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4 5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 6 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT TACOMA 7 TAMI KAY VANDUSEN, Case No. 3:26-cv-05261-TMC 8 Plaintiff, ORDER 9 v. 10 KALEI LAFAVE, JORDAN SANDERS, 11 RYAN JURVAKAINEN, KEITH YOUNG, 12 RICHARD DAHL, 13 Defendants. 14
15 I. INTRODUCTION 16 Before the Court is pro se plaintiff Tami Kay VanDusen’s motion for “preliminary 17 injunction and temporary restraining order” (“TRO”) against defendants Kalei LaFave, Jordan 18 Sanders, Richard Dahl, Tiffany Girard, Peggy Turner, Barbara Turner, Melvin Bell, Renee Janet, 19 Shad Mathers, Spencer Bourdeu, Andrew Swartout, Justin Krebs, Kortney Croak, Nancy 20 Westland, Ted DeBray, Tratan Properties LLC, The Housing Authority of the City of Longview, 21 City of Longview, City of Kelso, Cowlitz County, the State of Washington, John Reeves, Troy 22 Brightbill, and Brad Thurman. Dkt. 2. 23 24 1 The Court has reviewed Ms. VanDusen’s motion for a TRO and her complaint. 2 Ms. VanDusen’s motion for a TRO is DENIED. The Court also concludes that the complaint 3 (Dkt. 7) is both frivolous and does not sufficiently allege a claim. Accordingly, Ms. VanDusen is
4 directed to file a proposed amended complaint no later than May 1, 2026. Otherwise, the Court 5 will dismiss her complaint without prejudice. 6 II. BACKGROUND Ms. VanDusen began the instant case on March 13, 2026, when she filed her complaint, 7 an application to proceed in forma pauperis, and motion for a TRO. Dkts. 1–2. The Honorable 8 Grady J. Leupold granted Ms. VanDusen’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis. Dkt. 6. 9 III. DISCUSSION 10 A. Review of Complaint 11 The Court must subject each civil action commenced under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) to 12 mandatory screening and order the dismissal of any case that is “frivolous or malicious,” “fails to 13 state a claim on which relief may be granted,” or “seeks monetary relief against a defendant who 14 is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see also Calhoun v. Stahl, 254 F.3d 15 845, 845 (9th Cir. 2001) (“[T]he provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) are not limited to 16 prisoners.”); Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126–27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (noting that 28 17 U.S.C. § 1915(e) “not only permits but requires” the court to dismiss an IFP complaint that fails 18 to state a claim). 19 A pro se plaintiff’s complaint is to be construed liberally, but, like any other complaint, it 20 must nevertheless contain factual assertions sufficient to support a facially plausible claim for 21 relief. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 22 544, 570 (2007)). A claim for relief is facially plausible when “the plaintiff pleads factual 23 content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the 24 1 misconduct alleged.” Id. Unless it is clear a pro se plaintiff cannot cure the deficiencies of a 2 complaint, the Court will provide the plaintiff with an opportunity to amend the complaint to 3 state a plausible claim. See United States v. Corinthian Colleges, 655 F.3d 984, 995 (9th Cir.
