Tammy Lenore Ripp v. Commonwealth of Virginia

Opinion

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA

Record No. 0827-25-2

TAMMY LENORE RIPP v. COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA

Present: Chief Judge Decker, Judges Beales and Athey Argued at Richmond, Virginia Opinion Issued August 4, 2026*

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF HANOVER COUNTY Victoria A. B. Willis, Judge

Richard A. H. Quitiquit (Jurach, Tacey & Quitiquit, PLC, on brief), for appellant.

Robert D. Bauer, Assistant Attorney General (Jason S. Miyares,1 Attorney General; Susan Hallie Hovey-Murray, Assistant Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.

MEMORANDUM OPINION BY JUDGE CLIFFORD L. ATHEY, JR.

Following a bench trial, the Circuit Court of Hanover County (“trial court”) convicted

Tammy Lenore Ripp (“Ripp”) of financially exploiting a vulnerable adult, in violation of Code

§ 18.2-178.1, and unlawfully possessing a certificate of title issued to another, in violation of

Code § 46.2-618. On appeal, Ripp contends that her felony conviction for financially exploiting a

vulnerable adult must be reversed because there was no evidence in the record establishing that the

thing of value she converted—the title to a motor vehicle—had a value of $1,000 or more. Since

we agree, we must first reverse the felony conviction before remanding the case back to the trial

* This opinion is not designated for publication. See Code § 17.1-413(A). 1 Jay C. Jones succeeded Jason S. Miyares as Attorney General on January 17, 2026. court for a new trial, if the Commonwealth so elects, on a misdemeanor charge of financially

exploiting a vulnerable adult.

I. BACKGROUND2

In 2023, Ripp was dating Charles Wesley Boney, III (“Chuck”), who was in his late

seventies. On October 2, 2023, Chuck, who was recovering from a stroke, transferred the title to his

2015 Nissan Altima to Ripp. She was subsequently indicted for: 1) obtaining “a 2015 Nissan

Altima belonging to [Chuck]” under false pretenses, in violation of Code § 18.2-178; and 2)

financially exploiting Chuck, a vulnerable adult, by converting to her possession “a 2015 Nissan

Altima . . . belonging to [Chuck],” in violation of Code § 18.2-178.1. In addition to the felony

charges, she also received a misdemeanor charge for unlawfully possessing a certificate of title

issued to another, in violation of Code § 46.2-618, which was certified to the trial court pursuant

to Code § 19.2-190.1.

On October 4, 2024, a bench trial was held on the aforementioned felony and misdemeanor

charges. At the conclusion of the Commonwealth’s case-in-chief, the trial court granted Ripp’s

motion to strike the felony charge of obtaining the vehicle by false pretenses based upon the

Commonwealth failing to prove that Ripp ever took possession of the vehicle.3 The

Commonwealth then moved to amend its other felony indictment alleging financial exploitation of a

vulnerable adult. The proposed amendment identified the item allegedly converted as “the title to a

2015 Nissan Altima, a thing of value.” (Emphases added.) The trial court granted the proposed

amendment and continued the trial on the remaining charges to January 27, 2025. On that date, the

2 “Consistent with the standard of review when a criminal appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, we recite the evidence below ‘in the “light most favorable” to the Commonwealth, the prevailing party in the trial court.’” Hammer v. Commonwealth, 74 Va. App. 225, 231 (2022) (quoting Commonwealth v. Cady, 300 Va. 325, 329 (2021)). 3 At that juncture, the trial court denied Ripp’s motion to strike the charge of financially exploiting a vulnerable adult. -2- parties acquiesced to a de novo bench trial, which was held on the amended felony indictment for

financially exploiting a vulnerable adult and on the misdemeanor charge of unlawfully possessing a

certificate of title issued to another.

