Tamez, Javier

Court of Appeals of Texas·Decided May 26, 2015·No. WR-83,312-01·Published

Opinion

WR-83,312-01

COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS AUSTIN, TEXAS

Transmitted 5/25/2015 4:14:48 PM Accepted 5/26/2015 8:08:03 AM ABEL ACOSTA

CLERK

CAUSE NO. WR-83,312-01

RECEIVED

COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS IN THE 5/26/2015 ABEL ACOSTA, CLERK

COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS

AUSTIN, TEXAS

EX PARTE JAVIER TAMEZ,

APPLICANT

ON APPLICATION FOR AN ARTICLE 11.07 WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS IN CAUSE NO. 08-CR-0741-D IN THE 105TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, NUECES COUNTY, TEXAS

APPLICANT’S OBJECTIONS TO TRIAL COURT’S FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND RECOMMENDATION PURSUANT TO RULE 73.4 OF THE TEXAS RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE

ALFREDO MORALES, JR.

ATTORNEY AT LAW

P.O. BOX 52942

MCALLEN, TX 78505-2942

(956) 536-8800 BUS

(956) 381-4269 FAX

EMAIL: amjr700@gmail.com

TO THE HONORABLE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS:

Applicant JAVIER TAMEZ files his objections to the trial court’s findings of fact, conclusions of law, and recommendation, and in support thereof would show the court as follows:

I.

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

The trial court entered its findings on May 5, 2015. The trial court clerk certified the findings and entered them into the minutes of the court on May 13, 2015. On that same date, the findings were mailed to the undersigned counsel. (The District Clerk’s Office envelope is postmarked May 13, 2015.) As an officer of the court, counsel would represent that he received the findings on May 16, 2015. Rule 73.4 of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure allows counsel ten days to file objections to the trial court’s findings. Accordingly, counsel is filing his objections within the time frame provided by the rules.

The Applicant objects to all of the trial court’s conclusions that trial counsel rendered the requisite effective assistance of counsel in this case. It is clear that the trial court did not conduct a careful, studied examination of the Applicant’s writ, the affidavits, or the record in this case. The trial court relied exclusively on the State’s response, even adopting the State’s proposed findings and conclusions verbatim, without any independent analysis of its own.

Accordingly, the Applicant urges his objections as follows:

II.

OBJECTION 1:

TRIAL COUNSEL FAILED OR PRESERVE THE APPLICANT’S RIGHT TO APPEAL BECAUSE HE DID NOT FOLLOW THE MANDATES SET FORTH UNDER JONES v. STATE

While trial counsel’s affidavit states that he consulted with the Applicant about his post-conviction rights, including the right to file an appeal, he failed to take the appropriate the two-step process outlined in Jones v. State, 98 S.W.3d 700 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003): one, file a Pro Se Notice of Appeal and file a contemporaneous Motion to Withdraw as counsel of record.

That he (trail counsel) may have advised against filing an appeal is immaterial and not controlling. Trial counsel knew Applicant wanted to appeal, but instead of assisting him in providing the appropriate notice to the court, he did nothing, referring him to an appellate lawyer instead. The trial lawyer’s responsibility as trial counsel did not end upon the conclusion of the revocation hearing. Rather, it continued for the next thirty days during which time he had to follow the procedure in Jones v. State.

Trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel in this regard, and the Applicant is entitled to an out-of-time appeal.

III.

OBJECTION 2:

TRAIL COUNSEL FAILED TO PRESENT EVIDENCE AND ARGUE THAT THE ALLEGED VICTIM, NOT APPLICANT, WAS THE ONE WHO HAD INITIATED THE CONTACTS

The record clearly substantiates the Applicant’s position that he merely responded her constant texts. In fact, the evidence demonstrated that the alleged victim had, in fact, deleted some of the texts so as to give the appearance that it was he who, at times, was initiating contact. The State’s attorney even conceded this point in final argument and, even then, Applicant’s trial counsel did not make any argument to the trial court that the statue required “initiation” on the part of the Applicant. The evidence was insufficient to have sustained a violation of his terms and conditions of his probation. More importantly, trial counsel should have argued that, legally, the prosecution had no case, because at the time of the hearing in question, there was no legal precedent to show that text messaging was an “electronic communication” within the meaning of the statute. It was not until mid-2014, that an appeals court held, for the first time, that texting could be considered an “electronic communication” under the statute. Perone v. State, No. 14-12-00969-CR (Tex. App. – Houston [14th Dist.] 2014). Again, however, in light of the specific wording of the statute, when taken together with the definition of electronic communications, the

Appeal’s court’s decision is questionable.

Trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel on this point.

IV.

OBJECTION 3:

TRIAL COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE BECAUSE HE ADVISED APPLICANT TO ENTER PLEAS OF “TRUE” TO THE STATE’S ALLEGATIONS OF NON-PAYMENT OF FEES

Prior to beginning the revocation hearing, trial counsel advised and allowed Applicant to enter pleas of “true” to the allegations that he was in arrears in his monthly supervisory fees, court appointed fees, electronic home monitoring fees, and child support payments.

Suffice it to say, that Applicant had a legal defense to all of these allegations, given that during the relevant time period when they were due, the Applicant was incarcerated, unemployed, or sporadically working odd jobs. More importantly, the State, not the Applicant, had the burden to show that he had willfully failed to make all these payments. (See legal authorities cited in Applicant’s writ.)

Trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel on this point.

V.

OBJECTION 4:

TRIAL COUNSEL FAILED TO OBJECT OT THE STATE’S EXHIBIT WHICH CONTAINED THE OFFENDING TEXT MESSAGES

The State presented only one exhibit to support its allegation that Applicant had contacted the alleged victim in violation of the statute and the terms and conditions of his probation. State’s counsel, without setting the proper predicate, merely tendered the exhibit to the witness, who immediately began testifying as to its contents. Trial counsel did not object, and all of its contents (i.e., numerous texts) came into evidence. The fact that the exhibit could have been properly authenticated and formally introduced as evidence, as the State suggests, is of no moment. It was considered hearsay evidence until such time as all of the formalities were met. The Texas Rules of Evidence apply at revocation hearings. Ex Parte Doan, 369 S.W.3d 205 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012).

Trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel on this point.

VI.

OBJECTION 5:

TRIAL COUNSEL FAILED TO REQUEST FOR A CONTINUANCE IN ORDER TO ADEQUATELY PREPARE FOR THE HEARING

The record establishes that trial counsel was not fully prepared to contest the allegations in the State’s motion to revoke. Even the trial court, recognizing that counsel was not totally prepared, allowed counsel to review the State’s exhibit by calling for a brief recess in the proceedings. By having requested a continuance, trial counsel would have been able to secure the witnesses he needed to cast doubt on the alleged victim’s credibility, and would have allowed him time to prepare and present his own exhibit, which he told the court that he had some evidence he wanted to tender for the court’s consideration, but candidly admitted that it was not in “proper format.”

Trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel on this point.

VII.

OBJECTION 6:

TRIAL COUNSEL FAILD TO PRESERVE CERTAIN ISSUES FOR APPELLATE REVIEW

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Related

Nix v. State
65 S.W.3d 664 (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, 2001)
Weed v. State
891 S.W.2d 22 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 1995)
Doan, Ex Parte Dustin
369 S.W.3d 205 (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, 2012)
Walton, Charles Ray
422 S.W.3d 720 (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, 2014)
Jones v. State
98 S.W.3d 700 (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, 2003)