Tan v. Dir. of Ohio Dept. of Job & Family Servs.

2025 Ohio 2614

• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals
• Decided: July 25, 2025
• Docket: 30405
• Status: Published

Opinion

[Cite as Tan v. Dir., of Ohio Dept. of Job & Family Servs., 2025-Ohio-2614.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT MONTGOMERY COUNTY

MARY TAN : : C.A. No. 30405 Appellant : : Trial Court Case No. 2024 CV 05029 v. : : (Civil Appeal from Common Pleas DIRECTOR OF OHIO DEPARTMENT : Court) OF JOB AND FAMILY SERV. ET AL. : : FINAL JUDGMENT ENTRY & Appellees : OPINION

...........

Pursuant to the opinion of this court rendered on July 25, 2025, the judgment of the

trial court is affirmed.

Costs to be paid as stated in App.R. 24.

Pursuant to Ohio App.R. 30(A), the clerk of the court of appeals shall immediately

serve notice of this judgment upon all parties and make a note in the docket of the service.

Additionally, pursuant to App.R. 27, the clerk of the court of appeals shall send a certified

copy of this judgment, which constitutes a mandate, to the clerk of the trial court and note

the service on the appellate docket.

For the court,

[[Applied Signature]] ROBERT G. HANSEMAN, JUDGE

TUCKER, J., and LEWIS, J., concur. -2- OPINION MONTGOMERY C.A. No. 30405

MARY TAN, Appellant, Pro Se DOUGLAS R. UNVER, Attorney for Appellees

HANSEMAN, J.

{¶ 1} Appellant, Mary Tan, appeals pro se from a trial court judgment that affirmed an

administrative decision of the Unemployment Compensation Review Commission (“UCRC”).

The UCRC had found that Tan was discharged from her employment with Fuyao American

Glass, Inc. (“Fuyao”), with just cause. The UCRC, therefore, denied unemployment benefits

for Tan.

{¶ 2} While Tan’s assignments of error and argument are difficult to discern, she

appears to claim that the hearing officer’s decision was against the manifest weight of the

evidence and was unreasonable, that the trial court failed to read the transcript, and that the

hearing officer was not impartial. After reviewing the record, we find Tan’s assignments of

error without merit. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court will be affirmed.

I. Facts and Course of Proceedings

{¶ 3} In April 2024, Fuyao discharged Tan from employment due to her violation of

its policy against workplace violence. More specifically, Tan had indicated a desire for

revenge against other employees, and notes were discovered shortly thereafter at Tan’s

workstation in which she discussed how to make atomic bombs and other harmful

chemicals. Tan was initially granted unemployment benefits, but the decision was reversed

by a hearing officer, who found Fuyao had discharged Tan with just cause. The UCRC then

affirmed the hearing officer’s decision. In September 2024, Tan filed a notice of -3- administrative appeal in the trial court, asking it to overturn the UCRC’s decision and grant

her unemployment compensation. Tan also gave notice of her appeal to the Director of the

Ohio Department of Job and Family Services, to the UCRC Administrator, and to Fuyao.

{¶ 4} After the trial court set a briefing schedule, UCRC filed the certified transcript of

the administrative proceedings in November 2024. Tan and UCRC then filed briefs and, on

review, the court issued a decision affirming the denial of Tan’s benefits. Tan timely

appealed from the decision.

II. Manifest Weight and Unreasonableness of the Hearing Officer’s Decision

{¶ 5} From reading Tan’s brief, her first assignment of error appears to be that the

hearing officer’s decision was against the manifest weight of the evidence and was

unreasonable. In this regard, Tan contends: (1) the notes she wrote during work did not

indicate a threat, i.e., a present intent to injure anyone; (2) Fuyao’s workplace policy failed

to define what actions constituted hostility or aversion toward an individual or a group; (3)

Fuyao failed to uniformly apply its policy; and (4) Tan’s actions during “idle time” at work did

not materially and substantially affect Fuyao’s interests.

{¶ 6} Under R.C. 4141.29(D)(2)(a), an individual is precluded from obtaining

unemployment benefits if he or she “has been discharged for just cause in connection with

the individual's work.” Ohio courts have defined “just cause” as “ ‘that which, to an ordinarily

intelligent person, is a justifiable reason for doing or not doing a particular act.’ ” Irvine v.

State Unemp. Comp. Bd. of Rev., 19 Ohio St.3d 15, 17 (1985), quoting Peyton v. Sun T.V.

& Appliances, 44 Ohio App.2d 10, 12 (10th Dist. 1975). Claimants have the burden of

establishing they are entitled to unemployment benefits. Id.

