Tamia Redway v. Walmart Inc.

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Oklahoma
DecidedApril 8, 2026
Docket6:26-cv-00018
StatusUnknown

This text of Tamia Redway v. Walmart Inc. (Tamia Redway v. Walmart Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Oklahoma primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Tamia Redway v. Walmart Inc., (E.D. Okla. 2026).

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA

TAMIA REDWAY, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) Case No. CIV-26-18-JFH-GLJ ) WALMART INC., ) ) Defendant. )

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

This matter is before the Court on motion by Defendant Walmart Inc. for dismissal of this case filed by pro se Plaintiff Tamia Redway. This case was referred to the undersigned Magistrate Judge for all further proceedings in accordance with jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636, on February 20, 2026 [Docket No. 14]. Having considered the motion and all relevant filings, the undersigned Magistrate Judge recommends that Defendant’s Renewed Motion to Dismiss and Brief in Support [Docket No. 18] be GRANTED. I. Background and Procedural History Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, filed this case in Oklahoma state court in Bryan County, CJ-25-316, on December 18, 2025, and Defendant removed the case to this Court on January 20, 2026 [Docket Nos. 1-2]. On February 10, 2026, Defendant moved to dismiss Plaintiff’s state court Petition, and Plaintiff moved for leave to file an Amended Complaint. Docket Nos. 11, 13. Plaintiff filed her Amended Complaint on February 20, 2026, and Defendant filed a renewed Motion to Dismiss on March 4, 2026. Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint alleges violations of Title VII and the Oklahoma Anti-Discrimination Act (“OADA”) arising out of her employment with Defendant, including race discrimination

and retaliation. Additionally, she alleges the state law claims of wrongful termination and negligence. II. Legal Standards Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), a complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Practically, this means that the “complaint must contain sufficient

factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). A claim is plausible on its face when the complaint “pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. “In considering whether the complaint’s allegations are sufficient, the court first eliminates

conclusory allegations, mere ‘labels and conclusions,’ and any ‘formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.’” Bledsoe v. Carreno, 53 F.4th 589, 606 (10th Cir. 2022) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). “The court then accepts as true all well-pled factual allegations and considers ‘whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.’” Id. (quoting VDARE Found. v. City of Colorado Springs,

11 F.4th 1151, 1159 (10th Cir. 2021)). When reviewing a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court “‘must determine whether the complaint sufficiently alleges facts supporting all the elements necessary to establish an entitlement to relief under the legal theory proposed.’” Commonwealth Prop. Advocates, LLC v. Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., Inc., 680 F.3d 1194, 1201-1202 (10th Cir. 2011) (quoting Forest Guardians v. Forsgren, 478

F.3d 1149, 1160 (10th Cir. 2007)). “While the 12(b)(6) standard does not require that Plaintiff establish a prima facie case in her complaint, the elements of each alleged cause of action help to determine whether Plaintiff has set forth a plausible claim.” Khalik v. United Air Lines, 671 F.3d 1188, 1192 (10th Cir. 2012). Finally, because Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, the undersigned Magistrate Judge liberally construes her pleadings. See Green v. Dorrell, 969 F.2d 915, 917 (10th Cir. 1992)

(requiring courts to liberally construe a pro se litigant’s pleadings); Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991) (a court construes a pro se party’s pleadings liberally and holds them “to a less stringent standard than [that applied to] formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.”). Although pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than ones drafted by lawyers, a pro se litigant must “‘follow the same rules of procedure that govern other

litigants.’” Garrett v. Selby Connor Maddux & Janer, 425 F.3d 836, 840 (10th Cir. 2005) (quoting Nielsen v. Price, 17 F.3d 1276, 1277 (10th Cir. 1994)). Furthermore, the Tenth Circuit “do[es] not believe it is the proper function of the district court to assume the role of advocate for the pro se litigant.” Hall, 935 F.2d at 1110. III. Analysis

Defendant moves for dismissal pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(4), 12(b)(5), and 12(b)(6), contending that service of process and the process itself was insufficient here and that Plaintiff fails to state a claim. Plaintiff responds with additional factual allegations to support her claims, but does not address Defendant’s argument regarding service. A. Proper Service Defendant, appearing in this case out an abundance of caution, contends that

Plaintiff’s process itself was insufficient because the summons form, created while the case was still pending in Oklahoma state court, did not comply with 12 Okla. Stat. § 2004(B)(1), was not signed by the Clerk, contained a caption from the Western District of Oklahoma, did not provide Plaintiff’s address, and provided an incorrect answer deadline. Additionally, Defendant alleges service of process was insufficient because it was not made upon an officer, managing or general agent, or authorized agent, but was instead directed

at an individual and left at the Durant, Oklahoma, Walmart store by a sheriff’s deputy. The undersigned Magistrate Judge also notes that a return of service has not been filed with the Court. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(l) and 12 Okla. Stat. § 2004(B)(1). Plaintiff does not refute these assertions. The undersigned Magistrate Judge agrees that a sheriff dropping the improper summons and Petition off at a store is not considered proper service of process

pursuant to Rule 4(e), and that the service itself was incomplete. Accordingly, the undersigned Magistrate Judge finds Plaintiff’s service and attempted service of process were insufficient and Plaintiff is entitled to dismissal pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(4) and 12(b)(5). B. Failure to State a Claim

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Related

Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
550 U.S. 544 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)
Garrett v. Selby Connor Maddux & Janer
425 F.3d 836 (Tenth Circuit, 2005)
Forest Guardians v. Forsgren
478 F.3d 1149 (Tenth Circuit, 2007)
Hall v. Bellmon
935 F.2d 1106 (Tenth Circuit, 1991)
Green v. Dorrell
969 F.2d 915 (Tenth Circuit, 1992)
Khalik v. United Air Lines
671 F.3d 1188 (Tenth Circuit, 2012)
Nielsen v. Price
17 F.3d 1276 (Tenth Circuit, 1994)
Mobley v. Mccormick
40 F.3d 337 (Tenth Circuit, 1994)
Nixon v. City & County of Denver
784 F.3d 1364 (Tenth Circuit, 2015)
VDARE Foundation v. City of Colorado Springs
11 F.4th 1151 (Tenth Circuit, 2021)
Bledsoe v. Board Cty Comm. Jefferson KS
53 F.4th 589 (Tenth Circuit, 2022)

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Bluebook (online)
Tamia Redway v. Walmart Inc., Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/tamia-redway-v-walmart-inc-oked-2026.