Tamisha Lewis-Junge v. Hiland Mountain Correctional Center; Office of Children Services; and Anchorage School District, et. al

• Court: District Court, D. Alaska
• Decided: February 20, 2026
• Docket: 3:25-cv-00201
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF ALASKA

TAMISHA LEWIS-JUNGE, Plaintiff, Case Nos. 3:25-cv-00201 RRB v. 3:25-cv-00202 RRB HILAND MOUNTAIN 3:25-cv-00210 RRB CORRECTIONAL CENTER; OFFICE OF CHILDREN SERVICES; and ANCHORAGE SCHOOL DISTRICT, et. al, Defendants.

ORDER OF DISMISSAL On December 5, 2025, the Court screened sixty-three cases filed by self- represented prisoner Tamisha Lewis-Junge (“Plaintiff”). The Court found all sixty- three cases deficient, but granted Plaintiff leave to file either a First Amended

Complaint or a Notice of Voluntary Dismissal in each of the three above-captioned cases.1 The Court warned Plaintiff that failure to file such a document with the Court within 60 days of the Court’s Screening Order would result in dismissal of these cases without further notice to Plaintiff.2 To date, Plaintiff has not responded.

1 See Docket 6 in each of the three cases. 2 Id. at 30. DISCUSSION Rule 41(b) of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permits dismissal due to a

plaintiff’s failure to prosecute or comply with a court order. In deciding whether to dismiss on this basis, a district court considers five factors: “(1) the public’s interest in expeditious resolution of litigation; (2) the court’s need to manage its docket; (3) the risk of prejudice to the defendants; (4) the public policy favoring disposition of cases on their merits; and (5) the availability of less drastic sanctions.”3

Here, the first two factors—the public’s interest in expeditious resolution of litigation and the Court's need to manage its docket—weigh in favor of dismissal.4 Plaintiff’s failure to respond within the specified timeline suggests Plaintiff does not intend to litigate this action diligently.5 Further, a presumption of prejudice to a defendant arises when the plaintiff unreasonably delays prosecution of an action.6 Because Plaintiff has not offered any justifiable reason for failing to meet the

Court’s deadline, the third factor also favors dismissal.7 The fourth factor usually

3 Hernandez v. City of El Monte, 138 F.3d 393, 399 (quoting Henderson v. Duncan, 779 F.2d 1421, 1423 (9th Cir. 1986). 4 Pagtalunan v. Galaza, 291 F.3d 639, 642 (9th Cir. 2002) (“It is incumbent upon the Court to manage its docket without being subject to routine noncompliance of litigants.”). 5 Morris v. Morgan Stanley & Co., 942 F.2d 648, 652 (9th Cir. 1991) (noting that a plaintiff has the burden to move toward disposition at a reasonable pace and to refrain from dilatory and evasive tactics). 6 Anderson v. Air West, 542 F.2d 522, 524 (9th Cir. 1976). 7 See, e.g., Hernandez, 138 F.3d at 401 (reiterating that the burden of production shifts to the defendant to show at least some actual prejudice only after the plaintiff has given a non-frivolous excuse for delay). weighs against dismissal because public policy favors disposition on the merits.8 “At the same time, a case that is stalled or unreasonably delayed by a party’s

failure to comply with deadlines ... cannot move forward toward resolution on the merits.”9 The fifth factor is comprised of three subparts, which include “whether the court has considered lesser sanctions, whether it tried them, and whether it warned the [uncooperative] party about the possibility of case-dispositive sanctions.”10 The Court’s Order at Docket 6 accorded Plaintiff an opportunity to file a First Amended

Complaint and warned her of the potential dismissal of this action in the event of noncompliance.11 Based on the foregoing, these cases must be dismissed for failure to prosecute. The dismissal shall be without prejudice so as to preserve Plaintiff’s ability to seek relief.12 The Court finds no other lesser sanction to be satisfactory or effective in these cases.13

8 Pagtalunan, 291 F.3d at 643. 9 In re Phenylpropanolamine Prod. Liab. Litig., 460 F.3d 1217, 1228 (9th Cir. 2006). 10 Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. New Images of Beverly Hills, 482 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2007) (internal citation omitted). 11 Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1262 (9th Cir. 1992) (“A district court’s warning to a party that his failure to obey the court’s order will result in dismissal can satisfy the consideration of alternatives requirement.”) (citation and quotations omitted). 12 Id. 13 See, e.g., Henderson v. Duncan, 779 F.2d 1421, 1424 (9th Cir. 1986) (noting that a district court need not exhaust every sanction short of dismissal before finally dismissing a case but must explore possible and meaningful alternatives) (internal citation omitted). IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED: 1. The above-captioned cases are DISMISSED without prejudice.

2. Any pending motions are DENIED as moot. 3. The Clerk of Court shall issue a final judgment and close this case. DATED this 20th day of February, at Anchorage, Alaska. /s/ Ralph R. Beistline RALPH R. BEISTLINE Senior United States District Judge