Tamika F. Bailey v. SSA Commissioner

• Court: District Court, N.D. California
• Decided: June 23, 2026
• Docket: 5:25-cv-04940
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 4 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 5 SAN JOSE DIVISION 6 7 TAMIKA F. BAILEY, Case No. 25-cv-04940-BLF

8 Plaintiff, v. ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S 9 MOTION FOR SUMMARY SSA COMMISSIONER, JUDGMENT AND AFFIRMING THE 10 DENIAL OF BENEFITS Defendant. 11

12 13 14 Plaintiff Tamika Bailey (“Bailey”) appeals a final decision of Defendant Commissioner of 15 Social Security (the “Commissioner”) denying her application for Supplemental Security Income 16 (“SSI”) under Title XVI of the Social Security Act. Bailey asks the Court to reverse the 17 Commissioner’s decision and remand for payment of benefits or, alternatively, to remand for further 18 administrative proceedings. The motion has been fully briefed, and the matter has been submitted 19 without oral argument, pursuant to Civil Local Rule 16-5. 20 For the reasons discussed below, the Court DENIES Bailey’s motion, AFFIRMING the 21 denial of benefits. 22 I. BACKGROUND 23 Bailey was born on December 15, 1969. Administrative Record (“AR”) 133, ECF 8. Bailey 24 has some high school education through grade 11, AR 428, is able to communicate in English, and 25 has no past relevant work, AR 29. On June 17, 2021, Bailey filed an application under both Title II, 26 for period of disability and disability insurance benefits, as well as under Title XVI for SSI, each 27 with an onset date of September 22, 2009. Later, and upon confirming to the ALJ that she understood 1 the implications of her actions, Bailey amended her alleged onset date to the application date, June 2 17, 2021, and withdrew her Title II application entirely. AR 18. 3 Bailey claims disability due to several impairments, which the ALJ determined were 4 “severe.” AR 21.1 These severe impairments consist of: degenerative joint disease of the knees, 5 degenerative disc disease of the lumbar and cervical spine, obesity, right eye vision loss, bipolar 6 disorder, generalized anxiety disorder, and post-traumatic stress disorder. AR 21-22, 25, 426-36.2 7 In the application, Bailey submitted two personal function reports, which provided her 8 account of her limitations. AR 468-79, 584-92. Her spouse, who is considered a “lay witness” for 9 these purposes, submitted her own function report testimony, consisting of her own assessment of 10 Bailey’s conditions. AR 480-88, 575-83. In addition to reviewing the function reports, the ALJ also 11 held a hearing on December 5, 2023, during which both Bailey and a vocational expert testified. AR 12 42-70. Other pertinent evidence in Bailey’s application consisted of vast medical records and 13 opinions. 14 The ALJ undertook the required analysis of Bailey’s presented conditions and evidence to 15 determine whether Bailey was disabled, described in further detail below. As a result of this analysis, 16 the ALJ found Bailey was not disabled and denied her benefits on that basis. AR 15-31. The Appeals 17 Council affirmed the ALJ’s decision on April 22, 2025, making it the final decision of the 18 Commissioner. AR 1-7. 19 II. LEGAL STANDARD 20 A. Standard of Review 21 Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), district courts “have power to enter, upon the pleadings and 22 transcript of the record, a judgment affirming, modifying, or reversing the decision of the 23 Commissioner of Social Security, with or without remanding the cause for a rehearing.” 42 USC 24 1 Regardless of the severity determination, the ALJ considered all the medically determinable 25 impairments when assessing Bailey’s ability to work. AR 22. In contrast, the ALJ did not consider conditions present only prior to the onset date. AR 22. 26

2 Bailey additionally claims impairments of gastro esophageal reflux disease, leukocytosis, 27 osteoarthritis, anxiety, eczema, lumbago, sleep apnea, hyperthyroidism, and anemia, among other 1 § 405(g). However, “a federal court’s review of Social Security determinations is quite 2 limited.” Brown-Hunter v. Colvin, 806 F.3d 487, 492 (9th Cir. 2015). Federal courts “leave it to the 3 ALJ to determine credibility, resolve conflicts in the testimony, and resolve ambiguities in the 4 record.” Id. (quoting Treichler v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 775 F.3d 1090, 1098 (9th Cir. 2014)). 