Case: 19-14085 Date Filed: 09/02/2020 Page: 1 of 6
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT ________________________
No. 19-14085 Non-Argument Calendar ________________________
D.C. Docket No. 4:18-cv-00498-RDP
TAMMY FAYE CASTLEMAN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
COMMISSIONER, SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION,
Defendant-Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama ________________________
(September 2, 2020)
Before BRANCH, GRANT, and LUCK, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM: Case: 19-14085 Date Filed: 09/02/2020 Page: 2 of 6
Tammy Castleman appeals the district court’s order affirming the Social
Security Commissioner’s denial of a period of disability and disability insurance
benefits, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). She argues that the Administrative Law
Judge (ALJ) failed to properly determine the onset date of disability, pursuant to
Social Security Ruling 83-20. We affirm.
I.
To be eligible for disability insurance benefits, a claimant must demonstrate
a disability on or before the last date on which she was insured. 42 U.S.C.
§ 423(a)(1)(A); see Moore v. Barnhart, 405 F.3d 1208, 1211 (11th Cir. 2005).
Social Security regulations outline a five-step process that the ALJ must use to
determine whether a claimant is disabled: first, the ALJ considers the claimant’s
work activity; second, if the claimant is not engaged in substantial gainful activity,
the ALJ considers the medical severity of her impairments; third, if the claimant
has a severe impairment or combination of impairments of sufficient duration, the
ALJ must determine whether that impairment or combination of impairments
meets or equals one of the impairments listed in 20 C.F.R. § 404, Subpart P,
Appendix 1; fourth, if not, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant can
perform her past relevant work in light of her residual functional capacity; and
fifth, if the claimant cannot perform past relevant work, the ALJ must determine
whether she can perform other work found in the national economy commensurate
2 Case: 19-14085 Date Filed: 09/02/2020 Page: 3 of 6
with her age, education, and experience. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i)–(v); see
Winschel v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 631 F.3d 1176, 1178 (11th Cir. 2011). If, as the
ALJ found here, the claimant can perform past relevant work, then she is not
disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv).
Castleman applied for a period of disability and disability insurance benefits
on December 17, 2014, claiming that she became disabled on September 3, 2013.
She claimed that she suffered from type II diabetes, neuropathy, rheumatoid
arthritis, kidney dysfunction, back surgery, neck surgery, mental confusion,
memory loss, lack of sleep, and anemia. Her claims were denied at the initial level
and she requested a hearing before an ALJ, which was granted.
After the hearing, at which Castleman and a vocational expert testified, the
ALJ found that Castleman could perform her past relevant work as a bookkeeper
and accounting technician, and that she was not disabled between her alleged onset
date, September 3, 2013, and the date that she was last insured for disability
benefits, December 31, 2014. Castleman challenged the ALJ’s decision in the
district court, arguing that the ALJ failed to properly determine the onset date of
her disability pursuant to Social Security Ruling 83-20 and failed to accord proper
weight to the opinions of her treating physician, Dr. Joshi, and that the ALJ’s
finding that she could perform past work was not supported by substantial
3 Case: 19-14085 Date Filed: 09/02/2020 Page: 4 of 6
evidence. The district court affirmed the ALJ’s decision, and Castleman now
appeals.
II.
We review the district court’s judgment de novo. See Ingram v. Comm’r of
Soc. Sec., 496 F.3d 1253, 1260 (11th Cir. 2007). “We review the Commissioner’s
factual findings with deference and the Commissioner’s legal conclusions with
close scrutiny.” Doughty v. Apfel, 245 F.3d 1274, 1278 (11th Cir. 2001). We will
affirm if the Commissioner applied the correct legal standards and his decision is
supported by substantial evidence. See Wilson v. Barnhart, 284 F.3d 1219, 1221
(11th Cir. 2002). Where, as here, the Appeals Council denies review of an
unfavorable decision by the ALJ, we review the ALJ’s ruling as the final decision
of the Commissioner. Doughty, 245 F.3d at 1278.