At trial, Karen Robertson (“Robertson”), Chuck’s daughter, explained that her father

experienced a debilitating stroke in September of 2023 and, as a result, he began residing at Autumn

Care, a residential rehabilitation facility located in Hanover. She further testified that following the

stroke, “[h]e was very disoriented.” She emphasized that there was a “night-and-day difference”

between his pre-stroke and post-stroke demeanor. She also identified, from a photograph entered in

evidence, a 2015 Nissan Altima owned by her father that remained parked at his former residence in

Quinton, Virginia. Robertson also acknowledged that Ripp “had been dating” her father for

approximately four to five years, however Robertson felt that Ripp did not “ha[ve] very good

intentions with [her] father.”

Stephanie Williams (“Williams”), an occupational therapist at Autumn Care, subsequently

testified that on October 2, 2023, she went to Chuck’s room at Autumn Care “for an occupational

therapy evaluation.” Williams testified that, upon entering his room, she encountered Ripp and

sensed “tension in the room.” She also recalled that Chuck was “laying in the bed and his side table

or hospital table was over him, and there was a piece of paper on the table and [Ripp] was talking

about the signature of the paper on the table.” She further recalled that Ripp was telling Chuck that

his signature was “off,” or incorrect. Williams next explained that the document appeared to be “a

DMV form” and that Ripp asked her if the signature looked okay and whether she “would be a

witness to the signing” of the form. Williams testified that she declined to serve as a witness and

“tried to redirect” the conversation. However, she testified that she did observe that “the signature

was not on the line. It was off to the side and it was jumbled, not really legible.”

-3- Hanover County Sheriff’s Deputy Matthew O’Bryant (“Deputy O’Bryant”) testified that

he was dispatched to Autumn Care on October 2, 2023, where he interviewed Chuck. He

testified that Chuck told him that “he thought he signed something in regards to his lunch tray or

meal tray.”

The parties then stipulated that the value of the Nissan Altima was “over a thousand

dollars.” DMV records reflecting that Ripp became the registered owner of the Nissan Altima,

after having purchased the Nissan Altima for $1.00, were also admitted in evidence without

objection. The DMV records included a copy of the certificate of title that Chuck signed over to

Ripp on October 2, 2023.

At the conclusion of the Commonwealth’s case-in-chief, Ripp moved to strike the

Commonwealth’s case based upon the Commonwealth’s failure to prove that the “title itself

ha[d] a value of over [$1,000].” In support, Ripp asserted that the value of the title was not

equivalent to the value of the vehicle because a title is “just a document to show ownership.”

Although Ripp conceded that the title had “some value,” she argued that its value could only

support a misdemeanor conviction. The trial court denied the motion to strike.

Ripp then testified in her own defense. She explained that she had been in a relationship

with Chuck for over five years and that, prior to his stroke, they had discussed her “taking

ownership of the car.” She admitted that on October 2, 2023, she took the title to the Nissan

Altima to Autumn Care and that Chuck signed the title to the vehicle over to her. She also

explained that she then took the executed title to a DMV office but realized that Chuck had

“forgot to put the mileage of the car” on the document, so she called him on the phone and asked

him to tell the DMV clerk the mileage. On cross-examination, Ripp testified that after Chuck’s

stroke, his son had taken “the keys to the car.” She also admitted that she had four previous

felony convictions.

-4- Jo Lindsay (“Lindsay”), Ripp’s mother, confirmed that Chuck told the DMV clerk the

mileage on the vehicle over speakerphone. After being recalled, Ripp testified that she never

took possession of the Nissan Altima. However, she explained that she had been “keeping up

with the taxes on the car for two years and the insurance plan.”

In rebuttal, the Commonwealth recalled Deputy O’Bryant, who explained that Chuck told

him that “under no circumstance did he intend to sell his car, truck or house to [Ripp].”

At the conclusion of all the evidence, Ripp renewed her motion to strike, arguing in

support that if someone burned another person’s certificate of title and it was necessary “to

determine the value [of the title] for destruction of property,” the value of the burned title

“wouldn’t be the value of the vehicle.” Ripp again conceded that the title had some value;

however, she contended that the Commonwealth had failed to put on sufficient evidence to

establish that the value of the title was $1,000 or more as required for a felony violation of Code

§ 18.2‑178.1.

