NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION
STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL
FIRST CIRCUIT
NUMBER 2020 CA 0849
TAMI JERRIE TURNLEY
VERSUS
JOSEPH CHAD TURNLEY
Judgment Rendered: APR 2 9 2021
Appealed from the Family Court In and for the Parish of East Baton Rouge, Louisiana Docket Number F209536, Division " A" Honorable Pamela J. Baker, Judge Presiding
oY F xe'e' e4e F: cx9c
Lisa L. Boudreaux Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellee, Baton Rouge, LA Tami Jerrie Turnley
Brian J. Prendergast Counsel for Defendant/AppeIlant, Baton Rouge, LA Joseph Chad Turnley and
David M. Prados New Orleans, LA
BEFORE: WHIPPLE, C.J., WELCH, AND CHUTZ, JJ. WHIPPLE, C.J.
In this divorce and community partition matter, the husband appeals the trial
court' s April 16, 2020 judgment, which declared a Declaration of Separate
Property with Reservation of Fruits and Revenues to be invalid and unenforceable.
For the following reasons, we dismiss the appeal.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On September 5, 2001, two days prior to the parties' marriage, Joseph Chad
Turnley and Tami Jerrie Turnley signed a " Declaration of Separate Property with
Reservation of Fruits and Revenues with Concurrence and Acknowledgement"
the September 5, 2001 Declaration"), through which Mr. Turnley sought to
declare the separate nature of his interest in several corporations as well as all
fruits and revenues that may be derived therefrom. The September 5, 2001
Declaration was signed by a notary public, but was not signed before two
witnesses.
Both Mrs. Turnley and Mr. Turnley subsequently filed petitions for divorce,
with Mrs. Turnley filing her petition on June 9, 2017, and Mr. Turnley filing his
petition on May 9, 2019. By judgment dated July 2, 2019, the parties were
divorced.'
Thereafter, Mrs. Turnley filed a Petition for Partition, in which she averred
that Mr. Turnley' s September 5, 2001 Declaration was invalid in that it was not an
authentic act or an act under private signature duly acknowledged and, further, was
not filed in the conveyance records. Thus, she contended that the fruits and
revenues of Mr. Turnley' s separate property acquired during the community were
community assets to be divided between the parties.
The trial court also signed a Stipulated Judgment on April 17, 2019, which provided, in part, that " IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that a Judgment shall issue decreeing a separation of property between the parties retroactive to the date of filing the Petition for Divorce of June 8, 2017 pursuant to Louisiana Civil Code Article 2374( C)."
2 Given the dispute between the parties as to the classification of the fruits and
revenues of Mr. Turnley' s separate property, Mrs. Turnley filed in these
proceedings a petition for declaratory judgment, seeking a declaration that the
September 5, 2001 Declaration was invalid for lack of conformity with the
requirements of LSA -GC. art. 2339.
Following a hearing on the matter, where evidence and testimony were
taken, the trial court signed the April 16, 2020 judgment, declaring the September
5, 2001 Declaration to be invalid and unenforceable. Mr. Turnley then filed the
instant appeal.z
DISCUSSION
Appellate courts have the duty to examine subject matter jurisdiction sua
sponte, even when the parties do not raise the issue. Nicaud v. Nicaud, 2016- 1531
La. App. 1St Cir. 9/ 15/ 17), 227 So. 3d 329, 330. The appellate jurisdiction of this
court extends to final judgments. See LSA- C. C. P. arts. 1911( B), 1915, & 2083( A).
Pursuant to LSA-C.C.P. art. 1871, a declaratory judgment " shall have the force and
effect of a final judgment or decree." However, LSA- C. C.P. art. 1877 further
provides that "[ a] ll orders, judgments, and decrees under Articles 1871 through
1883 may be reviewed as other orders, judgments, and decrees." A judgment that
only partially determines the merits of the action is a partial final judgment and is
appealable only if authorized by LSA-C. C. P. art. 1915. Boutte v. Meadows, 2013-
1189 ( La. App. 1St Cir. 2/ 18/ 14), 2014 WL 651754, * 3 ( unpublished).