5 A court “will disturb the Commissioner’s decision to deny benefits only if it is not supported 6 by substantial evidence or is based on legal error.” Brown-Hunter, 806 F.3d at 492 (internal 7 quotation marks and citation omitted). “Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a 8 reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, and must be more than a mere 9 scintilla, but may be less than a preponderance.” Rounds v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 807 F.3d 10 996, 1002 (9th Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). A court “must consider 11 the evidence as a whole, weighing both the evidence that supports and the evidence that detracts 12 from the Commissioner's conclusion.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). If the 13 evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, the ALJ’s findings must be upheld 14 if supported by reasonable inferences drawn from the record. See id. 15 Finally, even when the ALJ commits legal error, the ALJ’s decision will be upheld so long 16 as the error is harmless. See Brown-Hunter, 806 F.3d at 492. However, “[a] reviewing court may 17 not make independent findings based on the evidence before the ALJ to conclude that the ALJ's 18 error was harmless.” Id. The court is “constrained to review the reasons the ALJ 19 asserts.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 20 B. Standard For Determining Disability 21 A claimant is considered “disabled” under the Act if she meets two requirements. See 42 22 U.S.C. § 423(d); Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1098 (9th Cir. 1999). First, the claimant must 23 demonstrate “an inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically 24 determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has 25 lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. § 26 423(d)(1)(A). Second, the impairment or impairments must be severe enough she is unable to do 27 her previous work and cannot, based on her age, education, and work experience, “engage in any 1 To determine whether a claimant is disabled, an ALJ is required to employ a five-step 2 sequential analysis, examining: (1) whether the claimant is engaging in “substantial gainful 3 activity”; (2) whether the claimant has a “severe medically determinable physical or mental 4 impairment or combination of impairments that has lasted for more than 12 months”; (3) whether 5 the impairment “meets or equals” one of the listings in the regulations; (4) whether, given the 6 claimant’s residual functional capacity (“RFC”), she can still do her “past relevant work”; and (5) 7 whether the claimant “can make an adjustment to other work.” Ghanim v. Colvin, 763 F.3d 1154, 8 1160 (9th Cir. 2014); see 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4) (setting the evaluation standard required for 9 review of Title XVI SSI claims). The RFC referenced at step four is what a claimant can still do 10 despite her limitations. Id. at 1160 n.5. “The burden of proof is on the claimant at steps one through 11 four, but shifts to the Commissioner at step five.” Bray v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 554 F.3d 12 1219, 1222 (9th Cir. 2009). 13 III. DISCUSSION 14 Below, the Court summarizes the ALJ’s decision denying benefits. The Court then 15 summarizes Bailey’s challenges to the ALJ’s decision and the Commissioner’s response thereto. 16 A. ALJ’s Decision 17 At step one, the ALJ determined that Bailey did not engage in substantial gainful activity 18 during the period since her revised alleged onset date of June 17, 2021. AR 21. At step two, the ALJ 19 found many of Bailey’s impairments were severe. AR 21-22. At step three, the ALJ determined that 20 Bailey did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or medically equals 21 the severity of one of the impairments listed in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1, to be 22 considered disabled, so the ALJ proceeded to the next stage of the analysis. AR 22-24. 23 At the next stage, the ALJ considered Bailey’s RFC under 20 CFR 416.920(e). Upon 24 considering the effect of Bailey’s impairments, the ALJ determined that Bailey had some residual 25 functional capacity, which might enable her to do basic work activities. AR 24-29. The ‘basic work 26 activities’ would have to take into account the limitations the ALJ found, including, inter alia, not 27 operating dangerous machinery or commercial vehicles; only carrying out simple instructions and 1 accounting for other physical constraints, such as not climbing ladders, only occasionally stooping, 2 and not engaging in work where objects rapidly approach from the side. AR 24. The ALJ made the 3 determination as to Bailey’s abilities upon weighing the persuasiveness of Bailey’s own disability 4 reports and testimony, as well as medical evidence and opinions, which are described in further 5 detail below. The ALJ did not consider lay witness testimony to reach this determination. AR 29. 