MEMORANDUM DECISION Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), FILED this Memorandum Decision shall not be Jul 16 2019, 8:52 am regarded as precedent or cited before any CLERK court except for the purpose of establishing Indiana Supreme Court Court of Appeals the defense of res judicata, collateral and Tax Court
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE James D. Crum Curtis T. Hill, Jr. Coots, Henke & Wheeler, P.C. Attorney General of Indiana Carmel, Indiana Sierra A. Murray Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Tamesha Angalena Williams, July 16, 2019 Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No. 19A-CR-383 v. Appeal from the Hamilton Superior Court State of Indiana, The Honorable David K. Najjar, Appellee-Plaintiff. Judge Trial Court Cause No. 29D05-1807-CM-5388
Bailey, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-383 | July 16, 2019 Page 1 of 6 Case Summary [1] Following a bench trial, Tamesha Angalena Williams (“Williams”) was
convicted of Class B misdemeanor Possession of Marijuana. 1 She now appeals,
challenging the sufficiency of evidence supporting the conviction. We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History [2] On July 18, 2018, Officer George Watson of the Sheridan Police Department
(“Officer Watson”) was training with Officer Coy Monroe (“Officer Monroe”)
serving as field training officer. At some point, Officer Watson stopped a
vehicle with one working headlight. When Officer Watson approached the
vehicle, he smelled the odor of a freshly lit cigarette. He noticed the driver’s
window was open several inches, but the other windows were closed. There
were two occupants—Williams, who was the driver, and a male passenger.
[3] Officer Watson asked Williams for certain information. Officer Monroe later
approached the vehicle to follow up about proof of insurance. Officer Monroe
noticed the odors of both burnt and raw marijuana. He asked the passenger to
step back with him. Officer Monroe mentioned the odor of marijuana to the
passenger, who said he did not think there was anything in the vehicle. When
speaking with the passenger, Officer Monroe did not smell the odor of
marijuana. Officer Monroe then asked Williams to speak with him. Officer
1 Ind. Code § 35-48-4-11(a)(1).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-383 | July 16, 2019 Page 2 of 6 Monroe smelled the odor of burnt marijuana “pungently coming off of her
clothing.” Tr. at 16. When Officer Monroe mentioned the odor to Williams,
she “initially denied it and that there was anything around it.” Id. at 15-16.
[4] The officers planned to search the vehicle, which was registered to Williams.
Before the search, Williams said “there was nothing in the car, she didn’t have
any marijuana.” Id. at 16. Williams also asked if she could retrieve personal
property before the search, saying “[s]omething about some money being in the
car.” Id. At that point, Williams was already outside the vehicle and had her
purse with her. She was not permitted to retrieve any property. During an
ensuing search, Officer Monroe found approximately two grams of marijuana
in the center console of the vehicle. No money was found in the vehicle.
[5] Officer Monroe handcuffed Williams and the passenger. He explained the legal
doctrine of constructive possession, at which point the passenger expressed
irritation about being caught up in things. Williams then said: “It’s my car, it’s
my dope.” Id. at 22. She emphasized “that she didn’t own the dope, but she
said, ‘I’m taking it because it’s my car, my dope, and it’s in my car.’” Id.
[6] The State charged Williams with Class B misdemeanor Possession of
Marijuana. A bench trial was held in late 2018, and Williams was found guilty.
The court imposed a sentence of 180 days in the Hamilton County Jail, fully
suspended the sentence, and placed Williams on probation for 180 days.
[7] Williams now appeals.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-383 | July 16, 2019 Page 3 of 6 Discussion and Decision [8] When reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, “we consider
only the evidence and reasonable inferences most favorable to the conviction[],
neither reweighing evidence nor reassessing witness credibility.” Griffith v.
State, 59 N.E.3d 947, 958 (Ind. 2016). “We will affirm the conviction unless no
reasonable fact-finder could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a
reasonable doubt.” Love v. State, 73 N.E.3d 693, 696 (Ind. 2017).
[9] To obtain the instant conviction, the State was obligated to prove, beyond a
reasonable doubt, Williams knowingly or intentionally possessed marijuana.
See I.C. § 35-48-4-11. Possession can be actual or constructive. Sargent v. State,
27 N.E.3d 729, 732-33 (Ind. 2015). “Actual possession occurs when a person
has direct physical control over the item.” Id. at 733. Where the State “cannot
show actual possession, it may nonetheless prevail on proof of constructive
possession.” Id. “A defendant is in the constructive possession of drugs when
the State shows that the defendant has both (i) the intent to maintain dominion
and control over the drugs and (ii) the capability to maintain dominion and
control over the drugs.” Gee v. State, 810 N.E.2d 338, 340 (Ind. 2004).