The principal claim at this stage in these proceedings is the claim for
partition of the parties' former community property. The April 16, 2020 judgment
at issue does not partition the former community property, but, instead, merely
2The judgment on appeal also ordered Mr. Tumley to provide Mrs. Tumley an advance of 25, 000.00, with full reservation of all rights to be addressed when the former community property is partitioned; however, Mr. Tumley seeks review of only the portion of the judgment declaring the September 5, 2001 Declaration.
3 declares invalid and unenforceable the September 5, 2001 Declaration, through
which Mr. Turnley sought to declare the fruits and revenues of his separate
property accruing during the community to be his separate property. Thus, the
April 16, 2020 judgment on appeal is not determinative of the entirety of the merits
of the claims between the parties, because a community property partition has yet
to be effected. See Tramontin v. Tramontin, 2010- 0060 ( La. App. 1St Cir.
12/ 22/ 10), 53 So. 3d 707, 712. Accordingly, the judgment constitutes a partial
judgment that is appealable only if authorized by LSA- C. C.P. art. 1915. See Fils
v. Allstate Insurance Company, 2015- 0360 ( La. App. 1St Cir. 12/ 23/ 15), 2015 WL
9435273, * 4 ( unpublished); see also St. Pierre v. St. Pierre, 2008- 2475 ( La. App.
I" Cir. 2/ 12/ 10), 35 So. 3d 369, 371- 372, writ not considered, 2010- 0587 ( La.
3/ 17/ 10), 29 So. 3d 1243 ( trial court' s judgment, which simply declared that the
parties operated under a community property regime during their marriage was a
partial judgment, which this court determined was improperly designated as a final
judgment for purposes of immediate appeal pursuant to LSA- C. C. P. art. 1915( B));
see also Tramontin, 53 So. 3d at 709- 712 ( trial court' s judgment, which in part
rescinded a Partition of Community Property Agreement, but which did not re -
partition the former community property of the parties, was a partial judgment,
which this court determined was improperly designated as final for purposes of
immediate appeal pursuant to LSA- C. C. P. art. 1915( B)).
A partial judgment is a final judgment that is immediately appealable if it
falls into one of the categories under LSA-C. C. P. art. 1915( A), including a
judgment that: ( 1) dismisses the suit as to less than all of the parties, defendants,
third party plaintiffs, third party defendants, or intervenors; ( 2) grants a motion for
judgment on the pleadings, as provided by Articles 965, 968, and 969; ( 3) grants a
motion for summary judgment, as provided by Articles 966 through 969, but not
including a summary judgment granted pursuant to Article 966( E); ( 4) determines
M either the principal or incidental demand, when the two have been tried separately,
as provided by Article 1038; ( 5) determines the issue of liability when that issue
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NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION
STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL
FIRST CIRCUIT
NUMBER 2020 CA 0849
TAMI JERRIE TURNLEY
VERSUS
JOSEPH CHAD TURNLEY
Judgment Rendered: APR 2 9 2021
Appealed from the Family Court In and for the Parish of East Baton Rouge, Louisiana Docket Number F209536, Division " A" Honorable Pamela J. Baker, Judge Presiding
oY F xe'e' e4e F: cx9c
Lisa L. Boudreaux Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellee, Baton Rouge, LA Tami Jerrie Turnley
Brian J. Prendergast Counsel for Defendant/AppeIlant, Baton Rouge, LA Joseph Chad Turnley and
David M. Prados New Orleans, LA
BEFORE: WHIPPLE, C.J., WELCH, AND CHUTZ, JJ. WHIPPLE, C.J.
In this divorce and community partition matter, the husband appeals the trial
court' s April 16, 2020 judgment, which declared a Declaration of Separate
Property with Reservation of Fruits and Revenues to be invalid and unenforceable.
For the following reasons, we dismiss the appeal.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On September 5, 2001, two days prior to the parties' marriage, Joseph Chad
Turnley and Tami Jerrie Turnley signed a " Declaration of Separate Property with
Reservation of Fruits and Revenues with Concurrence and Acknowledgement"
the September 5, 2001 Declaration"), through which Mr. Turnley sought to
declare the separate nature of his interest in several corporations as well as all
fruits and revenues that may be derived therefrom. The September 5, 2001
Declaration was signed by a notary public, but was not signed before two
witnesses.
Both Mrs. Turnley and Mr. Turnley subsequently filed petitions for divorce,
with Mrs. Turnley filing her petition on June 9, 2017, and Mr. Turnley filing his
petition on May 9, 2019. By judgment dated July 2, 2019, the parties were
divorced.'