{¶ 7} Deciding “what constitutes just cause must be analyzed in conjunction with the -4- legislative purpose underlying the Unemployment Compensation Act. Essentially, the Act's

purpose is ‘to enable unfortunate employees, who become and remain involuntarily

unemployed by adverse business and industrial conditions, to subsist on a reasonably

decent level and is in keeping with the humanitarian and enlightened concepts of this

modern day.’ ” (Emphasis in original.) Id., quoting Leach v. Republic Steel Corp., 176 Ohio

St. 221, 223 (1964).

{¶ 8} However, “[t]he Act does not exist to protect employees from themselves, but

to protect them from economic forces over which they have no control. When an employee

is at fault, he is no longer the victim of fortune's whims, but is instead directly responsible for

his own predicament. Fault on the employee's part separates him from the Act's intent and

the Act's protection. Thus, fault is essential to the unique chemistry of a just cause

termination.” Tzangas, Plakas & Mannos v. Ohio Bur. of Emp. Servs., 73 Ohio St.3d 694,

697-698 (1995). Tzangas also stressed that “the question of fault cannot be rigidly defined,

but, rather, can only be evaluated upon consideration of the particular facts of each case. If

an employer has been reasonable in finding fault on behalf of an employee, then the

employer may terminate the employee with just cause.” Id. at 698.

{¶ 9} After the UCRC completes its review, appeal is taken to the common pleas

court, where “ ‘ [i]f the court finds that the decision of the commission was unlawful,

unreasonable, or against the manifest weight of the evidence, it shall reverse, vacate, or

modify the decision, or remand the matter to the commission. Otherwise, the court shall

affirm the decision of the commission.’ ” Williams v. Ohio Dept. of Job & Family Servs., 2011-

Ohio-2897, ¶ 20, quoting R.C. 4141.282(H). On further appeal, all appellate courts apply the

same limited review as the common pleas court. Id. “Thus, a reviewing court may not make

factual findings or determine a witness's credibility and must affirm the commission's finding -5- if some competent, credible evidence in the record supports it.” Id.

{¶ 10} According to the evidence in the administrative file, Fuyao hired Tan in

September 2022. At that time, Fuyao furnished Tan with a copy of its employee handbook.

Tan acknowledged receipt and agreed she would read and comply with its terms.

Administrative Transcript (“Tr.”), 8 and 243. As relevant here, the handbook contained the

following policy:

3.5 Workplace Violence

The safety and security of all associates is of primary importance to FGA. Acts

or threats of physical or verbal violence (including intimidation and/or

harassment and/or coercion) which involve or affect the Company and/or its

associates, visitors, customers by anyone on the Company property or while

conducting Company business will not be tolerated.

Prohibited conduct includes, but is not limited to the following:

• Threatening communication, whether verbal, written or electronic, or

threatening physical gestures.

• Physical injury or potential physical harm, including behavior that

creates a reasonable fear of harm, to another individual.

...

All associates are responsible for notifying management of any threats that

they receive, witness, or they are told that another person witnessed or

received. Additionally, associates are expected to report behavior that they

reasonably believe poses a potential for workplace violence. . . .

Any associate responsible for conduct that violates any part of this policy will -6- be subject to discipline up to immediate discharge, as well as the possibility

for referral to criminal prosecution.

Upon actions or behavior that may appear to violate this policy, the Company

reserves the right to inspect and/or search any person or property on Company

premises or property used while performing Company business.

(Emphasis in original.) Tr. at 34-35.

{¶ 11} The handbook contained the following further provisions:

General Plant Rules - Most Serious Violations

Violation of any of the following rules, because of their seriousness, may result

in immediate discharge without a warning:

28. Use of threatening language toward a customer, vendor,

management, or co-worker;

39. Fighting, assaulting or using any form of physical contact that may

result in harm to another person. This includes, but is not limited to:

a. Threats and acts of violence against a person or property that alter

employment conditions or create a hostile abusive or intimidating work

environment; and

b. Use of abusive, malicious contemptuous or threatening language or

conduct.

(Emphasis in original.) Tr. at 38.

{¶ 12} Tan worked at Fuyao as an inspector for defects in glass windshields. Her last -7- day of work was April 28, 2024. On that day, a fellow employee discovered a note at Tan’s

workstation which contained ingredients on how to make atomic materials, including

materials like uranium, which is a radioactive metallic element. This employee brought the

note to the attention of the shift supervisor who, for the safety and well-being of all team

members, then reached out to Employee Relations and the safety team to help deal with the

situation and to see what needed to be done next. This consultation involved the safety staff

and Christopher Carmack, a Fuyao employee relations representative. The safety team was

on site and suspended Tan while they investigated to see what had occurred and where the

note came from. Id. at 241-242 and 244-245.

