TAMKO Building Products, LLC v. Mike Patterson and Lisa Patterson

• Court: Supreme Court of Alabama
• Decided: April 24, 2026
• Docket: SC-2025-0571
• Status: Published

Opinion

Rel: April 24, 2026

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.

SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA OCTOBER TERM, 2025-2026

_________________________

SC-2025-0571 _________________________

TAMKO Building Products, LLC

v.

Mike Patterson and Lisa Patterson

Appeal from Baldwin Circuit Court (CV-25-900384)

PARKER, Justice.

TAMKO Building Products, LLC, appeals from an order denying its

motion to compel arbitration. Because the arbitration clause at issue

clearly and unmistakably delegated the question of arbitrability to an SC-2025-0571

arbitrator, we reverse that order and remand the case with instructions

to grant the motion to compel arbitration.

I.

TAMKO sold roofing shingles to the original owner of a house

located in Baldwin County. A warranty included with the sale of the

shingles contained an arbitration clause, in all capital letters, broadly

covering all claims related either to the roofing shingles or to the

warranty itself:

"MANDATORY BINDING ARBITRATION: EVERY CLAIM OR CONTROVERSY BETWEEN YOU AND TAMKO AND/OR ITS EMPLOYEES AND AGENTS, ARISING FROM OR RELATING TO THE SHINGLES AND/OR THIS LIMITED WARRANTY SHALL BE RESOLVED BY FINAL AND BINDING ARBITRATION."

The warranty was transferrable to a subsequent purchaser of the house

within five years of the original purchase, subject to compliance with

certain transferability requirements. For example, the original owner

was responsible for providing TAMKO written notice within 30 days of

the transfer.

Mike and Lisa Patterson eventually purchased the house and came

to believe that the shingles were defective. They filed a warranty claim

with TAMKO, but TAMKO denied that claim because it had no record of 2 SC-2025-0571

the warranty being transferred. Dissatisfied, the Pattersons sued

TAMKO in the circuit court, asserting multiple claims based on their

allegation that the roofing shingles were defective.

TAMKO moved to dismiss the Pattersons' case and to compel

arbitration. In support, TAMKO relied on the arbitration clause in the

warranty that had accompanied the sale of the shingles. Specifically,

TAMKO cited the clause’s broad language, in all capital letters, requiring

even questions related to its "applicability" to be submitted to arbitration:

"THE ARBITRATOR SHALL HAVE EXCLUSIVE AUTHORITY TO

RESOLVE ANY DISPUTE RELATING TO THE INTERPRETATION,

APPLICABILITY, ENFORCEABILITY, OR FORMATION OF THIS

AGREEMENT …."

In opposition, the Pattersons asserted that they neither signed the

warranty nor accepted or received any benefits from the warranty. And

those arguments proved persuasive before the circuit court. That court

denied TAMKO's motion to compel arbitration and prepared to proceed

with trial preparation.

3 SC-2025-0571

Pursuant to our appellate rule conferring a right to appeal such an

order, see Ala. R. App. P. 4(d), TAMKO timely noticed its appeal to this

Court.

II.

On appeal, TAMKO reiterates its arguments from below that the

issue of arbitrability is itself subject to arbitration. The Pattersons, on

the other hand, assert that the existence of a valid arbitration clause is a

gateway issue that a trial court must decide.

Recently, this Court decided this very issue: We held that, "[w]hen

a contract contains an arbitration provision delegating threshold

questions of arbitrability to an arbitrator," the arbitrator decides the

issue of arbitrability, including the arbitrability of claims involving a

nonsignatory. Ex parte Smith, [Ms. SC-2025-0231, Mar. 6, 2026] ___ So.

3d ___, ___ (Ala. 2026). As we unanimously concluded, this proposition

flows necessarily from a long line of this Court's prior precedents.1 And

those precedents, in turn, flow logically from a commonsense proposition:

1See Wiggins v. Warren Averett, LLC, 307 So. 3d 519 (Ala. 2020);

Carroll v. Castellanos, 281 So. 3d 365 (Ala. 2019); Rainbow Cinemas, LLC v. Consolidated Constr. Co. of Alabama, 239 So. 3d 569 (Ala. 2017); Federal Ins. Co. v. Reedstrom, 197 So. 3d 971 (Ala. 2015); Anderton v. The Practice-Monroe., P.C., 164 So. 3d 1094 (Ala. 2014). 4 SC-2025-0571

Someone claiming the benefits of a contract (here, the roofing-shingles

sales contract) must also accept and bear the burdens of that contract.

See generally Southern Energy Homes, Inc. v. Ard, 772 So. 2d 1131, 1134-

35 (Ala. 2000).

The arbitration clause at issue here, clearly subjecting questions of

the clause's "applicability" to arbitration, is materially indistinguishable

from the arbitration clauses enforced in our precedents. We are

unpersuaded, moreover, that any plausible limits to this rule would apply

in this case. For example, the Pattersons suggest that their claims arise

independently of the warranty. But even if they are right about that (a

question we do not decide), their claims certainly do not arise

independently of the arbitration clause, which applies not only to

disputes about the warranty but also to "EVERY CLAIM OR

CONTROVERSY … ARISING FROM OR RELATING TO THE

SHINGLES."

III.

Because the arbitration clause at issue delegates to the arbitrator

the authority to determine the applicability of the arbitration clause, the

issue whether the Pattersons' claims are arbitrable must be decided in

5 SC-2025-0571

arbitration. In accordance with Ex parte Smith and the precedents cited

in Ex parte Smith, we reverse the circuit court's order denying the motion

to compel arbitration and remand the case with instructions to the circuit

court to enter an order granting TAMKO's motion to compel.

REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.

Stewart, C.J., and Wise, Sellers, and Mendheim, JJ., concur.

Cook, J., recuses himself.