Castleman’s sole argument on appeal is that Social Security Ruling 83-20
required the ALJ to consult a medical expert to determine the onset date of her
disability. 1 She argues that although Dr. Joshi did not explicitly provide an
opinion regarding the onset date, the logical inference from his opinions regarding
her work limitations was that she became disabled during the time that he provided
1 On appeal, Castleman does not contest the ALJ’s determination that she had the residual functional capacity to perform her past relevant work, and that she was not disabled during the relevant time period. She has therefore abandoned any argument on those issues. See Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian Ins. Co., 739 F.3d 678, 680, 681–82 (11th Cir. 2014); Timson v. Sampson, 518 F.3d 870, 874 (11th Cir. 2008). 4 Case: 19-14085 Date Filed: 09/02/2020 Page: 5 of 6
treatment, which period ended before the date that she was last insured. Castleman
contends that under SSR 83-20, the ALJ should have either given Dr. Joshi’s
opinions greater weight in determining the onset date or consulted another medical
expert.
Social Security Rulings are published under the Commissioner’s authority
and are binding on all components of the Administration. 20 C.F.R.
§ 402.35(b)(1); see Sullivan v. Zebley, 493 U.S. 521, 531 n.9 (1990) (citing 20
CFR § 422.408 (1989)). Social Security Ruling 83-20 is the policy statement in
effect at the time of the ALJ’s ruling here that describes the procedure for
determining the onset date of the claimant’s disability.2 It states that in “addition
to determining that an individual is disabled, the decision maker must also
establish the onset date of disability,” which it defines as “the first day an
individual is disabled as defined in the Act and the regulations.” SSR 83-20. The
rule explains that with “slowly progressive impairments, it is sometimes
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Case: 19-14085 Date Filed: 09/02/2020 Page: 1 of 6
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT ________________________
No. 19-14085 Non-Argument Calendar ________________________
D.C. Docket No. 4:18-cv-00498-RDP
TAMMY FAYE CASTLEMAN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
COMMISSIONER, SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION,
Defendant-Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama ________________________
(September 2, 2020)
Before BRANCH, GRANT, and LUCK, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM: Case: 19-14085 Date Filed: 09/02/2020 Page: 2 of 6
Tammy Castleman appeals the district court’s order affirming the Social
Security Commissioner’s denial of a period of disability and disability insurance
benefits, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). She argues that the Administrative Law
Judge (ALJ) failed to properly determine the onset date of disability, pursuant to
Social Security Ruling 83-20. We affirm.
I.
To be eligible for disability insurance benefits, a claimant must demonstrate
a disability on or before the last date on which she was insured. 42 U.S.C.
§ 423(a)(1)(A); see Moore v. Barnhart, 405 F.3d 1208, 1211 (11th Cir. 2005).
Social Security regulations outline a five-step process that the ALJ must use to
determine whether a claimant is disabled: first, the ALJ considers the claimant’s
work activity; second, if the claimant is not engaged in substantial gainful activity,
the ALJ considers the medical severity of her impairments; third, if the claimant
has a severe impairment or combination of impairments of sufficient duration, the
ALJ must determine whether that impairment or combination of impairments
meets or equals one of the impairments listed in 20 C.F.R. § 404, Subpart P,
Appendix 1; fourth, if not, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant can
perform her past relevant work in light of her residual functional capacity; and
fifth, if the claimant cannot perform past relevant work, the ALJ must determine
whether she can perform other work found in the national economy commensurate
2 Case: 19-14085 Date Filed: 09/02/2020 Page: 3 of 6
with her age, education, and experience. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i)–(v); see
Winschel v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 631 F.3d 1176, 1178 (11th Cir. 2011). If, as the
ALJ found here, the claimant can perform past relevant work, then she is not
disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv).
Castleman applied for a period of disability and disability insurance benefits
on December 17, 2014, claiming that she became disabled on September 3, 2013.
She claimed that she suffered from type II diabetes, neuropathy, rheumatoid
arthritis, kidney dysfunction, back surgery, neck surgery, mental confusion,
memory loss, lack of sleep, and anemia. Her claims were denied at the initial level
and she requested a hearing before an ALJ, which was granted.
After the hearing, at which Castleman and a vocational expert testified, the
ALJ found that Castleman could perform her past relevant work as a bookkeeper
and accounting technician, and that she was not disabled between her alleged onset
date, September 3, 2013, and the date that she was last insured for disability
benefits, December 31, 2014. Castleman challenged the ALJ’s decision in the
district court, arguing that the ALJ failed to properly determine the onset date of
her disability pursuant to Social Security Ruling 83-20 and failed to accord proper
weight to the opinions of her treating physician, Dr. Joshi, and that the ALJ’s
finding that she could perform past work was not supported by substantial
3 Case: 19-14085 Date Filed: 09/02/2020 Page: 4 of 6
evidence. The district court affirmed the ALJ’s decision, and Castleman now
appeals.