{¶ 13} The investigators looked through video footage and were able to see there

was a note on Tan’s workstation, and that around 5:00 p.m., Tan had the note in her hand,

taking it to the workstation. Carmack had photos of that and a time-stamp of the photos.

According to Carmack, the concern was about an atomic or nuclear bomb and the

ingredients of a bomb. That created a hostile work environment, as an employee cannot

speak or write about a bomb. A second note was also found in Tan’s workbench. This note

involved some sort of bleach liquid using organic compounds to make a harmful chemical

reaction with fumes. Id. at 242, 248, and 249-250.

{¶ 14} Fuyao’s investigation included gathering statements from team members, who

mentioned Tan’s concerning comments and odd behavior. A team member reported he had

felt uncomfortable and that Tan’s behavior was concerning. Tan had shared with the team

that she had some science background, that she had a lot of chemical knowledge on how

to create bombs and materials necessary to do so, and that she also had a plan for revenge.

Tr. at 246-247, 251, and 213-218 (written statements from Tan’s supervisor and a coworker).

During her conversation with the coworker, Tan also mentioned in a “revenge tone” that -8- everyone lied to her and that everyone on the line was mean to her. Id. at 215.

{¶ 15} When Carmack interviewed Tan, she denied writing any notes, said she did

not know what he was talking about, and threatened to sue Fuyao. However, a group of

employer relations people and legal team members later compared a prior sample of Tan’s

handwriting with both notes found at her workstation. They found the handwriting and letters

were nearly identical. Id. at 247. In the prior written statement made to Fuyao, Tan had also

said that “Everyone bothers me when I’m working and it happens every day.” Id. at 72 and

262.

{¶ 16} Carmack stated that there is never a time and a place for employees to use

company time or materials to write notes on creating weapons, that Tan did not ask

permission to use company time or items for personal use to create these notes, and that

he had no idea why she would be writing the notes. Without knowing why Tan wrote the

notes, there was no way Carmack could protect his employees. Based on his investigation

and Tan’s actions, Carmack had no option other than to discharge her from employment. Id.

at 249 and 251.

{¶ 17} Contrary to her prior denial to Fuyao, Tan admitted during the unemployment

hearing that she had written the notes. Concerning the atomic bomb note, Tan claimed that

she had a discussion that day with a coworker about radon gas because a friend of hers

was trying to buy a house. During this conversation, Tan also mentioned that she had taken

a science class in her own country. Tan’s story was that while waiting for her lunch break at

work, she had nothing to do and tried to recall a science lesson she had a long time ago.

Tan stated she wrote it down on her own paper and threw it away; she had no idea how

Fuyao obtained the paper. During the hearing, Tan gave the same kind of explanation for

writing down the bleach mixture. She claimed she was thinking of using it to clean her house -9- and tried to remember what she had previously learned in science class. Tr. at 257 and 259-

260.

{¶ 18} After considering the evidence, the hearing officer found that Tan had been

discharged with just cause. The officer found that Fuyao had presented “consistent and

credible evidence in support of its position” and that its policies were “fair, applicable, and

known” to Tan. Id. at 270. In addition, the officer stated that Tan “lacked an explanation for

why she prepared these notes about a bomb and a malodorous solution at work while on

the clock. She could have just as easily prepared these notes at home and left them there.”

Id. In addition, the officer stressed that Tan had “prepared these notes in English, not in

another language she knew, and left them where they could be found by others and read in

English. The fault is with [Tan].” Id.

{¶ 19} The hearing officer further found that Tan’s “position also lacks credibility since

as [Tan] is aware, not all matters in which employees engage are subject to a progressive

disciplinary process; but instead, like fostering a hostile workplace, are subject to immediate

termination under employer’s policies.” Id. at 270-271. Finally, the officer stated that Tan’s

failure to avoid engaging in inappropriate behavior like preparing notes, leaving them to be

discovered by coworkers while discussing her knowledge of chemicals and mentioning

revenge did not meet her employer’s legitimate business interests. As a result, the officer

reversed the prior decision to allow benefits. Id. Tan appealed to the UCRC, and it affirmed

the hearing officer’s decision.

{¶ 20} After reviewing the record and evidence from the hearing, the trial court upheld

the UCRC decision. In particular, the court relied on the hearing officer’s credibility

determinations. Order Affirming the Decision of the Commission (Jan. 31, 2025) (“Order”),

p. 4 and 6. -10- {¶ 21} As noted, “a reviewing court may not make factual findings or determine a

witness's credibility . . . .” Williams, 2011-Ohio-2897, at ¶ 20. “[W]hen reviewing a decision

of the Commission. . . , common pleas and appellate courts are precluded from making

factual findings; the resolution of factual questions and issues of credibility are for the

Commission, which acts as the fact-finder in unemployment compensation proceedings. A

reviewing court cannot substitute its judgment for the board's factual findings but can only

determine if the board's decision is supported by the evidence in the record.” Giles v. F & P

Am. Mfg., Inc., 2005-Ohio-4833, ¶ 29 (2d Dist.), citing Tzangas, 73 Ohio St.3d at 696.