Thereafter, Mrs. Turnley filed a Petition for Partition, in which she averred
that Mr. Turnley' s September 5, 2001 Declaration was invalid in that it was not an
authentic act or an act under private signature duly acknowledged and, further, was
not filed in the conveyance records. Thus, she contended that the fruits and
revenues of Mr. Turnley' s separate property acquired during the community were
community assets to be divided between the parties.
The trial court also signed a Stipulated Judgment on April 17, 2019, which provided, in part, that " IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that a Judgment shall issue decreeing a separation of property between the parties retroactive to the date of filing the Petition for Divorce of June 8, 2017 pursuant to Louisiana Civil Code Article 2374( C)."
2 Given the dispute between the parties as to the classification of the fruits and
revenues of Mr. Turnley' s separate property, Mrs. Turnley filed in these
proceedings a petition for declaratory judgment, seeking a declaration that the
September 5, 2001 Declaration was invalid for lack of conformity with the
requirements of LSA -GC. art. 2339.
Following a hearing on the matter, where evidence and testimony were
taken, the trial court signed the April 16, 2020 judgment, declaring the September
5, 2001 Declaration to be invalid and unenforceable. Mr. Turnley then filed the
instant appeal.z
DISCUSSION
Appellate courts have the duty to examine subject matter jurisdiction sua
sponte, even when the parties do not raise the issue. Nicaud v. Nicaud, 2016- 1531
La. App. 1St Cir. 9/ 15/ 17), 227 So. 3d 329, 330. The appellate jurisdiction of this
court extends to final judgments. See LSA- C. C. P. arts. 1911( B), 1915, & 2083( A).
Pursuant to LSA-C.C.P. art. 1871, a declaratory judgment " shall have the force and
effect of a final judgment or decree." However, LSA- C. C.P. art. 1877 further
provides that "[ a] ll orders, judgments, and decrees under Articles 1871 through
1883 may be reviewed as other orders, judgments, and decrees." A judgment that
only partially determines the merits of the action is a partial final judgment and is
appealable only if authorized by LSA-C. C. P. art. 1915. Boutte v. Meadows, 2013-
1189 ( La. App. 1St Cir. 2/ 18/ 14), 2014 WL 651754, * 3 ( unpublished).
The principal claim at this stage in these proceedings is the claim for
partition of the parties' former community property. The April 16, 2020 judgment
at issue does not partition the former community property, but, instead, merely
2The judgment on appeal also ordered Mr. Tumley to provide Mrs. Tumley an advance of 25, 000.00, with full reservation of all rights to be addressed when the former community property is partitioned; however, Mr. Tumley seeks review of only the portion of the judgment declaring the September 5, 2001 Declaration.
3 declares invalid and unenforceable the September 5, 2001 Declaration, through
which Mr. Turnley sought to declare the fruits and revenues of his separate
property accruing during the community to be his separate property. Thus, the
April 16, 2020 judgment on appeal is not determinative of the entirety of the merits
of the claims between the parties, because a community property partition has yet
to be effected. See Tramontin v. Tramontin, 2010- 0060 ( La. App. 1St Cir.
12/ 22/ 10), 53 So. 3d 707, 712. Accordingly, the judgment constitutes a partial
judgment that is appealable only if authorized by LSA- C. C.P. art. 1915. See Fils
v. Allstate Insurance Company, 2015- 0360 ( La. App. 1St Cir. 12/ 23/ 15), 2015 WL
9435273, * 4 ( unpublished); see also St. Pierre v. St. Pierre, 2008- 2475 ( La. App.
I" Cir. 2/ 12/ 10), 35 So. 3d 369, 371- 372, writ not considered, 2010- 0587 ( La.
3/ 17/ 10), 29 So. 3d 1243 ( trial court' s judgment, which simply declared that the
parties operated under a community property regime during their marriage was a
partial judgment, which this court determined was improperly designated as a final
judgment for purposes of immediate appeal pursuant to LSA- C. C. P. art. 1915( B));
see also Tramontin, 53 So. 3d at 709- 712 ( trial court' s judgment, which in part
rescinded a Partition of Community Property Agreement, but which did not re -
partition the former community property of the parties, was a partial judgment,
which this court determined was improperly designated as final for purposes of
immediate appeal pursuant to LSA- C. C. P. art. 1915( B)).
