Case: 18-10654 Date Filed: 11/01/2019 Page: 1 of 7
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT ________________________
No. 18-10654 ________________________
D.C. Docket No. 2:17-cv-00087-MRM
TAMMIE CHRISTMAS,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
versus
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant - Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida ________________________
(November 1, 2019) Case: 18-10654 Date Filed: 11/01/2019 Page: 2 of 7
Before MARCUS, JULIE CARNES, and KELLY,* Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Tammie Christmas appeals the district court’s decision 1 to affirm the denial
of Disability Insurance Benefits (DIB) and Supplemental Security Income (SSI) by
the Commissioner of Social Security (the Commissioner). Christmas v. Comm’r
of Soc. Sec., No: 2:17–cv–87–FtM–MRM, 2018 WL 564548 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 26,
2018). Our jurisdiction arises under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), and
we affirm.
Background
Ms. Christmas applied for DIB and SSI in October 2011. She suffers from
diabetes mellitus, diabetic neuropathy, alopecia, obesity, anxiety, and depression.
Aplt. Br. at 3. Her application was denied as an initial matter and denied again
upon motion for reconsideration. After a hearing by an ALJ, her application was
again denied on the grounds that she was not disabled within the meaning of the
Social Security Act. She appealed to the Appeals Council, which remanded the
claim to the same ALJ for a new hearing.
* The Honorable Paul J. Kelly, Jr., United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, sitting by designation. 1 A magistrate judge adjudicated the case by consent. 2 Case: 18-10654 Date Filed: 11/01/2019 Page: 3 of 7
The ALJ held the new hearing on September 8, 2015 and again denied her
application. Ms. Christmas again appealed to the Appeals Council, but was denied
review. The district court affirmed and this appeal followed. On appeal, Ms.
Christmas argues that substantial evidence and the applicable regulations do not
support the ALJ’s finding that she can perform a range of light work, the ALJ’s
credibility assessment, the vocational expert’s testimony, or the ALJ’s denial of
Ms. Christmas’s application.
Standard of Review
The ALJ’s decision is reviewed as the Commissioner’s final decision when
the ALJ denies benefits and the Appeals Council denies review. Doughty v. Apfel,
245 F.3d 1274, 1278 (11th Cir. 2001). We engage in a “limited review” of the
ALJ’s decision; we assess only whether it was supported by substantial evidence
and whether the correct legal standard was applied. Moore v. Barnhart, 405 F.3d
1208, 1211 (11th Cir. 2005). Substantial evidence is less than a preponderance; it
is evidence sufficient for a reasonable person to accept as adequate to support a
conclusion. Id.; Crawford v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 363 F.3d 1155, 1158–59 (11th
Cir. 2004). We do not decide the facts anew, make credibility determinations, or
re-weigh the evidence that the ALJ reviewed. Moore, 405 F.3d at 1211. Neither
may we disturb a clearly-articulated credibility finding supported by substantial
evidence. Mitchell v. Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin, 771 F.3d 780, 782 (11th Cir. 3 Case: 18-10654 Date Filed: 11/01/2019 Page: 4 of 7
2014). Our standard of review is the same as the district court’s, so we owe no
deference to its decision. See Miles v. Chater, 84 F.3d 1397, 1400 (11th Cir.
1996).
Discussion
Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s finding that Ms. Christmas can
perform a limited type of light work available in significant numbers in the
national economy and his assessment that her subjective complaints were not
credible. Further, there were no apparent conflicts, see Washington v. Comm’r of
Soc. Sec., 906 F.3d 1353 (11th Cir. 2018) (interpreting Social Security Ruling 00-
4p), between the testimony of the vocational expert (VE) and the Dictionary of
Occupational Titles (DOT).
Substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s finding that Ms. Christmas can
perform a limited range of light work. The ALJ’s decision discussed in detail the
reports of doctors who treated Ms. Christmas for her medical conditions, as well as
reports from hospitals to which Ms. Christmas was admitted. 1 R. 50–61. He
assessed the content of these reports and compared them to Ms. Christmas’s
testimony and the testimony of a vocational expert. Id.
At the September 8, 2015 hearing, the ALJ weighed evidence of the specific
physical and mental traits that Ms. Christmas alleged limited her ability to work to
4 Case: 18-10654 Date Filed: 11/01/2019 Page: 5 of 7
find that she could perform a limited range of light work. See id. at 13–39. The
ALJ specifically asked the VE about the type of work that a hypothetical person
with Ms. Christmas’s exact physical and mental constraints could perform,
including the limited use of her dominant extremity. Id. at 27–29. The VE
confirmed that a significant number of jobs are available in the national economy
that are within the range of light work that such a person could perform. Id. at 28–
33. This evidence supporting the ALJ’s decision is substantial and so we do not
disturb the decision.