6 Bailey’s Testimony. As mentioned, to reach the RFC determination, the ALJ considered 7 Bailey’s testimony, including through her disability reports, function reports, hearing testimony, and 8 statements in her medical records. Based on that testimony, the ALJ found that Bailey’s “medically 9 determinable impairments could reasonably be expected to cause the alleged symptoms; however, 10 [Bailey]’s statements concerning the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of these symptoms 11 are not entirely consistent with the medical evidence and other evidence in the record[.]” AR 25. 12 The ALJ similarly found Bailey’s testimony concerning her symptoms “inconsistent with the 13 evidence as a whole.” Id. Some of the evidence drawn in comparison to Bailey’s testimony included 14 medical opinions and medical evidence. AR 25-29. 15 Medical Opinions. Considering the medical evidence, the ALJ weighed the opinions of each 16 of the five medical providers and formed opinions as to their persuasiveness, which, in turn, 17 informed the ALJ’s ultimate determinations. AR 28-29. The ALJ found the following: (1) Dr. 18 Goldman’s opinion (Ex. C15F) was unpersuasive or somewhat persuasive, based on the consistency 19 of the medical opinion against the medical examination, cognitive findings, and consultative 20 examination; (2) Dr. Sharma’s opinion (Ex. C16F) was partially persuasive, in light of the findings 21 from the examination Dr. Sharma performed, less Dr. Sharma’s assessment of Bailey’s need for a 22 walker, which the ALJ determined was not a condition that persisted for 12 months and should not 23 go into the severe conditions consideration; (3) Dr. Kim’s opinion (Ex. C31F) was only persuasive 24 in part, due to some of the “moderate” limitations imposed, which the ALJ found were vague and 25 unsupported by the evidence; (4) Dr. Kartha’s opinion (Ex. C32F) was somewhat persuasive, but it 26 both assumed the continued need for a walker on the one hand, and overstated Bailey’s lifting and 27 carrying abilities on the other; and (5) Dr. Reynolds’s opinion (Ex. C37F) overstepped and made a 1 Dr. Reynolds’s report: “I am formally requesting authorization to add the right knee to the case 2 given the patient has been dealing with the right knee since her original fall.”). Id. 3 In light of those findings, the ALJ proceeded to step four and concluded that Bailey did not 4 have the RFC capacity to perform the requirements of her past relevant work under 20 CFR 5 416.920(f). AR 20, 24-29. Finally, under step five, in consideration of Bailey’s age, education, work 6 experience and RFC, the ALJ determined that “there are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the 7 national economy that the claimant can perform[.]” AR 30 (citing 20 CFR 416.969, 416.969a). This 8 conclusion was informed by the testimony of a vocational expert, who testified in Bailey’s 9 December 5, 2023 hearing. AR 42-70. Consequently, the ALJ found the Social Security 10 Administration met its burden in demonstrating that other work exists in significant numbers in the 11 national economy that Bailey could do, considering the same. AR 29-31. 12 Based on these determinations, the ALJ concluded that Bailey was not disabled. AR 29-31. 13 B. Bailey’s Challenges to the ALJ’s Decision 14 Bailey argues four categories of evidence were improperly considered or presented, which 15 warrant reversal or remand: (1) medical opinions; (2) Bailey’s testimony; (3) lay witness testimony; 16 and (4) vocational expert’s opinion. Pl. Br., ECF No. 13-1, at 8-21. Bailey further argues that if any 17 of these sources had been properly considered by the ALJ, then Bailey would have been found 18 disabled. Id. 19 The Commissioner addresses the arguments concerning the first three categories of 20 evidence, but did not respond to the fourth. Def. Br., ECF No. 18, at 1.3 As regards the first two, the 21 Commissioner argues that the ALJ properly evaluated the medical opinions and Bailey’s testimony. 22 Id. at 1-6. Indeed, the Commissioner asserts the ALJ made evaluations as to the sources’ 23 supportability and consistency with the rest of the evidence, and she made a valid determination not 24 to accept the accounts fully, which is the ALJ’s right to do. Id. The Commissioner argues, “the 25