[10] At trial, the State pursued a theory of constructive possession. Williams does
not dispute she had the capability to maintain dominion and control over the
marijuana. She instead challenges the sufficiency of evidence of her intent to
maintain dominion and control over the contraband. She points out the
marijuana was found in the center console and that she was not the only
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-383 | July 16, 2019 Page 4 of 6 occupant of the vehicle. Where, as here, “possession of the automobile in
which drugs are found is not exclusive, the inference of intent must be
supported by additional circumstances pointing to the defendant’s knowledge of
the nature of the controlled substances and their presence.” Lampkins v. State,
682 N.E.2d 1268, 1275 (Ind. 1997), modified on reh’g. Our supreme court has
identified “various means” of showing the required additional circumstances,
including—but not limited to—proof of “(1) incriminating statements by the
defendant, (2) attempted flight or furtive gestures, (3) location of substances like
drugs in settings that suggest manufacturing, (4) proximity of the contraband to
the defendant, (5) location of the contraband within the defendant’s plain view,
and (6) the mingling of the contraband with other items owned by the
defendant.” Henderson v. State, 715 N.E.2d 833, 836 (Ind. 1999).2
[11] Here, there was evidence Williams’s clothing smelled of burnt marijuana and
the passenger did not smell of marijuana. Williams attempts to minimize the
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MEMORANDUM DECISION Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), FILED this Memorandum Decision shall not be Jul 16 2019, 8:52 am regarded as precedent or cited before any CLERK court except for the purpose of establishing Indiana Supreme Court Court of Appeals the defense of res judicata, collateral and Tax Court
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE James D. Crum Curtis T. Hill, Jr. Coots, Henke & Wheeler, P.C. Attorney General of Indiana Carmel, Indiana Sierra A. Murray Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Tamesha Angalena Williams, July 16, 2019 Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No. 19A-CR-383 v. Appeal from the Hamilton Superior Court State of Indiana, The Honorable David K. Najjar, Appellee-Plaintiff. Judge Trial Court Cause No. 29D05-1807-CM-5388
Bailey, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-383 | July 16, 2019 Page 1 of 6 Case Summary [1] Following a bench trial, Tamesha Angalena Williams (“Williams”) was
convicted of Class B misdemeanor Possession of Marijuana. 1 She now appeals,
challenging the sufficiency of evidence supporting the conviction. We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History [2] On July 18, 2018, Officer George Watson of the Sheridan Police Department
(“Officer Watson”) was training with Officer Coy Monroe (“Officer Monroe”)
serving as field training officer. At some point, Officer Watson stopped a
vehicle with one working headlight. When Officer Watson approached the
vehicle, he smelled the odor of a freshly lit cigarette. He noticed the driver’s
window was open several inches, but the other windows were closed. There
were two occupants—Williams, who was the driver, and a male passenger.
[3] Officer Watson asked Williams for certain information. Officer Monroe later
approached the vehicle to follow up about proof of insurance. Officer Monroe
noticed the odors of both burnt and raw marijuana. He asked the passenger to
step back with him. Officer Monroe mentioned the odor of marijuana to the
passenger, who said he did not think there was anything in the vehicle. When
speaking with the passenger, Officer Monroe did not smell the odor of
marijuana. Officer Monroe then asked Williams to speak with him. Officer
1 Ind. Code § 35-48-4-11(a)(1).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-383 | July 16, 2019 Page 2 of 6 Monroe smelled the odor of burnt marijuana “pungently coming off of her
clothing.” Tr. at 16. When Officer Monroe mentioned the odor to Williams,
she “initially denied it and that there was anything around it.” Id. at 15-16.
[4] The officers planned to search the vehicle, which was registered to Williams.
Before the search, Williams said “there was nothing in the car, she didn’t have
any marijuana.” Id. at 16. Williams also asked if she could retrieve personal
property before the search, saying “[s]omething about some money being in the
car.” Id. At that point, Williams was already outside the vehicle and had her
purse with her. She was not permitted to retrieve any property. During an
ensuing search, Officer Monroe found approximately two grams of marijuana
in the center console of the vehicle. No money was found in the vehicle.
[5] Officer Monroe handcuffed Williams and the passenger. He explained the legal
doctrine of constructive possession, at which point the passenger expressed
irritation about being caught up in things. Williams then said: “It’s my car, it’s
my dope.” Id. at 22. She emphasized “that she didn’t own the dope, but she
said, ‘I’m taking it because it’s my car, my dope, and it’s in my car.’” Id.
