and Ms. Pinzon were. For instance, Ms. Davis does not indicate whether Ms. Pinzon made the same number or type of mistakes or made them with the same frequency. Nor does Ms. Davis reconcile the fact that Ms. Pinzon, who had worked at Henry for three years, was not in the initial 90-day probationary period of her
employment, meaning they were not similarly situated. , and finally, Ms. Davis argues that Henry replaced her with a non-disabled Caucasian person. While courts have found a plaintiff to have established a
case for discrimination when the plaintiff shows the company replaced her with someone outside of her protected class, , , 214 F. App’x 239, 241–42 (3d Cir. 2007), Ms. Davis fails to explain how this casts doubt on Henry’s articulated reason for firing her. Ms. Davis has cited no case that stands for a rule
holding that a plaintiff establishes pretext if she shows that she was replaced by a person outside of her protected class. Indeed, the only cases Ms. Davis cites in support of this argument are cases holding that a plaintiff can establish a case for discrimination by showing she was treated differently than employees who were outside
of her protected class.4 But the cases say nothing about whether such evidence is enough to establish pretext. In fact, in the case that Ms. Davis cites, the Third Circuit held the plaintiff failed to establish pretext despite having made out a case for
discrimination by showing he had been replaced by someone outside of his protected class. , 214 F. App’x at 242–43.
4 , 214 F. App’x at 241–42; , Civ. Action No. 08-4149, 2009 WL 533068, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 3, 2009). Finally, the evidence collectively on which Ms. Davis relies does not amount to more than the sum of its parts. That is, the various items to which she points, whether
considered individually or holistically, do not establish a basis for a factfinder to “reasonably either (1) disbelieve [Henry Company’s] articulated legitimate reason; or (2) believe that an invidious discriminatory reason was more likely than not a motivating or
determinative cause of [Henry Company’s] action.” , 100 F.4th at 474–75 (quotation omitted). Each piece of evidence that she cites suffers substantial flaws, and they do not collectively wash those flaws away. B. Failure To Accommodate
To establish a failure-to-accommodate claim under the ADA, a plaintiff must establish (1) she was disabled and her employer knew it; (2) she requested an accommodation or assistance; (3) her employer did not make a good faith effort to assist; and (4) she could have been reasonably accommodated. ,
847 F.3d 144, 157 (3d Cir. 2017). But even if an employee makes a request, employers are under no obligation “to make on-the-spot accommodations of the employee’s choosing.” , Case No. 2:22-cv-00565, 2024 WL 2383923, at *6 (E.D.
Pa. May 23, 2024) (quotation omitted). Moreover, while it appears the Third Circuit has yet to address the issue, other courts have held that an employer has no obligation to provide a reasonable accommodation if an employee fails to request an accommodation before the employer has made the decision to fire her. , 595 F. App’x 897, 899 (11th Cir. 2014); , Case No. 1:17-cv-00624, 2017 WL 6559905, at *5 (E.D. Va. Dec. 22, 2017);
, 669 F.3d 454, 465 (4th Cir. 2012). These decisions make sense because the employer does not have to reverse its termination decision after an employee makes a request for an accommodation. And the duty to accommodate is
forward-looking, meaning that if an employee engaged in deficient conduct without requesting an accommodation, the employer can fire her for that conduct. , 669 F.3d at 465. The Parties do not dispute that Ms. Davis is disabled or that Henry knew about her
disability. The Parties also agree that Ms. Davis was not punished after she left work without telling her supervisor on July 25, 2022. Rather, Ms. Davis’s failure to accommodate claim appears to arise from Henry’s denial of her request to work remotely on August 18, 2022 – the day it terminated her. Because it is undisputed that Ms. Dero made the decision
to fire Ms. Davis before Ms. Davis requested to work from home, Henry was under no obligation to provide Ms. Davis with an accommodation. And even if Henry had to provide an accommodation, it was not legally required to give Ms. Davis the accommodation she
sought right on the spot. Ms. Davis has thus failed to show that there is a genuine dispute as to any material fact related to her failure-to-accommodate claim. IV. CONCLUSION Ms. Davis has abandoned her racial discrimination and hostile work environment
claims. As for the remaining claims, a jury could not reasonably conclude that Henry discriminated against Ms. Davis based on her disability or retaliated against her for notifying Henry about her disability or for complaining about racial discrimination. Ms.
Davis also failed to show that Henry did not provide her with an accommodation to which she was entitled. Therefore, Henry is entitled to summary judgment on all Ms. Davis’s claims. An appropriate Order follows. BY THE COURT:
JOSHUA D. WOLSON, J. April 23, 2026