{¶ 22} Here, the decision was supported by the evidence in the record. Contrary to

Tan’s claim, Fuyao did not have to list every type of violence or threats of violence that might

exist; the possibilities are endless. People reading the policy would understand they will

create a hostile or intimidating work environment by expressing animosity toward coworkers,

discussing their own scientific background in chemicals, and leaving notes in plain view

about ingredients for making bombs (atomic or otherwise). Tan’s story about making the

note to remember chemical details about radon was inconsistent with her earlier denial of

writing any notes and also implausible. The note itself specifically mentioned “to make

atomic bomb (uranium)” and “Radium to make Nuclear Bomb.” Tr. at 28. See also

Appellant’s Brief, p. 4 (noting the content of the atomic bomb note).

{¶ 23} Radon is defined as “both the radioactive, gaseous element produced by the

disintegration of radium and the short-lived radionuclides that are decay products of radon.”

R.C. 3723.01; Adm.Code 3701-69-01(A)(43). Ohio has procedures for radon testing and

licensing of those conducting such testing. See R.C. Chap. 3723 and Adm.Code Chap.

3701. Federal law also classifies radon as a hazardous air pollutant and regulates uranium

mines, for example, which can produce such pollutants. E.g., Grand Canyon Trust v. Energy -11- Fuels Resources (U.S.A.) Inc., 269 F.Supp.3d 1173, 1179 (D. Utah 2017). However, there

is no plausible connection between radon and compiling lists of ingredients for making

nuclear or atomic bombs.

{¶ 24} Furthermore, the threat of violence was present on the day the notes were

discovered and was exacerbated by Tan’s denial and lack of explanation for the events that

occurred. Fuyao could have placed its other employees at future risk if it had failed to act.

As a result, Fuyao’s decision to terminate Tan was reasonable.

{¶ 25} Tan also argues that Fuyao did not uniformly apply its workplace violence

policy. “ ‘Just cause for discharge may be established by proof that the employee violated a

specific company rule or policy, . . . so long as the policy was fair and fairly applied.’ ”

Puterbaugh v. Goodwill Industries of the Miami Valley, Inc., 2014-Ohio-2208, ¶ 14 (2d Dist.),

quoting Jones v. Bd. of Rev., 1993 WL 393908, *3 (10th Dist. Sept. 28, 1993). However,

Tan did not provide any evidence that Fuyao failed to apply its policy consistently or fairly.

Despite Tan’s claim in her brief to that effect, the record is silent on this point.

{¶ 26} In addition, Tan asserted that her actions during “idle time” did not substantially

and materially affect Fuyao’s interests. For the reasons the hearing officer mentioned and

that we have also discussed, we disagree. The fact that employees are not directly

performing a work task at a particular moment does not give them license to engage in

behavior that harms or threatens other employees. Suppose, for example, that an employee

shoots a coworker while the employee is walking to the restroom or to a lunchroom. No one

would seriously argue that the employee’s actions did not affect the employer’s legitimate

business interests.

{¶ 27} As a final point, we see no evidence that the trial court failed to read the

transcript. In fact, the court’s order repeatedly refers to the record. See Order at p. 1-4. -12- {¶ 28} Based on the preceding discussion, Tan’s first assignment of error is

overruled.

IV. Bias of the Hearing Officer

{¶ 29} Tan also alleges the hearing officer was biased. Concerning this point,

Adm.Code 4146-11-01 provides that: “No hearing officer or member of the review

commission shall participate in proceedings in any case in which the hearing officer or

member has an interest which might prevent the hearing officer or member from conducting

a fair hearing or reaching an impartial decision.” “While due process entitles an individual

before an administrative tribunal to receive a fair hearing before an impartial tribunal, a

showing of substantial personal bias will be required before a hearing officer may be

disqualified or the results of the hearing vacated. In practice this means a personal bias so

extreme as to display clear inability to render a fair judgment.” Meadowbrook Care Ctr. v.

ODJFS, 2007-Ohio-6534, ¶ 25 (10th Dist.), citing Staschak v. State Med. Bd. of Ohio, 2004-

Ohio-4650 (10th Dist.).

{¶ 30} Tan does not point to any evidence of bias other than her disagreement with

the hearing officer’s decision, and there is no evidence of personal bias in the record.

Consequently, the second assignment of error is overruled.

IV. Conclusion

{¶ 31} Both of Tan’s assignments of error having been overruled, the judgment of the

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TUCKER, J. and LEWIS, J., concur.