The trial court denied the renewed motion to strike. In denying the motion, the trial court

took judicial notice that people “get loans,” “sell,” and “gamble with their titles,” and further

opined:

A title has value and you stipulated that the title had a value of a thousand dollars or more. I’m not sure where I could go with that except to say that there is value in that and that this line that you want to draw between the title and the car I don’t think is one that I can recognize in the law.

The trial court then found Ripp guilty on both counts before sentencing her to 5 years’

incarceration, with 4 years suspended, on the felony charge of financially exploiting a vulnerable

adult and 12 months’ incarceration, all suspended, on the misdemeanor charge of unlawfully

possessing a certificate of title issued to another. Ripp appealed.

-5- II. ANALYSIS

A. Standard of Review

“When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, ‘[t]he judgment of the trial court is

presumed correct and will not be disturbed unless it is plainly wrong or without evidence to

support it.’” Northcraft v. Commonwealth, 78 Va. App. 563, 591 (2023) (alteration in original)

(quoting Smith v. Commonwealth, 296 Va. 450, 460 (2018)). “[T]he relevant question is whether

‘any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a

reasonable doubt.’” Id. (quoting Vasquez v. Commonwealth, 291 Va. 232, 248 (2016)). To the

extent that a sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge requires us to address questions of law, we

review those questions de novo. See Butler v. Stegmaier, 77 Va. App. 115, 124 (2023).

B. The evidence was insufficient to prove that “the title to” the Nissan Altima had a value of $1,000 or more.

The amended indictment alleged that Ripp had converted “the title to” Chuck’s 2015

Nissan Altima. Ripp contends on appeal that the Commonwealth failed to introduce sufficient

evidence establishing that the value of “the title to” the 2015 Nissan Altima exceeded $1,000.

We agree.

Under Code § 18.2-178.1, it is considered larceny for “any person who knows or should

know that another person is a vulnerable adult to, through the use of that other person’s

impairment, take, obtain, or convert money or other thing of value belonging to that other person

with the intent to permanently deprive him thereof.” Thus, a violation of Code § 18.2-178.1—

where the “thing of value” converted has a value of $1,000 or more—is punishable as grand

-6- larceny. See Code § 18.2-95.4 Here, the amended indictment alleged that the “thing of value”

converted was “the title to”5 Chuck’s 2015 Nissan Altima.

“The owner of an automobile is the party who has legal title to it.” Hall, Inc. v. Empire

Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 248 Va. 307, 309 (1994).6 In Virginia, a certificate of title is “evidence

of ownership.” Bolden v. Commonwealth, 28 Va. App. 488, 493 (1998); accord King v.

Commonwealth, 303 Va. 341, 351 n.5 (2024). “In order to effect a transfer of the ownership of a

motor vehicle, two things are required: (1) the owner must actually deliver the endorsed

certificate of title to the transferee, and (2) the owner must deliver possession of the vehicle to

the transferee.” Allstate Ins. Co. v. Atlanta Cas. Co., 260 Va. 148, 155 (2000); see also Code

§ 46.2-628 (stating that, to transfer or assign a title, an owner must endorse the certificate and

“deliver the certificate to the purchaser or transferee at the time of delivering the motor vehicle”).

Hence, a certificate of title is an important document; however, it is not a substitute for a

motor vehicle. Instead, it is merely “evidence of ownership” of a motor vehicle. Bolden, 28