4 2011) (“Dismissal without leave to amend is improper unless it is clear, upon de novo review, 5 that the complaint could not be saved by any amendment.”). 6 In her complaint, Ms. VanDusen alleges the following. In August 2024, she informed 7 defendant LaFav that she was writing a manuscript title “Unseen Wounds / Broken Justice / A 8 Small Town’s Secret,” which detailed “local government corruption.” Dkt. 7 at 18. After this, 9 she was subject to a “24/7 surveillance operation.” Id. This included the use of “high-tech 10 equipment to monitor the interior of [her] private bedroom,” such as “multiple drones” “inches 11 from her window.” Id. at 19. This also included local law enforcement following her in “a 12 manner intended to intimidate” her in places such as the pharmacy and the waiting area of her 13 local Kaiser Permanente facility. Id. at 20. It is also alleged that Defendants “intentionally
14 sabotaged [her] digital devices and blocked [her] access” to the Kaiser Permanente portal, 15 “preventing [her] from accessing” her discharge instructions. Id. at 21. Ms. VanDusen also 16 alleges that she was assaulted by “individuals who arrived in EMS uniforms” on January 5, 17 2025, who were not EMS professionals, but were in fact “Cowlitz County Commissioners and/or 18 other high-ranking public officials acting in disguise.” Id. at 22. These officials tortured 19 Ms. VanDusen by puncturing her skin with medical needles for “fun.” Id. 20 Ms. VanDusen’s allegations are concerning. However, there are two fatal issues with her 21 complaint. First, even under the very liberal reading afforded to pro se pleadings, the complaint 22 can only be described as “not facially plausible.” Islas v. Seattle Police Dep’t, No. 2:25-CV-
23 00231-RAJ, 2025 WL 2579636, at *2 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 5, 2025). “[A] finding of factual 24 frivolousness is appropriate when the facts alleged rise to the level of the irrational or the wholly 1 incredible whether or not there are judicially noticeable facts available to contradict them.” 2 Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 25 (1992). Second, it is unclear which defendants are liable 3 under each claim, as Ms. VanDusen simply mentions all defendants. In re Nexus 6P Prod. Liab.
4 Litig., 293 F. Supp. 3d 888, 908 (N.D. Cal. 2018) (“Plaintiffs must identify what action each 5 Defendant took that caused Plaintiffs’ harm, without resort to generalized allegations against 6 Defendants as a whole.”). Because of these deficiencies, the complaint must be dismissed unless 7 Ms. VanDusen can remedy them. 28 U.S.C § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i–ii). 8 B. Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order 9 A TRO is “an extraordinary remedy that may only be awarded upon a clear showing that 10 the plaintiff is entitled to such relief.” Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 22 11 (2008); Stuhlbarg Int’l Sales Co. v. John D. Brush & Co., 240 F.3d 832, 839 n.7 (9th Cir. 2001) 12 (the standard for a TRO is “substantially identical” to the standard for a preliminary injunction). 13 TROs serve a limited purpose: “preserving the status quo and preventing irreparable harm just so
14 long as is necessary to hold a hearing, and no longer.” Granny Goose Foods, Inc. v. Bhd. Of 15 Teamsters and Auto Truck Drivers Loc. No. 70 of Alameda Cty., 415 U.S. 423, 439 (1974). 16 A plaintiff seeking a TRO must show: (1) they are likely to succeed on the merits, (2) a 17 likelihood of irreparable harm absent preliminary relief, (3) the balance of equities favors 18 injunction, and (4) the relief sought is in the public interest. Winter, 555 U.S. at 20; Stuhlbarg, 19 240 F.3d at 839 n.7. The movant must make a showing on each element of the Winter test. All. 20 for the Wild Rockies v.
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4 5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 6 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT TACOMA 7 TAMI KAY VANDUSEN, Case No. 3:26-cv-05261-TMC 8 Plaintiff, ORDER 9 v. 10 KALEI LAFAVE, JORDAN SANDERS, 11 RYAN JURVAKAINEN, KEITH YOUNG, 12 RICHARD DAHL, 13 Defendants. 14
15 I. INTRODUCTION 16 Before the Court is pro se plaintiff Tami Kay VanDusen’s motion for “preliminary 17 injunction and temporary restraining order” (“TRO”) against defendants Kalei LaFave, Jordan 18 Sanders, Richard Dahl, Tiffany Girard, Peggy Turner, Barbara Turner, Melvin Bell, Renee Janet, 19 Shad Mathers, Spencer Bourdeu, Andrew Swartout, Justin Krebs, Kortney Croak, Nancy 20 Westland, Ted DeBray, Tratan Properties LLC, The Housing Authority of the City of Longview, 21 City of Longview, City of Kelso, Cowlitz County, the State of Washington, John Reeves, Troy 22 Brightbill, and Brad Thurman. Dkt. 2. 23 24 1 The Court has reviewed Ms. VanDusen’s motion for a TRO and her complaint. 2 Ms. VanDusen’s motion for a TRO is DENIED. The Court also concludes that the complaint 3 (Dkt. 7) is both frivolous and does not sufficiently allege a claim. Accordingly, Ms. VanDusen is
