Tamara Scalise and Barrett King v. Stanley v. Powers and Michele Powers

CourtCourt of Appeals of Texas
DecidedJuly 7, 1993
Docket03-92-00457-CV
StatusPublished

This text of Tamara Scalise and Barrett King v. Stanley v. Powers and Michele Powers (Tamara Scalise and Barrett King v. Stanley v. Powers and Michele Powers) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Tamara Scalise and Barrett King v. Stanley v. Powers and Michele Powers, (Tex. Ct. App. 1993).

Opinion

Scalise-final
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT OF TEXAS,


AT AUSTIN




NO. 3-92-457-CV


TAMARA SCALISE AND BARRETT KING,


APPELLANTS

vs.


STANLEY V. POWERS AND MICHELE POWERS,


APPELLEES





FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF TRAVIS COUNTY, 353RD JUDICIAL DISTRICT


NO. 425,750, HONORABLE JOHN K. DIETZ, JUDGE PRESIDING




Tamara Scalise and Barrett King appeal the trial court's rendition of summary judgment in favor of Stanley V. Powers and Michele Powers. We will affirm the trial court's judgment.



BACKGROUND

This is a suit for personal injuries suffered in a residential fire. In May 1986, by oral agreement, Scalise and King (collectively, the "tenants") rented a duplex unit owned by the Powers. Smoke detectors had not been installed in the duplex when the tenants moved in or at the time of the fire. Neither Scalise nor King complained to the Powers of the absence of a smoke detector or requested that one be installed. On April 26, 1987, a fire occurred at the duplex. Scalise was severely burned and permanently disabled; King was injured to a lesser extent. These facts are undisputed.

The tenants brought this cause alleging that the Powers were negligent in failing to provide smoke detectors in the duplex. (1) The trial court granted summary judgment in the Powers' favor. The tenants appeal.



DISCUSSION

In their motion for summary judgment, the Powers contended that they had no duty to install a smoke alarm under either the common-law, the smoke-detector provisions of the Texas Property Code, Tex. Prop. Code Ann. §§ 92.251-.262 (West 1984 & Supp. 1993), (2) or any municipal ordinance.

The tenants urge three points of error. In their first two points of error, the tenants contend the trial court erred in granting summary judgment because it misconstrued the Code to require that tenants give notice of the failure to install a smoke detector before the landlord is liable for damages. The tenants argue that the trial court failed to give effect to the statutory provisions that require a landlord to install smoke detectors and that the tenant cannot waive the duty of installation. The Powers respond that the tenants' failure to give notice under section 92.259 precludes any liability under the Code. (3)

These arguments turn on an apparent inconsistency in the Code. Sections 92.255-.256 use mandatory language in setting out the landlord's duty to install smoke detectors; these sections do not provide for or require any type of tenant notice for this duty to arise. (4) Section 92.258, however, provides that the landlord's duty to inspect and repair arises only if the tenant gives notice of a malfunction or requests an inspection. (5) Further, section 92.006 precludes any waiver of the landlord's duty to install or liability for failure to install a smoke detector, although the tenant may waive the duty to inspect and repair in writing. (6) Sections 92.260 and 92.261 set out the remedies available to a tenant for violations of the smoke-detector requirements and specific defenses available to the landlord. (7)

Section 92.259 is somewhat inconsistent with the mandatory-installation requirements set out in sections 92.255-.256. Section 92.259 provides that a landlord is liable for a failure to install, inspect, or repair only if the tenant has made a request and given written notice. The tenants argue that this section is inconsistent, to the extent it limits the landlord's liability for a failure to install a smoke detector, with the mandatory duty of a landlord to install smoke detectors and the prohibition of a waiver of that duty.

The Powers initially argue that the tenants waived their statutory-construction arguments by failing to raise the no-waiver provisions of section 92.006 until their motion to reconsider the summary judgment. Even absent any response from the nonmovant, we may consider on appeal whether the grounds for the summary judgment are sufficient as a matter of law. City of Houston v. Clear Creek Basin Auth., 589 S.W.2d 671, 678 (Tex. 1979). The Powers raised the notice requirements of section 92.259 of the Code as a basis for summary judgment; therefore, this Court may properly review the trial court's interpretation of the Code as it applies to the Powers' motion for summary judgment. We shall consider all applicable provisions of the Code in doing so, including the sections supporting the tenants' position not expressly raised in their response to the summary-judgment motion.

The issue presented is whether a tenant must make a request and give written notice pursuant to section 92.259 before the landlord is liable for damages resulting from a failure to install a smoke detector. In other words, does section 92.259 apply to both the duty to install and the duty to inspect and repair? We reluctantly conclude that it does. Our conclusion is based in part on the holdings of our sister courts of appeals who have considered this statute and upon our examination of its legislative history.

In Garza-Vale v. Kwiecien, 796 S.W.2d 500 (Tex. App.--San Antonio 1990, writ denied), the San Antonio Court of Appeals found that the notice requirement was a condition precedent to a cause of action against a landlord for failure to install a smoke detector. Id. at 504. The court did not consider the effects of section 92.006.

In Cannon v. Lemon, 843 S.W.2d 178 (Tex. App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, writ denied), the court followed the Garza-Vale holding in affirming the dismissal of a cause alleging failure to install a smoke detector. The court held that although "a landlord does have a duty to install a smoke detector . . . liability arises only after the requirements of section 92.259(a) are met." Id. at 181 (emphasis added). The Cannon court also did not consider the effect of section 92.006.

In Coleman v. United Savings Association of Texas, 846 S.W.2d 128 (Tex. App.--Fort Worth 1993, n.w.h.), a case involving the duty to inspect and repair, the court attempted to reconcile sections 92.006 and 92.259. The court distinguished between "duties and remedies" and "liability" under the Code. Id. at 133. The court found that the waiver provision of section 92.006 "presupposes the existence of a right" and addressed only the nonwaivability of duties and remedies under the Code. Id. The court found that section 92.006 had no effect on whether a landlord could avoid liability if the tenant failed to give notice under section 92.259. Id.

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Related

Coleman v. United Savings Ass'n of Texas
846 S.W.2d 128 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 1993)
City of Houston v. Clear Creek Basin Authority
589 S.W.2d 671 (Texas Supreme Court, 1979)
Castro v. Hernandez-Davila
694 S.W.2d 575 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 1985)
Capitol Brick, Inc. v. Fleming Manufacturing Co.
722 S.W.2d 399 (Texas Supreme Court, 1986)
Cannon v. Lemon
843 S.W.2d 178 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 1992)
Drake v. State
686 S.W.2d 935 (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, 1985)
Fleming Manufacturing Co. v. Capitol Brick, Inc.
734 S.W.2d 405 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 1987)
Garza-Vale v. Kwiecien
796 S.W.2d 500 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 1990)
Dillehey v. State
815 S.W.2d 623 (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, 1991)
Marshall v. Joske's, Inc.
581 S.W.2d 192 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 1979)
Fleming Manufacturing Co. v. Capitol Brick, Inc.
703 S.W.2d 365 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 1986)

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