The ALJ assessed Ms. Christmas’s credibility as a witness, articulated his
reasons for finding it wanting, and did not engage in a “sit and squirm” analysis.
In giving limited weight to Ms. Christmas’s testimony, the ALJ noted several
instances in which it conflicted with the reports of her doctors or with her previous
testimony. See id. at 51, 58–59. The ALJ also compared her statements with the
reports of her doctors, specifically noting that they did not corroborate Ms.
Christmas’s statements regarding the “intensity, persistence and limiting effects of
these symptoms.” Id. at 51. We are unpersuaded that the framing of questions
eliciting her testimony or caveats Ms. Christmas included render her statements
consistent. Although the ALJ noted Ms. Christmas’s demeanor at the hearing, his
credibility determination was clearly supported by evidence in the record, like her
spoken testimony and the conflicts with the reports of her doctors. Id. at 60.
5 Case: 18-10654 Date Filed: 11/01/2019 Page: 6 of 7
Under our standard of review, we cannot disturb a clearly-articulated credibility
finding supported by substantial evidence. See Mitchell, 771 F.3d at 782.
At the hearing on September 8, 2015, there were no apparent conflicts
between the VE’s testimony and the DOT. In Washington, we held that an ALJ
must identify and resolve any “apparent conflict,” i.e., a discrepancy that arises by
a reasonable comparison of the DOT’s description of an occupation and the VE’s
testimony. Washington, 906 F.3d at 1362, 1365.
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Case: 18-10654 Date Filed: 11/01/2019 Page: 1 of 7
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT ________________________
No. 18-10654 ________________________
D.C. Docket No. 2:17-cv-00087-MRM
TAMMIE CHRISTMAS,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
versus
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant - Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida ________________________
(November 1, 2019) Case: 18-10654 Date Filed: 11/01/2019 Page: 2 of 7
Before MARCUS, JULIE CARNES, and KELLY,* Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Tammie Christmas appeals the district court’s decision 1 to affirm the denial
of Disability Insurance Benefits (DIB) and Supplemental Security Income (SSI) by
the Commissioner of Social Security (the Commissioner). Christmas v. Comm’r
of Soc. Sec., No: 2:17–cv–87–FtM–MRM, 2018 WL 564548 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 26,
2018). Our jurisdiction arises under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), and
we affirm.
Background
Ms. Christmas applied for DIB and SSI in October 2011. She suffers from
diabetes mellitus, diabetic neuropathy, alopecia, obesity, anxiety, and depression.
Aplt. Br. at 3. Her application was denied as an initial matter and denied again
upon motion for reconsideration. After a hearing by an ALJ, her application was
again denied on the grounds that she was not disabled within the meaning of the
Social Security Act. She appealed to the Appeals Council, which remanded the
claim to the same ALJ for a new hearing.
* The Honorable Paul J. Kelly, Jr., United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, sitting by designation. 1 A magistrate judge adjudicated the case by consent. 2 Case: 18-10654 Date Filed: 11/01/2019 Page: 3 of 7
The ALJ held the new hearing on September 8, 2015 and again denied her
application. Ms. Christmas again appealed to the Appeals Council, but was denied
review. The district court affirmed and this appeal followed. On appeal, Ms.
Christmas argues that substantial evidence and the applicable regulations do not
support the ALJ’s finding that she can perform a range of light work, the ALJ’s
credibility assessment, the vocational expert’s testimony, or the ALJ’s denial of
Ms. Christmas’s application.
Standard of Review
The ALJ’s decision is reviewed as the Commissioner’s final decision when
the ALJ denies benefits and the Appeals Council denies review. Doughty v. Apfel,
245 F.3d 1274, 1278 (11th Cir. 2001). We engage in a “limited review” of the
ALJ’s decision; we assess only whether it was supported by substantial evidence
and whether the correct legal standard was applied. Moore v. Barnhart, 405 F.3d
1208, 1211 (11th Cir. 2005). Substantial evidence is less than a preponderance; it
is evidence sufficient for a reasonable person to accept as adequate to support a
conclusion. Id.; Crawford v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 363 F.3d 1155, 1158–59 (11th
Cir. 2004). We do not decide the facts anew, make credibility determinations, or
re-weigh the evidence that the ALJ reviewed. Moore, 405 F.3d at 1211. Neither
may we disturb a clearly-articulated credibility finding supported by substantial
evidence. Mitchell v. Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin, 771 F.3d 780, 782 (11th Cir. 3 Case: 18-10654 Date Filed: 11/01/2019 Page: 4 of 7
2014). Our standard of review is the same as the district court’s, so we owe no
deference to its decision. See Miles v. Chater, 84 F.3d 1397, 1400 (11th Cir.