26 3 Instead, the Commissioner adds the following footnote: “Plaintiff also asserts that the ALJ presented an incomplete hypothetical to the vocational expert that excluded the limitations the ALJ 27 rejected. ECF No. 13-1 at 25. This argument simply reiterates prior assignments or error and does 1 possibility of reasonably reaching a different conclusion about persuasiveness does not make an 2 ALJ’s determination unsupported by substantial evidence and is not sufficient grounds for reversal.” 3 Id. at 6. Regarding the consideration of the lay witness testimony, the parties disagree about what, 4 exactly, an ALJ is required to undertake in their evaluation and whether the ALJ met that 5 requirement here. The Court addresses each argument in turn. 6 i. The ALJ Properly Determined the Persuasiveness of Each 7 Medical Opinion 8 By statute, an ALJ is instructed to evaluate medical opinions first and foremost according to 9 the supportability and consistency the opinions provide. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.920c(a) (setting revised 10 review standard as to medical opinions, when evaluating SSI claims filed on or after March 27, 11 2017). This means making assessments of the medical opinions in comparison to the objective 12 medical evidence and other medical sources and nonmedical sources. Id. at (c)(1)-(2). 13 Here, the ALJ made a determination as to the persuasiveness of each of the five medical 14 opinions. AR 28-29 (citing Exs. C15F, C16F, C31F, C32F, AND C37F). As stated above, this meant 15 finding the opinions ranged in persuasiveness, from somewhat persuasive (Dr. Kartha), to partially 16 persuasive (Drs. Sharma and Kim), to unpersuasive or only somewhat persuasive (Dr. Goldman), 17 and finally, to being set aside for overstepping the scope of opinion permissible of a medical report 18 (Dr. Reynolds). Id. These assessments were rooted in the supportability and consistency of each 19 medical opinion in light of the other medical evidence. The ALJ, therefore, met her obligation of 20 evaluating the medical opinions with substantial evidence. Woods v. Kijakazi, 32 F.4th 785, 791-92 21 (9th Cir. 2022). 22 The Court agrees with the Commissioner that just because the ALJ could have reached a 23 different conclusion about the medical opinions’ persuasiveness does not make an ALJ’s 24 determination unsupported by substantial evidence. Def. Br. at 6. Here, the ALJ properly evaluated 25 the persuasiveness of each doctor’s opinion based on the consistency and inconsistency within each 26 doctor’s own medical file. On that basis, the Court finds it is within the ALJ’s power, and it is not 27 for the Court to overrule, the ALJ’s well considered and articulated reasons for determining the 1 persuasiveness of the medical opinions. Consequently, Plaintiff’s motion is denied as to the first 2 claim, concerning the ALJ’s consideration of the medical opinions. 3 ii. The ALJ Provided Clear and Convincing Reasons to Discount 4 Bailey’s Testimony 5 Bailey argues that the ALJ improperly rejected her testimony and disagrees with the 6 conclusions the ALJ reached. Specifically, Bailey argues that the clinical signs and findings more 7 than reasonably support Bailey’s limitation, and Bailey’s daily living activities are inconsistent with 8 working eight hours a day for five days per week. Pl. Br. at 14-17. In response, the Commissioner 9 argues that the ALJ considered Bailey’s testimony and reasonably determined that it was not entirely 10 consistent with the medical and other evidence of record. Def. Br. at 1. 11 Under the Social Security Act, the ALJ is required to consider evidence other than the 12 medical record because subjective symptoms may suggest a higher severity of impairment than what 13 is reflected by the objective medical record. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(3). While an ALJ may not 14 discount a claimant’s subjective complaints based solely on a lack of objective medical evidence, 15 the ALJ “may find the claimant's allegations of severity to be not credible” based on specific 16 findings and other evidence in the record. Bunnell v. Sullivan, 947 F.2d 341, 345 (9th Cir. 1991) 17 (en banc). In determining Bailey’s credibility, the ALJ relied on ordinary techniques of credibility 18 evaluation, such as (1) inconsistencies either in the testimony or between the testimony and the 19 claimant’s conduct, and (2) the medical record addressing the claimant’s symptoms. Thomas v. 20 Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 958 (9th Cir. 2002); see also Dixon v. Saul, 411 F.Supp.3d 837, 854 (N.D. 21 Cal. 2019). 