Tandon Corporation v. U.S. International Trade Commission

831 F.2d 1017, 4 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1283, 1987 U.S. App. LEXIS 575
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
DecidedSeptember 30, 1987
Docket86-1077
StatusPublished
Cited by8 cases

This text of 831 F.2d 1017 (Tandon Corporation v. U.S. International Trade Commission) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Tandon Corporation v. U.S. International Trade Commission, 831 F.2d 1017, 4 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1283, 1987 U.S. App. LEXIS 575 (Fed. Cir. 1987).

Opinion

831 F.2d 1017

9 ITRD 1330, 4 U.S.P.Q.2d 1283, 5
Fed. Cir. (T) 129

TANDON CORPORATION, Appellant,
v.
U.S. INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION, Appellee,
and
Mitsubishi Electric Corporation, and Mitsubishi Electronics
America, Inc., Intervenors-Appellees.

No. 86-1077.

United States Court of Appeals,
Federal Circuit.

Sept. 30, 1987.

Steven E. Lipman, Lupo, Lipman & Lever, Washington, D.C., argued, for appellant. With him on the brief, were R.V. Lupo, Jack Q. Lever, Jr. and Sandra A. Sellers. Also on the brief, were Raymond A. Bogucki, Louis A. Mok, Bogucki, Scherlacher, Mok & Roth, James A. Hamilton, Thomas K. Bourke, Riordan & McKinzie, and Norman H. Kirshman and Michael Harris, Kirshman & Harris, Los Angeles, Cal.

Marcia H. Sundeen, Office of the General Counsel, U.S. Intern. Trade Com'n, Washington, D.C., argued, for appellee. With her on the brief, were Lyn M. Schlitt, General Counsel and Michael P. Mabile, Asst. Gen. Counsel.

Robert M. Taylor, Jr., Lyon & Lyon, Costa Mesa, Cal., argued, for intervenors-appellees. With him on the brief, were Samuel B. Stone, Gary M. Anderson and David B. Murphy. Also on the brief, were Thomas P. Ondeck and Kevin M. O'Brien, Baker & McKenzie, Washington, D.C.

Before FRIEDMAN, NEWMAN, and ARCHER, Circuit Judges.

PAULINE NEWMAN, Circuit Judge.

Tandon Corporation appeals the final decision of the United States International Trade Commission, which held that Tandon's U.S. Patent No. 4,151,573 ("the '573 patent") was not infringed by certain imported double-sided floppy disk drives and therefore that there was no violation of section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930 as amended, 19 U.S.C. Sec. 1337. In re Certain Double-Sided Floppy Disk Drives and Components Thereof, 229 USPQ 968 (USITC 1986). We affirm, on the basis that substantial evidence supports the Commission's finding of noninfringement.

Standard of Review

In this case that turns on the factual question of infringement, which in turn requires decision of factual questions of technological equivalency as well as the factual underpinnings of claim interpretation, we once more remark on the standard of appellate review that is set by the governing statutes. 19 U.S.C. Sec. 1337(c) provides for appellate review "in accordance with chapter 7 of title 5". 5 U.S.C. Sec. 706, subparagraph (2)(E), imposes the "substantial evidence" standard of review on Commission findings and conclusions. There is a significant difference between the standards of "substantial evidence" and of "clearly erroneous", and in close cases this difference can be controlling. See, for example, R.L. Stern, Review of Findings of Administrators, Judges and Juries: A Comparative Analysis, 58 Harv.L.Rev. 70, 80-89 (1944), in which was stated, "Policy, authority and history all thus show that the 'clearly erroneous' rule gives the reviewing court broader powers than the 'substantial evidence' formula," at pages 88-89. See also Consolo v. Federal Maritime Commission, 383 U.S. 607, 619-20, 86 S.Ct. 1018, 1026, 16 L.Ed.2d 131 (1966).

It was the intent of Congress that greater weight and finality be accorded to the Commission's findings as compared with those of a trial court. See S.Rep. No. 466, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 26 (1979). Indeed, the Senate Report criticized the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals' use of a more rigorous standard of review on the question of obviousness (i.e., was the decision "clearly contrary to the weight of the evidence") in Solder Removal Company v. U.S. International Trade Commission, 582 F.2d 628, 199 USPQ 129 (CCPA 1978). Id.

At the same time, the Senate Report accompanying the Trade Act of 1974 made clear that the Commission's primary responsibility is to administer the trade laws, not the patent laws:

[I]n patent-based cases, the Commission considers, for its own purposes under section 337, the status of imports with respect to the claims of U.S. patents. The Commission's findings neither purport to be, nor can they be, regarded as binding interpretations of the U.S. patent laws in particular factual contexts. Therefore, it seems clear that any disposition of a Commission action by a Federal Court should not have a res judicata or collateral estoppel effect in cases before such courts.

S.Rep. No. 1298, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 196, reprinted in 1974 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 7186, 7329. Thus, our appellate treatment of decisions of the Commission does not estop fresh consideration by other tribunals. See Lannom Manufacturing Co., Inc. v. U.S. International Trade Commission, 799 F.2d 1572, 1577-78, 231 USPQ 32, 36 (Fed.Cir.1986).

Background

Tandon alleged unfair practices based on importation by the respondents of certain double-sided floppy disk drives in infringement of certain claims of the '573 patent; the sale of the accused devices was asserted to have the effect or tendency to destroy or substantially injure an efficiently and economically operated industry in the United States. 50 Fed.Reg. 4276 (1985). The respondents were Mitsubishi Electric Corporation, Mitsubishi Electronics America, Inc., TEAC Corporation, TEAC Corporation of America, Sony Corporation, and Sony Corporation of America. Following a twelve-day hearing the Commission issued a temporary exclusion order. In re Certain Double-Sided Floppy Disk Drives and Components Thereof, 227 USPQ 982, 991 (USITC 1985). Before trial on the question of permanent relief Tandon settled with and granted licenses to all respondents except the two Mitsubishi companies (hereinafter "Mitsubishi").

The '573 patent is entitled "Magnetic Recording Device for Double Sided Media", and lists inventors Sirjang L. Tandon, Alfred C. Hackney, and Roy A. Applequist. The claimed invention is an apparatus whereby a pair of magnetic heads, also called transducers, receive and transfer information from and to both sides of a floppy disk.1 A drive mechanism moves the transducers along the disk radius to access its concentric data tracks as the disk rotates. The Tandon device was illustrated in the '573 patent as:

NOTE: OPINION CONTAINS TABLE OR OTHER DATA THAT IS NOT VIEWABLE

Tandon's first or lower transducer is shown at (14) as a "button head" transducer. As described in the specification, this transducer is fixed to the carriage, and the upper transducer is gimballed.

Early floppy disks stored information on only one side, using a single rigidly mounted transducer for data transfer. Opposite the single transducer was a pad that pressed the disk against the transducer and absorbed disk irregularities. The first double-sided floppy disk drive was introduced in 1976 by the International Business Machines Corporation.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
831 F.2d 1017, 4 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1283, 1987 U.S. App. LEXIS 575, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/tandon-corporation-v-us-international-trade-commission-cafc-1987.