4 On brief, both parties aver that the Commonwealth was required to prove that the value of the title exceeded $1,000. This is incorrect; the value must be “$1,000 or more.” Code § 18.2‑95 (emphasis added); see Dunn v. Commonwealth, 222 Va. 704, 705 (1981) (per curiam) (“In a grand larceny prosecution, the burden is upon the Commonwealth to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the value of the goods stolen equals at least the amount fixed by statute in definition of the offense.” (emphasis added)). 5 It can be inferred from the record that “the title to” the vehicle refers to the physical certificate of title issued by Department of Motor Vehicles, not an ownership interest in the vehicle. See King v. Commonwealth, 303 Va. 341, 350-51 (2024) (explaining the difference between the “legal concept of title” and “the certificate of title that DMV issues when an owner of a motor vehicle registers that vehicle with DMV”). To keep the two concepts separate, we use “title” and “certificate of title” to refer to a DMV-issued certificate of title and “legal title” when referring to an ownership interest in a vehicle. 6 The Commonwealth contends that Ripp became the legal owner of the Nissan Altima. But it is well-settled that “a thief takes no title in the property he steals and can transfer none.” Northcraft, 78 Va. App. at 600. Hence, the Commonwealth cannot simultaneously argue that Ripp criminally converted the title and obtained “legal ownership” of the vehicle. Ripp, as the thief of the title, could not obtain legal title to the vehicle: she merely obtained the certificate of title to the vehicle. See id. -7- Va. App. at 493. The unlawful conversion of a certificate of title alone does not result in “the

wrongful or fraudulent taking of another’s [vehicle] without his permission and with the intent to

deprive the owner of that [vehicle] permanently.” Northcraft, 78 Va. App. at 599 (quoting

Tarpley v. Commonwealth, 261 Va. 251, 256 (2001)) (defining larceny). So generally, where an

indictment for a species of larceny alleges only that “the title to” a vehicle was unlawfully

converted, the Commonwealth must prove that the value of the title itself meets or exceeds the

statutory threshold for grand larceny in order to obtain a felony conviction. See Code

§§ 18.2-95, -96.

The value of an item may be established by proof of its fair market value, see Robinson v.

Commonwealth, 258 Va. 3, 5 (1999), or its “actual value,” Grimes v. Commonwealth, 62

Va. App. 470, 477 (2013) (quoting Baylor v. Commonwealth, 55 Va. App. 82, 88 (2009)).

Importantly, “[i]t is the ‘current value’ of the stolen items that must be established.” Id. (quoting

Dunn v. Commonwealth, 222 Va. 704, 705 (1981) (per curiam)). Hence, the Commonwealth

was required to prove that the fair market value or actual value of the certificate of title, at the

time Ripp converted it, was worth at least $1,000. Id.; Code § 18.2‑95.

Here, the trial court relied on the following evidence when denying Ripp’s renewed

motion to strike: 1) the 2015 Nissan Altima was worth more than $1,000,7 and 2) people “get

loans,” “sell,” and “gamble with their titles.”8 However, the record here is bereft of any evidence

establishing that “the title to” the 2015 Nissan Altima had a value of $1,000 or more.

7 While the trial court opined that the parties “stipulated that the title had a value of a thousand dollars or more,” the record reflects that the parties stipulated that the value of the vehicle was $1,000 or more. 8 The record discloses that the trial court took judicial notice that a person may use a title as collateral for a loan, use a title as a stake, or sell a title. See Thomas v. Commonwealth, 36 Va. App. 326, 332 (2001) (“The fact of judicial notice must appear from the record.” (quoting Sutherland v. Commonwealth, 6 Va. App. 378, 383 (1988))). Because Ripp neither objected nor assigned error to the trial court judicially noticing these facts, we will accept them as true. -8- Although a title has some value, it strains reason to infer that the market or actual value of

a mere title is always equal to the value of the vehicle reflected on the title. A vehicle is sought

for its intrinsic value; a title is sought to ensure the proper transfer of an ownership interest in a

vehicle and as evidence of said ownership interest. A destroyed or stolen vehicle may be

irretrievable, whereas a destroyed or stolen certificate of title to a vehicle may be replaced. See

Code § 46.2-632 (providing a process for obtaining a new certificate of title “[w]henever the

applicant for the registration of a motor vehicle . . . is unable to present a certificate of title

because the certificate has been lost or unlawfully detained by one in possession of it or

whenever the certificate of title is otherwise not available”). Correspondingly, it also cannot be

successfully argued that the replacement cost of a motor vehicle is equal to the replacement cost

of a certificate of title. See Grimes, 62 Va. App. at 477 (noting that evidence of “replacement

value can, in certain circumstances, afford the fact finder a basis from which to draw inferences

about the market value of the stolen item”). The trial court was presented with no evidence that

this specific certificate of title was equal to the value of the vehicle reflected on the title.