II.
We review the district court’s judgment de novo. See Ingram v. Comm’r of
Soc. Sec., 496 F.3d 1253, 1260 (11th Cir. 2007). “We review the Commissioner’s
factual findings with deference and the Commissioner’s legal conclusions with
close scrutiny.” Doughty v. Apfel, 245 F.3d 1274, 1278 (11th Cir. 2001). We will
affirm if the Commissioner applied the correct legal standards and his decision is
supported by substantial evidence. See Wilson v. Barnhart, 284 F.3d 1219, 1221
(11th Cir. 2002). Where, as here, the Appeals Council denies review of an
unfavorable decision by the ALJ, we review the ALJ’s ruling as the final decision
of the Commissioner. Doughty, 245 F.3d at 1278.
Castleman’s sole argument on appeal is that Social Security Ruling 83-20
required the ALJ to consult a medical expert to determine the onset date of her
disability. 1 She argues that although Dr. Joshi did not explicitly provide an
opinion regarding the onset date, the logical inference from his opinions regarding
her work limitations was that she became disabled during the time that he provided
1 On appeal, Castleman does not contest the ALJ’s determination that she had the residual functional capacity to perform her past relevant work, and that she was not disabled during the relevant time period. She has therefore abandoned any argument on those issues. See Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian Ins. Co., 739 F.3d 678, 680, 681–82 (11th Cir. 2014); Timson v. Sampson, 518 F.3d 870, 874 (11th Cir. 2008). 4 Case: 19-14085 Date Filed: 09/02/2020 Page: 5 of 6
treatment, which period ended before the date that she was last insured. Castleman
contends that under SSR 83-20, the ALJ should have either given Dr. Joshi’s
opinions greater weight in determining the onset date or consulted another medical
expert.
Social Security Rulings are published under the Commissioner’s authority
and are binding on all components of the Administration. 20 C.F.R.
§ 402.35(b)(1); see Sullivan v. Zebley, 493 U.S. 521, 531 n.9 (1990) (citing 20
CFR § 422.408 (1989)). Social Security Ruling 83-20 is the policy statement in
effect at the time of the ALJ’s ruling here that describes the procedure for
determining the onset date of the claimant’s disability.2 It states that in “addition
to determining that an individual is disabled, the decision maker must also
establish the onset date of disability,” which it defines as “the first day an
individual is disabled as defined in the Act and the regulations.” SSR 83-20. The
rule explains that with “slowly progressive impairments, it is sometimes
impossible to obtain medical evidence establishing the precise date an impairment
became disabling.” Id. In such cases—“when, for example, the alleged onset and
the date last worked are far in the past and adequate medical records are not
2 Social Security Ruling 18-01p rescinded and replaced the relevant parts of SSR 83-20 as of October 2, 2018. SSR 18-01p. Social Security Ruling 18-01p does not apply retroactively, however, so we limit our consideration to the ALJ’s application of SSR 83-20. See SSR 18- 01p(III). 5 Case: 19-14085 Date Filed: 09/02/2020 Page: 6 of 6
available,” it will be necessary for the ALJ “to infer the onset date from the
medical and other evidence that describe the history and symptomatology of the
disease process.” Id. The Ruling instructs that the ALJ “should call on the
services of a medical advisor when onset must be inferred.” Id.
The district court correctly determined that the Commissioner’s decision
here did not contravene SSR 83-20, because (1) the record before the ALJ
contained adequate unambiguous medical evidence from which to determine
whether Castleman was disabled, and (2) based on that evidence, the ALJ
determined that Castleman was not disabled between her alleged onset date and the
date that she was last insured. The plain language of the Ruling indicates that it
applies when the claimant has shown that she is disabled, or that she was disabled
for some period of time before her “last insured” date, but the medical evidence
does not clearly indicate when her disability began. Because sufficient available
medical evidence supports the ALJ’s determination that Castleman was not
disabled at any time between her claimed onset date and the date that she was last
insured, SSR 83-20 does not apply. See, e.g., Eichstadt v. Astrue, 534 F.3d 663,
667 (7th Cir. 2008) (concluding that SSR 83-20 did not apply because “[w]ith no
finding of disability, there was no need to determine an onset date”); Key v.
Callahan, 109 F.3d 270, 274 (6th Cir. 1997) (similar). Accordingly, we affirm.
AFFIRMED.