1996).
Discussion
Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s finding that Ms. Christmas can
perform a limited type of light work available in significant numbers in the
national economy and his assessment that her subjective complaints were not
credible. Further, there were no apparent conflicts, see Washington v. Comm’r of
Soc. Sec., 906 F.3d 1353 (11th Cir. 2018) (interpreting Social Security Ruling 00-
4p), between the testimony of the vocational expert (VE) and the Dictionary of
Occupational Titles (DOT).
Substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s finding that Ms. Christmas can
perform a limited range of light work. The ALJ’s decision discussed in detail the
reports of doctors who treated Ms. Christmas for her medical conditions, as well as
reports from hospitals to which Ms. Christmas was admitted. 1 R. 50–61. He
assessed the content of these reports and compared them to Ms. Christmas’s
testimony and the testimony of a vocational expert. Id.
At the September 8, 2015 hearing, the ALJ weighed evidence of the specific
physical and mental traits that Ms. Christmas alleged limited her ability to work to
4 Case: 18-10654 Date Filed: 11/01/2019 Page: 5 of 7
find that she could perform a limited range of light work. See id. at 13–39. The
ALJ specifically asked the VE about the type of work that a hypothetical person
with Ms. Christmas’s exact physical and mental constraints could perform,
including the limited use of her dominant extremity. Id. at 27–29. The VE
confirmed that a significant number of jobs are available in the national economy
that are within the range of light work that such a person could perform. Id. at 28–
33. This evidence supporting the ALJ’s decision is substantial and so we do not
disturb the decision.
The ALJ assessed Ms. Christmas’s credibility as a witness, articulated his
reasons for finding it wanting, and did not engage in a “sit and squirm” analysis.
In giving limited weight to Ms. Christmas’s testimony, the ALJ noted several
instances in which it conflicted with the reports of her doctors or with her previous
testimony. See id. at 51, 58–59. The ALJ also compared her statements with the
reports of her doctors, specifically noting that they did not corroborate Ms.
Christmas’s statements regarding the “intensity, persistence and limiting effects of
these symptoms.” Id. at 51. We are unpersuaded that the framing of questions
eliciting her testimony or caveats Ms. Christmas included render her statements
consistent. Although the ALJ noted Ms. Christmas’s demeanor at the hearing, his
credibility determination was clearly supported by evidence in the record, like her
spoken testimony and the conflicts with the reports of her doctors. Id. at 60.
5 Case: 18-10654 Date Filed: 11/01/2019 Page: 6 of 7
Under our standard of review, we cannot disturb a clearly-articulated credibility
finding supported by substantial evidence. See Mitchell, 771 F.3d at 782.
At the hearing on September 8, 2015, there were no apparent conflicts
between the VE’s testimony and the DOT. In Washington, we held that an ALJ
must identify and resolve any “apparent conflict,” i.e., a discrepancy that arises by
a reasonable comparison of the DOT’s description of an occupation and the VE’s
testimony. Washington, 906 F.3d at 1362, 1365. Here, the VE acknowledged Ms.
Christmas’s limitations and testified that despite those limitations, she could
perform a fruit distributor job. Ms. Christmas argues this gave rise to two apparent
conflicts with the DOT. Both Ms. Christmas’s arguments fail.
First, Ms. Christmas notes that the VE acknowledged she could not
frequently communicate with others and argues this conflicts with the DOT, which
describes the job as requiring such communication. Aplt. Br. at 28. However, the
DOT does not discuss communication requirements for this role. See Fruit
Distributor, Dictionary of Occupational Titles § 921.685-046, 1991 WL 688088.
Therefore, this testimony did not present an apparent conflict that the ALJ had to
resolve.
Second, Ms. Christmas notes that the VE acknowledged she cannot work in
fast-paced assembly line jobs and argues this conflicts with the DOT description,
6 Case: 18-10654 Date Filed: 11/01/2019 Page: 7 of 7
which suggests that a fruit distributor is a fast-paced assembly line job. Aplt. Br. at
28–29. However, the DOT does not discuss the pace of a fruit distributor job or
the quantity of fruit that a distributor must or should handle. See Fruit Distributor,
Dictionary of Occupational Titles § 921.685-046, 1991 WL 688088. Washington
does not require the ALJ to draw inferences about job requirements that are
unsupported by the DOT’s text and then resolve conflicts between the VE’s
testimony and those unsupported inferences. See Washington, 906 F.3d at 1358
(describing the “sharp contrast” between the VE’s testimony and text of the DOT
description). Here, there was no apparent conflict for the ALJ to resolve.
AFFIRMED.