22 The Ninth Circuit has “established a two-step analysis for determining the extent to which a 23 claimant’s symptom testimony must be credited.” Trevizo v. Berryhill, 871 F.3d 664, 678 (9th Cir. 24 2017). First, “the claimant ‘must produce objective medical evidence of an underlying impairment’ 25 or impairments that could reasonably be expected to produce some degree of symptom.” Tommasetti 26 v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1281–82 27 (9th Cir. 1996)). Second, if the claimant does so and there is no affirmative evidence of malingering, 1 specific, clear and convincing reasons for doing so.” Tommasetti, 533 F.3d at 1309 (quoting Smolen, 2 80 F.3d at 1281); see also Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1014 (9th Cir. 2014). The Court applies 3 the Ninth Circuit’s “clear and convincing reasons” standard here, even though the Commissioner 4 has expressed “disagree[ment]” “because it deviates from the substantial-evidence standard set forth 5 in 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).” Def. Br. at 1 n.1. Despite the Commissioner’s objection, and in light of the 6 Commissioner’s use of this standard in the opposition brief, the Court adopts the same. 7 Here, the ALJ did not wholeheartedly accept the details of Bailey’s alleged disability, which 8 Bailey claimed affected a range of her physical and mental capabilities. Some of Bailey’s alleged 9 physical complications included her ability to stand, sit, and walk; the Commissioner additionally 10 notes Bailey’s claim that she could only stand for about 10 minutes and walk 20-30 feet before 11 needing to rest. Def. Br. at 1 (citing AR 51). Some of the mental conditions Bailey described 12 included difficulties with concentration, anxiety, memory, understanding, following instructions, 13 and others. AR 478, 590. Some of these mental effects were tied to Bailey’s bipolar disorder, which 14 the ALJ recognized as a medically determinable and severe impairment. AR 21. 15 The Court finds that the ALJ provided clear and convincing reasons for discounting 16 statements about the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of Bailey’s symptoms. AR 25-28; 17 see Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995 (9th Cir. 2014) (“the ALJ can reject the claimant’s testimony 18 about the severity of her symptoms only by offering specific, clear and convincing reasons for doing 19 so.”) (quoting Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1281 (9th Cir. 1996)). The ALJ reviewed Bailey’s 20 medical records in detail, including through comparing Bailey’s testimony to the objective medical 21 records. For example, the ALJ found that Bailey’s “alleged level of limitation is not consistent with 22 the evidence as a whole, including her normal gait, lack of spinal surgery, intact strength, lack of 23 psychiatric hospitalizations, intact cognitive functions, and her activities of daily living.” AR 26. 24 Similarly, when looking to Bailey’s mental impairments, the ALJ concluded that the reported 25 psychiatric symptoms, such as depressed mood, irritability, anxiety, panic attacks, paranoia, and 26 hallucinations, were not so severe as to require psychiatric hospitalization. AR 26 (citing Exs. C1F, 27 C21F, C33F, C1F, C31F, and C8F). In combination with the intact cognitive functions, normal limit 1 insight and judgment, pleasant demeanor, and ability to perform significant activities of daily living 2 and manage finances and use a computer (AR 26), these considerations led the ALJ to conclude the 3 extent of Bailey’s conditions were not as severe as Bailey represented. AR 25. 4 The Court also finds that the ALJ provided clear and convincing reasons for finding that 5 Bailey’s described daily activities were inconsistent with the level of symptoms and limitations 6 shown in her subjective testimony. For instance, the ALJ found inconsistencies in the medical 7 evidence compared with Bailey’s assertions that she could not walk, stand, or sit for extended 8 periods of time. AR 25-26. The ALJ found this contrasted with experiences Bailey had in Mexico, 9 citing Bailey’s reported walks on the beach or cycling for 22 miles. AR 26 (citing Exs. C36F/31, 10 C37F/47). Though Bailey raises that the ALJ failed to recognize the trip to Mexico as an element of 11 Bailey’s bipolar disorder, as she argues the trip “essentially amounted to a mental health episode,” 12 that does not justify discounting the ALJ’s findings as to the physical capabilities that Bailey 13 experienced during the same, which is what the ALJ used the Mexico trip to demonstrate. See Pl. 14 Br. at 15 (arguing “legal error for the ALJ to discount Bailey’s allegations because she has 15 psychological impairments which cause her involuntarily to experience symptoms at a level greater 16 than is normal”). This led the ALJ to find overall that the only mental impairments, evidenced by 17 mental status examination findings during treatment, were related to “mood.” AR 27 (referring to 18 