A partial judgment is a final judgment that is immediately appealable if it
falls into one of the categories under LSA-C. C. P. art. 1915( A), including a
judgment that: ( 1) dismisses the suit as to less than all of the parties, defendants,
third party plaintiffs, third party defendants, or intervenors; ( 2) grants a motion for
judgment on the pleadings, as provided by Articles 965, 968, and 969; ( 3) grants a
motion for summary judgment, as provided by Articles 966 through 969, but not
including a summary judgment granted pursuant to Article 966( E); ( 4) determines
M either the principal or incidental demand, when the two have been tried separately,
as provided by Article 1038; ( 5) determines the issue of liability when that issue
has been tried separately by the court, or when, in a jury trial, the issue of liability
has been tried before a jury and the issue of damages is to be tried before a
different jury; or ( 6) imposes sanctions or disciplinary action. pursuant to LSA-
C. C.P. arts. 191, 863, or 864 or LSA-C. E. art. 510( G). A partial judgment that is
not included in one of these categories is not a final judgment unless it is properly
designated as " final" by the court after an express determination that there is no
just reason for delay. LSA- C. C. P. arts. 1911( B) & 1915( B); Boutte, 2014 WL
651754 at * 3.
Pursuant to LSA-C. C. P. art. 1915( B)( 1), when a court renders a partial
judgment as to " one or more but less than all of the claims, demands, issues, or
theories" presented in an action, that judgment shall not constitute a final judgment
and, thus, shall not be immediately appealable, " unless it is designated as a final
judgment by the court after an express determination that there is no just reason for
delay." In the absence of such a determination and designation, any such order or
decision shall not constitute a final judgment for the purpose of an immediate
appeal and may be revised at any time prior to rendition of the judgment
adjudicating all of the claims and the rights and liabilities of the parties. LSA-
C. C. P. art. 1915( B)( 2).
A review of the April 16, 2020 judgment on appeal demonstrates that it does
not fall into any of the categories of partial final judgments set forth in LSA-C. C.P.
art. 1915( A). Moreover, the judgment on appeal does not contain a designation
that it is final for purposes of immediate appeal pursuant to LSA-C. C.P. art.
1915( B)( 1). Thus, the April 16, 2020 judgment is not a final judgment, and this
court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to review it on appeal. See Joseph v.
Ratcliff, 2010- 1342 ( La. App. 1" Cir. 3/ 25/ 11), 63 So. 3d 220, 224.
5 We also decline to exercise our plenary power of supervisory jurisdiction, as
the merits of the instant case do not meet the criteria set forth by the Louisiana
Supreme Court in Herlitz Constuction Company, Inc. v. Hotel Investors of New
Iberia, Inc., 396 So. 2d 878 ( La. 1981) ( per curiam).
CONCLUSION
For the above and foregoing reasons, the appeal of the trial court' s April 16,
2020 judgment is dismissed. Costs of this appeal are assessed against appellant,
Joseph Chad Turnley.
APPEAL DISMISSED.
0 TAMI JERRIE TURNLEY FIRST CIRCUIT
COURT OF APPEAL VERSUS STATE OF LOUISIANA
JOSEPH CHAD TURNLEY NO. 2020 CA 0849
CH Z9 J., dissenting. g
I respectfully dissent from the dismissal of this appeal on jurisdictional grounds
without a review of the merits. The majority correctly notes that this court lacks
appellate jurisdiction to review the judgment at issue because it is a partial judgment
that does not fall into any of the categories of immediately appealable partial final
judgments delineated in La. C. C. P. art. 1915( A) and it lacks a certification of finality
under La. C. C. P. art. 1915( B). Nevertheless, the judgment declaring the " Declaration
of Separate Property with Reservation of Fruits and Revenues" ( the Declaration)
entered into by the parties to be invalid involves an issue crucial to the partition of the
community property belonging to the parties. In the interests of judicial efficiency
and economy, I believe this court should exercise its discretion to convert this matter
to an application for a supervisory writ and review the judgment pursuant to our
supervisory jurisdiction, particularly since the result reached by the trial court is
arguably incorrect. To do otherwise risks a potential waste of the time and expense
incurred by the trial court in partitioning the community property based upon its
arguably incorrect determination that the Declaration is invalid.