4 directed to file a proposed amended complaint no later than May 1, 2026. Otherwise, the Court 5 will dismiss her complaint without prejudice. 6 II. BACKGROUND Ms. VanDusen began the instant case on March 13, 2026, when she filed her complaint, 7 an application to proceed in forma pauperis, and motion for a TRO. Dkts. 1–2. The Honorable 8 Grady J. Leupold granted Ms. VanDusen’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis. Dkt. 6. 9 III. DISCUSSION 10 A. Review of Complaint 11 The Court must subject each civil action commenced under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) to 12 mandatory screening and order the dismissal of any case that is “frivolous or malicious,” “fails to 13 state a claim on which relief may be granted,” or “seeks monetary relief against a defendant who 14 is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see also Calhoun v. Stahl, 254 F.3d 15 845, 845 (9th Cir. 2001) (“[T]he provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) are not limited to 16 prisoners.”); Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126–27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (noting that 28 17 U.S.C. § 1915(e) “not only permits but requires” the court to dismiss an IFP complaint that fails 18 to state a claim). 19 A pro se plaintiff’s complaint is to be construed liberally, but, like any other complaint, it 20 must nevertheless contain factual assertions sufficient to support a facially plausible claim for 21 relief. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 22 544, 570 (2007)). A claim for relief is facially plausible when “the plaintiff pleads factual 23 content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the 24 1 misconduct alleged.” Id. Unless it is clear a pro se plaintiff cannot cure the deficiencies of a 2 complaint, the Court will provide the plaintiff with an opportunity to amend the complaint to 3 state a plausible claim. See United States v. Corinthian Colleges, 655 F.3d 984, 995 (9th Cir.
4 2011) (“Dismissal without leave to amend is improper unless it is clear, upon de novo review, 5 that the complaint could not be saved by any amendment.”). 6 In her complaint, Ms. VanDusen alleges the following. In August 2024, she informed 7 defendant LaFav that she was writing a manuscript title “Unseen Wounds / Broken Justice / A 8 Small Town’s Secret,” which detailed “local government corruption.” Dkt. 7 at 18. After this, 9 she was subject to a “24/7 surveillance operation.” Id. This included the use of “high-tech 10 equipment to monitor the interior of [her] private bedroom,” such as “multiple drones” “inches 11 from her window.” Id. at 19. This also included local law enforcement following her in “a 12 manner intended to intimidate” her in places such as the pharmacy and the waiting area of her 13 local Kaiser Permanente facility. Id. at 20. It is also alleged that Defendants “intentionally
14 sabotaged [her] digital devices and blocked [her] access” to the Kaiser Permanente portal, 15 “preventing [her] from accessing” her discharge instructions. Id. at 21. Ms. VanDusen also 16 alleges that she was assaulted by “individuals who arrived in EMS uniforms” on January 5, 17 2025, who were not EMS professionals, but were in fact “Cowlitz County Commissioners and/or 18 other high-ranking public officials acting in disguise.” Id. at 22. These officials tortured 19 Ms. VanDusen by puncturing her skin with medical needles for “fun.” Id. 20 Ms. VanDusen’s allegations are concerning. However, there are two fatal issues with her 21 complaint. First, even under the very liberal reading afforded to pro se pleadings, the complaint 22 can only be described as “not facially plausible.” Islas v. Seattle Police Dep’t, No. 2:25-CV-
23 00231-RAJ, 2025 WL 2579636, at *2 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 5, 2025). “[A] finding of factual 24 frivolousness is appropriate when the facts alleged rise to the level of the irrational or the wholly 1 incredible whether or not there are judicially noticeable facts available to contradict them.” 2 Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 25 (1992). Second, it is unclear which defendants are liable 3 under each claim, as Ms. VanDusen simply mentions all defendants. In re Nexus 6P Prod. Liab.