Bailey’s bipolar disorder). In addition to subjective reports of symptoms like mania, such self-report 19 was not consistent with the record, which did not document elevated mood or emergent treatment 20 findings. Id. 21 Because the ALJ articulated clear and convincing reasons to conclude that Bailey’s 22 testimony was not entirely consistent with the evidence as a whole, AR 25, 26, the Court finds that 23 the ALJ properly rejected Bailey’s testimony regarding her subjective experiences. See Burch, 400 24 F.3d at 681 (“[medical evidence] is a factor that the ALJ can consider in his credibility analysis”); 25 Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2008) (“If the ALJ's finding is supported by 26 substantial evidence, the court may not engage in second-guessing.”) (internal quotation omitted). 27 While the ALJ’s interpretation “may not be the only reasonable one,” the Court finds that the ALJ 1 as reflected in the record. See Rollins v. Massanari, 261 F.3d 853, 857 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding the 2 ALJ’s interpretation of claimant’s daily activity was reasonable and supported by substantial 3 evidence despite the claimant's “testimony was somewhat equivocal” about her daily activities). 4 iii. The ALJ Properly Discounted the Lay Witness Testimony 5 The ALJ properly considered the statements of Bailey’s spouse. AR 29. Bailey’s spouse 6 submitted two function reports describing Bailey’s conditions that she observed daily (AR 480-88, 7 575-83), some of which were distinct from those Bailey described. See, e.g., Pl. Br. at 18-19 (noting 8 several conditions that the lay witness included in her function report, some of which overlapped 9 with, and a few differed from, the conditions provided in Bailey’s own function report). Bailey 10 raises a couple of challenges related to this lay witness testimony. 11 First, Bailey argues the ALJ did not properly evaluate and apply the lay witness testimony, 12 and if she had done so, the ALJ would have found Bailey disabled. Pl. Br. at 18-19. Specifically, 13 Bailey disagrees with the ALJ’s assessments of the consistency of the lay witness’s testimony and 14 impact thereof. Id. at 19. The ALJ here assessed the lay witness testimony as “somewhat consistent 15 with the record…[h]owever, it is not entirely consistent with the evidence…[or] the reported daily 16 activities…[, and] the mental allegations are not consistent with the quite minimal mental status 17 findings and, again, reported daily activities.” AR 29. 18 Historically, lay witness testimony is viewed as valuable insight into a claimant’s daily 19 practices, which can help to determine a claimant’s limitations and disabilities. See, e.g., Dodrill v. 20 Shalala, 12 F.3d 915, 918–19 (9th Cir. 1993) (“Although eyewitnesses have to rely to some extent 21 on communications with the claimant in ascertaining whether she is disabled or malingering, we 22 have held that friends and family members in a position to observe a claimant’s symptoms and daily 23 activities are competent to testify as to her condition.”). While “[l]ay testimony as to a claimant’s 24 symptoms is competent evidence that an ALJ must take into account, … One reason for which an 25 ALJ may discount lay testimony is that it conflicts with medical evidence.” Lewis v. Apfel, 236 F.3d 26 503, 511 (9th Cir. 2001) (citations omitted). Therefore, it is within an ALJ’s authority to discount 27 such testimony. 1 The Court recognizes that the parties disagree about the level of consideration and discussion 2 an ALJ must give lay witness testimony. Bailey argues that where the ALJ wishes to discount a lay 3 witness’s testimony, the ALJ must give reasons germane to each witness for doing so. Pl. Br. at 18- 4 19 (citing Dodrill, 12 F.3d at 919). Bailey asserts that the ALJ’s failure to base the rejection of the 5 lay witness’s testimony on the record and to give specific and legitimate reasons germane to the 6 rejection is reversible error. Id. at 19. The Commissioner challenges Bailey’s position, arguing that 7 an ALJ has no obligation to articulate reasons for how she considered a statement provided by 8 Bailey’s spouse; in support of this position, the Commissioner asserts that the germane reasons 9 standard no longer applies to claims filed on or after March 27, 2017, because the Agency amended 10 its regulations. Def. Br. at 7-9 (citing 20 C.F.R. § 416.920c(d)). The Ninth Circuit does not have 11 current guidance on point. See Hudnall v. Dudek, 130 F.4th 668 (9th Cir.), opinion withdrawn, 12 decision vacated, 133 F.4th 968 (9th Cir. 2025), unpublished decision issued, No. 23-3727, 2025 13 WL 1379101, at *2 (9th Cir. May 13, 2025) (declining to “decide whether the regulations constitute 14 ‘intervening higher authority’ that is ‘clearly irreconcilable’ with our [germane reasons] 15 precedent.”). Also like Hudnall, here, the Court need not answer what standard for consideration 16 applies, as the ALJ met either standard; the ALJ’s description on AR 29 provides adequate reasons 17 for discounting the lay witness testimony. 