[6] The State charged Williams with Class B misdemeanor Possession of
Marijuana. A bench trial was held in late 2018, and Williams was found guilty.
The court imposed a sentence of 180 days in the Hamilton County Jail, fully
suspended the sentence, and placed Williams on probation for 180 days.
[7] Williams now appeals.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-383 | July 16, 2019 Page 3 of 6 Discussion and Decision [8] When reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, “we consider
only the evidence and reasonable inferences most favorable to the conviction[],
neither reweighing evidence nor reassessing witness credibility.” Griffith v.
State, 59 N.E.3d 947, 958 (Ind. 2016). “We will affirm the conviction unless no
reasonable fact-finder could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a
reasonable doubt.” Love v. State, 73 N.E.3d 693, 696 (Ind. 2017).
[9] To obtain the instant conviction, the State was obligated to prove, beyond a
reasonable doubt, Williams knowingly or intentionally possessed marijuana.
See I.C. § 35-48-4-11. Possession can be actual or constructive. Sargent v. State,
27 N.E.3d 729, 732-33 (Ind. 2015). “Actual possession occurs when a person
has direct physical control over the item.” Id. at 733. Where the State “cannot
show actual possession, it may nonetheless prevail on proof of constructive
possession.” Id. “A defendant is in the constructive possession of drugs when
the State shows that the defendant has both (i) the intent to maintain dominion
and control over the drugs and (ii) the capability to maintain dominion and
control over the drugs.” Gee v. State, 810 N.E.2d 338, 340 (Ind. 2004).
[10] At trial, the State pursued a theory of constructive possession. Williams does
not dispute she had the capability to maintain dominion and control over the
marijuana. She instead challenges the sufficiency of evidence of her intent to
maintain dominion and control over the contraband. She points out the
marijuana was found in the center console and that she was not the only
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-383 | July 16, 2019 Page 4 of 6 occupant of the vehicle. Where, as here, “possession of the automobile in
which drugs are found is not exclusive, the inference of intent must be
supported by additional circumstances pointing to the defendant’s knowledge of
the nature of the controlled substances and their presence.” Lampkins v. State,
682 N.E.2d 1268, 1275 (Ind. 1997), modified on reh’g. Our supreme court has
identified “various means” of showing the required additional circumstances,
including—but not limited to—proof of “(1) incriminating statements by the
defendant, (2) attempted flight or furtive gestures, (3) location of substances like
drugs in settings that suggest manufacturing, (4) proximity of the contraband to
the defendant, (5) location of the contraband within the defendant’s plain view,
and (6) the mingling of the contraband with other items owned by the
defendant.” Henderson v. State, 715 N.E.2d 833, 836 (Ind. 1999).2
[11] Here, there was evidence Williams’s clothing smelled of burnt marijuana and
the passenger did not smell of marijuana. Williams attempts to minimize the
probative value of the odor of marijuana, but this was not the only evidence
indicative of her knowledge of the presence and nature of the contraband.
Indeed, when Williams was informed of an imminent vehicle search, she asked
to retrieve property from the vehicle. Although Williams mentioned wanting to
retrieve money, she was already carrying her purse—and the officers found no
2 To the extent Williams regards the foregoing as an exhaustive list of potential ways the State may meet its burden of proof, we emphasize that “the listed circumstances are not exhaustive. Other circumstances could just as reasonably demonstrate the requisite knowledge.” Cannon v. State, 99 N.E.3d 274, 280 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018) (quoting Carnes v. State, 480 N.E.2d 581, 586 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985)), trans. denied.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-383 | July 16, 2019 Page 5 of 6 money in the vehicle. Moreover, although Williams denied the marijuana was
hers, Williams said she would accept responsibility for the marijuana found in
her vehicle. Williams said so after the passenger complained, and the timing of
her remarks suggests some consciousness of guilt concerning the contraband.
Furthermore, although Williams draws our attention to favorable evidence—
including her adamant denial of ownership of the contraband—we are not free
to reweigh evidence. We conclude there is sufficient evidence from which a
fact-finder could reasonably infer Williams knew there was marijuana in her
vehicle—contraband she hoped to conceal before the search. Ultimately, there
is sufficient evidence supporting the conviction of Possession of Marijuana.
[12] Affirmed.
Riley, J., and Pyle, J., concur.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-383 | July 16, 2019 Page 6 of 6