4 Litig., 293 F. Supp. 3d 888, 908 (N.D. Cal. 2018) (“Plaintiffs must identify what action each 5 Defendant took that caused Plaintiffs’ harm, without resort to generalized allegations against 6 Defendants as a whole.”). Because of these deficiencies, the complaint must be dismissed unless 7 Ms. VanDusen can remedy them. 28 U.S.C § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i–ii). 8 B. Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order 9 A TRO is “an extraordinary remedy that may only be awarded upon a clear showing that 10 the plaintiff is entitled to such relief.” Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 22 11 (2008); Stuhlbarg Int’l Sales Co. v. John D. Brush & Co., 240 F.3d 832, 839 n.7 (9th Cir. 2001) 12 (the standard for a TRO is “substantially identical” to the standard for a preliminary injunction). 13 TROs serve a limited purpose: “preserving the status quo and preventing irreparable harm just so
14 long as is necessary to hold a hearing, and no longer.” Granny Goose Foods, Inc. v. Bhd. Of 15 Teamsters and Auto Truck Drivers Loc. No. 70 of Alameda Cty., 415 U.S. 423, 439 (1974). 16 A plaintiff seeking a TRO must show: (1) they are likely to succeed on the merits, (2) a 17 likelihood of irreparable harm absent preliminary relief, (3) the balance of equities favors 18 injunction, and (4) the relief sought is in the public interest. Winter, 555 U.S. at 20; Stuhlbarg, 19 240 F.3d at 839 n.7. The movant must make a showing on each element of the Winter test. All. 20 for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 1135 (9th Cir. 2011). But “where the ‘balance of 21 hardships . . . tips sharply towards the plaintiff,’ a plaintiff need only show ‘serious questions 22 going to the merits,’ rather than likelihood of success on the merits[.]” Roman v. Wolf, 977 F.3d
23 935, 941 (9th Cir. 2020) (quoting All. for the Wild Rockies, 632 F.3d at 1135). 24 1 Additional requirements are imposed on TROs that are granted “ex parte,” or without 2 notice to the other party. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(b), a TRO may be granted 3 without notice to the adverse party if it appears from specific facts shown by affidavit or by a
4 verified complaint that immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage will result to the 5 applicant. Reno Air Racing Ass’n., Inc. v. McCord, 452 F.3d 1126, 1130 (9th Cir. 2006). 6 Ms. VanDusen seeks a TRO preventing Defendants from: (1) “[e]ngaging in electronic 7 surveillance and digital sabotage”; (2) “[i]nterfering with [her] access to legal research”; 8 (3) “[e]ngaging in physical stalking and ‘loitering’ at [her] residence”; and (4) “[u]tilizing public 9 funds to facilitate the unauthorized surveillance of a private citizen.” Dkt. 2 at 1–2. In support of 10 her motion for a TRO, Ms. VanDusen briefly discusses the Winter factors. Id. at 4–5. When 11 discussing the first Winter factor, likelihood of “success on the merits,” Ms. VanDusen mentions 12 “physical evidence” of things like “misuse of public funds” and “digital sabotage,” but does not 13 discuss the actual claims, the laws they are brought under, or their likelihood of success against
14 the Defendants. The Court has also reviewed the evidence packets attached to Ms. VanDusen’s 15 pleadings (Dkts. 7-3, 7-4), which consists primarily of communications surrounding a public 16 records request, and Ms. VanDusen’s own statements regarding technology problems that she 17 attributes to digital sabotage and surveillance. These statements are not plausibly connected to 18 any allegations against the Defendants. Therefore, Ms. VanDusen’s motion for a TRO is denied. 19 IV. CONCLUSION Ms. VanDusen’s motion for a TRO (Dkt. 2) is DENIED. If Ms. VanDusen wants to 20 continue pursuing this case, she must file a proposed amended complaint no later than May 1, 21 2026. The amended complaint must include a short, plain statement explaining (1) the grounds 22 for the Court’s jurisdiction, (2) the claims asserted against Defendants, (3) specific facts that 23 24 l Ms. VanDusen believes support each claim, and (4) the relief requested. Otherwise, the Court 2 || will dismiss her complaint without prejudice. 3 The Clerk is directed to send uncertified copies of this Order to all counsel of record and 4 || to any party appearing pro se at said party’s last known address. 5 Dated this 9th day of April, 2026.
7 Lo Ww Cartwright United States District Judge 8 9 10 1] 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24