Tameka Chandler v. State of Nebraska, United States Government, and FMCSA

CourtDistrict Court, D. Nebraska
DecidedJune 29, 2026
Docket8:25-cv-00605
StatusUnknown

This text of Tameka Chandler v. State of Nebraska, United States Government, and FMCSA (Tameka Chandler v. State of Nebraska, United States Government, and FMCSA) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Nebraska primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Tameka Chandler v. State of Nebraska, United States Government, and FMCSA, (D. Neb. 2026).

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEBRASKA

TAMEKA CHANDLER,

Plaintiff, 8:25CV605

vs. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER STATE OF NEBRASKA, US GOVERNMENT, and FMCSA,

Defendants.

This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff Tameka Chandler’s Complaint. Filing No. 1. Plaintiff has been granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis, Filing No. 5. The Court now conducts an initial review of Plaintiff’s claims to determine whether summary dismissal is appropriate under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). II. SUMMARY OF COMPLAINT Plaintiff sues the State of Nebraska, the United States, and the FMCSA. Filing No. 1 at 2. Plaintiff seeks $25,000,000.00 for “[i]nvasion of privacy, ignoring Amendments, breaking oaths to [p]rotect and [s]erve, malicious intent, [i]solating, mental anguish, mental threats, retaliation behaviors.” Filing No. 1 at 5. Copied in its entirety from her Complaint, Plaintiff alleges: Denied employment, housing, having my grandchildren taking from the Department of Health and Human services due to not having information they wanted. State agencies have taken my life and used it as a pawn. keeping me in a state of poverty with situations that I have no knowledge of. Never have I been asked permission or given information on any issues. I have been a hostage/prisoner with no monetary compensation and left without adequate healthcare or basic needs met. I have suffered slander, cruel treatment and no care for my human life or any life around. A serious abuse of power is taking place. not only is it harmful to me but it has affected "WE THE PEOPLE". There is a genocide taking place. Filing No. 1 at 4. II. APPLICABLE LEGAL STANDARDS ON INITIAL REVIEW The Court is required to review in forma pauperis complaints to determine whether summary dismissal is appropriate. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). The Court must dismiss a complaint or any portion of it that states a frivolous or malicious claim, that fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seeks monetary relief from a defendant

who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). “The essential function of a complaint under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is to give the opposing party ‘fair notice of the nature and basis or grounds for a claim, and a general indication of the type of litigation involved.’” Topchian v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 760 F.3d 843, 848 (8th Cir. 2014) (quoting Hopkins v. Saunders, 199 F.3d 968, 973 (8th Cir. 1999)). Plaintiffs must set forth enough factual allegations to “nudge[ ] their claims across the line from conceivable to plausible,” or “their complaint must be dismissed.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 569-70 (2007); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“A claim has facial plausibility when the

plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”). “A pro se complaint must be liberally construed, and pro se litigants are held to a lesser pleading standard than other parties.” Topchian, 760 F.3d at 849 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). This means that “if the essence of an allegation is discernible, even though it is not pleaded with legal nicety, then the district court should construe the complaint in a way that permits the layperson’s claim to be considered within the proper legal framework.” Stone v. Harry, 364 F.3d 912, 915 (8th Cir. 2004). However, even pro se complaints are required to allege facts which, if true, state a claim for relief as a matter of law. Martin v. Aubuchon, 623 F.2d 1282, 1286 (8th Cir. 1980). III. DISCUSSION OF COMPLAINT Plaintiff seeks relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. To state a claim under section 1983, a plaintiff must allege a violation of rights protected by the United States Constitution or

created by federal statute, and also must show that the alleged deprivation was caused by conduct of a person acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). The Complaint lacks sufficient support to give notice of any claim. The Court reaches this conclusion keeping in mind that complaints filed by pro se litigants are held to less stringent standards than those applied to formal pleadings drafted by lawyers. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). “Although pro se pleadings are to be construed liberally, pro se litigants are not excused from failing to comply with substantive and procedural law.” Burgs v. Sissel, 745 F.2d 526, 528 (8th Cir. 1984). Additionally,

“[t]hough pro se complaints are to be construed liberally, they still must allege sufficient facts to support the claims advanced.” Stone v. Harry, 364 F.3d 912, 914 (8th Cir. 2004) (internal citations omitted); see also Dunn v. White, 880 F.2d 1188, 1197 (10th Cir. 1989) (“[W]e will not supply additional facts, nor will we construct a legal theory for plaintiff that assumes facts that have not been pleaded”); Cunningham v. Ray, 648 F.2d 1185, 1186 (8th Cir. 1981) (“[P]ro se litigants must set [a claim] forth in a manner which, taking the pleaded facts as true, states a claim as a matter of law.”). A complaint must state enough to “‘give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Plaintiff’s complaint does not describe the circumstances—the what, where, when, and how—of any incidents, inactions, or actions by Defendants that caused the harm described in her Complaint. Without these factual allegations, Plaintiff has failed to state

a claim for relief. Because Plaintiff’s allegations are difficult to discern and are without a factual or legal basis, this action is subject to dismissal on initial review. See Jones v. Norris, 310 F.3d 610, 612 (8th Cir. 2002) (dismissing complaint as frivolous and stating that “[a] complaint is frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis in either law or fact”) (citing Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989)).

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Related

Haines v. Kerner
404 U.S. 519 (Supreme Court, 1972)
West v. Atkins
487 U.S. 42 (Supreme Court, 1988)
Neitzke v. Williams
490 U.S. 319 (Supreme Court, 1989)
Erickson v. Pardus
551 U.S. 89 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
550 U.S. 544 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)
Martin v. Aubuchon
623 F.2d 1282 (Eighth Circuit, 1980)
Jones v. Norris
310 F.3d 610 (Eighth Circuit, 2002)
Samvel Topchian v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.
760 F.3d 843 (Eighth Circuit, 2014)
Tommy Hopkins v. John Saunders
199 F.3d 968 (Eighth Circuit, 1999)
Burgs v. Sissel
745 F.2d 526 (Eighth Circuit, 1984)
Dunn v. White
880 F.2d 1188 (Tenth Circuit, 1989)

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Tameka Chandler v. State of Nebraska, United States Government, and FMCSA, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/tameka-chandler-v-state-of-nebraska-united-states-government-and-fmcsa-ned-2026.