18 Indeed, in the explanation, the ALJ made a determination that the lay witness testimony was 19 not credible, based on her review of the record, and the ALJ articulated reasons for the same. 20 Notwithstanding the ALJ’s inartful, seeming hand-waving of her obligation to consider the lay 21 witness testimony at the conclusion of that paragraph,4 the Court finds the ALJ gave reasons based 22 on the record to discount the lay witness testimony. Indeed, prior to that final sentence, the Court 23 finds that the ALJ sufficiently articulated the reasons that she did not accept the lay witness’s 24 testimony because it was inconsistent with the other evidence in the record. AR 29. 25 26 27 1 Even if, however, the Court were to determine that not “formally assess[ing]” the 2 “persuasiveness” of the lay witness testimony were error, the Court would still find such error 3 harmless. The Ninth Circuit has stated affirmatively:

4 Where lay witness testimony does not describe any limitations not already described by the claimant, and the ALJ’s well-supported 5 reasons for rejecting the claimant’s testimony apply equally well to the lay witness testimony, it would be inconsistent with our prior 6 harmless error precedent to deem the ALJ's failure to discuss the lay witness testimony to be prejudicial per se. 7 8 Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1117 (9th Cir. 2012). 9 Here, the Court accepts the Commissioner’s argument that the lay witness’s testimony was, 10 in effect, addressed and properly discounted because it was similar to Bailey’s testimony, which the 11 ALJ independently reviewed. Def. Br. at 9 (citing AR 25-27, 576-83). This position is clearly 12 supported by Hudnall v. Dudek, in which the Ninth Circuit found the lay witness’s testimony was 13 “substantially similar” to his spouse’s and therefore concluded that the error was harmless. No. 23- 14 3727, 2025 WL 1379101, at *2 (May 13, 2025). The Court therefore finds that the ALJ’s 15 determination that Bailey’s spouse’s testimony was “substantially similar” to Bailey’s and 16 discounting the same is not error, and even if it were, it would be harmless. 17 iv. The ALJ Properly Relied on the Vocational Expert Testimony 18 In her motion, Bailey argues that the Court should reverse the ALJ’s determination at step 19 five because the ALJ relied on the vocational expert’s testimony that was based on an incomplete 20 hypothetical question. Pl. Br. at 20. Specifically, Bailey argues that the ALJ did not include all of 21 her functional limitations, and therefore, the determination had no evidentiary value. Id. The 22 Commissioner did not separately brief this argument but contends in a footnote that this argument 23 is simply a repetition of Plaintiff’s other arguments, as it is premised on the same. Def. Br. at 1, n.1. 24 The Court rejects Bailey’s argument that the ALJ improperly relied on vocational expert 25 testimony that was based on an incomplete hypothetical question. Bailey asserts the ALJ’s failure 26 to pose a complete hypothetical is based on the ALJ’s failure to account properly for “Bailey’s 27 credible allegations, the limitations described by the lay witness, and the limitations assessed by ] her challenges already asserted as to all three of those sources and which the Court rejected above. 2 || Because the hypothetical posed to the vocational expert is based on the ALJ’s valid RFC finding, 3 || the ALJ did not err in considering the vocational expert’s testimony. See Stubbs-Danielson v. Astrue, 4 |} 539 F.3d 1169, 1175-76 (9th Cir. 2008) (finding the ALJ did not err in his RFC finding and rejecting 5 a claimant’s challenge to an ALJ’s step five analysis on the basis that the vocational expert’s 6 || testimony was not based on an incomplete hypothetical posed by the ALJ). 7 Accordingly, the Court finds that Bailey has failed to identify any reversible error in the 8 || ALJ’s step five analysis. 9 IV. ORDER 10 For the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Bailey’s motion for summary 11 || judgment is DENIED. The determination of the ALJ and Appeals Council is AFFIRMED. %L IT IS SO ORDERED.

|] Dated: June 23, 2026

TH LABSON FREEMAN 16 United States District Judge

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