And although the trial court took judicial notice that a person may secure a loan using a

title, wager a title, or sell a title, no evidence establishing what value a lender, bettor, or

purchaser would have assigned to this specific certificate of title was introduced. See DiMaio v.

Commonwealth, 46 Va. App. 755, 764 (2005) (delineating the methods of proving “the value of

an asset,” to include “lay opinion of the property’s fair market value,” the opinion of an expert,

and “traditional accounting principles”). In fact, there is no evidence of what anyone would have

paid for the title or its actual value.

When the Commonwealth chose to amend the original indictment, the Commonwealth

became tasked with the burden of proving that the value of “the title to” the vehicle was $1,000

or more. But the evidence adduced by the Commonwealth simply established that the value of

-9- the vehicle was greater than $1,000 and that the certificate of title had some value—not that the

title alone had a value of $1,000 or more. See Walls v. Commonwealth, 248 Va. 480, 481-483

(1994) (“Proof that an article has some value is sufficient to warrant a conviction of petit larceny,

but where the value of the thing stolen determines the grade of the offense, the value must be

alleged and the Commonwealth must prove the value to be the statutory amount.” (quoting

Wright v. Commonwealth, 196 Va. 132, 139 (1954))). Hence, the trial court was left to speculate

as to whether the value of the title met the statutory threshold for a grand larceny conviction.

Thus, because the value of the title was “an essential element of the crime” that the

Commonwealth had to “prove . . . beyond a reasonable doubt,” id. at 481, Ripp’s felony

conviction for financially exploiting a vulnerable adult must be reversed, see Jennings v.

Commonwealth, 67 Va. App. 620, 628 (2017) (holding that a “conviction was plainly wrong”

where “a reasonable factfinder could not have concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that

[appellant] was guilty of th[e] crime without resorting to sheer speculation outside the evidence

presented by the Commonwealth”).

Nevertheless, Ripp is not entitled to dismissal of the financial exploitation of a vulnerable

adult charge with prejudice. As here, where the only deficiency in the Commonwealth’s case is

the failure to prove that the value of the item converted met or exceeded the threshold value for a

felony conviction, we must remand the case for either a new trial at the election of the

Commonwealth on the lesser-included misdemeanor offense or, with the consent of both parties,

resentencing on said lesser-included offense. See Britt v. Commonwealth, 276 Va. 569, 576

(2008); cf. Frango v. Commonwealth, 66 Va. App. 34, 43-46 (2016) (reversing felony conviction

for “statutory larceny” of timber under Code § 55-334.1 where the evidence failed to show that

the value of the trees exceeded the statutory amount but remanding for a new trial because the

evidence was sufficient to “support[] a conviction for the lesser-included offense of petit

- 10 - larceny”). Since the record reflects that the title had some value, Ripp does not contend that the

evidence was insufficient in any other respect, and the parties have not consented to remanding

for resentencing on the misdemeanor offense, we remand for a new trial on misdemeanor

financial exploitation of a vulnerable adult, if the Commonwealth be so inclined.9 See Frango,

66 Va. App. at 44, 46 & n.7.

III. CONCLUSION

The evidence was insufficient to prove that the value of the title to the 2015 Nissan

Altima was $1,000 or more. Thus, we reverse Ripp’s felony conviction for financially exploiting

a vulnerable adult. However, we remand for a new trial on misdemeanor financial exploitation

of a vulnerable adult, if the Commonwealth so elects.

Reversed and remanded.

9 Ripp did not note an appeal of her misdemeanor conviction for unlawfully possessing a certificate of title issued to another, so this Court did not acquire jurisdiction over that conviction. See Aponte v. Commonwealth, 68 Va. App. 146, 150 n.1 (2017). Hence, even if there were a reason to do so, we could not consider remanding for resentencing on that conviction. See id. - 11 -